diff --git a/peps/pep-0675.rst b/peps/pep-0675.rst
index 505b89f33f4..7dbd211b6b4 100644
--- a/peps/pep-0675.rst
+++ b/peps/pep-0675.rst
@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
 PEP: 675
 Title: Arbitrary Literal String Type
-Version: $Revision$
-Last-Modified: $Date$
 Author: Pradeep Kumar Srinivasan <gohanpra@gmail.com>, Graham Bleaney <gbleaney@gmail.com>
 Sponsor: Jelle Zijlstra <jelle.zijlstra@gmail.com>
 Discussions-To: https://mail.python.org/archives/list/typing-sig@python.org/thread/VB74EHNM4RODDFM64NEEEBJQVAUAWIAW/
 Status: Accepted
 Type: Standards Track
 Topic: Typing
-Content-Type: text/x-rst
 Created: 30-Nov-2021
 Python-Version: 3.11
 Post-History: 07-Feb-2022
@@ -50,7 +47,8 @@ However, the user-controlled data ``user_id`` is being mixed with the
 SQL command string, which means a malicious user could run arbitrary
 SQL commands:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: bad
 
     # Delete the table.
     query_user(conn, "user123; DROP TABLE data;")
@@ -883,7 +881,8 @@ or ``do_mark_safe`` in `Jinja2
 <https://github.com/pallets/jinja/blob/077b7918a7642ff6742fe48a32e54d7875140894/src/jinja2/filters.py#L1264>`_,
 which cause XSS vulnerabilities:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: bad
 
     dangerous_string = django.utils.safestring.mark_safe(f"<script>{user_input}</script>")
     return(dangerous_string)
@@ -891,7 +890,8 @@ which cause XSS vulnerabilities:
 This vulnerability could be prevented by updating ``mark_safe`` to
 only accept ``LiteralString``:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: good
 
     def mark_safe(s: LiteralString) -> str: ...
 
@@ -913,7 +913,8 @@ insert expressions which execute arbitrary code and `compromise
 <https://www.onsecurity.io/blog/server-side-template-injection-with-jinja2/>`_
 the application:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: bad
 
     malicious_str = "{{''.__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[408]('rm - rf /',shell=True)}}"
     template = jinja2.Template(malicious_str)
@@ -923,7 +924,8 @@ the application:
 Template injection exploits like this could be prevented by updating
 the ``Template`` API to only accept ``LiteralString``:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: good
 
     class Template:
         def __init__(self, source: LiteralString): ...
@@ -945,7 +947,8 @@ options which are vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks from
 externally controlled logging strings. The following example
 illustrates a simple denial of service scenario:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: bad
 
     external_string = "%(foo)999999999s"
     ...
@@ -957,7 +960,8 @@ string passed to the logger be a ``LiteralString`` and that all
 externally controlled data be passed separately as arguments (as
 proposed in `Issue 46200 <https://bugs.python.org/issue46200>`_):
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: good
 
     def info(msg: LiteralString, *args: object) -> None:
         ...
@@ -983,7 +987,8 @@ warnings about non-literal strings.
 4. Trivial functions could be constructed to convert a ``str`` to a
 ``LiteralString``:
 
-::
+.. code-block::
+   :class: bad
 
     def make_literal(s: str) -> LiteralString:
         letters: Dict[str, LiteralString] = {