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PSA recently gained interruptible functions for signing and verifying hash-based signatures. So far, these functions are not used by X.509 or TLS, but they should be used when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO enabled, in all places that currently support restartable operations using the legacy API (that's currently just 1.2 with the ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange, including client authentication), in order to avoid feature gaps in PSA-based builds.
This task is to investigate how to achieve that goal, and break the work down in reasonnably-size and testable steps.
Note: execution of the work will probably depend on #7029
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
I've just been thinking: since the keys are held as PK contexts in X.509 and TLS so far, and those modules always use PK functions to operate on them (even when USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled), perhaps the easiest way to achieve what we want is to extend mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable() and mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable() so that they use the PSA interruptible API under the hood when USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. That way absolutely no change to X.509 or TLS is needed.
This would probably involve providing an alternative definition of the type mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx when USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, as well as providing PSA-based implementations of ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap and ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap when USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
In general I think pk is a good abstraction layer between X.509/TLS and crypto, and I think it can stay around for a while. I'd like to change some things about it in an incompatible way (in particular, make its concept of mechanism match the one in PSA), but I don't feel any need to remove it. Especially not until we have PSA functions to replace parse/write.
PSA recently gained interruptible functions for signing and verifying hash-based signatures. So far, these functions are not used by X.509 or TLS, but they should be used when
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
enabled, in all places that currently support restartable operations using the legacy API (that's currently just 1.2 with the ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange, including client authentication), in order to avoid feature gaps in PSA-based builds.This task is to investigate how to achieve that goal, and break the work down in reasonnably-size and testable steps.
Note: execution of the work will probably depend on #7029
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: