Merge branch 'fixes' into next

Merge our fixes branch, which contains some fixes that didn't make it
into rc2 but which we'd like in next.

Author: mpe

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c

@@ -2697,8 +2697,10 @@ static int kvmppc_core_vcpu_create_hv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		HFSCR_DSCR | HFSCR_VECVSX | HFSCR_FP | HFSCR_PREFIX;
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
 		vcpu->arch.hfscr &= mfspr(SPRN_HFSCR);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
 		if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST))
 			vcpu->arch.hfscr |= HFSCR_TM;
+#endif
 	}
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM_COMP))
 		vcpu->arch.hfscr |= HFSCR_TM;

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_nested.c

@@ -302,6 +302,9 @@ long kvmhv_enter_nested_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.l1_ptcr == 0)
 		return H_NOT_AVAILABLE;
 
+	if (MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr))
+		return H_BAD_MODE;
+
 	/* copy parameters in */
 	hv_ptr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4);
 	regs_ptr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5);
@@ -322,6 +325,23 @@ long kvmhv_enter_nested_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (l2_hv.vcpu_token >= NR_CPUS)
 		return H_PARAMETER;
 
+	/*
+	 * L1 must have set up a suspended state to enter the L2 in a
+	 * transactional state, and only in that case. These have to be
+	 * filtered out here to prevent causing a TM Bad Thing in the
+	 * host HRFID. We could synthesize a TM Bad Thing back to the L1
+	 * here but there doesn't seem like much point.
+	 */
+	if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr)) {
+		if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(l2_regs.msr))
+			return H_BAD_MODE;
+	} else {
+		if (l2_regs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK)
+			return H_BAD_MODE;
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK))
+			return H_BAD_MODE;
+	}
+
 	/* translate lpid */
 	l2 = kvmhv_get_nested(vcpu->kvm, l2_hv.lpid, true);
 	if (!l2)

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_p9_entry.c

@@ -317,6 +317,9 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
 	 */
 	mtspr(SPRN_HDEC, hdec);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
+tm_return_to_guest:
+#endif
 	mtspr(SPRN_DAR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dar);
 	mtspr(SPRN_DSISR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dsisr);
 	mtspr(SPRN_SRR0, vcpu->arch.shregs.srr0);
@@ -415,11 +418,23 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
 		 * is in real suspend mode and is trying to transition to
 		 * transactional mode.
 		 */
-		if (local_paca->kvm_hstate.fake_suspend &&
+		if (!local_paca->kvm_hstate.fake_suspend &&
 				(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_S)) {
 			if (kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(vcpu)) {
-				/* Prevent it being handled again. */
-				trap = 0;
+				/*
+				 * Go straight back into the guest with the
+				 * new NIP/MSR as set by TM emulation.
+				 */
+				mtspr(SPRN_HSRR0, vcpu->arch.regs.nip);
+				mtspr(SPRN_HSRR1, vcpu->arch.shregs.msr);
+
+				/*
+				 * tm_return_to_guest re-loads SRR0/1, DAR,
+				 * DSISR after RI is cleared, in case they had
+				 * been clobbered by a MCE.
+				 */
+				__mtmsrd(0, 1); /* clear RI */
+				goto tm_return_to_guest;
 			}
 		}
 #endif
@@ -499,6 +514,10 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
 	 * If we are in real mode, only switch MMU on after the MMU is
 	 * switched to host, to avoid the P9_RADIX_PREFETCH_BUG.
 	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK)
+		msr |= MSR_TS_S;
+
 	__mtmsrd(msr, 0);
 
 	end_timing(vcpu);

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rtas.c

@@ -242,6 +242,17 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * value so we can restore it on the way out.
 	 */
 	orig_rets = args.rets;
+	if (be32_to_cpu(args.nargs) >= ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)) {
+		/*
+		 * Don't overflow our args array: ensure there is room for
+		 * at least rets[0] (even if the call specifies 0 nret).
+		 *
+		 * Each handler must then check for the correct nargs and nret
+		 * values, but they may always return failure in rets[0].
+		 */
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
 	args.rets = &args.args[be32_to_cpu(args.nargs)];
 
 	mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
@@ -269,9 +280,17 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 fail:
 	/*
 	 * We only get here if the guest has called RTAS with a bogus
-	 * args pointer. That means we can't get to the args, and so we
-	 * can't fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace,
-	 * which should kill the guest.
+	 * args pointer or nargs/nret values that would overflow the
+	 * array. That means we can't get to the args, and so we can't
+	 * fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace, which
+	 * should kill the guest.
+	 *
+	 * SLOF should actually pass the hcall return value from the
+	 * rtas handler call in r3, so enter_rtas could be modified to
+	 * return a failure indication in r3 and we could return such
+	 * errors to the guest rather than failing to host userspace.
+	 * However old guests that don't test for failure could then
+	 * continue silently after errors, so for now we won't do this.
 	 */
 	return rc;
 }

arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c

@@ -2048,9 +2048,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	{
 		struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
 		r = -EFAULT;
-		vcpu_load(vcpu);
 		if (copy_from_user(&cap, argp, sizeof(cap)))
 			goto out;
+		vcpu_load(vcpu);
 		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(vcpu, &cap);
 		vcpu_put(vcpu);
 		break;
@@ -2074,9 +2074,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_DIRTY_TLB: {
 		struct kvm_dirty_tlb dirty;
 		r = -EFAULT;
-		vcpu_load(vcpu);
 		if (copy_from_user(&dirty, argp, sizeof(dirty)))
 			goto out;
+		vcpu_load(vcpu);
 		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_dirty_tlb(vcpu, &dirty);
 		vcpu_put(vcpu);
 		break;