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---
bibtex: @InCollection{sep-authority,
          author       =  {Christiano, Tom},
          title        =  {Authority},
          booktitle    =  {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
          editor       =  {Edward N. Zalta},
          howpublished =  {\url{http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/authority/}},
          year         =  {2012},
          edition      =  {Spring 2012},
        }
---

#Authority

Notes from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/

##Differing conceptions and usage of authority

au·thor·i·ty/əˈTHôritē/

Noun:

The power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience: "he had absolute authority over his subordinates".
The right to act in a specified way, delegated from one person or organization to another.

Authority can be characterised along a range of dimensions:

  • Normative authority (de jure) vs descriptive authority (de facto). Authority is de jure just if it is legitimate in a normative sense. Authority is de facto simply if the state maintains public order and it's rules are generally obeyed. Some accounts also rely on sufficient subjects believing the authority is legitimate.
  • Political authority vs political power. The latter is merely the ability realise one's will over subjects differing desires. If de facto authority doesn't require a pro attitude, then the difference between authority and power is that the former is successful in maintaining public order.
  • Theoretical vs practical. Theoretical authorities give reasons for beliefs. Practical authorities give reasons for actions
  • Authority as legitimate coercion merely requires a moral justification for the imposition of an agent's political power over others. (weak moral bonds between subject & authority)
  • Authority as capacity to impose duties upon subjects. (moderate moral bond)
  • Authority as a right to rule. There is also a distinction here between internal authority (who must be obeyed) and external authority (who may not be interfered with) (strong moral bonds for internal authorities)
  • Authority can held held by diverse institutions: legislative, judicial, executive, administrative etc.

The distinction between legitimate coercion, imposition of duties and right to rule seems vague. Can a state maintain order (necessary for de facto authority) without coercive action against non-compliance? Can a state rule without the imposition of duties?

Duty to Obey

Christiano makes a bold claim: "The duty of the subject is grounded not in the content of the command itself but in the nature of the source issuing the command…the duty to obey is content independent or independent of the content of the particular command. One must obey because one has been commanded and not because of the particular content of the command. One must do it because one has been told to do it."

  • Duties may be merely one of non-interferences with the authority or a stronger duty to obey just because it is the authority.
  • Duties may be preemptive (they replace earlier duties) or non-preemptive.
  • Duties may be content dependent or independent.
  • Duties may be owed to the authority or to others in general.

Wolff's Anarchism

  • An agent has a duty to realise their autonomy
  • A seeks to impose duties of obedience on its subjects
  • These two things are necessarily incompatible.
  • ergo, states can't be legitimate

Wolff's concerns only apply to authority as a right to impose duties.

Simmons's Anarchism

  • An agent has a right not to be subjected to another's duties
  • An agent can only be bound if they have consented
  • A state can't be setup so that it can demand the obedience of all and only those who consented
  • ergo, states can't be legitimate

Raz's instrumental account of normal authority

  • Raz proposes a Normal Justification Thesis
  • "An authority does its job well and is therefore legitimate when it enables subjects to act better on the reasons that apply to them when they take the commands as giving them preemptive reasons."

Consent Theories

Questions

  • is illegitimate authority an oxymoron? Is legitimacy a necessary, constituent factor of political authority.
  • if I recognise an authority as legitimate, do I have a duty to obey?
  • does legitimacy of authority only extend to certain dimensions?

Follow up readings

  • Hurd, Heidi, 2001, Moral Combat, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Simmons, A. John, 2001, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.