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Game theoretical proofs of cooperation in Trustchain #5202
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remarks on this work, a year ago. Might be incorrect. |
It seems like the project proposal of this issue will never get its first sprint and the technology that is addresses (Trustchain) has been removed from Tribler. Therefore, I'll close this. |
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Motivation:
After the initial literature review, it is observed that costly signaling can be used for the proof. This term is mainly used in evolutionary biology in an attempt to explain self-sacrificial behavior of individuals towards the benefit of the group. According to the theory, individuals send honest signals to the group by performing costly and hard-to-fake works, to increase their likelihood for an alliance (or a reciprocation).
A recent study built a model (which involves costly signaling) in which deception is a sybil attack.
Scope:
Initial Hypothesis:
Work flow:
Next sprint:
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