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The end goal of this repository is to:
- Independently evaluate and typecheck Lean 4 programs with a kernel implemented both in Rust and Lean 4
- Content-address every Lean 4 environment, declaration, expression and universe level via using the IPLD data format, with a name-irrelevant representation similar to the Unison language
- Compile Lean programs to the Lurk zk-SNARK language, so that we can generate zero-knowledge proof, which can be verified in constant-time and space, that a Lean program
f
, with inputx
, evaluates toy
- Compile the Yatima typechecker itself to Lurk, so we can generate zero-knowledge proofs that our Lean typechecker, with inputs
env : Yatima.Environment
andconst : Yatima.Constant
, returns successfully without error. For example, we can produce a cryptographic witness that some definitiondef foo : M := N
correctly typechecks, which can be validated without re-running the typechecker.
This will enable us to produce a succinct and efficiently verifiable correctness certificate for e.g. Lean's mathematical library (and for each of its declarations) once it's ported to Lean 4, which currently takes over 4 hours to be typechecked by the Lean 3 kernel (as of May '22).
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Since we want to build on top of Lean 4 source files, we can take advantage from the fact that its API becomes available for any Lean 4 code that does
import Lean
. Thus, we are creating an application in Lean 4 to make use of itsLean.Elab.runFrontend
function, which can parse the source files and instantiateLean.Environment
for us. -
With a
Lean.Environment
at hand, we can translate its declarations to our own content-addressed "Yatima" types and populate aYatima.Env
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The
Yatima.Env
can be printed to a.ya
file, which then can be read by a typechecker. Up to this point, everything is done in Lean 4 -
We can parse
.ya
files and typecheck them with our own kernels. We aim to build a kernel in Lean 4 and another one in Rust -
Typechecking can be implemented as Lurk programs, expected to be fast/cheap with the use of recursive zk-SNARKs
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If typechecking succeeds, we can upload the content-addressed environment to IPFS and generate a cryptographic certificate that the original Lean 4 code can be trusted
We want our Lean 4 certificates to be "name-irrelevant". That is, the following should be mapped as the very same definition:
def foo : Nat := 0
def bar : Nat := 0
def boo := 0
Having name-irrelevant certificates can reduce the need for duplicate computations if the Lean 4 code doesn't change in semantics.
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Created by the team
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Official documentation
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Literature, books, repositories, videos, pages etc