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This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 2, 2024. It is now read-only.
We looked at the individual points with the following results:
not enough knowledge for the remaining time to implement
not enough knowledge for the remaining time to implement
ACL of config are set to only allow admin access -> modifying is not possible
not enough knowledge for the remaining time to implement
not enough knowledge for the remaining time to implement
all files sent to the service are parsed as config files, if this fails we exit
& should be prevented by peters token
windows messages can only be sent to processes on the same desktop -> labeler runs on the secure desktop and is the only process which has a custom message loop
not sure how this can be achieved from the default desktop
Yes, the picture should be available only to the cage labeller. The attack program could try to read the picture from the config file (and fail) and could try to show the wrong picture. The point here is that the attack program could be used in an experiment where unsuspecting users could be observed whether or not they detect that the wrong picture is shown (or if they do not care):
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The implementation should be tested for security vulnerabilities by providing attack samples, e.g.
Once this issue is addressed, it makes sense to create sub-issues dealing with individual attacks.
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