diff --git a/src/pages/hegel/reference/the-mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process-section-1.mdx b/src/pages/hegel/reference/the-mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process-section-1.mdx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..faf96af4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/pages/hegel/reference/the-mechanical-process/the-formal-mechanical-process-section-1.mdx @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +--- +title: The Formal Mechanical Process, Section 1 +description: + Learn about the first section of the Formal Mechanical Process from Hegel's + Science of Logic +isArticle: true +authors: Ahilleas Rokni (2024) +editors: Filip Niklas (2024) +--- + +## (a) The Formal Mechanical Process: Section 1 + +The Mechanical Process in the Science of Logic consists of two headings: (a) The +Formal Mechanical Process and (b) The Real Mechanical Process. In this article, +I will deal with the first section of (a) The Formal Mechanical Process. + +The section begins with the following: “The mechanical process is the positing +of what is contained in the Notion of mechanism, and therefore, in the first +instance, of a _contradiction_” (Hegel 1991, 716). The “concept” of Mechanism is +the logical moment with which the section, A. The Mechanical Object finished. +The `mechanical object` is now a negative unity: the negativity of having the +identical determinateness to other mechanical objects whilst being indifferent +to them. This is the contradiction with which A. The Mechanical Object +concludes. This contradiction is now explored further in the (a) The Formal +Mechanical Process. + +Above, Hegel writes that it is the “positing” of the contradiction in the +`mechanical object` that gets the mechanical process started and it is worth +dwelling on this for a moment. Hegel explains that by “positing” he means, + +> It follows from the Notion just indicated that the interaction of objects +> takes the form of the _positing_ of the _identical_ relation of the objects. +> This consists merely in giving to the determinateness that is determined, the +> form of _universality_; this is _communication_, which does not involve +> transition into an opposite (Hegel 1991, 716). + +Thus, the “positing” is an expression of the logical interaction of objects that +relate to each other as identical. But where has this logical interaction come +from? If we cast our minds back to the conclusion of A. The Mechanical Object +[section-3](hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-3) we will recall that the +contradiction was more specifically conceptualised as a negative unity. This +negativity is the interaction of the `mechanical object` with another +`mechanical object` – whereby a `mechanical object` has both an identical +determinateness to another `mechanical object`, whilst being indifferent to it. + +The negativity of the contradiction, then, logically unfolds as the positing of +their identical determinateness. At this point, one might legitimately ask: why +is the first positing that of their identity and not that of their indifference +to each other? The answer must be: because it is their identity that binds them +into a relation with one another. It is because they have an identical +determinateness that there is a negative _unity_ in the first place, and it is +because of their identical determinateness that an interaction can take place. +Thus, the identical relation is posited. + +The logical result of this positing is that the identical determinateness of the +`mechanical objects` is itself determined. In other words, the logical structure +of that identity is posited and in being posited is hardened (determined) into +an actual moment between `mechanical objects`. Their identity is no longer just +one side of a contradiction, but it has its day in the Sun, it is determined as +a moment of what it is for the `mechanical object` to be in a formal mechanical +relation with another `mechanical object`. + +Accordingly, because their identity is determined, their relation takes the form +of a `universal` – there is nothing other than `mechanical objects` and these +`mechanical objects` relate to each other as identical.[^1] Hegel calls this +`communication` and, crucially, adds that it “does not involve transition into +an opposite” (Hegel 1991, 716). + +The `communication` between `mechanical objects` is a movement of identical +determinations, and so strictly speaking, there is no change from one thing to +something different. It is quite simply the identical determinateness that +exists between `mechanical objects` – a kind of ether of determinateness that +connects all objects together but does not affect them beyond connecting them. + +[^1]: See [first-paragraph](hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph). + +### Communication Between Objects + +Hegel then embarks on a remark that helpfully unpacks what he has in mind with +the logical determination of `communication`. He writes: + +> _Spiritual communication_, which moreover takes place in that element which is +> the universal in the form of universality, is explicitly an _ideal_ relation +> in which _a determinateness continues_ itself from one person into another +> unimpaired, and universalizes itself without any alteration whatever-as a +> scent freely spreads in the unresisting atmosphere. But even in communication +> between material objects, their determinateness _spreads_, so to speak, in a +> similarly ideal manner; personality is an infinitely more intense +> _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess (Hegel 1991, 716). + +The above paragraph provides a series of concrete instances of `communication`. +Crucially, the examples given are