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If the client is a server-side application, it can easily set any origin it wants in the HTTP header. WAC has acl:origin used for access control; if it relies on an HTTP header, it can be very easily circumvented. The same applies to the trusted apps experiment if the server relies on the HTTP origin header.
An alternative relies on client identifiers; for example, Solid-OIDC sets an app claim in the issued ID Token. This doesn't work with dynamic client registration since client identifiers are ephemeral. ACP has acp:client matcher, and a similar proposal exists for WAC solid/web-access-control-spec#81
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Original issue from 2018 solid/web-access-control-spec#34
TL;DR
If the client is a server-side application, it can easily set any origin it wants in the HTTP header. WAC has
acl:origin
used for access control; if it relies on an HTTP header, it can be very easily circumvented. The same applies to the trusted apps experiment if the server relies on the HTTP origin header.An alternative relies on client identifiers; for example, Solid-OIDC sets an
app
claim in the issued ID Token. This doesn't work with dynamic client registration since client identifiers are ephemeral. ACP hasacp:client
matcher, and a similar proposal exists for WAC solid/web-access-control-spec#81The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: