diff --git a/mozilla_django_oidc/_jose.py b/mozilla_django_oidc/_jose.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..85ce21a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mozilla_django_oidc/_jose.py
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""
+Helpers for dealing with Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) in an OpenID
+Connect context.
+"""
+import json
+from typing import Dict, Any, TypeAlias, Union
+
+from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousOperation
+from django.utils.encoding import smart_bytes
+
+from josepy.jwk import JWK
+from josepy.jws import JWS
+
+# values could be narrowed down to relevant JSON types.
+Payload: TypeAlias = Dict[str, Any]
+
+
+def verify_jws_and_decode(
+    token: bytes,
+    key,
+    signing_algorithm: str = "",
+    decode_json: bool = False,  # for backwards compatibility reasons
+) -> Union[Payload, bytes]:
+    """
+    Cryptographically verify the passed in token and return the decoded payload.
+
+    Verification is done with utilities from the josepy library.
+
+    :arg token: the raw binary content of the JWT/token.
+    :arg key: the key to verify the signature with. This may be a key obtained from
+      the OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT or a shared key as a string (XXX CONFIRM THIS!)
+    :arg signing_algorithm: If provided, the token must employ this exact signing
+      algorithm. Values must be valid names from algorithms in :mod:`josepy.jwa`.
+    :arg decode_json: If true, the payload will be json-decoded and return a Python
+      object rather than a bytestring.
+    :return: the extracted payload object, deserialized from JSON.
+    :raises SuspiciousOperation: if the token verification fails.
+    """
+    jws = JWS.from_compact(token)
+
+    # validate the signing algorithm
+    if (alg := jws.signature.combined.alg) is None:
+        msg = "No alg value found in header"
+        raise SuspiciousOperation(msg)
+
+    if signing_algorithm and signing_algorithm != alg.name:
+        msg = (
+            "The provider algorithm {!r} does not match the client's "
+            "expected signing algorithm.".format(alg)
+        )
+        raise SuspiciousOperation(msg)
+
+    # one of the most common implementation weaknesses -> attacker can supply 'none'
+    # algorithm
+    # XXX: check if this is okay, technically users can now set
+    # settings.OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO = "none" and things should work?
+    if alg.name == "none":
+        raise SuspiciousOperation("'none' for alg value is not allowed")
+
+    # process the key parameter which was/may have been loaded from keys endpoint
+    if isinstance(key, str):
+        # Use smart_bytes here since the key string comes from settings.
+        jwk = JWK.load(smart_bytes(key))
+    else:
+        # The key is a json returned from the IDP JWKS endpoint.
+        jwk = JWK.from_json(key)
+        # address some missing upstream Self type declarations
+        assert isinstance(jwk, JWK)
+
+    if not jws.verify(jwk):
+        msg = "JWS token verification failed."
+        raise SuspiciousOperation(msg)
+
+    # return the decoded JSON or the raw bytestring payload
+    payload = jws.payload
+    if not decode_json:
+        return payload
+    else:
+        return json.loads(payload.decode("utf-8"))
diff --git a/mozilla_django_oidc/auth.py b/mozilla_django_oidc/auth.py
index f8243fe3..869a3346 100644
--- a/mozilla_django_oidc/auth.py
+++ b/mozilla_django_oidc/auth.py
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@
 from django.contrib.auth.backends import ModelBackend
 from django.core.exceptions import ImproperlyConfigured, SuspiciousOperation
 from django.urls import reverse
-from django.utils.encoding import force_bytes, smart_bytes, smart_str
+from django.utils.encoding import force_bytes, smart_str
 from django.utils.module_loading import import_string
 from josepy.b64 import b64decode
-from josepy.jwk import JWK
 from josepy.jws import JWS, Header
 from requests.auth import HTTPBasicAuth
 from requests.exceptions import HTTPError
 
 from mozilla_django_oidc.utils import absolutify, import_from_settings
+from ._jose import verify_jws_and_decode
 
 LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -127,33 +127,12 @@ def update_user(self, user, claims):
 
     def _verify_jws(self, payload, key):
         """Verify the given JWS payload with the given key and return the payload"""
-        jws = JWS.from_compact(payload)
-
-        try:
-            alg = jws.signature.combined.alg.name
-        except KeyError:
-            msg = "No alg value found in header"
-            raise SuspiciousOperation(msg)
-
-        if alg != self.OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO:
-            msg = (
-                "The provider algorithm {!r} does not match the client's "
-                "OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO.".format(alg)
-            )
-            raise SuspiciousOperation(msg)
-
-        if isinstance(key, str):
-            # Use smart_bytes here since the key string comes from settings.
-            jwk = JWK.load(smart_bytes(key))
-        else:
-            # The key is a json returned from the IDP JWKS endpoint.
-            jwk = JWK.from_json(key)
-
-        if not jws.verify(jwk):
-            msg = "JWS token verification failed."
-            raise SuspiciousOperation(msg)
-
-        return jws.payload
+        return verify_jws_and_decode(
+            token=payload,
+            key=key,
+            signing_algorithm=self.OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO,
+            decode_json=False,
+        )
 
     def retrieve_matching_jwk(self, token):
         """Get the signing key by exploring the JWKS endpoint of the OP."""