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+% Information Flow Control
+% Lecture by David Mazières
+% Scribed by Chris Copeland (chrisnc@stanford.edu)
+
+<!---
+A few things are copied from the actual lecture notes in places where my typing
+couldn't keep up (mainly code samples).
+-->
+
+# Safe Haskell
+
+* How can we incorporate untrusted code in our programs?
+
+* We often want to use 3rd party libraries (e.g., from Hackage), but we need to
+limit the damage they can do if they are malicious.
+
+## How do we decide whether code is safe?
+
+* We can't determine safety of functions just from type signatures.
+
+* `unsafePerformIO` and others can do nasty things without making the
+(potential) nastiness obvious in the type signature of the function.
+
+* We need some way to trust the type signature (pure functions should actually be pure).
+
+## Enter Safe Haskell
+
+* Prevents your modules from importing "unsafe" modules
+
+* Usage: `import safe ...`
+
+* Can invoke GHC with `-XSafe` to force all imports to be safe.
+
+* Forces compilation to fail if the import is not safe.
+
+## Trusting packages
+
+* Problem: useful modules often need to do "unsafe" operations, so we need a
+way of asserting the safety of these operations.
+
+* Module authors can compile with `-XTrustworthy`.
+    * Asserts that the module is safe.
+    * Does not restrict the module's implementation from doing unsafe things: `unsafePerformIO`, `inlinePerformIO`, etc.
+    * Forces the module to expose a safe interface.
+
+* How does this help? Can't anyone just use `-XTrustworthy`?
+
+* Users of these modules can decide whether to trust them.
+    * `-fpackage-trust` enables per-package trust.
+    * `-distrust` ignores `Trustworthy` for a specific package.
+    * `-distrust-all-packages` ignores `Trustworthy` for all packages.
+
+## Restricted I/O
+
+* What if untrusted code needs to do I/O (that cannot be hidden behind a pure interface)?
+
+* Implement "restricted" I/O with an `RIO` monad.
+    * Implement `RIO` functions for specific capabilities, and implicitly
+      disable all other forms of I/O by not implementing them for the `RIO` monad.
+    * Use `newtype` to wrap `RIO` around `IO`, and export the type, but not the constructor.
+    * Export `runRIO` to allow the `IO` action to be run, but this can only
+      happen in the `RIO` monad, and hence it is safe.
+    * Internally, the `RIO` implementation uses the `UnsafeRIO` constructor.
+    * This means a user can't take an `IO` action and turn it into an `RIO` action, but can take an
+      `RIO` action and turn it into an `IO` action, and therefore can only run `RIO` actions.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+runRIO :: RIO a -> IO a
+~~~
+
+Example: restrict access to particular network ports or files.
+
+This isn't possible in many other languages, where we are always implicitly in the
+`IO` monad.
+
+
+# Decentralized Information Flow Control
+
+## Why `RIO` isn't enough
+
+* How can we prevent leaking private data on a website while still using 3rd party libraries to
+manipulate that data?
+
+* Consider a malicious `googleTranslate` function.
+
+* We can use code that manipulates and stores private data in a sandbox, but the
+implementor might have created a backdoor that returns the contents of the
+sandbox when given a certain input.
+
+## Information Flow Control (IFC)
+
+* Military origins (managing classified data)
+* The basics:
+    * All data has a label.
+    * All processes have a label.
+    * The labels have a partial order: A "can flow to" B is denoted A ⊑ B.
+
+* Examples:
+    * If "file" ⊑ "emacs" then emacs can read the file.
+    * If "emacs" ⊑ "file" then emacs can write to the file.
+    * We often want both directions.
+
+* Access control is transitive (one of the properties of partial orders).
+
+* In IFC we have a lattice of labels.
+
+Consider two users.
+
+~~~
+public : L_0
+userA : L_A
+userB : L_B
+AandB : L_AB
+~~~
+
+`L_AB` is the least upper bound of `L_A` and `L_B`.
+
+## *Decentralized* Information Flow Control
+
+A DIFC system has a notion of privileges, which form a preorder on the "can flow to" (⊑)
+operator.
+
+Using privileges, users can declassify their own data and partially declassify data
+higher on the lattice.
+
+Under `A`'s privileges, the lattice collapses to (`L_0` + `L_A`) and (`L_B` + `L_AB`).
+
+Under `B`'s privileges, the lattice collapses to (`L_0` + `L_B`) and (`L_A` + `L_AB`).
+
+## Static implementation in Haskell
+
+Encode a two point lattice in the type system.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+data L = Lpriv
+data H = Hpriv
+~~~
+
+* Export types but not constructors.
+
+* Constructors act like "keys" that can deconstruct the value, which would let users
+circumvent the labels.
+
+Use a multi-parameter typeclass to implement (⊑).
