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cryptlib.asn
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cryptlib.asn
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-/ This specification makes one slight deviation from standard ASN.1 syntax
to overcome an annoyance in ASN.1 which requires a separate -- at the
start of each and every line of comment. Instead, this specification uses
-//- comment delimiters (which work like C's /**/) in place of standard
ASN.1 delimiters /-
cryptlib DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- PKCS #7 Data Formats --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ There are several variants of the PKCS #7/S/MIME/CMS format which gradually
get more flexible (but not necessarily better) over time. The initial
format was PKCS #7 1.5 and earlier, 1.6 was a quick update which changed a
number of SETs to SEQUENCEs (which don't require sorting of the encoded
components), this doesn't appear to have been used by anything. S/MIME 3/
CMS was an extended form of S/MIME 2 which fiddled with some of the inner
fields but was mostly the same as PKCS #7 1.5. 1.5 is a significant
improvement on most of its successors /-
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL
}
-/ Raw data /-
Data ::= OCTET STRING -- PKCS #7 1
-/ Authenticated data: Digested, signed, MAC'd data /-
DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #7 5
version INTEGER (0), -- PKCS #7 v1.5
digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,-- v=2 for non id-Data
encapContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
content [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
},
digest OCTET STRING
}
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #7 2
version INTEGER (1), -- PKCS #7 v1.5
digestAlgorithms SET OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
encapContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
content [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
certificates [0] SET OF Certificate,
signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo
}
AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #9 16 1 2
version INTEGER (0), -- S/MIME v3
recipientInfos SET OF RecipientInfo,
macAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
encapContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
content [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
authAttrs [1] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
mac OCTET STRING
unauthAttrs [2] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
}
-/ Encrypted data: Raw encrypted, enveloped /-
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #7 6
version INTEGER (0), -- PKCS #7 v1.5
encrContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
contentEncrAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier,
content [0] OCTET STRING
}
}
EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #7 3
version INTEGER (0), -- PKCS #7 v1.5, v=2 for origInfo
recipientInfos SET OF RecipientInfo,
encrContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
contentEncrAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier,
content [0] OCTET STRING
},
unauthAttrs [1] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
}
-/ Combined encrypted + authenticated data /-
AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #9 16 1 23
version INTEGER (0), -- CMS
recipientInfos SET OF RecipientInfo,
encrContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data/Sig/Encr/Env,
contentEncrAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier,
content [0] OCTET STRING
},
authAttrs [1] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
mac OCTET STRING
unauthAttrs [2] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- Key Management --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ The parameters used to derive the conventional encryption key from the
user key. Usually we use the key directly, but sometimes it may have
been derived from a longer user key, which is encoded in this record /-
PBKDF2 ::= SEQUENCE { -- PKCS #5v2 key setup parameters
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier (pkcs-5 12),
params SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING, -- Key setup salt
iterationCount -- Key setup iterations
INTEGER (1..MAX),
}
}
-/ CMS key transport information /-
KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -- CMS - S/MIME
version INTEGER (0), -- CMS
issuerAndSerial IssuerAndSerialNumber, -- Encrypting certificate
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Encryption algorithm
encryptedKey OCTET STRING -- Encryped key
}
KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -- CMS - cryptlib
version INTEGER (2), -- CMS
keyID [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- Key ID of encrypting key
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Encryption algorithm
encryptedKey OCTET STRING -- Encrypted key
}
-/ CMS key agreement information, which is officially called
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo but in order for it to make sense it really needs
to be named FortezzaRecipientInfo /-
FortezzaRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -- CMS - S/MIME
version INTEGER (3), -- CMS
originator [0] EXPLICIT [ 0 ] SubjectKeyIdentifier,-- Originator pub.key
ukm [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Nonce, Ra
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Fortezza key wrap OID
recipientKeys SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
rKeyId [0] SEQUENCE { SubjectKeyIdentifier }, -- Recip.pubk
encryptedKey OCTET STRING -- Encr.key info, TEK( MEK )
}
}
-/ CMS conventional key transport information. This structure is somewhat
misnamed since it's really just a kludge to work with pre-distributed
shared RC2 or 3DES keys for S/MIME-based mailing lists and not a general-
purpose KEK object, however by using the PWRI AlgorithmIdentifier for
KEKRI we can turn it into a general-purpose key transport mechanism /-
KEKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (4), -- CMS
kekid SEQUENCE {
keyIdent OCTET STRING -- Magic ID for KEK
},
keyEncAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Key wrap algorithm
encryptedKey OCTET STRING -- Encrypted key
}
-/ CMS password-based key transport information. This is also misnamed since
it's actually general-purpose and does what KEKRecipientInfo should do /-
PasswordRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (0), -- CMS
keyDerivationAlgorithm -- KEK derivation algorithm,
[0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- PBKDF2 if present
keyEncryptionAlgorithm -- KEK algorithm
AlgorithmIdentifier, -- PWRI-KEK
encryptedKey OCTET STRING
}
-/ CMS key management /-
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo, -- Public-key encrypted key
kari [1] FortezzaRecipientInfo, -- Fortezza key-agreement info
kekri [2] KEKRecipientInfo, -- Conventionally encrypted key
pwri [3] PasswordRecipientInfo -- Password-encrypted key
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- Signatures --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ CMS signature information /-
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -- CMS - S/MIME
version INTEGER (1), -- CMS
issuerAndSerial IssuerAndSerialNumber, -- Signing certificate
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Hash algorithm type
signedAttributes -- Authenticated attributes
[0] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm -- Signature algorithm type
AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature OCTET STRING -- The signature itself
unsignedAttrs -- Countersignature
[1] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { -- CMS - cryptlib
version INTEGER (3), -- CMS
keyID [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- Key ID of signing key
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Hash algorithm type
signatureAlgorithm -- Signature algorithm type
AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature OCTET STRING -- The signature itself
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- Public/Private Keys --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ PKCS #15 uses a very object-oriented design that follows PKCS #11 and
uses a lot of the expressive power of ASN.1 in the specification of its
PDUs. The basic PKCS #15 object is defined as follows:
PKCS15Object( ClassAttributes, SubclassAttributes, TypeAttributes ) ->
SEQUENCE {
commonAttr CommonObjectAttributes,
classAttr ClassAttributes,
subclassAttr[0] SubclassAttributes OPTIONAL,
typeAttr [1] TypeAttributes
}
with the attributes being filled in on a per-object basis. Every object
contains common object attributes, and every key or certificate object
contains common key or cert class attributes. In addition the public and
private key subclasses contain subclass-specific attributes, but they
don't contain anything which isn't present elsewhere so they're omitted.
Note the explicit use of EXPLICIT tagging, this is required because dummy
parameters like TypeAttributes are always explict-tagged to ensure tag
uniqueness (it's like the CHOICE explicit-tag rule):
Key Cert
SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- CommonObjectAttr
label UTF8String,
...
},
SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE { -- ClassAttr
iD OCTET STRING, iD OCTET STRING,
usage BIT STRING, authority BOOLEAN DEF FALSE,
accessFlags BIT STRING OPTIONAL, trusted [1] SEQUENCE { usage BIT STR },
... keyID [2] SEQUENCE OF KeyID,
}, impTrust[3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
...
},
[0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE { -- SubclassAttr
... SEQUENCE OPTIONAL,
keyID [0] SEQUENCE OF KeyID,
...
} OPTIONAL,
[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE { -- TypeAttr
<data>
}
}
cryptlib config/user data
SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- CommonObjectAttr
label UTF8String,
...
},
SEQUENCE { -- ClassAttr
...
appOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER (cryptlib),
...
},
[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
<data>
}
} /-
PKCS15CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
label UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Object label
...
}
-/ Class attributes. Note that the validFrom/validTo attributes were
added for PKCS #11 support after the PKCS #15 / ISO 7816-15 split and
are for the PKCS #15 v1.2 spec /-
PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
iD OCTET STRING, -- Cross-reference to cert
usage BIT STRING, -- PKCS #11 usage flags
accessFlags BIT STRING b'01101' OPT,-- PKCS #11 access flags
validFrom GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
validTo [0] GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
...
}
PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
iD OCTET STRING, -- Cross-reference to key
authority BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, -- CA flag
dummy SEQUENCE {} OPTIONAL, -- Not used
dummy [0] SEQUENCE {} OPTIONAL, -- Not used
trusted [1] SEQUENCE {
keyUsage BIT STRING, -- Key usage cert is trusted for
...
} OPTIONAL,
keyID [2] SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL,
impTrust [3] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
validFrom GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
validTo [4] GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
...
}
PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
...
}
PKCS15CommonDataObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
applicationName UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- One or both must be present
applicationOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
iD OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
-/ Subclass attributes. These are required for public/private keys, for
which the ID information isn't present in the class attributes as it is
for certificates. Unfortunately the ID information also isn't present
in the public-key subclass attributes, which means that looking up a
raw public key by ID is impossible /-
PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
keyID [0] SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL,
...
}
-/ Key identifiers. Note that the pgp/openPGP IDs were added after the
PKCS #15 / ISO 7816-15 split and are for the PKCS #15 v1.2 spec /-
PKCS15KeyIdentifier ::= TYPED CHOICE {
iAndS SEQUENCE { -- Not written, conv.to iAndSHash on rd
id INTEGER (1),
value IssuerAndSerialNumber
},
subjectKeyID SEQUENCE { -- Only used if different from iD
id INTEGER (2),
value OCTET STRING
},
iAndSHash SEQUENCE { -- Written and read
id INTEGER (3),
value OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
},
iHash SEQUENCE { -- Written and read
id INTEGER (6),
value OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
},
sHash SEQUENCE { -- Written and read
id INTEGER (7),
value OCTET STRING SIZE(20)
},
pgp SEQUENCE { -- Written and read
id INTEGER (8),
value OCTET STRING SIZE(8)
},
openPGP SEQUENCE { -- Written and read
id INTEGER (9),
value OCTET STRING SIZE(8)
},
...
}
-/ Private key information (DLP = DSA/DH/KEA/etc) /-
PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
value [2] EnvelopedData {
SEQUENCE {
modulus [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- n, not written
publicExp [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- e, not written
privateExp [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- d, not written
prime1 [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- p
prime2 [4] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- q
exponent1 [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- d mod p-1
exponent2 [6] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- d mod q-1
coefficient [7] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- q^-1 mod p
}
},
modulusLength INTEGER,
...
}
PKCS15PrivateDLPKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
value [2] EnvelopedData {
INTEGER -- DSA x value
},
...
}
PKCS15PrivateKey ::= CHOICE {
privateRSAKey PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes, -- ClassAttr
PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes, -- SubclassAttr
PKCS15PrivateRSAKeyAttributes }, -- TypeAttr
privateDSAKey [2] PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
PKCS15PrivateDSAKeyAttributes }
}
-/ This expands out to:
SEQUENCE {
keyAttr PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
privKeyAttr PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
keyData [1] { SEQUENCE { [2] IMPLICIT { Enveloped key data } } }
}
Note that when the PKCS #15 keyset is being used as structured storage
for a crypto hardware device then the direct-protected option
'[2] EnvelopedData' is replaced by an indirect 'Path' reference, where:
Path ::= SEQUENCE {
path OCTET STRING
}
So the above would become:
SEQUENCE {
keyAttr PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
privKeyAttr PKCS15CommonPrivateKeyAttributes,
keyData [1] { SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE { OCTET STRING } } }
}
with the key components stored in the crypto hardware, referenced by the
value in the OCTET STRING /-
-/ Public key information (DLP = DSA/DH/KEA/etc) /-
PKCS15PublicRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
value [0] EXPLICIT {
[1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo
},
modulusLength INTEGER,
...
}
PKCS15PublicDLPKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
value [0] EXPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
...
}
PKCS15PublicKey ::= CHOICE {
publicRSAKey PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes, -- ClassAttr
PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes, -- SubclassAttr
PKCS15PublicRSAKeyAttributes }, -- TypeAttr
publicDSAKey [2] PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
PKCS15PublicDSAKeyAttributes }
}
-/ This expands out to:
SEQUENCE {
keyAttr PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
privKeyAttr PKCS15CommonPublicKeyAttributes,
keyData [1] { SEQUENCE { [0] { Public-key data } } }
} /-
-/ Certificate information /-
PKCS15X509CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
value [0] Certificate,
...
}
PKCS15Certificate ::= CHOICE {
x509Certificate PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes -- ClassAttr
NULL, -- SubclassAttr
PKCS15X509CertificateAttributes } -- TypeAttr
}
-/ This expands out to:
SEQUENCE {
certAttr PKCS15CommonCertificateAttributes,
classAttr NULL,
certData [1] { SEQUENCE { [0] IMPLICIT Certificate } }
} /-
-/ Secret key information /-
PKCS15GenericSecretKeyAttributes ::= {
value [2] EnvelopedData {
OCTET STRING -- Raw secret key
}
}
PKCS15SecretKey ::= CHOICE {
des3Key [4] PKCS15Object{ PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes, -- ClassAttr
PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes, -- SubclassAttr
PKCS15GenericSecretKeyAttributes },-- TypeAttr
}
-/ This expands out to:
SEQUENCE {
keyAttr PKCS15CommonKeyAttributes,
secKeyAttr PKCS15CommonSecretKeyAttributes,
keyData [1] { [2] { Enveloped key data } }
} /-
-/ Data information /-
ConfigOption ::= SEQUENCE {
type INTEGER, -- CRYPT_PROPERTY_xxx
value ANY DEFINED BY type -- BOOLEAN, INTEGER, UTF8String
}
ConfigOptions ::= SEQUENCE OF ConfigOption
UserIndexEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
iD OCTET STRING SIZE(16), -- User ID
creatorID OCTET STRING SIZE(16), -- Creating SO's ID
name UTF8String, -- User name
fileReference INTEGER -- Reference to user file
}
UserIndex ::= SEQUENCE OF UserIndexEntry
UserInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
role ENUMERATED, -- SO/user/CA
iD OCTET STRING SIZE(16), -- User ID
creatorID OCTET STRING SIZE(16), -- Creating SO's ID
name UTF8String, -- User name
}
// Other user data, has to be stored elsewhere
// state ENUMERATED, -- SO inited/user inited/locked
// encSecKey EncryptedData OPTIONAL -- (Used for CAs)
PKCS15OidDO ::= SEQUENCE {
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value ANY DEFINED BY type -- ConfigOptions/UserIndex/UserInfo
}
PKCS15Data ::= CHOICE {
oidDO [1] PKCS15Object { PKCS15CommonDataObjectAttributes,
NULL,
PKCS15OidDO }
}
-/ Overall object wrappers. The tagging is [n] PKCS15Objects.foo
[0] PKCS15ObjectValue.objects /-
PrivateKeys ::= [0][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15PrivateKey
PublicKeys ::= [1][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15PublicKey
SecretKeys ::= [3][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15SecretKey
Certificates ::= [4][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15Certificate
DataObjects ::= [7][0] SEQUENCE OF PKCS15Data
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- User/Config Info --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ User information /-
-/ PKI user information needed for CMP. The attributes always include an
sKID (to uniquely identify the user info) and optionally additional
template attributes that are applied to certificate(s) created for this
user. The dual use of the attributes is somewhat ugly, in theory we
could split the two into attributes required for PKI user management and
attributes to apply to the issued certificate, but because the only one
that's used for user management is the sKID it's easier to special-case
it in the cert handling code /-
userData ::= SEQUENCE {
name Name, -- Name for CMP
encAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier, -- Algo to encrypt passwords
encPW OCTET STRING, -- Encrypted passwords
attributes Attributes
}
userPW ::= SEQUENCE {
issuePW OCTET STRING SIZE(11), -- Password for ir
revPW OCTET STRING SIZE(11) -- Password for rr
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- Misc --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ OCSP /-
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- tbsRequest
version [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
-- Must be 1 if !certID used
reqName [1] EXPLICIT ... OPTIONAL
-- Ignored
SEQUENCE { -- requestList
SEQUENCE { -- request
certID CertID,
singleReqExt
[0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
}
},
reqExts [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
},
signature [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
sigAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier,
