From ac8002f7cd0a9cede249a6e4829391c097b31d63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hannes Reinecke Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 16:26:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/37] scsi: scsi_devinfo: fixup string compare commit b8018b973c7cefa5eb386540130fa47315b8e337 upstream. When checking the model and vendor string we need to use the minimum value of either string, otherwise we'll miss out on wildcard matches. And we should take care when matching with zero size strings; results might be unpredictable. With this patch the rules for matching devinfo strings are as follows: - Vendor strings must match exactly - Empty Model strings will only match if the devinfo model is also empty - Model strings shorter than the devinfo model string will not match Fixes: 5e7ff2c ("SCSI: fix new bug in scsi_dev_info_list string matching") Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke Reviewed-by: Alan Stern Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c index 75f2179860a7..4055cb7c212b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c @@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(scsi_dev_info_list_add_keyed); /** * scsi_dev_info_list_find - find a matching dev_info list entry. - * @vendor: vendor string - * @model: model (product) string + * @vendor: full vendor string + * @model: full model (product) string * @key: specify list to use * * Description: @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static struct scsi_dev_info_list *scsi_dev_info_list_find(const char *vendor, struct scsi_dev_info_list *devinfo; struct scsi_dev_info_list_table *devinfo_table = scsi_devinfo_lookup_by_key(key); - size_t vmax, mmax; + size_t vmax, mmax, mlen; const char *vskip, *mskip; if (IS_ERR(devinfo_table)) @@ -441,15 +441,18 @@ static struct scsi_dev_info_list *scsi_dev_info_list_find(const char *vendor, dev_info_list) { if (devinfo->compatible) { /* - * Behave like the older version of get_device_flags. + * vendor strings must be an exact match */ - if (memcmp(devinfo->vendor, vskip, vmax) || - (vmax < sizeof(devinfo->vendor) && - devinfo->vendor[vmax])) + if (vmax != strlen(devinfo->vendor) || + memcmp(devinfo->vendor, vskip, vmax)) continue; - if (memcmp(devinfo->model, mskip, mmax) || - (mmax < sizeof(devinfo->model) && - devinfo->model[mmax])) + + /* + * @model specifies the full string, and + * must be larger or equal to devinfo->model + */ + mlen = strlen(devinfo->model); + if (mmax < mlen || memcmp(devinfo->model, mskip, mlen)) continue; return devinfo; } else { From 8b4e7d93453f8ea8972bae9fc7398170b9bee111 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eugeniu Rosca Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2018 17:22:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/37] usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix error handling in afunc_bind (again) commit e87581fe0509020f77ebf0b7c4c1c338c6a4bcf6 upstream. If usb_ep_autoconfig() fails (i.e. returns a null endpoint descriptor), we expect afunc_bind() to fail (i.e. return a negative error code). However, due to v4.10-rc1 commit f1d3861d63a5 ("usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix error handling at afunc_bind"), afunc_bind() returns zero, telling the caller that it succeeded. This then generates NULL pointer dereference in below scenario on Rcar H3-ES20-Salvator-X target: rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe g_audio [ 626.521155] g_audio gadget: afunc_bind:565 Error! [ 626.526319] g_audio gadget: Linux USB Audio Gadget, version: Feb 2, 2012 [ 626.533405] g_audio gadget: g_audio ready rcar-gen3:/home/root# rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe -r g_audio [ 728.256707] ================================================================== [ 728.264293] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.272244] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000000a0 by task modprobe/2545 [ 728.279309] [ 728.280849] CPU: 0 PID: 2545 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G WC 4.14.47+ #152 [ 728.288778] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT) [ 728.296454] Call trace: [ 728.299151] [] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x364 [ 728.304808] [] show_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 728.310081] [] dump_stack+0x108/0x174 [ 728.315522] [] kasan_report+0x1fc/0x354 [ 728.321134] [] __asan_load8+0x24/0x94 [ 728.326600] [] u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.333735] [] afunc_disable+0x44/0x60 [usb_f_uac2] [ 728.340503] [] usb_remove_function+0x9c/0x210 [libcomposite] [ 728.348060] [] remove_config.isra.2+0x1d8/0x218 [libcomposite] [ 728.355788] [] __composite_unbind+0x104/0x1f8 [libcomposite] [ 728.363339] [] composite_unbind+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.370536] [] usb_gadget_remove_driver+0xc0/0x170 [udc_core] [ 728.378172] [] usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0x1cc/0x258 [udc_core] [ 728.386274] [] usb_composite_unregister+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.394116] [] audio_driver_exit+0x14/0x28 [g_audio] [ 728.400878] [] SyS_delete_module+0x288/0x32c [ 728.406935] Exception stack(0xffff8006cf6c7ec0 to 0xffff8006cf6c8000) [ 728.413624] 7ec0: 0000000006136428 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 0000ffffd706efe8 [ 728.421718] 7ee0: 0000ffffd706efe9 000000000000000a 1999999999999999 0000000000000000 [ 728.429792] 7f00: 000000000000006a 000000000042c078 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 [ 728.437870] 7f20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 [ 728.445952] 7f40: 000000000042bfc8 0000ffffbc7c8f40 0000000000000000 00000000061363c0 [ 728.454035] 7f60: 0000000006136428 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000006136428 [ 728.462114] 7f80: 000000000042c000 0000ffffd7071448 000000000042c000 0000000000000000 [ 728.470190] 7fa0: 00000000061350c0 0000ffffd7070010 000000000041129c 0000ffffd7070010 [ 728.478281] 7fc0: 0000ffffbc7c8f48 0000000060000000 0000000006136428 000000000000006a [ 728.486351] 7fe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 728.494434] [] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 [ 728.499957] ================================================================== [ 728.507801] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000a0 [ 728.517742] Mem abort info: [ 728.520993] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 728.527375] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 728.530731] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 728.534361] Data abort info: [ 728.537650] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [ 728.541863] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 728.545167] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgd = ffff8006c6100000 [ 728.552156] [00000000000000a0] *pgd=0000000716a8d003 [ 728.557519] , *pud=00000007116fc003 [ 728.561259] , *pmd=0000000000000000 [ 728.564985] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 728.570815] Modules linked in: [ 728.574023] usb_f_uac2 [ 728.576560] u_audio [ 728.578827] g_audio(-) [ 728.581361] libcomposite [ 728.584071] configfs [ 728.586428] aes_ce_blk [ 728.588960] sata_rcar [ 728.591421] crypto_simd [ 728.594039] cryptd [ 728.596217] libata [ 728.598396] aes_ce_cipher [ 728.601188] crc32_ce [ 728.603542] ghash_ce [ 728.605896] gf128mul [ 728.608250] aes_arm64 [ 728.610692] scsi_mod [ 728.613046] sha2_ce [ 728.615313] xhci_plat_hcd [ 728.618106] sha256_arm64 [ 728.620811] sha1_ce [ 728.623077] renesas_usbhs [ 728.625869] xhci_hcd [ 728.628243] renesas_usb3 [ 728.630948] sha1_generic [ 728.633670] ravb_streaming(C) [ 728.636814] udc_core [ 728.639168] cpufreq_dt [ 728.641697] rcar_gen3_thermal [ 728.644840] usb_dmac [ 728.647194] pwm_rcar [ 728.649548] thermal_sys [ 728.652165] virt_dma [ 728.654519] mch_core(C) [ 728.657137] pwm_bl [ 728.659315] snd_soc_rcar [ 728.662020] snd_aloop [ 728.664462] snd_soc_generic_card [ 728.667869] snd_soc_ak4613 [ 728.670749] ipv6 [ 728.672768] autofs4 [ 728.675052] CPU: 0 PID: 2545 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B WC 4.14.47+ #152 [ 728.682973] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT) [ 728.690637] task: ffff8006ced38000 task.stack: ffff8006cf6c0000 [ 728.696814] PC is at u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.702896] LR is at u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.708964] pc : [] lr : [] pstate: 60000145 [ 728.716620] sp : ffff8006cf6c7a50 [ 728.720154] x29: ffff8006cf6c7a50 [ 728.723760] x28: ffff8006ced38000 [ 728.727272] x27: ffff200008fd7000 [ 728.730857] x26: ffff2000021d2340 [ 728.734361] x25: 0000000000000000 [ 728.737948] x24: ffff200009e94b08 [ 728.741452] x23: 00000000000000a0 [ 728.745052] x22: 00000000000000a8 [ 728.748558] x21: 1ffff000d9ed8f7c [ 728.752142] x20: ffff8006d671a800 [ 728.755646] x19: 0000000000000000 [ 728.759231] x18: 0000000000000000 [ 728.762736] x17: 0000ffffbc7c8f40 [ 728.766320] x16: ffff200008213c4c [ 728.769823] x15: 0000000000000000 [ 728.773408] x14: 0720072007200720 [ 728.776912] x13: 0720072007200720 [ 728.780497] x12: ffffffffffffffff [ 728.784001] x11: 0000000000000040 [ 728.787598] x10: 0000000000001600 [ 728.791103] x9 : ffff8006cf6c77a0 [ 728.794689] x8 : ffff8006ced39660 [ 728.798193] x7 : ffff20000811c738 [ 728.801794] x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 728.805299] x5 : dfff200000000000 [ 728.808885] x4 : ffff8006ced38000 [ 728.812390] x3 : ffff200008fb46e8 [ 728.815976] x2 : 0000000000000007 [ 728.819480] x1 : 3ba68643e7431500 [ 728.823066] x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 728.826574] Process modprobe (pid: 2545, stack limit = 0xffff8006cf6c0000) [ 728.833704] Call trace: [ 728.836292] Exception stack(0xffff8006cf6c7910 to 0xffff8006cf6c7a50) [ 728.842987] 7900: 0000000000000000 3ba68643e7431500 [ 728.851084] 7920: 0000000000000007 ffff200008fb46e8 ffff8006ced38000 dfff200000000000 [ 728.859173] 7940: 0000000000000000 ffff20000811c738 ffff8006ced39660 ffff8006cf6c77a0 [ 728.867248] 7960: 0000000000001600 0000000000000040 ffffffffffffffff 0720072007200720 [ 728.875323] 7980: 0720072007200720 0000000000000000 ffff200008213c4c 0000ffffbc7c8f40 [ 728.883412] 79a0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8006d671a800 1ffff000d9ed8f7c [ 728.891485] 79c0: 00000000000000a8 00000000000000a0 ffff200009e94b08 0000000000000000 [ 728.899561] 79e0: ffff2000021d2340 ffff200008fd7000 ffff8006ced38000 ffff8006cf6c7a50 [ 728.907636] 7a00: ffff2000021e1618 ffff8006cf6c7a50 ffff2000021e1618 0000000060000145 [ 728.915710] 7a20: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 0000ffffffffffff 3ba68643e7431500 [ 728.923780] 7a40: ffff8006cf6c7a50 ffff2000021e1618 [ 728.928880] [] u_audio_stop_capture+0x70/0x268 [u_audio] [ 728.936032] [] afunc_disable+0x44/0x60 [usb_f_uac2] [ 728.942822] [] usb_remove_function+0x9c/0x210 [libcomposite] [ 728.950385] [] remove_config.isra.2+0x1d8/0x218 [libcomposite] [ 728.958134] [] __composite_unbind+0x104/0x1f8 [libcomposite] [ 728.965689] [] composite_unbind+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.972882] [] usb_gadget_remove_driver+0xc0/0x170 [udc_core] [ 728.980522] [] usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0x1cc/0x258 [udc_core] [ 728.988638] [] usb_composite_unregister+0x10/0x18 [libcomposite] [ 728.996472] [] audio_driver_exit+0x14/0x28 [g_audio] [ 729.003231] [] SyS_delete_module+0x288/0x32c [ 729.009278] Exception stack(0xffff8006cf6c7ec0 to 0xffff8006cf6c8000) [ 729.015946] 7ec0: 0000000006136428 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 0000ffffd706efe8 [ 729.024022] 7ee0: 0000ffffd706efe9 000000000000000a 1999999999999999 0000000000000000 [ 729.032099] 7f00: 000000000000006a 000000000042c078 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 [ 729.040172] 7f20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 [ 729.048263] 7f40: 000000000042bfc8 0000ffffbc7c8f40 0000000000000000 00000000061363c0 [ 729.056337] 7f60: 0000000006136428 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000006136428 [ 729.064411] 7f80: 000000000042c000 0000ffffd7071448 000000000042c000 0000000000000000 [ 729.072484] 7fa0: 00000000061350c0 0000ffffd7070010 000000000041129c 0000ffffd7070010 [ 729.080563] 7fc0: 0000ffffbc7c8f48 0000000060000000 0000000006136428 000000000000006a [ 729.088636] 7fe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 729.096733] [] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 [ 729.102259] Code: 9597d1b3 aa1703e0 9102a276 958792b9 (f9405275) [ 729.108617] ---[ end trace 7560c5fa3d100243 ]--- After this patch is applied, the issue is fixed: rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe g_audio [ 59.217127] g_audio gadget: afunc_bind:565 Error! [ 59.222329] g_audio ee020000.usb: failed to start g_audio: -19 modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'g_audio': No such device rcar-gen3:/home/root# modprobe -r g_audio rcar-gen3:/home/root# Fixes: f1d3861d63a5 ("usb: gadget: f_uac2: fix error handling at afunc_bind") Signed-off-by: Eugeniu Rosca Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c index ac190650314a..24c8fbda1a54 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c @@ -1069,13 +1069,13 @@ afunc_bind(struct usb_configuration *cfg, struct usb_function *fn) agdev->out_ep = usb_ep_autoconfig(gadget, &fs_epout_desc); if (!agdev->out_ep) { dev_err(dev, "%s:%d Error!\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return ret; + return -ENODEV; } agdev->in_ep = usb_ep_autoconfig(gadget, &fs_epin_desc); if (!agdev->in_ep) { dev_err(dev, "%s:%d Error!\n", __func__, __LINE__); - return ret; + return -ENODEV; } uac2->p_prm.uac2 = uac2; From 37902e44c6e23cf88ed4e529195b2d50f86385b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 16:23:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/37] platform/x86: acer-wmi: setup accelerometer when ACPI device was found commit f9ac89f5ad613b462339e845aeb8494646fd9be2 upstream. The 98d610c3739a patch was introduced since v4.11-rc1 that it causes that the accelerometer input device will not be created on workable machines because the HID string comparing logic is wrong. And, the patch doesn't prevent that the accelerometer input device be created on the machines that have no BST0001. That's because the acpi_get_devices() returns success even it didn't find any match device. This patch fixed the HID string comparing logic of BST0001 device. And, it also makes sure that the acpi_get_devices() returns acpi_handle for BST0001. Fixes: 98d610c3739a ("acer-wmi: setup accelerometer when machine has appropriate notify event") Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=193761 Reported-by: Samuel Sieb Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/platform/x86/acer-wmi.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/acer-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/acer-wmi.c index b2cdc1a1ad4f..5c169a837ebd 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/acer-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/acer-wmi.c @@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ static acpi_status __init acer_wmi_get_handle_cb(acpi_handle ah, u32 level, if (!strcmp(ctx, "SENR")) { if (acpi_bus_get_device(ah, &dev)) return AE_OK; - if (!strcmp(ACER_WMID_ACCEL_HID, acpi_device_hid(dev))) + if (strcmp(ACER_WMID_ACCEL_HID, acpi_device_hid(dev))) return AE_OK; } else return AE_OK; @@ -1847,8 +1847,7 @@ static int __init acer_wmi_get_handle(const char *name, const char *prop, handle = NULL; status = acpi_get_devices(prop, acer_wmi_get_handle_cb, (void *)name, &handle); - - if (ACPI_SUCCESS(status)) { + if (ACPI_SUCCESS(status) && handle) { *ah = handle; return 0; } else { @@ -2199,8 +2198,8 @@ static int __init acer_wmi_init(void) if (err) return err; err = acer_wmi_accel_setup(); - if (err) - return err; + if (err && err != -ENODEV) + pr_warn("Cannot enable accelerometer\n"); } err = platform_driver_register(&acer_platform_driver); From db643130bf44c2096ff400fe83ff4d9e6ba16416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhen Lei Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 11:49:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/37] esp6: fix memleak on error path in esp6_input commit 7284fdf39a912322ce97de2d30def3c6068a418c upstream. This ought to be an omission in e6194923237 ("esp: Fix memleaks on error paths."). The memleak on error path in esp6_input is similar to esp_input of esp4. Fixes: e6194923237 ("esp: Fix memleaks on error paths.") Fixes: 3f29770723f ("ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always") Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index 6a924be66e37..da158a3acac4 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -426,8 +426,10 @@ static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) sg_init_table(sg, nfrags); ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { + kfree(tmp); goto out; + } aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen + ivlen, iv); aead_request_set_ad(req, assoclen); From b49cae47284561a32e30dc0dedafd978bcc12c8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Jaillet Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 20:15:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/37] IB/mlx4: Fix an error handling path in 'mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr()' commit 3dc7c7badb7502ec3e3aa817a8bdd9e53aa54c52 upstream. Before returning -EPERM we should release some resources, as already done in the other error handling path of the function. Fixes: d8f9cc328c88 ("IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c index bf52e35dd506..deeae49ed44d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c @@ -246,8 +246,11 @@ int mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *mr, int flags, } if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) { - if (ib_access_writable(mr_access_flags) && !mmr->umem->writable) - return -EPERM; + if (ib_access_writable(mr_access_flags) && + !mmr->umem->writable) { + err = -EPERM; + goto release_mpt_entry; + } err = mlx4_mr_hw_change_access(dev->dev, *pmpt_entry, convert_access(mr_access_flags)); From 6ddeb501cc5510d2276a9a81a888b9f11ffdca72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 16 May 2017 09:11:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/37] ALSA: hda - No loopback on ALC299 codec commit fa16b69f1299004b60b625f181143500a246e5cb upstream. ALC299 has no loopback mixer, but the driver still tries to add a beep control over the mixer NID which leads to the error at accessing it. This patch fixes it by properly declaring mixer_nid=0 for this codec. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195775 Fixes: 28f1f9b26cee ("ALSA: hda/realtek - Add new codec ID ALC299") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 7c5bbc6b91b9..0d6de70b4e08 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6342,8 +6342,11 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec) break; case 0x10ec0225: case 0x10ec0295: + spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC225; + break; case 0x10ec0299: spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC225; + spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* no loopback on ALC299 */ break; case 0x10ec0234: case 0x10ec0274: From af375aab2eb688b8c02c43159b4378ee95ddda19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xinwei Kong Date: Fri, 3 Jan 2020 10:52:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/37] spi: dw: use "smp_mb()" to avoid sending spi data error [ Upstream commit bfda044533b213985bc62bd7ca96f2b984d21b80 ] Because of out-of-order execution about some CPU architecture, In this debug stage we find Completing spi interrupt enable -> prodrucing TXEI interrupt -> running "interrupt_transfer" function will prior to set "dw->rx and dws->rx_end" data, so this patch add memory barrier to enable dw->rx and dw->rx_end to be visible and solve to send SPI data error. eg: it will fix to this following low possibility error in testing environment which using SPI control to connect TPM Modules kernel: tpm tpm0: Operation Timed out kernel: tpm tpm0: tpm_relinquish_locality: : error -1 Signed-off-by: fengsheng Signed-off-by: Xinwei Kong Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1578019930-55858-1-git-send-email-kong.kongxinwei@hisilicon.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/spi/spi-dw.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c index 4edd38d03b93..5688591e9cd3 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c @@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ static int dw_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master *master, dws->len = transfer->len; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dws->buf_lock, flags); + /* Ensure dw->rx and dw->rx_end are visible */ + smp_mb(); + spi_enable_chip(dws, 0); /* Handle per transfer options for bpw and speed */ From 2328a3bb3fe943ff5dc399a24668eb2ebabc4322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Gorbik Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 13:50:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/37] s390/ftrace: save traced function caller [ Upstream commit b4adfe55915d8363e244e42386d69567db1719b9 ] A typical backtrace acquired from ftraced function currently looks like the following (e.g. for "path_openat"): arch_stack_walk+0x15c/0x2d8 stack_trace_save+0x50/0x68 stack_trace_call+0x15a/0x3b8 ftrace_graph_caller+0x0/0x1c 0x3e0007e3c98 <- ftraced function caller (should be do_filp_open+0x7c/0xe8) do_open_execat+0x70/0x1b8 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x7d8/0x860 __s390x_sys_execve+0x56/0x68 system_call+0xdc/0x2d8 Note random "0x3e0007e3c98" stack value as ftraced function caller. This value causes either imprecise unwinder result or unwinding failure. That "0x3e0007e3c98" comes from r14 of ftraced function stack frame, which it haven't had a chance to initialize since the very first instruction calls ftrace code ("ftrace_caller"). (ftraced function might never save r14 as well). Nevertheless according to s390 ABI any function is called with stack frame allocated for it and r14 contains return address. "ftrace_caller" itself is called with "brasl %r0,ftrace_caller". So, to fix this issue simply always save traced function caller onto ftraced function stack frame. Reported-by: Sven Schnelle Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S index 78ba14546e00..68425e68e65a 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ ENTRY(_mcount) ENTRY(ftrace_caller) .globl ftrace_regs_caller .set ftrace_regs_caller,ftrace_caller + stg %r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15) # save traced function caller lgr %r1,%r15 #ifndef CC_USING_HOTPATCH aghi %r0,MCOUNT_RETURN_FIXUP From 50bca976d9999016a3394d1ba7bed69b8b83e92b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eugeniy Paltsev Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 20:54:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 09/37] ARC: Fix ICCM & DCCM runtime size checks [ Upstream commit 43900edf67d7ef3ac8909854d75b8a1fba2d570c ] As of today the ICCM and DCCM size checks are incorrectly using mismatched units (KiB checked against bytes). The CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ and CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ are in KiB, but the size calculated in runtime and stored in cpu->dccm.sz and cpu->iccm.sz is in bytes. Fix that. Reported-by: Paul Greco Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arc/kernel/setup.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c index 3013f3f82b95..66e4dc8bce1d 100644 --- a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -308,12 +309,12 @@ static void arc_chk_core_config(void) if ((unsigned int)__arc_dccm_base != cpu->dccm.base_addr) panic("Linux built with incorrect DCCM Base address\n"); - if (CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ != cpu->dccm.sz) + if (CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ * SZ_1K != cpu->dccm.sz) panic("Linux built with incorrect DCCM Size\n"); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_ICCM - if (CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ != cpu->iccm.sz) + if (CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ * SZ_1K != cpu->iccm.sz) panic("Linux built with incorrect ICCM Size\n"); #endif From 74e6c4996d07c5657202eb0192e093ba49db864b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2020 13:53:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 10/37] x86/mmiotrace: Use cpumask_available() for cpumask_var_t variables [ Upstream commit d7110a26e5905ec2fe3fc88bc6a538901accb72b ] When building with Clang + -Wtautological-compare and CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK unset: arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:375:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL && ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:405:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ 2 warnings generated. Commit f7e30f01a9e2 ("cpumask: Add helper cpumask_available()") added cpumask_available() to fix warnings of this nature. Use that here so that clang does not warn regardless of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK's value. Reported-by: Sedat Dilek Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/982 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200408205323.44490-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c index 0057a7accfb1..5448ad4d0703 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static void enter_uniprocessor(void) int cpu; int err; - if (downed_cpus == NULL && + if (!cpumask_available(downed_cpus) && !alloc_cpumask_var(&downed_cpus, GFP_KERNEL)) { pr_notice("Failed to allocate mask\n"); goto out; @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static void leave_uniprocessor(void) int cpu; int err; - if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) + if (!cpumask_available(downed_cpus) || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) return; pr_notice("Re-enabling CPUs...\n"); for_each_cpu(cpu, downed_cpus) { From 9b3e310e9aa39b1d8b172864da61a6026435aa6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Kerr Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 09:05:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/37] net: bmac: Fix read of MAC address from ROM [ Upstream commit ef01cee2ee1b369c57a936166483d40942bcc3e3 ] In bmac_get_station_address, We're reading two bytes at a time from ROM, but we do that six times, resulting in 12 bytes of read & writes. This means we will write off the end of the six-byte destination buffer. This change fixes the for-loop to only read/write six bytes. Based on a proposed fix from Finn Thain . Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr Reported-by: Stan Johnson Tested-by: Stan Johnson Reported-by: Finn Thain Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c index a65d7a60f116..ffa7e7e6d18d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c @@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ bmac_get_station_address(struct net_device *dev, unsigned char *ea) int i; unsigned short data; - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { reset_and_select_srom(dev); data = read_srom(dev, i + EnetAddressOffset/2, SROMAddressBits); From fbef864990cb05775adc58415a8cf8cbce1530bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valentin Longchamp Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 17:53:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/37] net/ethernet/freescale: rework quiesce/activate for ucc_geth [ Upstream commit 79dde73cf9bcf1dd317a2667f78b758e9fe139ed ] ugeth_quiesce/activate are used to halt the controller when there is a link change that requires to reconfigure the mac. The previous implementation called netif_device_detach(). This however causes the initial activation of the netdevice to fail precisely because it's detached. For details, see [1]. A possible workaround was the revert of commit net: linkwatch: add check for netdevice being present to linkwatch_do_dev However, the check introduced in the above commit is correct and shall be kept. The netif_device_detach() is thus replaced with netif_tx_stop_all_queues() that prevents any tranmission. This allows to perform mac config change required by the link change, without detaching the corresponding netdevice and thus not preventing its initial activation. [1] https://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2020/01/08/201 Signed-off-by: Valentin Longchamp Acked-by: Matteo Ghidoni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c index 55ac00055977..96a1f62cc148 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ucc_geth.h" @@ -1551,11 +1552,8 @@ static int ugeth_disable(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth, enum comm_dir mode) static void ugeth_quiesce(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth) { - /* Prevent any further xmits, plus detach the device. */ - netif_device_detach(ugeth->ndev); - - /* Wait for any current xmits to finish. */ - netif_tx_disable(ugeth->ndev); + /* Prevent any further xmits */ + netif_tx_stop_all_queues(ugeth->ndev); /* Disable the interrupt to avoid NAPI rescheduling. */ disable_irq(ugeth->ug_info->uf_info.irq); @@ -1568,7 +1566,10 @@ static void ugeth_activate(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth) { napi_enable(&ugeth->napi); enable_irq(ugeth->ug_info->uf_info.irq); - netif_device_attach(ugeth->ndev); + + /* allow to xmit again */ + netif_tx_wake_all_queues(ugeth->ndev); + __netdev_watchdog_up(ugeth->ndev); } /* Called every time the controller might need to be made From d59be4c68319e95870d90389e8010885e871c8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan McDowell Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 12:49:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/37] net: ethernet: stmmac: Enable interface clocks on probe for IPQ806x [ Upstream commit a96ac8a0045e3cbe3e5af6d1b3c78c6c2065dec5 ] The ipq806x_gmac_probe() function enables the PTP clock but not the appropriate interface clocks. This means that if the bootloader hasn't done so attempting to bring up the interface will fail with an error like: [ 59.028131] ipq806x-gmac-dwmac 37600000.ethernet: Failed to reset the dma [ 59.028196] ipq806x-gmac-dwmac 37600000.ethernet eth1: stmmac_hw_setup: DMA engine initialization failed [ 59.034056] ipq806x-gmac-dwmac 37600000.ethernet eth1: stmmac_open: Hw setup failed This patch, a slightly cleaned up version of one posted by Sergey Sergeev in: https://forum.openwrt.org/t/support-for-mikrotik-rb3011uias-rm/4064/257 correctly enables the clock; we have already configured the source just before this. Tested on a MikroTik RB3011. Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c index 1fc356c17750..15aabffd21a8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c @@ -328,6 +328,19 @@ static int ipq806x_gmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) /* Enable PTP clock */ regmap_read(gmac->nss_common, NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE, &val); val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_PTP_EN(gmac->id); + switch (gmac->phy_mode) { + case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII: + val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_RGMII_RX_EN(gmac->id) | + NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_RGMII_TX_EN(gmac->id); + break; + case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII: + val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_GMII_RX_EN(gmac->id) | + NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_GMII_TX_EN(gmac->id); + break; + default: + /* We don't get here; the switch above will have errored out */ + unreachable(); + } regmap_write(gmac->nss_common, NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE, val); if (gmac->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII) { From 19b96fa547efa8ca93857ac9f3083390c29b7f28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 12:15:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/37] pppoe: only process PADT targeted at local interfaces MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit We don't want to disconnect a session because of a stray PADT arriving while the interface is in promiscuous mode. Furthermore, multicast and broadcast packets make no sense here, so only PACKET_HOST is accepted. Reported-by: David Balažic Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c index 39976892b312..13f8464741a1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c @@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ static int pppoe_disc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, if (!skb) goto out; + if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST) + goto abort; + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr))) goto abort; From 6997070078c2e072bb8ab7628767087ab72528c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=A9r=C3=B4me=20Pouiller?= Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 18:19:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/37] mmc: fix compilation of user API MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 83fc5dd57f86c3ec7d6d22565a6ff6c948853b64 upstream. The definitions of MMC_IOC_CMD and of MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD rely on MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR: #define MMC_IOC_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 0, struct mmc_ioc_cmd) #define MMC_IOC_MULTI_CMD _IOWR(MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR, 1, struct mmc_ioc_multi_cmd) However, MMC_BLOCK_MAJOR is defined in linux/major.h and linux/mmc/ioctl.h did not include it. Signed-off-by: Jérôme Pouiller Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200511161902.191405-1-Jerome.Pouiller@silabs.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h index 7e385b83b9d8..fe4b6b69d79a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #define LINUX_MMC_IOCTL_H #include +#include struct mmc_ioc_cmd { /* Implies direction of data. true = write, false = read */ From ab3ec512a1bd9a8269dc8292aff9bb12ce83ba83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 18:54:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 16/37] slcan: Fix double-free on slcan_open() error path Commit 9ebd796e2400 ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") was incorrectly backported to 4.4 and 4.9 stable branches. Since they do not have commit cf124db566e6 ("net: Fix inconsistent teardown and release of private netdev state."), the destructor function slc_free_netdev() is already responsible for calling free_netdev() and slcan_open() must not call both of them. yangerkun previously fixed the same bug in slip. Fixes: ce624b2089ea ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") # 4.4 Fixes: f59604a80fa4 ("slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock ...") # 4.4 Fixes: 56635a1e6ffb ("can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open") # 4.9 Fixes: a1c9b23142ac ("slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock ...") # 4.9 Cc: yangerkun Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/can/slcan.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c index 5bacb019ec1f..1107f200d3f1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c @@ -618,10 +618,9 @@ static int slcan_open(struct tty_struct *tty) sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); - slc_free_netdev(sl->dev); /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */ rtnl_unlock(); - free_netdev(sl->dev); + slc_free_netdev(sl->dev); return err; err_exit: From fb586519dec413d455791267daf16925853faecd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yangerkun Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 11:54:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 17/37] slip: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock in slip_open commit f596c87005f7b1baeb7d62d9a9e25d68c3dfae10 upstream. As the description before netdev_run_todo, we cannot call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock, fix it by reorder the code. Signed-off-by: yangerkun Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [bwh: Backported to <4.11: free_netdev() is called through sl_free_netdev()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c index d4a33baa33b6..3132cf4626a8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c +++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c @@ -867,7 +867,10 @@ static int slip_open(struct tty_struct *tty) sl->tty = NULL; tty->disc_data = NULL; clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags); + /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */ + rtnl_unlock(); sl_free_netdev(sl->dev); + return err; err_exit: rtnl_unlock(); From 992203a7c0d58bfb160a2a648134773583132117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Can Guo Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 02:14:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 18/37] scsi: ufs: Release clock if DMA map fails commit 17c7d35f141ef6158076adf3338f115f64fcf760 upstream. In queuecommand path, if DMA map fails, it bails out with clock held. In this case, release the clock to keep its usage paired. [mkp: applied by hand] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0101016ed3d66395-1b7e7fce-b74d-42ca-a88a-4db78b795d3b-000000@us-west-2.amazonses.com Reviewed-by: Bean Huo Signed-off-by: Can Guo Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen [EB: resolved cherry-pick conflict caused by newer kernels not having the clear_bit_unlock() line] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index bc7f8d634c80..d15cd7a02f9b 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -1374,6 +1374,7 @@ static int ufshcd_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) ufshcd_compose_upiu(hba, lrbp); err = ufshcd_map_sg(lrbp); if (err) { + ufshcd_release(hba); lrbp->cmd = NULL; clear_bit_unlock(tag, &hba->lrb_in_use); goto out; From 263bac172c6b8a9c3f9f2a65535a9aed190a529b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yang Yingliang Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 11:34:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 19/37] devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init() [ Upstream commit 1b49cd71b52403822731dc9f283185d1da355f97 ] When devinet_sysctl_register() failed, the memory allocated in neigh_parms_alloc() should be freed. Fixes: 20e61da7ffcf ("ipv4: fail early when creating netdev named all or default") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang Acked-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index b062f4c41306..2cb8612e7821 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static struct in_device *inetdev_init(struct net_device *dev) err = devinet_sysctl_register(in_dev); if (err) { in_dev->dead = 1; + neigh_parms_release(&arp_tbl, in_dev->arp_parms); in_dev_put(in_dev); in_dev = NULL; goto out; From 3058a08e232751ecac9ea8fc420acb280f06982b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuhong Yuan Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:20:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 20/37] NFC: st21nfca: add missed kfree_skb() in an error path [ Upstream commit 3decabdc714ca56c944f4669b4cdec5c2c1cea23 ] st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res() misses to call kfree_skb() in an error path. Add the missed function call to fix it. Fixes: 1892bf844ea0 ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding P2P support to st21nfca in Initiator & Target mode") Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c index 798a32bbac5d..e023a679bdea 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c @@ -184,8 +184,10 @@ static int st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, memcpy(atr_res->gbi, atr_req->gbi, gb_len); r = nfc_set_remote_general_bytes(hdev->ndev, atr_res->gbi, gb_len); - if (r < 0) + if (r < 0) { + kfree_skb(skb); return r; + } } info->dep_info.curr_nfc_dep_pni = 0; From de25fb851e02821a6d29c272579c92d82c9fd289 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefano Garzarella Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 09:56:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/37] vsock: fix timeout in vsock_accept() [ Upstream commit 7e0afbdfd13d1e708fe96e31c46c4897101a6a43 ] The accept(2) is an "input" socket interface, so we should use SO_RCVTIMEO instead of SO_SNDTIMEO to set the timeout. So this patch replace sock_sndtimeo() with sock_rcvtimeo() to use the right timeout in the vsock_accept(). Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index 412d56614fd5..a645352e366a 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ static int vsock_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags) /* Wait for children sockets to appear; these are the new sockets * created upon connection establishment. */ - timeout = sock_sndtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK); + timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK); prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(listener), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); while ((connected = vsock_dequeue_accept(listener)) == NULL && From 268b8670bfd29e5f4e9ba177854d820c07d4bde9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:32:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 22/37] l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket [ Upstream commit d9a81a225277686eb629938986d97629ea102633 ] syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket and fool l2tp. Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018 CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625 setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523 l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x45ca29 Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4 Allocated by task 3018: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline] __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612 sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666 data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline] mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 Freed by task 2484: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603 __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31 put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline] put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445 do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894 get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739 do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab) raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 6b9f34239b00 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation") Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: James Chapman Cc: Guillaume Nault Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 0233c496fc51..239464045697 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -1573,6 +1573,8 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 tunnel_id, fd); goto err; } + if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) + goto err; switch (encap) { case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP: if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) { From c848444df2cc180c9a04ed1b7d1efa09e297b2bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:20:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 23/37] l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash() [ Upstream commit 02c71b144c811bcdd865e0a1226d0407d11357e8 ] syzbot recently found a way to crash the kernel [1] Issue here is that inet_hash() & inet_unhash() are currently only meant to be used by TCP & DCCP, since only these protocols provide the needed hashinfo pointer. L2TP uses a single list (instead of a hash table) This old bug became an issue after commit 610236587600 ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications") since after this commit, sk_common_release() can be called while the L2TP socket is still considered 'hashed'. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 7063 Comm: syz-executor654 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1 R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00 FS: 0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: sk_common_release+0xba/0x370 net/core/sock.c:3210 inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:390 [inline] inet_create+0x966/0xe00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:248 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x441e29 Code: e8 fc b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffdce184148 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441e29 RDX: 0000000000000073 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000402c30 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 23b6578228ce553e ]--- RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600 Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1 R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0 R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00 FS: 0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 0d76751fad77 ("l2tp: Add L2TPv3 IP encapsulation (no UDP) support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: James Chapman Cc: Andrii Nakryiko Reported-by: syzbot+3610d489778b57cc8031@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++------- net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c index fd7363f8405a..aed0c7350988 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -213,15 +212,30 @@ static int l2tp_ip_recv(struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk) +static void l2tp_ip_hash(struct sock *sk) { - /* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */ - inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP; + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) { + write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); + sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table); + write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); + } +} +static void l2tp_ip_unhash(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) + return; write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); - sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table); + sk_del_node_init(sk); write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock); +} + +static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk) +{ + /* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */ + inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP; + l2tp_ip_hash(sk); return 0; } @@ -603,8 +617,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip_prot = { .sendmsg = l2tp_ip_sendmsg, .recvmsg = l2tp_ip_recvmsg, .backlog_rcv = l2tp_ip_backlog_recv, - .hash = inet_hash, - .unhash = inet_unhash, + .hash = l2tp_ip_hash, + .unhash = l2tp_ip_unhash, .obj_size = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip_sock), #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_setsockopt = compat_ip_setsockopt, diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c index 5bb5337e74fc..bc2c5284d1cb 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -226,15 +225,30 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_recv(struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk) +static void l2tp_ip6_hash(struct sock *sk) { - /* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */ - inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP; + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) { + write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); + sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table); + write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); + } +} +static void l2tp_ip6_unhash(struct sock *sk) +{ + if (sk_unhashed(sk)) + return; write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); - sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table); + sk_del_node_init(sk); write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock); +} + +static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk) +{ + /* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */ + inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP; + l2tp_ip6_hash(sk); return 0; } @@ -730,8 +744,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip6_prot = { .sendmsg = l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, .recvmsg = l2tp_ip6_recvmsg, .backlog_rcv = l2tp_ip6_backlog_recv, - .hash = inet_hash, - .unhash = inet_unhash, + .hash = l2tp_ip6_hash, + .unhash = l2tp_ip6_unhash, .obj_size = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip6_sock), #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_setsockopt = compat_ipv6_setsockopt, From a913cddf136aa4a4795860dff73d6611321b9fc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Jolly Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 10:43:58 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 24/37] USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support commit 3429444abdd9dbd5faebd9bee552ec6162b17ad6 upstream. Add support for Dell Wireless 5816e Download Mode (AKA boot & hold mode / QDL download mode) to drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c This is required to update device firmware. Signed-off-by: Matt Jolly Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c index 06916ddc3159..c59e6d4a8a61 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)}, /* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */ + {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */ From f37a82c00f0095d2ab4d8111399c23de5e8202fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bin Liu Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 16:36:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 25/37] USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors commit 986c1748c84d7727defeaeca74a73b37f7d5cce1 upstream. usb_wwan_indat_callback() shouldn't resubmit rx urb if the previous urb status is a fatal error. Or the usb controller would keep processing the new urbs then run into interrupt storm, and has no chance to recover. Fixes: 6c1ee66a0b2b ("USB-Serial: Fix error handling of usb_wwan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bin Liu Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c index 485bad73b6ed..814a72935a21 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c @@ -305,6 +305,10 @@ static void usb_wwan_indat_callback(struct urb *urb) if (status) { dev_dbg(dev, "%s: nonzero status: %d on endpoint %02x.\n", __func__, status, endpoint); + + /* don't resubmit on fatal errors */ + if (status == -ESHUTDOWN || status == -ENOENT) + return; } else { if (urb->actual_length) { tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data, From 043ff85abd394d2a5806a1ba58b720ddb84d605d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniele Palmas Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 23:11:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/37] USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions commit 399ad9477c523f721f8e51d4f824bdf7267f120c upstream. Add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions: 0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet 0x1033: tty, tty, tty, ecm Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525211106.27338-1-dnlplm@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 737b6652a0b5..326e7109b8f8 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -1146,6 +1146,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(0) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG0), .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG1), From dad0bf9ce93fa40b667eccd3306783f4db4b932b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 16:27:40 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 27/37] vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii commit b86dab054059b970111b5516ae548efaae5b3aae upstream. When k_ascii is invoked several times in a row there is a potential for signed integer overflow: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888:19 signed integer overflow: 10 * 1111111111 cannot be represented in type 'int' CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:154 handle_overflow+0xdc/0xf0 lib/ubsan.c:184 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x2a/0x40 lib/ubsan.c:205 k_ascii+0xbf/0xd0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1477 [inline] kbd_event+0x888/0x3be0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495 While it can be worked around by using check_mul_overflow()/ check_add_overflow(), it is better to introduce a separate flag to signal that number pad is being used to compose a symbol, and change type of the accumulator from signed to unsigned, thus avoiding undefined behavior when it overflows. Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525232740.GA262061@dtor-ws Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c index fb43f8dc9246..96c65fe64141 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c @@ -125,7 +125,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /* guard 'func_buf' and friends */ static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)]; /* keyboard key bitmap */ static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT]; /* shift state counters.. */ static bool dead_key_next; -static int npadch = -1; /* -1 or number assembled on pad */ + +/* Handles a number being assembled on the number pad */ +static bool npadch_active; +static unsigned int npadch_value; + static unsigned int diacr; static char rep; /* flag telling character repeat */ @@ -815,12 +819,12 @@ static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) shift_state &= ~(1 << value); /* kludge */ - if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) { + if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) { if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE) - to_utf8(vc, npadch); + to_utf8(vc, npadch_value); else - put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff); - npadch = -1; + put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff); + npadch_active = false; } } @@ -838,7 +842,7 @@ static void k_meta(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) { - int base; + unsigned int base; if (up_flag) return; @@ -852,10 +856,12 @@ static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) base = 16; } - if (npadch == -1) - npadch = value; - else - npadch = npadch * base + value; + if (!npadch_active) { + npadch_value = 0; + npadch_active = true; + } + + npadch_value = npadch_value * base + value; } static void k_lock(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag) From 8f5b7c0f7843dff129998b5ff86a81ecf977e67b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pascal Terjan Date: Sat, 23 May 2020 22:12:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 28/37] staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK commit 15ea976a1f12b5fd76b1bd6ff3eb5132fd28047f upstream. The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e462d ("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants I noticed this driver uses the old value. The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the second definition. Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan Cc: stable Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h index 7a352c45344f..309d45029ff6 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bssid(unsigned char *pframe) /* block-ack parameters */ #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002 #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0 +#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800 @@ -560,13 +560,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info { #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT 0x0004 #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT 0x0010 -/* block-ack parameters */ -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002 -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C -#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0 -#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000 -#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800 - /* * A-PMDU buffer sizes * According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2) From 00bbe36fb9c2a41c87f4775ee985c882ca54b3f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia Zhang Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 16:58:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 29/37] x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping commit b399151cb48db30ad1e0e93dd40d68c6d007b637 upstream. x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the processor's stepping. Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c. [ Backport by Mark Gross to simplify the SRBDS backport ] Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang [ Updated it to more recent kernels. ] Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 26 +++++++++++----------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 8 +++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 20 ++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c | 2 +- drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c | 6 ++--- drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c | 2 +- drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c | 4 ++-- drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c | 6 ++--- drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c | 2 +- drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c | 2 +- drivers/edac/mce_amd.c | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c | 6 ++--- drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c | 2 +- drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c | 2 +- drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c | 2 +- 33 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h index 94c18ebfd68c..fd51f638e4ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static inline unsigned int acpi_processor_cstate_check(unsigned int max_cstate) if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x0F && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x05 && - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 0x0A) + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 0x0A) return 1; else if (amd_e400_c1e_detected) return 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 048942d53988..55163bc810db 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 { __u8 x86; /* CPU family */ __u8 x86_vendor; /* CPU vendor */ __u8 x86_model; - __u8 x86_mask; + __u8 x86_stepping; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 char wp_works_ok; /* It doesn't on 386's */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c index c986d0b3bc35..df9ee8d768bf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int amd_cache_northbridges(void) if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x8 && (boot_cpu_data.x86_model > 0x9 || - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask >= 0x1)) + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping >= 0x1)) amd_northbridges.flags |= AMD_NB_L3_INDEX_DISABLE; if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x15) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c index 6ce39025f467..f876141e380c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ void foo(void) OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86, cpuinfo_x86, x86); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_vendor, cpuinfo_x86, x86_vendor); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_model, cpuinfo_x86, x86_model); - OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_mask, cpuinfo_x86, x86_mask); + OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_stepping, cpuinfo_x86, x86_stepping); OFFSET(CPUINFO_cpuid_level, cpuinfo_x86, cpuid_level); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_capability, cpuinfo_x86, x86_capability); OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_vendor_id, cpuinfo_x86, x86_vendor_id); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 424d8a636615..b8fbe983277b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return; } - if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_mask == 1) { + if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_stepping == 1) { const int K6_BUG_LOOP = 1000000; int n; void (*f_vide)(void); @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* K6 with old style WHCR */ if (c->x86_model < 8 || - (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask < 8)) { + (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping < 8)) { /* We can only write allocate on the low 508Mb */ if (mbytes > 508) mbytes = 508; @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return; } - if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask > 7) || + if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping > 7) || c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 13) { /* The more serious chips .. */ @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * are more robust with CLK_CTL set to 200xxxxx instead of 600xxxxx * As per AMD technical note 27212 0.2 */ - if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) { + if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) { rdmsr(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, l, h); if ((l & 0xfff00000) != 0x20000000) { printk(KERN_INFO @@ -235,12 +235,12 @@ static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * but they are not certified as MP capable. */ /* Athlon 660/661 is valid. */ - if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_mask == 0) || - (c->x86_mask == 1))) + if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_stepping == 0) || + (c->x86_stepping == 1))) return; /* Duron 670 is valid */ - if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_mask == 0)) + if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping == 0)) return; /* @@ -250,8 +250,8 @@ static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * See http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jow-18.10.01-000 for * more. */ - if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_mask >= 2)) || - ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_mask >= 1)) || + if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping >= 2)) || + ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping >= 1)) || (c->x86_model > 7)) if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MP)) return; @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* Set MTRR capability flag if appropriate */ if (c->x86 == 5) if (c->x86_model == 13 || c->x86_model == 9 || - (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask >= 8)) + (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 8)) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR); #endif #if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI) @@ -902,11 +902,11 @@ static unsigned int amd_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size) /* AMD errata T13 (order #21922) */ if ((c->x86 == 6)) { /* Duron Rev A0 */ - if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_mask == 0) + if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_stepping == 0) size = 64; /* Tbird rev A1/A2 */ if (c->x86_model == 4 && - (c->x86_mask == 0 || c->x86_mask == 1)) + (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 1)) size = 256; } return size; @@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum) } /* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */ - ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_mask; + ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping; while ((range = *erratum++)) if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) && (ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) && diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c index 6608c03c2126..cf761e640797 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static void init_centaur(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TSC); break; case 8: - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { default: name = "2"; break; @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ centaur_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size) * - Note, it seems this may only be in engineering samples. */ if ((c->x86 == 6) && (c->x86_model == 9) && - (c->x86_mask == 1) && (size == 65)) + (c->x86_stepping == 1) && (size == 65)) size -= 1; return size; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index e8fa12c7ad5b..50db461961d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0); c->x86 = (tfms >> 8) & 0xf; c->x86_model = (tfms >> 4) & 0xf; - c->x86_mask = tfms & 0xf; + c->x86_stepping = tfms & 0xf; if (c->x86 == 0xf) c->x86 += (tfms >> 20) & 0xff; @@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; c->x86_cache_size = 0; c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN; - c->x86_model = c->x86_mask = 0; /* So far unknown... */ + c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0; /* So far unknown... */ c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */ c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */ c->x86_max_cores = 1; @@ -1403,8 +1403,8 @@ void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) printk(KERN_CONT " (family: 0x%x, model: 0x%x", c->x86, c->x86_model); - if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0) - printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: 0x%x)\n", c->x86_mask); + if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0) + pr_cont(", stepping: 0x%x)\n", c->x86_stepping); else printk(KERN_CONT ")\n"); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c index 151625a83d9e..bc90e879998c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void init_cyrix(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* common case step number/rev -- exceptions handled below */ c->x86_model = (dir1 >> 4) + 1; - c->x86_mask = dir1 & 0xf; + c->x86_stepping = dir1 & 0xf; /* Now cook; the original recipe is by Channing Corn, from Cyrix. * We do the same thing for each generation: we work out diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 7beef3da5904..cb73d16d540c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && - c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + c->x86_stepping == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); } return false; @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * need the microcode to have already been loaded... so if it is * not, recommend a BIOS update and disable large pages. */ - if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_mask <= 2 && + if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_stepping <= 2 && c->microcode < 0x20e) { printk(KERN_WARNING "Atom PSE erratum detected, BIOS microcode update recommended\n"); clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE); @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* CPUID workaround for 0F33/0F34 CPU */ if (c->x86 == 0xF && c->x86_model == 0x3 - && (c->x86_mask == 0x3 || c->x86_mask == 0x4)) + && (c->x86_stepping == 0x3 || c->x86_stepping == 0x4)) c->x86_phys_bits = 36; /* @@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ int ppro_with_ram_bug(void) if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 && - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 8) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Pentium Pro with Errata#50 detected. Taking evasive action.\n"); + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 8) { + pr_info("Pentium Pro with Errata#50 detected. Taking evasive action.\n"); return 1; } return 0; @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static void intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Mask B, Pentium, but not Pentium MMX */ if (c->x86 == 5 && - c->x86_mask >= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 4 && + c->x86_stepping >= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 4 && c->x86_model <= 3) { /* * Remember we have B step Pentia with bugs @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * SEP CPUID bug: Pentium Pro reports SEP but doesn't have it until * model 3 mask 3 */ - if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_mask) < 0x633) + if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_stepping) < 0x633) clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEP); /* @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * P4 Xeon errata 037 workaround. * Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache. */ - if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_mask == 1)) { + if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_stepping == 1)) { if (msr_set_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT) > 0) { @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Specification Update"). */ if (cpu_has_apic && (c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4) == 0x520 && - (c->x86_mask < 0x6 || c->x86_mask == 0xb)) + (c->x86_stepping < 0x6 || c->x86_stepping == 0xb)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_11AP); @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 6: if (l2 == 128) p = "Celeron (Mendocino)"; - else if (c->x86_mask == 0 || c->x86_mask == 5) + else if (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 5) p = "Celeron-A"; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c index afaf648386e9..619d69aa81c8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int cpu) */ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 79 && - c->x86_mask == 0x01 && + c->x86_stepping == 0x01 && llc_size_per_core > 2621440 && c->microcode < 0x0b000021) { pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode); @@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcode_fw(int cpu, struct device *device, return UCODE_NFOUND; sprintf(name, "intel-ucode/%02x-%02x-%02x", - c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask); + c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping); if (request_firmware_direct(&firmware, name, device)) { pr_debug("data file %s load failed\n", name); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c index 136ae86f4f5f..55d499593e6a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ int generic_validate_add_page(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, */ if (is_cpu(INTEL) && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 && - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 7) { + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 7) { if (base & ((1 << (22 - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)) { pr_warning("mtrr: base(0x%lx000) is not 4 MiB aligned\n", base); return -EINVAL; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c index 49bd700d9b7f..be3050f23536 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c @@ -699,8 +699,8 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void) if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x3 && - (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x3 || - boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x4)) + (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x3 || + boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x4)) phys_addr = 36; size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(phys_addr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c index f65f74163ff7..d973c079e97c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c @@ -3052,7 +3052,7 @@ static int intel_snb_pebs_broken(int cpu) break; case 45: /* SNB-EP */ - switch (cpu_data(cpu).x86_mask) { + switch (cpu_data(cpu).x86_stepping) { case 6: rev = 0x618; break; case 7: rev = 0x70c; break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c index 2cdae69d7e0b..09058ad9816c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c @@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ void __init intel_pmu_lbr_init_atom(void) * on PMU interrupt */ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 28 - && boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 10) { + && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 10) { pr_cont("LBR disabled due to erratum"); return; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c index 7c1a0c07b607..507e2e319f52 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static __initconst const struct x86_pmu p6_pmu = { static __init void p6_pmu_rdpmc_quirk(void) { - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 9) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 9) { /* * PPro erratum 26; fixed in stepping 9 and above. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c index 935225c0375f..c4f772d3f35c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c @@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v) c->x86_model, c->x86_model_id[0] ? c->x86_model_id : "unknown"); - if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0) - seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_mask); + if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0) + seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_stepping); else seq_puts(m, "stepping\t: unknown\n"); if (c->microcode) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S index 1c0b49fd6365..10139b8f1e53 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ #define X86 new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86 #define X86_VENDOR new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_vendor #define X86_MODEL new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_model -#define X86_MASK new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_mask +#define X86_STEPPING new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_stepping #define X86_HARD_MATH new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_hard_math #define X86_CPUID new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_cpuid_level #define X86_CAPABILITY new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_capability @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ enable_paging: shrb $4,%al movb %al,X86_MODEL andb $0x0f,%cl # mask mask revision - movb %cl,X86_MASK + movb %cl,X86_STEPPING movl %edx,X86_CAPABILITY is486: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c index 30ca7607cbbb..c1cccfa900de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static inline void __init construct_default_ISA_mptable(int mpc_default_type) processor.apicver = mpc_default_type > 4 ? 0x10 : 0x01; processor.cpuflag = CPU_ENABLED; processor.cpufeature = (boot_cpu_data.x86 << 8) | - (boot_cpu_data.x86_model << 4) | boot_cpu_data.x86_mask; + (boot_cpu_data.x86_model << 4) | boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping; processor.featureflag = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[0]; processor.reserved[0] = 0; processor.reserved[1] = 0; diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c index 44ce80606944..e278125ddf41 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int via_rng_init(struct hwrng *rng) /* Enable secondary noise source on CPUs where it is present. */ /* Nehemiah stepping 8 and higher */ - if ((c->x86_model == 9) && (c->x86_mask > 7)) + if ((c->x86_model == 9) && (c->x86_stepping > 7)) lo |= VIA_NOISESRC2; /* Esther */ diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c index cec1ee2d2f74..c2598381fbc8 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int acpi_cpufreq_blacklist(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 6) && - (c->x86_mask == 8)) { + (c->x86_stepping == 8)) { printk(KERN_INFO "acpi-cpufreq: Intel(R) " "Xeon(R) 7100 Errata AL30, processors may " "lock up on frequency changes: disabling " diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c b/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c index 0f6b229afcb9..22c854bcbcbc 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c @@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) break; case 7: - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { case 0: longhaul_version = TYPE_LONGHAUL_V1; cpu_model = CPU_SAMUEL2; @@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) break; case 1 ... 15: longhaul_version = TYPE_LONGHAUL_V2; - if (c->x86_mask < 8) { + if (c->x86_stepping < 8) { cpu_model = CPU_SAMUEL2; cpuname = "C3 'Samuel 2' [C5B]"; } else { @@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) numscales = 32; memcpy(mults, nehemiah_mults, sizeof(nehemiah_mults)); memcpy(eblcr, nehemiah_eblcr, sizeof(nehemiah_eblcr)); - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { case 0 ... 1: cpu_model = CPU_NEHEMIAH; cpuname = "C3 'Nehemiah A' [C5XLOE]"; diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c b/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c index 5dd95dab580d..75db125c1b4c 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int cpufreq_p4_cpu_init(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) #endif /* Errata workaround */ - cpuid = (c->x86 << 8) | (c->x86_model << 4) | c->x86_mask; + cpuid = (c->x86 << 8) | (c->x86_model << 4) | c->x86_stepping; switch (cpuid) { case 0x0f07: case 0x0f0a: diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c b/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c index c1ae1999770a..5cd05bfa8f10 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int check_powernow(void) return 0; } - if ((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_mask == 0)) { + if ((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping == 0)) { printk(KERN_INFO PFX "K7 660[A0] core detected, " "enabling errata workarounds\n"); have_a0 = 1; diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c index 7d4a31571608..a7e72a51806a 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct cpu_id { __u8 x86; /* CPU family */ __u8 x86_model; /* model */ - __u8 x86_mask; /* stepping */ + __u8 x86_stepping; /* stepping */ }; enum { @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int centrino_verify_cpu_id(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, { if ((c->x86 == x->x86) && (c->x86_model == x->x86_model) && - (c->x86_mask == x->x86_mask)) + (c->x86_stepping == x->x86_stepping)) return 1; return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c index 15d3214aaa00..4e1fbb0a93fd 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c @@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ unsigned int speedstep_detect_processor(void) ebx = cpuid_ebx(0x00000001); ebx &= 0x000000FF; - pr_debug("ebx value is %x, x86_mask is %x\n", ebx, c->x86_mask); + pr_debug("ebx value is %x, x86_stepping is %x\n", ebx, c->x86_stepping); - switch (c->x86_mask) { + switch (c->x86_stepping) { case 4: /* * B-stepping [M-P4-M] @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ unsigned int speedstep_detect_processor(void) msr_lo, msr_hi); if ((msr_hi & (1<<18)) && (relaxed_check ? 1 : (msr_hi & (3<<24)))) { - if (c->x86_mask == 0x01) { + if (c->x86_stepping == 0x01) { pr_debug("early PIII version\n"); return SPEEDSTEP_CPU_PIII_C_EARLY; } else diff --git a/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c b/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c index 047ef69b7e65..4493b4622207 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static int __init padlock_init(void) printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "Using VIA PadLock ACE for AES algorithm.\n"); - if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_mask == 2) { + if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_stepping == 2) { ecb_fetch_blocks = MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS; cbc_fetch_blocks = MAX_CBC_FETCH_BLOCKS; printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "VIA Nano stepping 2 detected: enabling workaround.\n"); diff --git a/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c b/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c index d87a47547ba5..932ba7676183 100644 --- a/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c +++ b/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c @@ -2715,7 +2715,7 @@ static struct amd64_family_type *per_family_init(struct amd64_pvt *pvt) struct amd64_family_type *fam_type = NULL; pvt->ext_model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model >> 4; - pvt->stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_mask; + pvt->stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping; pvt->model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model; pvt->fam = boot_cpu_data.x86; diff --git a/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c b/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c index e3a945ce374b..858da1a752b0 100644 --- a/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c +++ b/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c @@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ int amd_decode_mce(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, void *data) pr_emerg(HW_ERR "CPU:%d (%x:%x:%x) MC%d_STATUS[%s|%s|%s|%s|%s", m->extcpu, - c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask, + c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping, m->bank, ((m->status & MCI_STATUS_OVER) ? "Over" : "-"), ((m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) ? "UE" : diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c index 6a27eb2fed17..be1e380fa1c3 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c @@ -269,13 +269,13 @@ static int adjust_tjmax(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, u32 id, struct device *dev) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tjmax_model_table); i++) { const struct tjmax_model *tm = &tjmax_model_table[i]; if (c->x86_model == tm->model && - (tm->mask == ANY || c->x86_mask == tm->mask)) + (tm->mask == ANY || c->x86_stepping == tm->mask)) return tm->tjmax; } /* Early chips have no MSR for TjMax */ - if (c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_mask < 4) + if (c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_stepping < 4) usemsr_ee = 0; if (c->x86_model > 0xe && usemsr_ee) { @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int chk_ucode_version(unsigned int cpu) * Readings might stop update when processor visited too deep sleep, * fixed for stepping D0 (6EC). */ - if (c->x86_model == 0xe && c->x86_mask < 0xc && c->microcode < 0x39) { + if (c->x86_model == 0xe && c->x86_stepping < 0xc && c->microcode < 0x39) { pr_err("Errata AE18 not fixed, update BIOS or microcode of the CPU!\n"); return -ENODEV; } diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c index ef91b8a67549..84e91286fc4f 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ u8 vid_which_vrm(void) if (c->x86 < 6) /* Any CPU with family lower than 6 */ return 0; /* doesn't have VID */ - vrm_ret = find_vrm(c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask, c->x86_vendor); + vrm_ret = find_vrm(c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping, c->x86_vendor); if (vrm_ret == 134) vrm_ret = get_via_model_d_vrm(); if (vrm_ret == 0) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c b/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c index 9cdfde6515ad..0124584a6a6d 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static bool has_erratum_319(struct pci_dev *pdev) * and AM3 formats, but that's the best we can do. */ return boot_cpu_data.x86_model < 4 || - (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 2); + (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 2); } static int k10temp_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c b/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c index 734d55d48cc8..486502798fc5 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int k8temp_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, return -ENOMEM; model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model; - stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_mask; + stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping; /* feature available since SH-C0, exclude older revisions */ if ((model == 4 && stepping == 0) || diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c index 6082f653c68a..67773e8bbb95 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ void gx_set_dclk_frequency(struct fb_info *info) int timeout = 1000; /* Rev. 1 Geode GXs use a 14 MHz reference clock instead of 48 MHz. */ - if (cpu_data(0).x86_mask == 1) { + if (cpu_data(0).x86_stepping == 1) { pll_table = gx_pll_table_14MHz; pll_table_len = ARRAY_SIZE(gx_pll_table_14MHz); } else { From ebb9e39670740e99a1d4aeb9aacd69b98c7f0418 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 16:58:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 30/37] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the stepping must be checked to tell them apart. On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro and support for matching against family/model/stepping. [ bp: Massage. tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c | 7 ++++++- include/linux/mod_devicetable.h | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h index ff501e511d91..b9473858c6b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h @@ -8,6 +8,33 @@ #include +#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching + * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor + * @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY + * @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY + * @_steppings: Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY + * @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY + * @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants + * required for this. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \ + _steppings, _feature, _data) { \ + .vendor = X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, \ + .family = _family, \ + .model = _model, \ + .steppings = _steppings, \ + .feature = _feature, \ + .driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \ +} + extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c index fbb5e90557a5..a207aaaf78db 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c @@ -33,13 +33,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match) const struct x86_cpu_id *m; struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data; - for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) { + for (m = match; + m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature; + m++) { if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor) continue; if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family) continue; if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model) continue; + if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY && + !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings)) + continue; if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature)) continue; return m; diff --git a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h index 3f3f801ca488..d7c721f53dd5 100644 --- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h +++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h @@ -572,6 +572,10 @@ struct mips_cdmm_device_id { /* * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id. * Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define. + * + * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the + * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream + * has been converted to proper C99 initializers. */ #define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id struct x86_cpu_id { @@ -580,6 +584,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id { __u16 model; __u16 feature; /* bit index */ kernel_ulong_t driver_data; + __u16 steppings; }; #define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \ @@ -588,6 +593,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id { #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0 #define X86_MODEL_ANY 0 +#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0 #define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0 /* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */ /* From 4ebffa4b0a198d8671ee68742ba6d3f56164301f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 16:58:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/37] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches() commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument. [ bp: Flip arguments order. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 50db461961d2..5c1274beaf7a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -912,9 +912,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; -static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which) +static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which) { - const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist); + const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table); return m && !!(m->driver_data & which); } @@ -934,29 +934,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */ - if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); - if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION)) return; setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1); setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); - if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); - if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS); - if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); } - if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS)) + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS); /* @@ -974,7 +977,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); - if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ @@ -983,7 +986,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN); - if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF)) + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF)) return; setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF); From 7180c930dcedb3f33efe992ea4a077f420524e6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 16:58:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 32/37] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse. While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL. The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom. * Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off. * Export vulnerability status via sysfs * Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations. [ bp: Massage, - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g, - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in, - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level, - reflow comments. jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 31 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++ 8 files changed, 173 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index f97d1aaec1f9..e9f9ce0688bc 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit Date: January 2018 diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index da9acfb23383..b19d872feb56 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -3787,6 +3787,26 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. spia_pedr= spia_peddr= + srbds= [X86,INTEL] + Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling + (SRBDS) mitigation. + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like + exploit which can leak bits from the random + number generator. + + By default, this issue is mitigated by + microcode. However, the microcode fix can cause + the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become + much slower. Among other effects, this will + result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom. + + The microcode mitigation can be disabled with + the following option: + + off: Disable mitigation and remove + performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED + stack_guard_gap= [MM] override the default stack gap protection. The value is in page units and it defines how many pages prior diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 01ec126c5969..492889d92146 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */ #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ @@ -343,5 +344,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */ #define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ +#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 854a20efa771..4ee65ec8c29c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */ #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */ +/* SRBDS support */ +#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 +#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) + #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 950e6bb21955..1a0ab4af93b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; @@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) l1tf_select_mitigation(); mds_select_mitigation(); taa_select_mitigation(); + srbds_select_mitigation(); /* * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS @@ -368,6 +370,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt + +enum srbds_mitigations { + SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF, + SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, +}; + +static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL; + +static const char * const srbds_strings[] = { + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled", + [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", +}; + +static bool srbds_off; + +void update_srbds_msr(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return; + + if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + + switch (srbds_mitigation) { + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF: + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF: + mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL: + mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + default: + break; + } + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); +} + +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return; + + /* + * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting + * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled. + */ + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; + else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; + else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off) + srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + + update_srbds_msr(); + pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +} + +static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS)) + return 0; + + srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off"); + return 0; +} +early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline); + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt @@ -1377,6 +1470,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ""; } +static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -1418,6 +1516,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT: return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_SRBDS: + return srbds_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -1464,4 +1565,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 5c1274beaf7a..32567a5bb8d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -912,6 +912,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; +#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ + INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ + X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) + +#define SRBDS BIT(0) + +static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS), + {} +}; + static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which) { const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table); @@ -977,6 +998,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); + /* + * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed + * in the vulnerability blacklist. + */ + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) && + cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; @@ -1330,6 +1360,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif mtrr_ap_init(); x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); + update_srbds_msr(); } struct msr_range { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index c42cc1acd668..f2eca5632f7d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); +extern void update_srbds_msr(void); extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 9666effc0799..919043e7cc76 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -549,6 +549,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -557,6 +563,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -567,6 +574,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_mds.attr, &dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr, &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, + &dev_attr_srbds.attr, NULL }; From 7c4a0a19590ac80744f6037c86df340f9b098339 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Gross Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 16:58:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 33/37] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation. [ bp: Massage. jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6a473da80b62 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling +============================================= + +SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to +infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register +accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation, +the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are +RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY. + +When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved +to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible +to MDS attacks. + +Affected processors +-------------------- +Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may +be affected. + +A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is +in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors +exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The +latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled +by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. + + ============= ============ ======== + common name Family_Model Stepping + ============= ============ ======== + Haswell 06_3CH All + Haswell_L 06_45H All + Haswell_G 06_46H All + + Broadwell_G 06_47H All + Broadwell 06_3DH All + + Skylake_L 06_4EH All + Skylake 06_5EH All + + Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC + + Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD + ============= ============ ======== + +Related CVEs +------------ + +The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue: + + ============== ===== ===================================== + CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling + ============== ===== ===================================== + +Attack scenarios +---------------- +An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED +executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques. + + +Mitigation mechanism +------------------- +Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and +EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared +staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical +processor. + +During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core +accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special +register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is +overwritten. + +This has three effects on performance: + +#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency. + +#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be + serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND + bandwidth. + +#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other + logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to + legacy locked cache-line-split accesses. + +The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable +the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel +Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that +disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not +take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical +processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX +enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well +as EGETKEY execution). + +IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition +-------------------------------- +Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope +IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and +RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL = +9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update. + +Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor +disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX +enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a +particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations +for other logical processors. + +Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless +of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time +with the option "srbds=". The option for this is: + + ============= ============================================================= + off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on + affected platforms. + ============= ============================================================= + +SRBDS System Information +----------------------- +The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For +SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: +/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds + +The possible values contained in this file are: + + ============================== ============================================= + Not affected Processor not vulnerable + Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled + Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation + Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect. + Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is + enabled while this system was booted with TSX + disabled. + Unknown: Dependent on + hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is + affected but with no way to know if host + processor is mitigated or vulnerable. + ============================== ============================================= + +SRBDS Default mitigation +------------------------ +This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND, +RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for +reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for +RDRAND and RDSEED. From 8a782408e080b4129bd2c14b08a6b921afa2669a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 20:46:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 34/37] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream Make the docs match the code. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst index 6a473da80b62..47b1b3afac99 100644 --- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst +++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. ============= ============ ======== common name Family_Model Stepping ============= ============ ======== + IvyBridge 06_3AH All + Haswell 06_3CH All Haswell_L 06_45H All Haswell_G 06_46H All @@ -37,9 +39,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected. Skylake_L 06_4EH All Skylake 06_5EH All - Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC - - Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD + Kabylake_L 06_8EH <= 0xC + Kabylake 06_9EH <= 0xD ============= ============ ======== Related CVEs From dc3f4c14d92760b5abdefe0bcd6c7cb28533f88b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Othacehe Date: Sun, 3 May 2020 11:29:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 35/37] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading. [ Upstream commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 ] The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be returned. Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up. Fixes: 62a1efb9f868 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c index c9d85bbc9230..a17891511be5 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c @@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask, u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val) { int tries = 20; - __be16 buf; int ret; ret = i2c_smbus_write_byte_data(data->client, VCNL4000_COMMAND, @@ -80,12 +79,11 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask, return -EIO; } - ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client, - data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf); + ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg); if (ret < 0) return ret; - *val = be16_to_cpu(buf); + *val = ret; return 0; } From 1c66189c16f1213a71310440d0eca9468ed6c246 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 18:47:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 36/37] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream. uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe() relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this. We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures, so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE. Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger Tested-by: Sven Schnelle Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds [ check for ref_ctr_offset removed for backport - gregkh ] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/events/uprobes.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c index 8cad3cd92e23..e7dabb254404 100644 --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c @@ -602,10 +602,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file, if (ret) goto out; - /* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */ - BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) + - UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE); - smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */ set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags); @@ -884,6 +880,13 @@ int uprobe_register(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, struct uprobe_consumer * if (offset > i_size_read(inode)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * This ensures that copy_from_page() and copy_to_page() + * can't cross page boundary. + */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + retry: uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset); if (!uprobe) @@ -1692,6 +1695,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr) uprobe_opcode_t opcode; int result; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))) + return -EINVAL; + pagefault_disable(); result = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&opcode, (void __user*)vaddr, sizeof(opcode)); From f17c881e4c8899900a5a77e87fb064158d32b05c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 09:21:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 37/37] Linux 4.4.227 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 1b8bc1f294db..f13f464d9928 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 226 +SUBLEVEL = 227 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Blurry Fish Butt