all of the kind of communication that occurs +between objects; Hegel makes the point to distinguish the kind of communication +between objects to something like personality, which “is an infinitely more +intense _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess” (Hegel 1991, 716). +This is an excellent opportunity to look closely at Hegel’s examples as they +provide a window into how he thinks about the real-world instances of the +logical development. If we spend a bit of time unpacking Hegel’s examples and +scrutinising their validity, we will get a clearer understanding of +communication its its technical sense and ontological status. + +Beginning with Hegel’s first example, that of a scent diffusing in an atmosphere +where there is no restriction on the diffusion of the scent. Why does Hegel +think that this is a helpful example of how `communication` is exemplified in +everyday life? At first glance, it makes sense. The way a scent freely diffuses +itself around an atmosphere so that the whole atmosphere smells of the scent is +reminiscent of the identical determinateness of the `mechanical object` that +leads to it becoming a universal. However, how _exactly_ are we supposed to +understand this? Is the mechanical process at work between the scented molecules +and the non-scented molecules, or is it just between the scented molecules? To +pose this question is, I think, to overstep the conceptual restrictions of +Mechanism and mechanistic thought. The distinction between a scented molecule +and a non-scented molecule does not obtain within a mechanistic framework +because, as `mechanical objects`, they do not have different determinations +(_i.e._ one is scented and the other is non-scented). Quite simply, scented +molecules and non-scented molecules have an identical determinateness. + +What the above example provides us with, is a way of thinking about the abstract +logical structure of `communication` in a concrete way. The diffusion of the +scent is the unimpeded movement of the identical determinateness of +`mechanical objects` and the fact that a scent will diffuse throughout a room +and thus universalises itself within the room - in the sense that the scent can +be smelt throughout the room. As such, Hegel's account of `communication` gives +a philosophical explanation for why a scent diffuses through a room. Note, a +philosophical explanation does not seek to provide the material causes for why a +scent diffuses in a room. It explains what the (onto-)logical reasons for scent +diffusion are. These ontological reasons are: all of the particles in a room are +treated as the same, they are all `mechanical objects`; and the diffusion of the +scent, then, is explained by the fact that the particles share an identical +determinateness - they are identical. + +A final note. This does not supplant a materialist explanation. Nor is it merely +a description of what is going on. The ontological reasons exist side-by-side +the materialist causes. The ontological reasons provide the conditions under +which the material causes can then find expression in the world. It is only +because particles or `mechanical objects` are identical to each other that the +diffusion of a scent in external reality can occur. Because, it is a +philosophical position to conceptualise all objects as identical - it is not +self-evident from the diversity of objects that we see around us. + +### Interlude: How does the Science of Logic relate to External Reality? (Rokni) + +A further philosophical conundrum poses itself. Above, I said that the +distinction between a scented molecule and a non-scented molecule does not +obtain within a mechanistic framework. This mode of thinking about how the +logical determinations are reflected in everyday occurrences suggests that the +same object can be thought of within a mechanistic framework, as well as other +frameworks. Take the human body,for example, one could conceive of it purely in +mechanistic terms and theorise of its processes in terms of cause and effect, or +one could conceive of it in organicist terms and conceive of its processes +differently. Now, what is crucial about this example is that it works because +mechanistic thinking is more reductive than organicist thinking – the reverse +would not be possible. One could not conceive of a rock within an organicist +framework. Thus, the possibility of an object to be conceived within a plurality +of frameworks requires that the object is open to reductionism. + +Now, a further thought. This does not mean that it is equally correct to +conceive of the same object through the prism of multiple frameworks. The human +body is an organic thing and so to conceive of it as a `mechanical object` is to +misconstrue it. It _can_ be done but you are failing to fully grasp what it is a +for a human body to be what it is. Let us hold onto this reflection and turn +back to the example of the diffusion of scent. Since we are within the realm of +Mechanism, the simplest way that we have to conceive of the scented and the +non-scented molecules is as `mechanical objects`[^2]. + +[^2]: + Of course, one could conceive of them as a `syllogism` or a `judgement`, but + then they would cease to be conceived of as objects. Instead, they would be + conceived of as concepts. It is plausible that one would have a more + accurate conception of them through a chemical framework, as found in + `Chemism`, which actually takes into account their different + determinateness. But for now, they are `mechanical objects` whose + determinateness is identical. + +### The Ideality of Communication + +Looking at the second half of the first paragraph of (a)The Formal Mechanical +Process, Hegel writes that: “But even in communication between material objects, +their