EPIC: Provider assumption of trusted consumer too strong

[mpoke]

Problem

Currently, the provider assumes that the consumers are not malicious. Although the assumption is realistic for every consumer validator set (i.e., Replicated Security), the consumer may have malicious code. Thus, this assumption adds high requirements for the auditing process of consumer chains.

Closing criteria

The assumption of trusted consumer is dropped or relaxed.

Tasks

Beta Give feedback

1. Allow provider to enforce correct slashing with malicious consumers #417
   type: feature-request +1
   
2. Prevent DOS vector introduced by throttling #594
   ccv-core type: feature-request +2
3. ValidateBasic is not called when receiving packets from consumers #634
   S: KTLO good first issue type: bug +3
   
4. Malicious consumer can slash same validator for downtime multiple times #635
   S: KTLO type: bug +2
5. Potentially delay consumer removal until slash packet queue is empty #566
   S: NewThings question spec +3
6. StopConsumerChainProposal to unlock unbondings locked with LockUnbondingOnTimeout #261
   S: NewThings other: decayed type: feature-request +3

[mpoke]

Replaced by #732 and #761