sig BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
} OPTIONAL
}
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
respStatus ENUMERATED, -- 0 = OK
respBytes [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
respType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- id-pkix-ocsp-basic
resp OCTET STRING {
SEQUENCE { -- basicOCSPResponse
SEQUENCE { -- tbsRespData
version [0] EXPLICIT ... OPTIONAL,-- Ignored
respID ..., -- Ignored
producedAt ..., -- Ignored
responses SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- singleResponse
certID ..., -- Ignored
certStatus [0] EXPLICIT = OK, else !OK
... -- Ignored
}
},
respExts[0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
}
sigAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
}
}
}
}
CertID ::= CHOICE {
certID SEQUENCE {
hashAlgo AlgorithmIdentifier,
iNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuerName
iKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer SPKI w/o tag+len
serialNo INTEGER
},
issuerAndSerial [0] IssuerAndSerialNumber, -- OCSPv2 only
certificate [1] Certificate, -- OCSPv2 only
certHash [2] OCTET STRING -- OCSPv2 only
}
-/ RTCS /-
RTCSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- requests
SEQUENCE { -- requestTypeInfo
certHash
OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
}
attributes Attributes OPTIONAL,
}
}
RTCSResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- responseBasic/Extended
certHash
OCTET STRING SIZE(20),
status BOOLEAN -- For basic response
status ENUMERATED, -- For ext.response
[...], -- For ext.response
attributes
[0] Attributes OPTIONAL -- For ext.response
}
}
-/ Timestamping /-
TSARequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (1),
msgImprint SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hash OCTET STRING
},
policy OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
-- Ignored
nonce INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- Copy to output if present
includeSigCerts BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
-- Include signer certs if set
extensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL -- Reject if present
}
TSAResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE {
status INTEGER, -- 0 = OK
... OPTIONAL
},
timeStamp ContentInfo
}
TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (1),
policy OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
msgImprint SEQUENCE { ... } -- From request
serialNo INTEGER, -- Unique value
genTime GeneralizedTime, -- Current time
nonce INTEGER OPTIONAL -- From input if present
}
-/ PKCS #12. Note that what's deployed (and documented here) bears very
little resemblance to what's given in the specification /-
PFX ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (3),
authSafe SEQUENCE { -- ContentInfo
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
content [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
safeConts SEQUENCE OF {
CHOICE { -- Effectively a CHOICE
p12Data PKCS12Data, -- Data for encrypted keys
p12Encr PKCS12Encr -- EncrData for public keys
}
}
}
}
}
macData SEQUENCE {
mac SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
mac OCTET STRING
}
macSalt OCTET STRING,
iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 1 -- Usually set to 2,000
}
}
PKCS12Data ::= SEQUENCE { -- For encrypted private keys
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
content [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
safeContents SEQUENCE OF PKCS12Bag -- SIZE(1)
}
}
PKCS12Bag ::= SEQUENCE {
bagId OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag,
bagValue [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
encryptionAlgo SEQUENCE {
algo OBJECT IDENTIFIER pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC,
pbeParams SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
iters INTEGER
}
}
encryptedData OCTET STRING -- Encrypted PKCS #8
}
bagAttributes SET OF Attribute
}
PKCS8 ::= SEQUENCE { -- Within PKCS12Bag above
version INTEGER (0),
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
key SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (0),
keyValues ...
}
attributes [0] SET OF Attribute OPTIONAL
}
PKCS12Encr ::= SEQUENCE { -- For public certificates
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-EncryptedData,
content [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (0),
encContentInfo SEQUENCE {
contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-Data,
contentEncAlgo SEQUENCE {
algo OBJECT IDENTIFIER pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC,
pbeParams SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
iters INTEGER
}
}
encryptedData OCTET STRING -- Encrypted PKCS12CertBag
}
}
}
PKCS12CertBag ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -- Within PKCS12Enc above
bagId OBJECT IDENTIFIER pkcs12CertBag,
bagValue [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
certId OBJECT IDENTIFIER x509Certificate,
certValue [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING {
cert Certificate
}
}
bagAttributes SET OF Attribute
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- --
-- Certificate Mismanagement Protocol --
-- --
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/ "If an undergraduate student handed this in as an assignment I'd fail them
on the grounds that it shows a complete lack of understanding of the
principles of workable protocol design" /-
xxxRequest ::= SEQUENCE { -- ir/cr/kur, 3.3.1/3.3.3/3.3.5
header SEQUENCE { -- Profile = B8
version INTEGER (2),
sender [4] EXPLICIT DirectoryName, -- DN of subject
recipient [4] EXPLICIT DirectoryName, -- DN of CA
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16), -- Random
nonce [5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16), -- Random
},
body [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE { -- [2] in cr, [7] in kur
certReqMsg SEQUENCE { -- RFC 2510
SEQUENCE {
cReqID INTEGER (0),
cTemplate SEQUENCE {
validity[1] TIME OPTIONAL,
subject [5] EXPLICIT Name,
pubKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
exts [9] Extensions OPTIONAL
},
cControls SEQUENCE OF Attribute OPTIONAL -- Ignored
},
pop [1] EXPLICIT Signature -- From X.509, for sig.key
or pop [2] EXPLICIT [1] INTEGER (0)
-- For encr-only key
}
}
},
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- ir = MAC, cr/kur = SIG
}
xxxResponse ::= SEQUENCE { -- ip/cp/kup, 3.3.2/3.3.4/3.3.6
header SEQUENCE { -- Profile = B8
version INTEGER (2),
sender SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
recipient SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
messageTime [0] ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Must match previous
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
nonceX [5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Needed in CertConf
...
},
body [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE { -- [3] in cp, [8] in kup
caPubs [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {...} OPTIONAL,-- Ignored
response SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {
certReqID INTEGER (0),
status SEQUENCE { -- PKIStatusInfo, 3.2.3
status INTEGER,
statusStr SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL,
failInfo BIT STRING OPTIONAL
},
certKeyPair SEQUENCE { -- If status == 0 or 1
cert[0] EXPLICIT Certificate,
or encCert -- For encr-only key
[1] EXPLICIT EncryptedCert,
... -- Ignored
}
}
}
},
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- ip = MAC, cp/kup = SIG
}
CertConf ::= SEQUENCE { -- 3.3.18, profile = B8
header SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (2),
sender SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
recipient SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
messageTime [0] ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Must match previous
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
nonce [5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Random
nonceX [6] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Copied from InitResp
... -- Ignored
},
body [24] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING
certReqID INTEGER (0),
}
},
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- ix = MAC, cx/kux = SIG
}
Conf ::= SEQUENCE { -- 3.3.17, profile = B8
header SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (2),
sender SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
recipient SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
messageTime [0] ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Must match previous
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
... -- Ignored
},
body [19] EXPLICIT NULL,
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- ix = MAC, cx/kux = SIG
}
RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE { -- rr, 3.3.9
header SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (2),
sender [4] EXPLICIT DirectoryName, -- DN of subject
recipient [4] EXPLICIT DirectoryName, -- DN of CA
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16), -- Random
nonce [5] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16), -- Random
},
body [11] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
revDetails SEQUENCE {
cTemplate SEQUENCE { -- RFC 2510
serial [1] INTEGER,
issuer [3] EXPLICIT NAME
},
crlEntries Extensions OPTIONAL
}
},
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- MAC or SIG
}
RevResponse ::= SEQUENCE { -- rp, 3.3.10
header SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (2),
sender SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
recipient SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
messageTime [0] ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (PBMac),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Must match previous
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
... -- Ignored
},
body [12] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE { -- PKIStatusInfo, 3.2.3
status INTEGER,
statusStr SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL,
failInfo BIT STRING OPTIONAL
},
... -- Ignored
}
... -- Ignored
},
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- MAC or SIG
}
GenMsg ::= SEQUENCE { -- 3.3.19/3.3.20
header SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (2),
sender SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
recipient SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
messageTime [0] ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (sigAlgo),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Must match previous
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
... -- Ignored
},
body [21] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF {
SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
intoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
}
},
protection [0] EXPLICIT BIT STRING -- MAC or SIG
}
Error ::= SEQUENCE { -- 3.3.21
header SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER (2),
sender SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
recipient SEQUENCE {...}, -- Ignored
messageTime [0] ... OPTIONAL, -- Ignored
protAlgo [1] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier (sigAlgo),
protKeyID [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- Must match previous
transID [4] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (16),-- Must match previous
... -- Ignored
},
body [23] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {
status INTEGER,
SEQUENCE {