Derive a note's randomness from the ephemeral shared secret. #8999
Labels
C-aztec.nr
Component: Aztec smart contract framework
C-pxe
Component: PXE (Private eXecution Envrionment)
team-fairies
Nico's team
Computing the randomness as the hash of the shared secret
S
(see the new definition forS
here: #8969) means the recipient doesn't need to be told what it is, so we can remove it from the logs and save DA costs.Note that the key changes don't enable this: this optimization had always been available. It also doesn't change the trust assumption re. the recipient, since they're still freely choosing a 'random' value for the
esk
generation, even if the randomness itself is derived.While this optimization is nice in theory, it will wreak havoc a bit with our
NoteInterface
, since we won't simply be able to serialize the data structure and place it in the logs: likely the logs will need to know more about how notes work in order to cooperate during log creation.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: