diff --git a/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-bash.sh b/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-bash.sh
index e364324..087861c 100755
--- a/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-bash.sh
+++ b/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-bash.sh
@@ -16,7 +16,21 @@ if [ -z "$command" ]; then
   exit 0
 fi
 
+# SECURITY: Check for command chaining/injection patterns FIRST
+# These checks must run before the "safe command" allowlist to prevent bypasses
+# like: echo $(rm -rf /), ls; malicious, pwd && evil, whoami | exfil
+# Note: This is not exhaustive - production hooks should consider additional
+# patterns like newlines (\n), null bytes (\x00), and shell-specific syntax
+# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # Single quotes intentional - matching literal $( and ` characters
+if [[ "$command" == *";"* ]] || [[ "$command" == *"|"* ]] ||
+   [[ "$command" == *'$('* ]] || [[ "$command" == *'`'* ]] ||
+   [[ "$command" == *"&&"* ]] || [[ "$command" == *"||"* ]]; then
+  echo '{"hookSpecificOutput": {"permissionDecision": "ask"}, "systemMessage": "Command chaining detected - requires review"}' >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
 # Check for obviously safe commands (quick approval)
+# IMPORTANT: This check is only safe because chaining patterns are caught above
 if [[ "$command" =~ ^(ls|pwd|echo|date|whoami)(\s|$) ]]; then
   exit 0
 fi
diff --git a/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-write.sh b/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-write.sh
index c4dde41..999a40e 100755
--- a/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-write.sh
+++ b/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/examples/validate-write.sh
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ if [ -z "$file_path" ]; then
 fi
 
 # Check for path traversal
+# NOTE: This basic check catches literal ".." but has limitations:
+# - Does not detect URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e)
+# - Cannot detect symlink-based traversal where resolved path escapes bounds
+# - Shell expansion could bypass in some contexts
+# For production hooks, consider using:
+#   resolved=$(realpath -m "$file_path" 2>/dev/null || echo "$file_path")
+# and comparing against an allowed directory prefix
 if [[ "$file_path" == *".."* ]]; then
   jq -n --arg path "$file_path" \
     '{"hookSpecificOutput": {"permissionDecision": "deny"}, "systemMessage": "Path traversal detected in: \($path)"}' >&2
diff --git a/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/references/migration.md b/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/references/migration.md
index 587cae3..f53c0fc 100644
--- a/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/references/migration.md
+++ b/plugins/plugin-dev/skills/hook-development/references/migration.md
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ input=$(cat)
 file_path=$(echo "$input" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path')
 
 # Check for path traversal
+# NOTE: This basic check catches literal ".." but has limitations:
+# - Does not detect URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e)
+# - Cannot detect symlink-based traversal where resolved path escapes bounds
+# - Shell expansion could bypass in some contexts
+# For production hooks, consider using:
+#   resolved=$(realpath -m "$file_path" 2>/dev/null || echo "$file_path")
+# and comparing against an allowed directory prefix
 if [[ "$file_path" == *".."* ]]; then
   echo '{"decision": "deny", "reason": "Path traversal detected"}' >&2
   exit 2