diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod
index 43edc24b6..a82e314ec 100644
--- a/go.mod
+++ b/go.mod
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/containers/ocicrypt v1.2.0
 	github.com/containers/storage v1.54.1-0.20240627145511-52b643e1ff51
 	github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.5.0
-	github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.5
+	github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.0
 	github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc
 	github.com/disiqueira/gotree/v3 v3.0.2
 	github.com/docker/distribution v2.8.3+incompatible
diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum
index c7ee84215..999da739e 100644
--- a/go.sum
+++ b/go.sum
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.5.0/go.mod h1:Y58oyj3AT4RCenI/lSvhwexgC+NSV
 github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.4/go.mod h1:tgQtvFlXSQOSOSIRvRPT7W67SCa46tRHOmNcaadrF8o=
 github.com/cyberphone/json-canonicalization v0.0.0-20231217050601-ba74d44ecf5f h1:eHnXnuK47UlSTOQexbzxAZfekVz6i+LKRdj1CU5DPaM=
 github.com/cyberphone/json-canonicalization v0.0.0-20231217050601-ba74d44ecf5f/go.mod h1:uzvlm1mxhHkdfqitSA92i7Se+S9ksOn3a3qmv/kyOCw=
-github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.5 h1:6iR5tXJ/e6tJZzzdMc1km3Sa7RRIVBKAK32O2s7AYfo=
-github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.5/go.mod h1:aPGpWjXOXUn2NCNjFvBE6aRxGGx79pTxQpKOJNYHHl4=
+github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.0 h1:tXpmbiaeBrS/K2US8nhgwdKYnfAOnVfkcLPKFgFHeA0=
+github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.0/go.mod h1:F7i41x/9cBF7lzCrVsYs9fuzwRZm4NQsGTBdpp6mETc=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc h1:U9qPSI2PIWSS1VwoXQT9A3Wy9MM3WgvqSxFWenqJduM=
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/LICENSE b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/LICENSE
index bec842f29..cb1ab88da 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/LICENSE
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/LICENSE
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Docker Inc & Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-Copyright (C) 2017 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (C) 2017-2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
 
 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/README.md b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/README.md
index 4eca0f235..253956f86 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/README.md
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/README.md
@@ -2,31 +2,24 @@
 
 [![Build Status](https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
 
-An implementation of `SecureJoin`, a [candidate for inclusion in the Go
-standard library][go#20126]. The purpose of this function is to be a "secure"
-alternative to `filepath.Join`, and in particular it provides certain
-guarantees that are not provided by `filepath.Join`.
-
-> **NOTE**: This code is *only* safe if you are not at risk of other processes
-> modifying path components after you've used `SecureJoin`. If it is possible
-> for a malicious process to modify path components of the resolved path, then
-> you will be vulnerable to some fairly trivial TOCTOU race conditions. [There
-> are some Linux kernel patches I'm working on which might allow for a better
-> solution.][lwn-obeneath]
->
-> In addition, with a slightly modified API it might be possible to use
-> `O_PATH` and verify that the opened path is actually the resolved one -- but
-> I have not done that yet. I might add it in the future as a helper function
-> to help users verify the path (we can't just return `/proc/self/fd/<foo>`
-> because that doesn't always work transparently for all users).
-
-This is the function prototype:
+### Old API ###
 
-```go
-func SecureJoin(root, unsafePath string) (string, error)
-```
+This library was originally just an implementation of `SecureJoin` which was
+[intended to be included in the Go standard library][go#20126] as a safer
+`filepath.Join` that would restrict the path lookup to be inside a root
+directory.
+
+The implementation was based on code that existed in several container
+runtimes. Unfortunately, this API is **fundamentally unsafe** against attackers
+that can modify path components after `SecureJoin` returns and before the
+caller uses the path, allowing for some fairly trivial TOCTOU attacks.
+
+`SecureJoin` (and `SecureJoinVFS`) are still provided by this library to
+support legacy users, but new users are strongly suggested to avoid using
+`SecureJoin` and instead use the [new api](#new-api) or switch to
+[libpathrs][libpathrs].
 
-This library **guarantees** the following:
+With the above limitations in mind, this library guarantees the following:
 
 * If no error is set, the resulting string **must** be a child path of
   `root` and will not contain any symlink path components (they will all be
@@ -47,7 +40,7 @@ This library **guarantees** the following:
 A (trivial) implementation of this function on GNU/Linux systems could be done
 with the following (note that this requires root privileges and is far more
 opaque than the implementation in this library, and also requires that
-`readlink` is inside the `root` path):
+`readlink` is inside the `root` path and is trustworthy):
 
 ```go
 package securejoin
@@ -70,9 +63,105 @@ func SecureJoin(root, unsafePath string) (string, error) {
 }
 ```
 
-[lwn-obeneath]: https://lwn.net/Articles/767547/
+[libpathrs]: https://github.com/openSUSE/libpathrs
 [go#20126]: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20126
 
+### New API ###
+
+While we recommend users switch to [libpathrs][libpathrs] as soon as it has a
+stable release, some methods implemented by libpathrs have been ported to this
+library to ease the transition. These APIs are only supported on Linux.
+
+These APIs are implemented such that `filepath-securejoin` will
+opportunistically use certain newer kernel APIs that make these operations far
+more secure. In particular:
+
+* All of the lookup operations will use [`openat2`][openat2.2] on new enough
+  kernels (Linux 5.6 or later) to restrict lookups through magic-links and
+  bind-mounts (for certain operations) and to make use of `RESOLVE_IN_ROOT` to
+  efficiently resolve symlinks within a rootfs.
+
+* The APIs provide hardening against a malicious `/proc` mount to either detect
+  or avoid being tricked by a `/proc` that is not legitimate. This is done
+  using [`openat2`][openat2.2] for all users, and privileged users will also be
+  further protected by using [`fsopen`][fsopen.2] and [`open_tree`][open_tree.2]
+  (Linux 4.18 or later).
+
+[openat2.2]: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/openat2.2.html
+[fsopen.2]: https://github.com/brauner/man-pages-md/blob/main/fsopen.md
+[open_tree.2]: https://github.com/brauner/man-pages-md/blob/main/open_tree.md
+
+#### `OpenInRoot` ####
+
+```go
+func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error)
+func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error)
+func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error)
+```
+
+`OpenInRoot` is a much safer version of
+
+```go
+path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+file, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
+```
+
+that protects against various race attacks that could lead to serious security
+issues, depending on the application. Note that the returned `*os.File` is an
+`O_PATH` file descriptor, which is quite restricted. Callers will probably need
+to use `Reopen` to get a more usable handle (this split is done to provide
+useful features like PTY spawning and to avoid users accidentally opening bad
+inodes that could cause a DoS).
+
+Callers need to be careful in how they use the returned `*os.File`. Usually it
+is only safe to operate on the handle directly, and it is very easy to create a
+security issue. [libpathrs][libpathrs] provides far more helpers to make using
+these handles safer -- there is currently no plan to port them to
+`filepath-securejoin`.
+
+`OpenatInRoot` is like `OpenInRoot` except that the root is provided using an
+`*os.File`. This allows you to ensure that multiple `OpenatInRoot` (or
+`MkdirAllHandle`) calls are operating on the same rootfs.
+
+> **NOTE**: Unlike `SecureJoin`, `OpenInRoot` will error out as soon as it hits
+> a dangling symlink or non-existent path. This is in contrast to `SecureJoin`
+> which treated non-existent components as though they were real directories,
+> and would allow for partial resolution of dangling symlinks. These behaviours
+> are at odds with how Linux treats non-existent paths and dangling symlinks,
+> and so these are no longer allowed.
+
+#### `MkdirAll` ####
+
+```go
+func MkdirAll(root, unsafePath string, mode int) error
+func MkdirAllHandle(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode int) (*os.File, error)
+```
+
+`MkdirAll` is a much safer version of
+
+```go
+path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+err = os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
+```
+
+that protects against the same kinds of races that `OpenInRoot` protects
+against.
+
+`MkdirAllHandle` is like `MkdirAll` except that the root is provided using an
+`*os.File` (the reason for this is the same as with `OpenatInRoot`) and an
+`*os.File` of the final created directory is returned (this directory is
+guaranteed to be effectively identical to the directory created by
+`MkdirAllHandle`, which is not possible to ensure by just using `OpenatInRoot`
+after `MkdirAll`).
+
+> **NOTE**: Unlike `SecureJoin`, `MkdirAll` will error out as soon as it hits
+> a dangling symlink or non-existent path. This is in contrast to `SecureJoin`
+> which treated non-existent components as though they were real directories,
+> and would allow for partial resolution of dangling symlinks. These behaviours
+> are at odds with how Linux treats non-existent paths and dangling symlinks,
+> and so these are no longer allowed. This means that `MkdirAll` will not
+> create non-existent directories referenced by a dangling symlink.
+
 ### License ###
 
 The license of this project is the same as Go, which is a BSD 3-clause license
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/VERSION b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/VERSION
index 3a4036fb4..0d91a54c7 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/VERSION
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.2.5
+0.3.0
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/join.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/join.go
index 5ac23b998..bd86a48b0 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/join.go
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/join.go
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Docker Inc & Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Copyright (C) 2017 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright (C) 2017-2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ func IsNotExist(err error) bool {
 // replaced with symlinks on the filesystem) after this function has returned.
 // Such a symlink race is necessarily out-of-scope of SecureJoin.
 //
+// NOTE: Due to the above limitation, Linux users are strongly encouraged to
+// use OpenInRoot instead, which does safely protect against these kinds of
+// attacks. There is no way to solve this problem with SecureJoinVFS because
+// the API is fundamentally wrong (you cannot return a "safe" path string and
+// guarantee it won't be modified afterwards).
+//
 // Volume names in unsafePath are always discarded, regardless if they are
 // provided via direct input or when evaluating symlinks. Therefore:
 //
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/lookup_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/lookup_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..140ac18ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/lookup_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+type symlinkStackEntry struct {
+	// (dir, remainingPath) is what we would've returned if the link didn't
+	// exist. This matches what openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) would return in
+	// this case.
+	dir           *os.File
+	remainingPath string
+	// linkUnwalked is the remaining path components from the original
+	// Readlink which we have yet to walk. When this slice is empty, we
+	// drop the link from the stack.
+	linkUnwalked []string
+}
+
+func (se symlinkStackEntry) String() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("<%s>/%s [->%s]", se.dir.Name(), se.remainingPath, strings.Join(se.linkUnwalked, "/"))
+}
+
+func (se symlinkStackEntry) Close() {
+	_ = se.dir.Close()
+}
+
+type symlinkStack []*symlinkStackEntry
+
+func (s symlinkStack) IsEmpty() bool {
+	return len(s) == 0
+}
+
+func (s *symlinkStack) Close() {
+	for _, link := range *s {
+		link.Close()
+	}
+	// TODO: Switch to clear once we switch to Go 1.21.
+	*s = nil
+}
+
+var (
+	errEmptyStack         = errors.New("[internal] stack is empty")
+	errBrokenSymlinkStack = errors.New("[internal error] broken symlink stack")
+)
+
+func (s *symlinkStack) popPart(part string) error {
+	if s.IsEmpty() {
+		// If there is nothing in the symlink stack, then the part was from the
+		// real path provided by the user, and this is a no-op.
+		return errEmptyStack
+	}
+	tailEntry := (*s)[len(*s)-1]
+
+	// Double-check that we are popping the component we expect.
+	if len(tailEntry.linkUnwalked) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: trying to pop component %q of empty stack entry %s", errBrokenSymlinkStack, part, tailEntry)
+	}
+	headPart := tailEntry.linkUnwalked[0]
+	if headPart != part {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: trying to pop component %q but the last stack entry is %s (%q)", errBrokenSymlinkStack, part, tailEntry, headPart)
+	}
+
+	// Drop the component, but keep the entry around in case we are dealing
+	// with a "tail-chained" symlink.
+	tailEntry.linkUnwalked = tailEntry.linkUnwalked[1:]
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *symlinkStack) PopPart(part string) error {
+	if err := s.popPart(part); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, errEmptyStack) {
+			// Skip empty stacks.
+			err = nil
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Clean up any of the trailing stack entries that are empty.
+	for lastGood := len(*s) - 1; lastGood >= 0; lastGood-- {
+		entry := (*s)[lastGood]
+		if len(entry.linkUnwalked) > 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		entry.Close()
+		(*s) = (*s)[:lastGood]
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *symlinkStack) push(dir *os.File, remainingPath, linkTarget string) error {
+	// Split the link target and clean up any "" parts.
+	linkTargetParts := slices.DeleteFunc(
+		strings.Split(linkTarget, "/"),
+		func(part string) bool { return part == "" })
+
+	// Don't add a no-op link to the stack. You can't create a no-op link
+	// symlink, but if the symlink is /, partialLookupInRoot has already jumped to the
+	// root and so there's nothing more to do.
+	if len(linkTargetParts) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Copy the directory so the caller doesn't close our copy.
+	dirCopy, err := dupFile(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Add to the stack.
+	*s = append(*s, &symlinkStackEntry{
+		dir:           dirCopy,
+		remainingPath: remainingPath,
+		linkUnwalked:  linkTargetParts,
+	})
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *symlinkStack) SwapLink(linkPart string, dir *os.File, remainingPath, linkTarget string) error {
+	// If we are currently inside a symlink resolution, remove the symlink
+	// component from the last symlink entry, but don't remove the entry even
+	// if it's empty. If we are a "tail-chained" symlink (a trailing symlink we
+	// hit during a symlink resolution) we need to keep the old symlink until
+	// we finish the resolution.
+	if err := s.popPart(linkPart); err != nil {
+		if !errors.Is(err, errEmptyStack) {
+			return err
+		}
+		// Push the component regardless of whether the stack was empty.
+	}
+	return s.push(dir, remainingPath, linkTarget)
+}
+
+func (s *symlinkStack) PopTopSymlink() (*os.File, string, bool) {
+	if s.IsEmpty() {
+		return nil, "", false
+	}
+	tailEntry := (*s)[0]
+	*s = (*s)[1:]
+	return tailEntry.dir, tailEntry.remainingPath, true
+}
+
+// partialLookupInRoot tries to lookup as much of the request path as possible
+// within the provided root (a-la RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) and opens the final existing
+// component of the requested path, returning a file handle to the final
+// existing component and a string containing the remaining path components.
+func partialLookupInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (_ *os.File, _ string, Err error) {
+	unsafePath = filepath.ToSlash(unsafePath) // noop
+
+	// This is very similar to SecureJoin, except that we operate on the
+	// components using file descriptors. We then return the last component we
+	// managed open, along with the remaining path components not opened.
+
+	// Try to use openat2 if possible.
+	if hasOpenat2() {
+		return partialLookupOpenat2(root, unsafePath)
+	}
+
+	// Get the "actual" root path from /proc/self/fd. This is necessary if the
+	// root is some magic-link like /proc/$pid/root, in which case we want to
+	// make sure when we do checkProcSelfFdPath that we are using the correct
+	// root path.
+	logicalRootPath, err := procSelfFdReadlink(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("get real root path: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	currentDir, err := dupFile(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("clone root fd: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if Err != nil {
+			_ = currentDir.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// symlinkStack is used to emulate how openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) treats
+	// dangling symlinks. If we hit a non-existent path while resolving a
+	// symlink, we need to return the (dir, remainingPath) that we had when we
+	// hit the symlink (treating the symlink as though it were a regular file).
+	// The set of (dir, remainingPath) sets is stored within the symlinkStack
+	// and we add and remove parts when we hit symlink and non-symlink
+	// components respectively. We need a stack because of recursive symlinks
+	// (symlinks that contain symlink components in their target).
+	//
+	// Note that the stack is ONLY used for book-keeping. All of the actual
+	// path walking logic is still based on currentPath/remainingPath and
+	// currentDir (as in SecureJoin).
+	var symlinkStack symlinkStack
+	defer symlinkStack.Close()
+
+	var (
+		linksWalked   int
+		currentPath   string
+		remainingPath = unsafePath
+	)
+	for remainingPath != "" {
+		// Save the current remaining path so if the part is not real we can
+		// return the path including the component.
+		oldRemainingPath := remainingPath
+
+		// Get the next path component.
+		var part string
+		if i := strings.IndexByte(remainingPath, '/'); i == -1 {
+			part, remainingPath = remainingPath, ""
+		} else {
+			part, remainingPath = remainingPath[:i], remainingPath[i+1:]
+		}
+		// Skip any "//" components.
+		if part == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Apply the component lexically to the path we are building.
+		// currentPath does not contain any symlinks, and we are lexically
+		// dealing with a single component, so it's okay to do a filepath.Clean
+		// here.
+		nextPath := path.Join("/", currentPath, part)
+		// If we logically hit the root, just clone the root rather than
+		// opening the part and doing all of the other checks.
+		if nextPath == "/" {
+			if err := symlinkStack.PopPart(part); err != nil {
+				return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into root with part %q failed: %w", part, err)
+			}
+			// Jump to root.
+			rootClone, err := dupFile(root)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("clone root fd: %w", err)
+			}
+			_ = currentDir.Close()
+			currentDir = rootClone
+			currentPath = nextPath
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Try to open the next component.
+		nextDir, err := openatFile(currentDir, part, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+		switch {
+		case err == nil:
+			st, err := nextDir.Stat()
+			if err != nil {
+				_ = nextDir.Close()
+				return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("stat component %q: %w", part, err)
+			}
+
+			switch st.Mode() & os.ModeType {
+			case os.ModeDir:
+				// If we are dealing with a directory, simply walk into it.
+				_ = currentDir.Close()
+				currentDir = nextDir
+				currentPath = nextPath
+
+				// The part was real, so drop it from the symlink stack.
+				if err := symlinkStack.PopPart(part); err != nil {
+					return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into directory %q failed: %w", part, err)
+				}
+
+				// If we are operating on a .., make sure we haven't escaped.
+				// We only have to check for ".." here because walking down
+				// into a regular component component cannot cause you to
+				// escape. This mirrors the logic in RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, except we
+				// have to check every ".." rather than only checking after a
+				// rename or mount on the system.
+				if part == ".." {
+					// Make sure the root hasn't moved.
+					if err := checkProcSelfFdPath(logicalRootPath, root); err != nil {
+						return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("root path moved during lookup: %w", err)
+					}
+					// Make sure the path is what we expect.
+					fullPath := logicalRootPath + nextPath
+					if err := checkProcSelfFdPath(fullPath, currentDir); err != nil {
+						return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into %q had unexpected result: %w", part, err)
+					}
+				}
+
+			case os.ModeSymlink:
+				// We don't need the handle anymore.
+				_ = nextDir.Close()
+
+				// Unfortunately, we cannot readlink through our handle and so
+				// we need to do a separate readlinkat (which could race to
+				// give us an error if the attacker swapped the symlink with a
+				// non-symlink).
+				linkDest, err := readlinkatFile(currentDir, part)
+				if err != nil {
+					if errors.Is(err, unix.EINVAL) {
+						// The part was not a symlink, so assume that it's a
+						// regular file. It is possible for it to be a
+						// directory (if an attacker is swapping a directory
+						// and non-directory at this subpath) but erroring out
+						// here is better anyway.
+						err = fmt.Errorf("%w: path component %q is invalid: %w", errPossibleAttack, part, unix.ENOTDIR)
+					}
+					return nil, "", err
+				}
+
+				linksWalked++
+				if linksWalked > maxSymlinkLimit {
+					return nil, "", &os.PathError{Op: "partialLookupInRoot", Path: logicalRootPath + "/" + unsafePath, Err: unix.ELOOP}
+				}
+
+				// Swap out the symlink's component for the link entry itself.
+				if err := symlinkStack.SwapLink(part, currentDir, oldRemainingPath, linkDest); err != nil {
+					return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into symlink %q failed: push symlink: %w", part, err)
+				}
+
+				// Update our logical remaining path.
+				remainingPath = linkDest + "/" + remainingPath
+				// Absolute symlinks reset any work we've already done.
+				if path.IsAbs(linkDest) {
+					// Jump to root.
+					rootClone, err := dupFile(root)
+					if err != nil {
+						return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("clone root fd: %w", err)
+					}
+					_ = currentDir.Close()
+					currentDir = rootClone
+					currentPath = "/"
+				}
+			default:
+				// For any other file type, we can't walk further and so we've
+				// hit the end of the lookup. The handling is very similar to
+				// ENOENT from openat(2), except that we return a handle to the
+				// component we just walked into (and we drop the component
+				// from the symlink stack).
+				_ = currentDir.Close()
+
+				// The part existed, so drop it from the symlink stack.
+				if err := symlinkStack.PopPart(part); err != nil {
+					return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into non-directory %q failed: %w", part, err)
+				}
+
+				// If there are any remaining components in the symlink stack,
+				// we are still within a symlink resolution and thus we hit a
+				// dangling symlink. So pretend that the first symlink in the
+				// stack we hit was an ENOENT (to match openat2).
+				if oldDir, remainingPath, ok := symlinkStack.PopTopSymlink(); ok {
+					_ = nextDir.Close()
+					return oldDir, remainingPath, nil
+				}
+
+				// The current component exists, so return it.
+				return nextDir, remainingPath, nil
+			}
+
+		case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist):
+			// If there are any remaining components in the symlink stack, we
+			// are still within a symlink resolution and thus we hit a dangling
+			// symlink. So pretend that the first symlink in the stack we hit
+			// was an ENOENT (to match openat2).
+			if oldDir, remainingPath, ok := symlinkStack.PopTopSymlink(); ok {
+				_ = currentDir.Close()
+				return oldDir, remainingPath, nil
+			}
+			// We have hit a final component that doesn't exist, so we have our
+			// partial open result. Note that we have to use the OLD remaining
+			// path, since the lookup failed.
+			return currentDir, oldRemainingPath, nil
+
+		default:
+			return nil, "", err
+		}
+	}
+	// All of the components existed!
+	return currentDir, "", nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/mkdir_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/mkdir_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..05e0bde9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/mkdir_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+var (
+	errInvalidMode    = errors.New("invalid permission mode")
+	errPossibleAttack = errors.New("possible attack detected")
+)
+
+// MkdirAllHandle is equivalent to MkdirAll, except that it is safer to use in
+// two respects:
+//
+//   - The caller provides the root directory as an *os.File (preferably O_PATH)
+//     handle. This means that the caller can be sure which root directory is
+//     being used. Note that this can be emulated by using /proc/self/fd/... as
+//     the root path with MkdirAll.
+//
+//   - Once all of the directories have been created, an *os.File (O_PATH) handle
+//     to the directory at unsafePath is returned to the caller. This is done in
+//     an effectively-race-free way (an attacker would only be able to swap the
+//     final directory component), which is not possible to emulate with
+//     MkdirAll.
+//
+// In addition, the returned handle is obtained far more efficiently than doing
+// a brand new lookup of unsafePath (such as with SecureJoin or openat2) after
+// doing MkdirAll. If you intend to open the directory after creating it, you
+// should use MkdirAllHandle.
+func MkdirAllHandle(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
+	// Make sure there are no os.FileMode bits set.
+	if mode&^0o7777 != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for mkdir 0o%.3o", errInvalidMode, mode)
+	}
+
+	// Try to open as much of the path as possible.
+	currentDir, remainingPath, err := partialLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("find existing subpath of %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if Err != nil {
+			_ = currentDir.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// If there is an attacker deleting directories as we walk into them,
+	// detect this proactively. Note this is guaranteed to detect if the
+	// attacker deleted any part of the tree up to currentDir.
+	//
+	// Once we walk into a dead directory, partialLookupInRoot would not be
+	// able to walk further down the tree (directories must be empty before
+	// they are deleted), and if the attacker has removed the entire tree we
+	// can be sure that anything that was originally inside a dead directory
+	// must also be deleted and thus is a dead directory in its own right.
+	//
+	// This is mostly a quality-of-life check, because mkdir will simply fail
+	// later if the attacker deletes the tree after this check.
+	if err := isDeadInode(currentDir); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("finding existing subpath of %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
+	}
+
+	// Re-open the path to match the O_DIRECTORY reopen loop later (so that we
+	// always return a non-O_PATH handle). We also check that we actually got a
+	// directory.
+	if reopenDir, err := Reopen(currentDir, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC); errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot create subdirectories in %q: %w", currentDir.Name(), unix.ENOTDIR)
+	} else if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-opening handle to %q: %w", currentDir.Name(), err)
+	} else {
+		currentDir = reopenDir
+	}
+
+	remainingParts := strings.Split(remainingPath, string(filepath.Separator))
+	if slices.Contains(remainingParts, "..") {
+		// The path contained ".." components after the end of the "real"
+		// components. We could try to safely resolve ".." here but that would
+		// add a bunch of extra logic for something that it's not clear even
+		// needs to be supported. So just return an error.
+		//
+		// If we do filepath.Clean(remainingPath) then we end up with the
+		// problem that ".." can erase a trailing dangling symlink and produce
+		// a path that doesn't quite match what the user asked for.
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: yet-to-be-created path %q contains '..' components", unix.ENOENT, remainingPath)
+	}
+
+	// Make sure the mode doesn't have any type bits.
+	mode &^= unix.S_IFMT
+	// What properties do we expect any newly created directories to have?
+	var (
+		// While umask(2) is a per-thread property, and thus this value could
+		// vary between threads, a functioning Go program would LockOSThread
+		// threads with different umasks and so we don't need to LockOSThread
+		// for this entire mkdirat loop (if we are in the locked thread with a
+		// different umask, we are already locked and there's nothing for us to
+		// do -- and if not then it doesn't matter which thread we run on and
+		// there's nothing for us to do).
+		expectedMode = uint32(unix.S_IFDIR | (mode &^ getUmask()))
+
+		// We would want to get the fs[ug]id here, but we can't access those
+		// from userspace. In practice, nobody uses setfs[ug]id() anymore, so
+		// just use the effective [ug]id (which is equivalent to the fs[ug]id
+		// for programs that don't use setfs[ug]id).
+		expectedUid = uint32(unix.Geteuid())
+		expectedGid = uint32(unix.Getegid())
+	)
+
+	// Create the remaining components.
+	for _, part := range remainingParts {
+		switch part {
+		case "", ".":
+			// Skip over no-op paths.
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// NOTE: mkdir(2) will not follow trailing symlinks, so we can safely
+		// create the finaly component without worrying about symlink-exchange
+		// attacks.
+		if err := unix.Mkdirat(int(currentDir.Fd()), part, uint32(mode)); err != nil {
+			err = &os.PathError{Op: "mkdirat", Path: currentDir.Name() + "/" + part, Err: err}
+			// Make the error a bit nicer if the directory is dead.
+			if err2 := isDeadInode(currentDir); err2 != nil {
+				err = fmt.Errorf("%w (%w)", err, err2)
+			}
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		// Get a handle to the next component. O_DIRECTORY means we don't need
+		// to use O_PATH.
+		var nextDir *os.File
+		if hasOpenat2() {
+			nextDir, err = openat2File(currentDir, part, &unix.OpenHow{
+				Flags:   unix.O_NOFOLLOW | unix.O_DIRECTORY | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
+				Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH | unix.RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | unix.RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
+			})
+		} else {
+			nextDir, err = openatFile(currentDir, part, unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		_ = currentDir.Close()
+		currentDir = nextDir
+
+		// Make sure that the directory matches what we expect. An attacker
+		// could have swapped the directory between us making it and opening
+		// it. There's no way for us to be sure that the directory is
+		// _precisely_ the same as the directory we created, but if we are in
+		// an empty directory with the same owner and mode as the one we
+		// created then there is nothing the attacker could do with this new
+		// directory that they couldn't do with the old one.
+		if stat, err := fstat(currentDir); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("check newly created directory: %w", err)
+		} else {
+			if stat.Mode != expectedMode {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: newly created directory %q has incorrect mode 0o%.3o (expected 0o%.3o)", errPossibleAttack, currentDir.Name(), stat.Mode, expectedMode)
+			}
+			if stat.Uid != expectedUid || stat.Gid != expectedGid {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: newly created directory %q has incorrect owner %d:%d (expected %d:%d)", errPossibleAttack, currentDir.Name(), stat.Uid, stat.Gid, expectedUid, expectedGid)
+			}
+			// Check that the directory is empty. We only need to check for
+			// a single entry, and we should get EOF if the directory is
+			// empty.
+			_, err := currentDir.Readdirnames(1)
+			if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+				if err == nil {
+					err = fmt.Errorf("%w: newly created directory %q is non-empty", errPossibleAttack, currentDir.Name())
+				}
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("check if newly created directory %q is empty: %w", currentDir.Name(), err)
+			}
+			// Reset the offset.
+			_, _ = currentDir.Seek(0, unix.SEEK_SET)
+		}
+	}
+	return currentDir, nil
+}
+
+// MkdirAll is a race-safe alternative to the Go stdlib's os.MkdirAll function,
+// where the new directory is guaranteed to be within the root directory (if an
+// attacker can move directories from inside the root to outside the root, the
+// created directory tree might be outside of the root but the key constraint
+// is that at no point will we walk outside of the directory tree we are
+// creating).
+//
+// Effectively, MkdirAll(root, unsafePath, mode) is equivalent to
+//
+//	path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+//	err := os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
+//
+// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
+// can modify the filesystem tree between SecureJoin and MkdirAll, it is
+// possible for MkdirAll to resolve unsafe symlink components and create
+// directories outside of the root.
+//
+// If you plan to open the directory after you have created it or want to use
+// an open directory handle as the root, you should use MkdirAllHandle instead.
+// This function is a wrapper around MkdirAllHandle.
+//
+// NOTE: The mode argument must be set the unix mode bits (unix.S_I...), not
+// the Go generic mode bits (os.Mode...).
+func MkdirAll(root, unsafePath string, mode int) error {
+	rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer rootDir.Close()
+
+	f, err := MkdirAllHandle(rootDir, unsafePath, mode)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_ = f.Close()
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/open_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/open_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21700612c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/open_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// OpenatInRoot is equivalent to OpenInRoot, except that the root is provided
+// using an *os.File handle, to ensure that the correct root directory is used.
+func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
+	handle, remainingPath, err := partialLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if remainingPath != "" {
+		_ = handle.Close()
+		return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "securejoin.OpenInRoot", Path: unsafePath, Err: unix.ENOENT}
+	}
+	return handle, nil
+}
+
+// OpenInRoot safely opens the provided unsafePath within the root.
+// Effectively, OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath) is equivalent to
+//
+//	path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+//	handle, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
+//
+// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
+// can modify the filesystem tree between SecureJoin and OpenFile, it is
+// possible for the returned file to be outside of the root.
+//
+// Note that the returned handle is an O_PATH handle, meaning that only a very
+// limited set of operations will work on the handle. This is done to avoid
+// accidentally opening an untrusted file that could cause issues (such as a
+// disconnected TTY that could cause a DoS, or some other issue). In order to
+// use the returned handle, you can "upgrade" it to a proper handle using
+// Reopen.
+func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
+	rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rootDir.Close()
+	return OpenatInRoot(rootDir, unsafePath)
+}
+
+// Reopen takes an *os.File handle and re-opens it through /proc/self/fd.
+// Reopen(file, flags) is effectively equivalent to
+//
+//	fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", file.Fd())
+//	os.OpenFile(fdPath, flags|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
+//
+// But with some extra hardenings to ensure that we are not tricked by a
+// maliciously-configured /proc mount. While this attack scenario is not
+// common, in container runtimes it is possible for higher-level runtimes to be
+// tricked into configuring an unsafe /proc that can be used to attack file
+// operations. See CVE-2019-19921 for more details.
+func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
+	procRoot, err := getProcRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
+	fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("fd/%d", handle.Fd())
+	return doProcSelfMagiclink(procRoot, fdPath, func(procDirHandle *os.File, base string) (*os.File, error) {
+		// Rather than just wrapping openatFile, open-code it so we can copy
+		// handle.Name().
+		reopenFd, err := unix.Openat(int(procDirHandle.Fd()), base, flags, 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("reopen fd %d: %w", handle.Fd(), err)
+		}
+		return os.NewFile(uintptr(reopenFd), handle.Name()), nil
+	})
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat2_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat2_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc93db864
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat2_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+var (
+	hasOpenat2Bool bool
+	hasOpenat2Once sync.Once
+
+	testingForceHasOpenat2 *bool
+)
+
+func hasOpenat2() bool {
+	if testing.Testing() && testingForceHasOpenat2 != nil {
+		return *testingForceHasOpenat2
+	}
+	hasOpenat2Once.Do(func() {
+		fd, err := unix.Openat2(unix.AT_FDCWD, ".", &unix.OpenHow{
+			Flags:   unix.O_PATH | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
+			Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
+		})
+		if err == nil {
+			hasOpenat2Bool = true
+			_ = unix.Close(fd)
+		}
+	})
+	return hasOpenat2Bool
+}
+
+func scopedLookupShouldRetry(how *unix.OpenHow, err error) bool {
+	// RESOLVE_IN_ROOT (and RESOLVE_BENEATH) can return -EAGAIN if we resolve
+	// ".." while a mount or rename occurs anywhere on the system. This could
+	// happen spuriously, or as the result of an attacker trying to mess with
+	// us during lookup.
+	//
+	// In addition, scoped lookups have a "safety check" at the end of
+	// complete_walk which will return -EXDEV if the final path is not in the
+	// root.
+	return how.Resolve&(unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT|unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH) != 0 &&
+		(errors.Is(err, unix.EAGAIN) || errors.Is(err, unix.EXDEV))
+}
+
+const scopedLookupMaxRetries = 10
+
+func openat2File(dir *os.File, path string, how *unix.OpenHow) (*os.File, error) {
+	fullPath := dir.Name() + "/" + path
+	// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
+	how.Flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
+	var tries int
+	for tries < scopedLookupMaxRetries {
+		fd, err := unix.Openat2(int(dir.Fd()), path, how)
+		if err != nil {
+			if scopedLookupShouldRetry(how, err) {
+				// We retry a couple of times to avoid the spurious errors, and
+				// if we are being attacked then returning -EAGAIN is the best
+				// we can do.
+				tries++
+				continue
+			}
+			return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat2", Path: fullPath, Err: err}
+		}
+		// If we are using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, the name we generated may be wrong.
+		// NOTE: The procRoot code MUST NOT use RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, otherwise
+		//       you'll get infinite recursion here.
+		if how.Resolve&unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT == unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT {
+			if actualPath, err := rawProcSelfFdReadlink(fd); err == nil {
+				fullPath = actualPath
+			}
+		}
+		return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), fullPath), nil
+	}
+	return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat2", Path: fullPath, Err: errPossibleAttack}
+}
+
+// partialLookupOpenat2 is an alternative implementation of
+// partialLookupInRoot, using openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) to more safely get a
+// handle to the deepest existing child of the requested path within the root.
+func partialLookupOpenat2(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, string, error) {
+	// TODO: Implement this as a git-bisect-like binary search.
+
+	unsafePath = filepath.ToSlash(unsafePath) // noop
+	endIdx := len(unsafePath)
+	for endIdx > 0 {
+		subpath := unsafePath[:endIdx]
+
+		handle, err := openat2File(root, subpath, &unix.OpenHow{
+			Flags:   unix.O_PATH | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
+			Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT | unix.RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+		})
+		if err == nil {
+			// Jump over the slash if we have a non-"" remainingPath.
+			if endIdx < len(unsafePath) {
+				endIdx += 1
+			}
+			// We found a subpath!
+			return handle, unsafePath[endIdx:], nil
+		}
+		if errors.Is(err, unix.ENOENT) || errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR) {
+			// That path doesn't exist, let's try the next directory up.
+			endIdx = strings.LastIndexByte(subpath, '/')
+			continue
+		}
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("open subpath: %w", err)
+	}
+	// If we couldn't open anything, the whole subpath is missing. Return a
+	// copy of the root fd so that the caller doesn't close this one by
+	// accident.
+	rootClone, err := dupFile(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	return rootClone, unsafePath, nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..949fb5f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+func dupFile(f *os.File) (*os.File, error) {
+	fd, err := unix.FcntlInt(f.Fd(), unix.F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fcntl(F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC)", err)
+	}
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), f.Name()), nil
+}
+
+func openatFile(dir *os.File, path string, flags int, mode int) (*os.File, error) {
+	// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
+	flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
+	fd, err := unix.Openat(int(dir.Fd()), path, flags, uint32(mode))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
+	}
+	// All of the paths we use with openatFile(2) are guaranteed to be
+	// lexically safe, so we can use path.Join here.
+	fullPath := filepath.Join(dir.Name(), path)
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), fullPath), nil
+}
+
+func fstatatFile(dir *os.File, path string, flags int) (unix.Stat_t, error) {
+	var stat unix.Stat_t
+	if err := unix.Fstatat(int(dir.Fd()), path, &stat, flags); err != nil {
+		return stat, &os.PathError{Op: "fstatat", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
+	}
+	return stat, nil
+}
+
+func readlinkatFile(dir *os.File, path string) (string, error) {
+	size := 4096
+	for {
+		linkBuf := make([]byte, size)
+		n, err := unix.Readlinkat(int(dir.Fd()), path, linkBuf)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", &os.PathError{Op: "readlinkat", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
+		}
+		if n != size {
+			return string(linkBuf[:n]), nil
+		}
+		// Possible truncation, resize the buffer.
+		size *= 2
+	}
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/procfs_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/procfs_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..daac3f061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/procfs_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"strconv"
+	"sync"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+func fstat(f *os.File) (unix.Stat_t, error) {
+	var stat unix.Stat_t
+	if err := unix.Fstat(int(f.Fd()), &stat); err != nil {
+		return stat, &os.PathError{Op: "fstat", Path: f.Name(), Err: err}
+	}
+	return stat, nil
+}
+
+func fstatfs(f *os.File) (unix.Statfs_t, error) {
+	var statfs unix.Statfs_t
+	if err := unix.Fstatfs(int(f.Fd()), &statfs); err != nil {
+		return statfs, &os.PathError{Op: "fstatfs", Path: f.Name(), Err: err}
+	}
+	return statfs, nil
+}
+
+// The kernel guarantees that the root inode of a procfs mount has an
+// f_type of PROC_SUPER_MAGIC and st_ino of PROC_ROOT_INO.
+const (
+	procSuperMagic = 0x9fa0 // PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+	procRootIno    = 1      // PROC_ROOT_INO
+)
+
+func verifyProcRoot(procRoot *os.File) error {
+	if statfs, err := fstatfs(procRoot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	} else if statfs.Type != procSuperMagic {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect procfs root filesystem type 0x%x", errUnsafeProcfs, statfs.Type)
+	}
+	if stat, err := fstat(procRoot); err != nil {
+		return err
+	} else if stat.Ino != procRootIno {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect procfs root inode number %d", errUnsafeProcfs, stat.Ino)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+var (
+	hasNewMountApiBool bool
+	hasNewMountApiOnce sync.Once
+)
+
+func hasNewMountApi() bool {
+	hasNewMountApiOnce.Do(func() {
+		// All of the pieces of the new mount API we use (fsopen, fsconfig,
+		// fsmount, open_tree) were added together in Linux 5.1[1,2], so we can
+		// just check for one of the syscalls and the others should also be
+		// available.
+		//
+		// Just try to use open_tree(2) to open a file without OPEN_TREE_CLONE.
+		// This is equivalent to openat(2), but tells us if open_tree is
+		// available (and thus all of the other basic new mount API syscalls).
+		// open_tree(2) is most light-weight syscall to test here.
+		//
+		// [1]: merge commit 400913252d09
+		// [2]: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/153754740781.17872.7869536526927736855.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/>
+		fd, err := unix.OpenTree(-int(unix.EBADF), "/", unix.OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC)
+		if err == nil {
+			hasNewMountApiBool = true
+			_ = unix.Close(fd)
+		}
+	})
+	return hasNewMountApiBool
+}
+
+func fsopen(fsName string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
+	// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
+	flags |= unix.FSOPEN_CLOEXEC
+	fd, err := unix.Fsopen(fsName, flags)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fsopen "+fsName, err)
+	}
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "fscontext:"+fsName), nil
+}
+
+func fsmount(ctx *os.File, flags, mountAttrs int) (*os.File, error) {
+	// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
+	flags |= unix.FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC
+	fd, err := unix.Fsmount(int(ctx.Fd()), flags, mountAttrs)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fsmount "+ctx.Name(), err)
+	}
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "fsmount:"+ctx.Name()), nil
+}
+
+func newPrivateProcMount() (*os.File, error) {
+	procfsCtx, err := fsopen("proc", unix.FSOPEN_CLOEXEC)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer procfsCtx.Close()
+
+	// Try to configure hidepid=ptraceable,subset=pid if possible, but ignore errors.
+	_ = unix.FsconfigSetString(int(procfsCtx.Fd()), "hidepid", "ptraceable")
+	_ = unix.FsconfigSetString(int(procfsCtx.Fd()), "subset", "pid")
+
+	// Get an actual handle.
+	if err := unix.FsconfigCreate(int(procfsCtx.Fd())); err != nil {
+		return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fsconfig create procfs", err)
+	}
+	return fsmount(procfsCtx, unix.FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, unix.MS_RDONLY|unix.MS_NODEV|unix.MS_NOEXEC|unix.MS_NOSUID)
+}
+
+func openTree(dir *os.File, path string, flags uint) (*os.File, error) {
+	dirFd := -int(unix.EBADF)
+	dirName := "."
+	if dir != nil {
+		dirFd = int(dir.Fd())
+		dirName = dir.Name()
+	}
+	// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
+	flags |= unix.OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC
+	fd, err := unix.OpenTree(dirFd, path, flags)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "open_tree", Path: path, Err: err}
+	}
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), dirName+"/"+path), nil
+}
+
+func clonePrivateProcMount() (_ *os.File, Err error) {
+	// Try to make a clone without using AT_RECURSIVE if we can. If this works,
+	// we can be sure there are no over-mounts and so if the root is valid then
+	// we're golden. Otherwise, we have to deal with over-mounts.
+	procfsHandle, err := openTree(nil, "/proc", unix.OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
+	if err != nil || testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive(procfsHandle) {
+		procfsHandle, err = openTree(nil, "/proc", unix.OPEN_TREE_CLONE|unix.AT_RECURSIVE)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating a detached procfs clone: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if Err != nil {
+			_ = procfsHandle.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+	if err := verifyProcRoot(procfsHandle); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return procfsHandle, nil
+}
+
+func privateProcRoot() (*os.File, error) {
+	if !hasNewMountApi() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("new mount api: %w", unix.ENOTSUP)
+	}
+	// Try to create a new procfs mount from scratch if we can. This ensures we
+	// can get a procfs mount even if /proc is fake (for whatever reason).
+	procRoot, err := newPrivateProcMount()
+	if err != nil || testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTree(procRoot) {
+		// Try to clone /proc then...
+		procRoot, err = clonePrivateProcMount()
+	}
+	return procRoot, err
+}
+
+var (
+	procRootHandle *os.File
+	procRootError  error
+	procRootOnce   sync.Once
+
+	errUnsafeProcfs = errors.New("unsafe procfs detected")
+)
+
+func unsafeHostProcRoot() (_ *os.File, Err error) {
+	procRoot, err := os.OpenFile("/proc", unix.O_PATH|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if Err != nil {
+			_ = procRoot.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+	if err := verifyProcRoot(procRoot); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return procRoot, nil
+}
+
+func doGetProcRoot() (*os.File, error) {
+	procRoot, err := privateProcRoot()
+	if err != nil || testingForceGetProcRootUnsafe(procRoot) {
+		// Fall back to using a /proc handle if making a private mount failed.
+		// If we have openat2, at least we can avoid some kinds of over-mount
+		// attacks, but without openat2 there's not much we can do.
+		procRoot, err = unsafeHostProcRoot()
+	}
+	return procRoot, err
+}
+
+func getProcRoot() (*os.File, error) {
+	procRootOnce.Do(func() {
+		procRootHandle, procRootError = doGetProcRoot()
+	})
+	return procRootHandle, procRootError
+}
+
+var (
+	haveProcThreadSelf     bool
+	haveProcThreadSelfOnce sync.Once
+)
+
+type procThreadSelfCloser func()
+
+// procThreadSelf returns a handle to /proc/thread-self/<subpath> (or an
+// equivalent handle on older kernels where /proc/thread-self doesn't exist).
+// Once finished with the handle, you must call the returned closer function
+// (runtime.UnlockOSThread). You must not pass the returned *os.File to other
+// Go threads or use the handle after calling the closer.
+//
+// This is similar to ProcThreadSelf from runc, but with extra hardening
+// applied and using *os.File.
+func procThreadSelf(procRoot *os.File, subpath string) (_ *os.File, _ procThreadSelfCloser, Err error) {
+	haveProcThreadSelfOnce.Do(func() {
+		// If the kernel doesn't support thread-self, it doesn't matter which
+		// /proc handle we use.
+		_, err := fstatatFile(procRoot, "thread-self", unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+		haveProcThreadSelf = (err == nil)
+	})
+
+	// We need to lock our thread until the caller is done with the handle
+	// because between getting the handle and using it we could get interrupted
+	// by the Go runtime and hit the case where the underlying thread is
+	// swapped out and the original thread is killed, resulting in
+	// pull-your-hair-out-hard-to-debug issues in the caller.
+	runtime.LockOSThread()
+	defer func() {
+		if Err != nil {
+			runtime.UnlockOSThread()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Figure out what prefix we want to use.
+	threadSelf := "thread-self/"
+	if !haveProcThreadSelf || testingForceProcSelfTask() {
+		/// Pre-3.17 kernels don't have /proc/thread-self, so do it manually.
+		threadSelf = "self/task/" + strconv.Itoa(unix.Gettid()) + "/"
+		if _, err := fstatatFile(procRoot, threadSelf, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); err != nil || testingForceProcSelf() {
+			// In this case, we running in a pid namespace that doesn't match
+			// the /proc mount we have. This can happen inside runc.
+			//
+			// Unfortunately, there is no nice way to get the correct TID to
+			// use here because of the age of the kernel, so we have to just
+			// use /proc/self and hope that it works.
+			threadSelf = "self/"
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Grab the handle.
+	var (
+		handle *os.File
+		err    error
+	)
+	if hasOpenat2() {
+		// We prefer being able to use RESOLVE_NO_XDEV if we can, to be
+		// absolutely sure we are operating on a clean /proc handle that
+		// doesn't have any cheeky overmounts that could trick us (including
+		// symlink mounts on top of /proc/thread-self). RESOLVE_BENEATH isn't
+		// stricly needed, but just use it since we have it.
+		//
+		// NOTE: /proc/self is technically a magic-link (the contents of the
+		//       symlink are generated dynamically), but it doesn't use
+		//       nd_jump_link() so RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS allows it.
+		//
+		// NOTE: We MUST NOT use RESOLVE_IN_ROOT here, as openat2File uses
+		//       procSelfFdReadlink to clean up the returned f.Name() if we use
+		//       RESOLVE_IN_ROOT (which would lead to an infinite recursion).
+		handle, err = openat2File(procRoot, threadSelf+subpath, &unix.OpenHow{
+			Flags:   unix.O_PATH | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
+			Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH | unix.RESOLVE_NO_XDEV | unix.RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errUnsafeProcfs, err)
+		}
+	} else {
+		handle, err = openatFile(procRoot, threadSelf+subpath, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errUnsafeProcfs, err)
+		}
+		defer func() {
+			if Err != nil {
+				_ = handle.Close()
+			}
+		}()
+		// We can't detect bind-mounts of different parts of procfs on top of
+		// /proc (a-la RESOLVE_NO_XDEV), but we can at least be sure that we
+		// aren't on the wrong filesystem here.
+		if statfs, err := fstatfs(handle); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		} else if statfs.Type != procSuperMagic {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect /proc/self/fd filesystem type 0x%x", errUnsafeProcfs, statfs.Type)
+		}
+	}
+	return handle, runtime.UnlockOSThread, nil
+}
+
+var (
+	hasStatxMountIdBool bool
+	hasStatxMountIdOnce sync.Once
+)
+
+func hasStatxMountId() bool {
+	hasStatxMountIdOnce.Do(func() {
+		var (
+			stx unix.Statx_t
+			// We don't care which mount ID we get. The kernel will give us the
+			// unique one if it is supported.
+			wantStxMask uint32 = unix.STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE | unix.STATX_MNT_ID
+		)
+		err := unix.Statx(-int(unix.EBADF), "/", 0, int(wantStxMask), &stx)
+		hasStatxMountIdBool = (err == nil && (stx.Mask&wantStxMask != 0))
+	})
+	return hasStatxMountIdBool
+}
+
+func checkSymlinkOvermount(dir *os.File, path string) error {
+	// If we don't have statx(STATX_MNT_ID*) support, we can't do anything.
+	if !hasStatxMountId() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var (
+		stx unix.Statx_t
+		// We don't care which mount ID we get. The kernel will give us the
+		// unique one if it is supported.
+		wantStxMask uint32 = unix.STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE | unix.STATX_MNT_ID
+	)
+
+	// Get the mntId of our procfs handle.
+	err := unix.Statx(int(dir.Fd()), "", unix.AT_EMPTY_PATH, int(wantStxMask), &stx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &os.PathError{Op: "statx", Path: dir.Name(), Err: err}
+	}
+	if stx.Mask&wantStxMask == 0 {
+		// It's not a kernel limitation, for some reason we couldn't get a
+		// mount ID. Assume it's some kind of attack.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: could not get mnt id of dir %s", errUnsafeProcfs, dir.Name())
+	}
+	expectedMountId := stx.Mnt_id
+
+	// Get the mntId of the target symlink.
+	stx = unix.Statx_t{}
+	err = unix.Statx(int(dir.Fd()), path, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, int(wantStxMask), &stx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return &os.PathError{Op: "statx", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
+	}
+	if stx.Mask&wantStxMask == 0 {
+		// It's not a kernel limitation, for some reason we couldn't get a
+		// mount ID. Assume it's some kind of attack.
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: could not get mnt id of symlink %s", errUnsafeProcfs, path)
+	}
+	gotMountId := stx.Mnt_id
+
+	// As long as the directory mount is alive, even with wrapping mount IDs,
+	// we would expect to see a different mount ID here. (Of course, if we're
+	// using unsafeHostProcRoot() then an attaker could change this after we
+	// did this check.)
+	if expectedMountId != gotMountId {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: symlink %s/%s has an overmount obscuring the real link (mount ids do not match %d != %d)", errUnsafeProcfs, dir.Name(), path, expectedMountId, gotMountId)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func doProcSelfMagiclink[T any](procRoot *os.File, subPath string, fn func(procDirHandle *os.File, base string) (T, error)) (T, error) {
+	// We cannot operate on the magic-link directly with a handle, we need to
+	// create a handle to the parent of the magic-link and then do
+	// single-component operations on it.
+	dir, base := filepath.Dir(subPath), filepath.Base(subPath)
+
+	procDirHandle, closer, err := procThreadSelf(procRoot, dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return *new(T), fmt.Errorf("get safe /proc/thread-self/%s handle: %w", dir, err)
+	}
+	defer procDirHandle.Close()
+	defer closer()
+
+	// Try to detect if there is a mount on top of the symlink we are about to
+	// read. If we are using unsafeHostProcRoot(), this could change after we
+	// check it (and there's nothing we can do about that) but for
+	// privateProcRoot() this should be guaranteed to be safe (at least since
+	// Linux 5.12[1], when anonymous mount namespaces were completely isolated
+	// from external mounts including mount propagation events).
+	//
+	// [1]: Linux commit ee2e3f50629f ("mount: fix mounting of detached mounts
+	// onto targets that reside on shared mounts").
+	if err := checkSymlinkOvermount(procDirHandle, base); err != nil {
+		return *new(T), fmt.Errorf("check safety of %s proc magiclink: %w", subPath, err)
+	}
+	return fn(procDirHandle, base)
+}
+
+func doRawProcSelfFdReadlink(procRoot *os.File, fd int) (string, error) {
+	fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("fd/%d", fd)
+	return doProcSelfMagiclink(procRoot, fdPath, readlinkatFile)
+}
+
+func rawProcSelfFdReadlink(fd int) (string, error) {
+	procRoot, err := getProcRoot()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return doRawProcSelfFdReadlink(procRoot, fd)
+}
+
+func procSelfFdReadlink(f *os.File) (string, error) {
+	return rawProcSelfFdReadlink(int(f.Fd()))
+}
+
+var (
+	errPossibleBreakout = errors.New("possible breakout detected")
+	errInvalidDirectory = errors.New("wandered into deleted directory")
+	errDeletedInode     = errors.New("cannot verify path of deleted inode")
+)
+
+func isDeadInode(file *os.File) error {
+	// If the nlink of a file drops to 0, there is an attacker deleting
+	// directories during our walk, which could result in weird /proc values.
+	// It's better to error out in this case.
+	stat, err := fstat(file)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("check for dead inode: %w", err)
+	}
+	if stat.Nlink == 0 {
+		err := errDeletedInode
+		if stat.Mode&unix.S_IFMT == unix.S_IFDIR {
+			err = errInvalidDirectory
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w %q", err, file.Name())
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func getUmask() int {
+	// umask is a per-thread property, but it is inherited by children, so we
+	// need to lock our OS thread to make sure that no other goroutine runs in
+	// this thread and no goroutines are spawned from this thread until we
+	// revert to the old umask.
+	//
+	// We could parse /proc/self/status to avoid this get-set problem, but
+	// /proc/thread-self requires LockOSThread anyway, so there's no real
+	// benefit over just using umask(2).
+	runtime.LockOSThread()
+	umask := unix.Umask(0)
+	unix.Umask(umask)
+	runtime.UnlockOSThread()
+	return umask
+}
+
+func checkProcSelfFdPath(path string, file *os.File) error {
+	if err := isDeadInode(file); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	actualPath, err := procSelfFdReadlink(file)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("get path of handle: %w", err)
+	}
+	if actualPath != path {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: handle path %q doesn't match expected path %q", errPossibleBreakout, actualPath, path)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/testing_mocks_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/testing_mocks_linux.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a25d08e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/testing_mocks_linux.go
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package securejoin
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type forceGetProcRootLevel int
+
+const (
+	forceGetProcRootDefault             forceGetProcRootLevel = iota
+	forceGetProcRootOpenTree                                  // force open_tree()
+	forceGetProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive                       // force open_tree(AT_RECURSIVE)
+	forceGetProcRootUnsafe                                    // force open()
+)
+
+var testingForceGetProcRoot *forceGetProcRootLevel
+
+func testingCheckClose(check bool, f *os.File) bool {
+	if check {
+		if f != nil {
+			_ = f.Close()
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTree(f *os.File) bool {
+	return testing.Testing() && testingForceGetProcRoot != nil &&
+		testingCheckClose(*testingForceGetProcRoot >= forceGetProcRootOpenTree, f)
+}
+
+func testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive(f *os.File) bool {
+	return testing.Testing() && testingForceGetProcRoot != nil &&
+		testingCheckClose(*testingForceGetProcRoot >= forceGetProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive, f)
+}
+
+func testingForceGetProcRootUnsafe(f *os.File) bool {
+	return testing.Testing() && testingForceGetProcRoot != nil &&
+		testingCheckClose(*testingForceGetProcRoot >= forceGetProcRootUnsafe, f)
+}
+
+type forceProcThreadSelfLevel int
+
+const (
+	forceProcThreadSelfDefault forceProcThreadSelfLevel = iota
+	forceProcSelfTask
+	forceProcSelf
+)
+
+var testingForceProcThreadSelf *forceProcThreadSelfLevel
+
+func testingForceProcSelfTask() bool {
+	return testing.Testing() && testingForceProcThreadSelf != nil &&
+		*testingForceProcThreadSelf >= forceProcSelfTask
+}
+
+func testingForceProcSelf() bool {
+	return testing.Testing() && testingForceProcThreadSelf != nil &&
+		*testingForceProcThreadSelf >= forceProcSelf
+}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/vfs.go b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/vfs.go
index a82a5eae1..6e27c7dd8 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/vfs.go
+++ b/vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/vfs.go
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2017 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright (C) 2017-2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt
index f46ccb275..9972afb31 100644
--- a/vendor/modules.txt
+++ b/vendor/modules.txt
@@ -242,8 +242,8 @@ github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22/dbus
 # github.com/cyberphone/json-canonicalization v0.0.0-20231217050601-ba74d44ecf5f
 ## explicit
 github.com/cyberphone/json-canonicalization/go/src/webpki.org/jsoncanonicalizer
-# github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.5
-## explicit; go 1.13
+# github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.0
+## explicit; go 1.20
 github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin
 # github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc
 ## explicit