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deps: upgrade to openssl-1.0.1m
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All sources are just extracted from tarball into deps/openssl/openssl.
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Shigeki Ohtsu committed Mar 19, 2015
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361 changes: 82 additions & 279 deletions deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES
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OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________

Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015]

*) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix

The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
(CVE-2015-0286)
[Stephen Henson]

*) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix

Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.

Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
not affected.
(CVE-2015-0287)
[Stephen Henson]

*) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix

The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.

Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.

This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-0289)
[Emilia K�sper]

*) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix

A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.

This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K�sper
(OpenSSL development team).
(CVE-2015-0293)
[Emilia K�sper]

*) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix

A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
sources. This scenario is considered rare.

This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
commit 517073cd4b.
(CVE-2015-0209)
[Matt Caswell]

*) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix

The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.

This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
(CVE-2015-0288)
[Stephen Henson]

*) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
[Kurt Roeckx]

Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]

*) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
[Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte]

Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]

*) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
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Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]

*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.

This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/

Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K�sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K�sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]

*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]

*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]

*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]

[NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
OpenSSL 1.0.1.]

*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]

*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]

*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.

Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]

Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]

*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1813,228 +1838,6 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]

Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]

*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.

This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/

Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K�sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K�sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]

*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]

*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]

*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]

*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]

*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]

*) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
[Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]

Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]

*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.

Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]

Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]

*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
an MMA defence is not necessary.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
[Steve Henson]

*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]

*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]

Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]

*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
differences arising during decryption processing. A research
paper describing this attack can be found at:
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
[Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]

*) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
[Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]

*) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
(CVE-2011-4576)
[Adam Langley (Google)]

*) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
[Adam Langley (Google)]

*) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]

*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]

*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
[Emilia K�sper (Google)]

*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
[Adam Langley (Google)]

*) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.

This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
the last update always remained unused).
[Emilia K�sper (Google)]

*) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
[Adam Langley (Google)]

*) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
[Bodo Moeller]

*) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:

http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf

[Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]

Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]

*) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
[Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]

*) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
ambiguous.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]

*) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
[Steve Henson]

*) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
[Ben Laurie]

Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]

*) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
[Steve Henson]

*) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
[Steve Henson]

*) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
some broken encodings work correctly.
[Steve Henson]

*) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
is also one of the inputs.
[Emilia K�sper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]

*) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
etc are non-op.
[Steve Henson]

Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]

[NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
OpenSSL 1.0.0.]

*) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
[Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]

*) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
common in certificates and some applications which only call
SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
[Steve Henson]

*) VMS fixes:
Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
[Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]

Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]

*) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
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