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Streamlined NTRU Prime: sntrup761 #23
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I'm neutral on this. |
I'd much rather see the NIST-selected algorithms added to and supported by the library. |
@mouse07410 There are some legitimate concerns in relation to NIST selected KEM algorithm:
As much as I can process all the available information, sntrup is the only post-quantum KEM that should be used (and it's used in SSH, btw), and that NIST-selected algorithm as standardised should not be used, at least not until the story gets resolved one way or another. EDIT: key sizes can vary, of course, but 761 seems to be the correct balance of performance/security for the majority of cases, and it's in public domain / submitted in Internet drafts - so no licensing limitations, like the one selected by NIST has. |
As a cryptographer, I respectfully disagree with the above post, and think that most of the info it's based on is, sadly, nothing but FUD. For example. Say, your RNG is broken or predictable. Is hash of a predictable/known value any less predictable/known? Re. Patent claims and other "allegations": first, the proponent of that concern has a horse in this race, which might impact his objectivity, just a tiny bit... Second, I've seen claims on NTRU too... Also, there are many other scientists that aren't on NIST payroll - shouldn't it bother you that there's only one, and likely biased, person voicing "legitimate concerns"? |
We will be adopting it for both remote access protocol and for double ratchet, it's here for now:
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/tree/xrcp/cbits
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/xrcp/src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/SNTRUP761/Bindings.hs
The source code for sntrup761 KEM and for hybrid shared secret construction are from referenced Internet drafts, so we could drop them into crypton if you want. All we did was Haskell bindings and newtypes. That would also help addressing the hack with DRG state, as crypton doesn't make it available, so we have to create closure with atomic access to DRG. If it's in crypton it could use some more efficient locking mechanism (although it probably won't make a huge difference).
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