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+-- multiparam typeclass extension
+class Flows sl sh where
+instance Flows L L
+instance Flows L H
+instance Flows H H
+
+newtype Sec s a = MkSec a
+instance Monad (Sec s) where
+    return x = MkSec x
+    MkSec a >>= k = k
+~~~
+
+Allow anyone to label a value but require the label's private constructor to
+unlabel.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+label :: a -> Sec s a
+label x = MkSec x
+unlabel :: Sec s a -> s -> a
+unlabel (MkSec a) s = s `seq` a -- need to force the privilege with seq, otherwise it won't be checked
+~~~
+
+There is only one valid value for each of the label types, namely the private
+constructor, so if we don't have access to it, we can't call `unlabel` without
+crashing (or just failing to compile). (We can pass `undefined` as the argument
+`s`, but `seq` will force it and crash.)
+
+Allow data to be relabeled if an instance of `Flows` exists for that ordered pair.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+relabel :: (Flows lin lout) => Sec lin a -> Sec lout a
+relabel (MkSec val) = MkSec val
+~~~
+
+## Secure I/O
+
+What if we need both the `Sec` and `IO` monads?
+
+Is this code safe?
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+untrustedTranslate :: Sec H L.ByteString -> Sec H (IO L.ByteString)
+~~~
+
+No, because the I/O action wrapped by `Sec` can be arbitrary, and might do
+nasty things if we run it.
+
+Solution: combine `Sec` and `RIO` into one monad, so that we can define what I/O is
+allowed in the secure context.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+value :: Sec s a -> SecIO s a
+value s a = MkSecIO (return sa)
+
+plug :: Less sl sh => SecIO sh a -> SecIO sl (Sec sh a)
+
+type File s = SecFilePath String
+
+readFileSecIO :: File s -> SecIO s' (Sec s String)
+~~~
+
+New safe external query type signature:
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+queryGoogle :: Sec H L.ByteString -> SecIO H L.ByteString
+~~~
+
+All enforcement done at compile time.
+
+## Dynamic DIFC with `LIO`
+
+* We may need to create new labels at runtime and enforce the DIFC properties on them.
+
+* Idea: track both the current label and maximum label or "clearance".
+
+* Associate an `LIOState` with each thread.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+data LIOState l = LIOSTate { lioLabel, lioClearance :: !l }
+
+newtype LIO l a = LIOTCB (IORef (LIOState l) -> IO a)
+
+instance Monad (LIO l) where
+    return = LIOTCB . const . return
+    (LIOTCB ma) >>= k = LIOTCB $ \s -> do
+        a <- ma
+        case k a of LIOTCB mb -> mb s
+
+
+-- need back door from IO to LIO for privileged code
+-- don't export this symbol
+ioTCB :: IO a -> LIO l a
+ioTCB = LIOTCB . const
+~~~
+
+(TCB = Trusted Computing Base)
+
+Encoding privileges:
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+class (Typeable p, Show p) => SpeaksFor p where
+    speaksFor :: p -> p -> Bool
+
+downgradeP -- compute lowest equivalent label under some privilege
+canFlowToP -- determine whether the downgrade of one label can flow to
+~~~
+
+How can we allow computation that encodes the fact that you have seen information
+with a particular label?
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+taint :: Label l => l -> LIO l ()
+~~~
+
+## Privileges vs. privilege descriptions
+
+* We want to be able to name privileges in any context.
+
+* There is an important difference between naming privileges and exercising them.
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+newtype Priv a = PrivTCB a deriving (Show, Eq, Typeable)
+
+instance Monoid p => Monoid (Priv p) where
+  mempty = PrivTCB mempty
+  mappend (PrivTCB m1) (PrivTCB m2) = PrivTCB $ m1 `mappend` m2
+
+privDesc :: Priv a -> a
+privDesc (PrivTCB a) = a
+
+privInit :: p -> IO (Priv p)
+privInit p = return $ PrivTCB p
+~~~
+
+* Can delegate privileges to someone else.
+
+* Can wrap privileges in closures.
+
+* Can use "Gates", which take privileges and return privilege descriptions, so
+someone can require you to have privileges to do something, without forcing
+you to delegate those privileges in order to prove that you have them.
+
+Augmenting normal I/O actions with labels:
+
+~~~ {.haskell}
+{-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-}
+
+import LIO.TCB.LObj
+
+type LMVar l a = LObj l (MVar a)
+
+takeLMVar :: Label l => LMVar l a -> LIO l a
+takeLMVar = blessTCB "takeLMVar" takeMVar
+
+tryTakeLMVar :: Label l => LMVar l a -> LIO l (Maybe a)
+tryTakeLMVar = blessTCB "tryTakeLMVar" tryTakeMVar
+
+putLMVar :: Label l => LMVar l a -> a -> LIO l ()
+putLMVar = blessTCB "putLMVar" putMVar
+~~~
+
+## Applications using `LIO`
+
+* Main application is Hails web framework
+    * Really a framework for creating web platforms hosting mutually distrustful apps
+* Example: GitStar (which is implemented with Hails)
+    * Host potentially private git repositories
+    * Functionality for third party extensions (e.g., syntax-highlighting) cannot leak private source code
+* Ongoing research here at Stanford
+