determinateness spreads, so to speak, in a similarly ideal manner” (Hegel +1991, 716). When talking about the diffusion of scent amongst molecules one +might get the false impression that `communication` is the kind of process that +only works with ideal, non-material objects. Now, It looks as if in Hegel’s time +scent was thought to be transmitted in a non-material way. Obviously, this is no +longer the case, but Hegel’s point is clear: `communication` is an ideal process +that occurs between material objects. In other words, it is not just material +processes that occur between material objects. Here, Hegel is clearly going +against a materialist/mechanistic worldview whereby the only processes are +_material_ processes. Perhaps Hegel is thinking of forces and, perhaps more +specifically, the force of gravity as an example of `communication`. + +At the end of this long paragraph where Hegel gives examples of `communication`, +he expands on an important _logical_ dimension of this moment. He writes: + +> The formal totality of the object in general, which is indifferent to the +> determinateness and hence is not a self-determination, makes it +> undistinguished from the other object and thus renders the interaction +> primarily an unimpeded continuation of the determinateness of the one in the +> other (Hegel 1991, 716). + +`Communication` does not work simply because the determinateness between +`mechanical objects` is identical but also because they are indifferent to +determination. Their indifference means that the identical determinateness, in +other words, the determinateness that is _communicated_, continues from one +object to the other without any alteration in that determinateness. It just +continues exactly as it did from the beginning. Thus, not only does +`communication` begin from the identity of `mechanical objects` but it also +continues with that identity throughout the interaction. + +Hegel, then, concludes this section on `communication` with an analysis of how +it functions in the “spiritual sphere” (Hegel 1991, 716). By spiritual sphere, +Hegel has in mind the following: “Laws, morals, rational conceptions in general” +(Hegel 1991, 716). There are laws in a society, and these laws pervade (are +communicated) throughout society without any obstruction or alteration. The same +with morals, what a society takes to be right or wrong is immediately +communicated throughout the society and, again, there is no alteration of +morality (on a social level) as it goes from individual to individual.[^3] + +[^3]: + Of course, this is based on an understanding of individuals within a society + as mechanical objects that are part of mechanical processes. From this + paragraph alone, it is not clear whether Hegel thinks that laws or morals + are examples of `communication` or that he thinks that _they can be_ used or + expressed in the form of `communication`. I suspect that he thinks that the + proliferation of laws, customs, etc, are logically structured according to + `communication`. See (Ross, 2013). + +### How Communication is different to Intelligence + +Let us have a look at the first sentence of this paragraph to get a better +understanding of what Hegel is going for: + +> Now in the spiritual sphere there is an infinitely manifold content that is +> communicable; for being taken up into intelligence it receives this _form_ of +> universality in which it becomes communicable. But the universal that is such +> not merely through the form but in and for itself, is the _objective_ as such, +> both in the spiritual and in the material sphere; as against which the +> individuality of outer objects as well as of persons is an unessential element +> that can offer it no resistance (Hegel 1991, 716). + +The paragraph begins with an example that does not fall within the purview of +`communication` because it is concerned with “intelligence” (Hegel 1991, 716). +Intelligence, then, does not fall within the logical remit of Mechanism. If we +just focus on the text, however, intelligence has the effect of giving the form +of universality to a content and thereby making it communicable. There are 2 +logical steps to clarify here: (1) intelligence takes on a manifold content and +gives it the form of universality – a capacity that intelligence has, and (2) +intelligence is able to communicate the content _because_ it has the form of +universality, _i.e._ a communicated content, whether it be through the +`formal mechanical process` or through intelligence, must be universalised in +order to be communicated.[^4] + +[^4]: + It would be a fascinating thread of further research to explain exactly why + intelligence has the capacity to give the form of universality to manifold + content. I suspect that a good place to start for such an enquiry would be + the ‘Philosophy of Spirit’. + +This is in stark contrast to the kind of universalisable content that an +intelligence can try to communicate. As we saw above, the content of an +intelligence can be given the form of a universal, but the fact that it is not +in-and-for-itself a universal means that its content can be resisted, i.e. I am +not automatically within the remit of Kant’s conception of the moral law just +because it has the form of universality – my individuality has the power to +resist. It is not the case with the `formal mechanical process' where resistance +is not even an option. On a mechanistic conception of society, i.e. where +citizens and political institutions are conceived of as mechanical objects that +participate within the formal mechanical processes, there is quite simply total +and an automatic acquiescence to the moral law and/or the law. + +[^5]: See [first-paragraph](hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph).