diff --git i/stage0/src/lib.rs w/stage0/src/lib.rs
index 738e661129..eca200f99e 100644
--- i/stage0/src/lib.rs
+++ w/stage0/src/lib.rs
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ pub fn rust64_start<P: hal::Platform>() -> ! {
 
     P::early_initialize_platform();
     logging::init_logging::<P>();
-    log::info!("starting...");
+    log::info!("starting (no attestation)...");
     // Safety: we assume there won't be any other hardware devices using the fw_cfg
     // IO ports.
     let mut fwcfg = unsafe { fw_cfg::FwCfg::new(&BOOT_ALLOC) }.expect("fw_cfg device not found!");
@@ -196,11 +196,11 @@ pub fn rust64_start<P: hal::Platform>() -> ! {
 
     // Use the root derived key as the UDS (unique device secret) for deriving
     // sealing keys.
-    let mut uds: DerivedKey = P::get_derived_key().expect("couldn't get derived key");
+    //let mut uds: DerivedKey = P::get_derived_key().expect("couldn't get derived key");
 
-    let mut cdi = derive_sealing_cdi(&uds, &stage0_event_proto);
+    //let mut cdi = derive_sealing_cdi(&uds, &stage0_event_proto);
     // Zero out the UDS.
-    uds.zeroize();
+    //uds.zeroize();
 
     // Generate Stage0 Event Log data.
     let stage0_event = oak_stage0_dice::encode_stage0_event(stage0_event_proto);
@@ -238,9 +238,9 @@ pub fn rust64_start<P: hal::Platform>() -> ! {
         .eca_private_key
         .zeroize();
 
-    attestation_data_struct.layer_1_cdi.cdi[..].copy_from_slice(&cdi[..]);
+    //attestation_data_struct.layer_1_cdi.cdi[..].copy_from_slice(&cdi[..]);
     // Zero out the copy of the sealing CDIs.
-    cdi.zeroize();
+    //cdi.zeroize();
 
     let attestation_data = Box::leak(Box::new_in(attestation_data_struct, &crate::BOOT_ALLOC));
 
diff --git i/stage0_sev/src/platform/dice_attestation.rs w/stage0_sev/src/platform/dice_attestation.rs
index 842ed3dc2e..75cec40bef 100644
--- i/stage0_sev/src/platform/dice_attestation.rs
+++ w/stage0_sev/src/platform/dice_attestation.rs
@@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ pub fn init_guest_message_encryptor() -> Result<(), &'static str> {
     // Once the we have read VMPCK0 we wipe it so that later boot stages cannot
     // request attestation reports or derived sealing keys for VMPL0. This stops
     // later boot stages from creating counterfeit DICE chains.
-    key.zeroize();
+    //key.zeroize();
     // The sev-guest driver in the upstream kernel does not initialize with such
     // an empty vmpck. So we fill it up with 0xFF.
-    key.fill(0xFF);
+    //key.fill(0xFF);
     Ok(())
 }
 
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ pub fn get_attester() -> Result<DiceAttester, &'static str> {
 }
 
 fn get_attestation(report_data: [u8; REPORT_DATA_SIZE]) -> Result<AttestationReport, &'static str> {
-    if super::sev_status().contains(SevStatus::SNP_ACTIVE) {
+    if false { // super::sev_status().contains(SevStatus::SNP_ACTIVE) {
         let mut report_request = AttestationRequest::new();
         report_request.report_data = report_data;
         let attestation_response: AttestationResponse = send_guest_message_request(report_request)?;