diff --git a/crates/openssl-src/RUSTSEC-0000-0000.md b/crates/openssl-src/RUSTSEC-0000-0000.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19223f209
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+```toml
+[advisory]
+id = "RUSTSEC-0000-0000"
+package = "openssl-src"
+aliases = ["CVE-2023-0401"]
+categories = ["denial-of-service"]
+date = "2023-02-07"
+url = "https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230207.txt"
+[versions]
+patched = [">= 300.0.12"]
+unaffected = ["< 300.0.0"]
+```
+
+# `NULL` dereference during PKCS7 data verification
+
+A `NULL` pointer can be dereferenced when signatures are being
+verified on PKCS7 `signed` or `signedAndEnveloped` data. In case the hash
+algorithm used for the signature is known to the OpenSSL library but
+the implementation of the hash algorithm is not available the digest
+initialization will fail. There is a missing check for the return
+value from the initialization function which later leads to invalid
+usage of the digest API most likely leading to a crash.
+
+The unavailability of an algorithm can be caused by using FIPS
+enabled configuration of providers or more commonly by not loading
+the legacy provider.
+
+PKCS7 data is processed by the SMIME library calls and also by the
+time stamp (TS) library calls. The TLS implementation in OpenSSL does
+not call these functions however third party applications would be
+affected if they call these functions to verify signatures on untrusted
+data.