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Add rule docs for 8.1.0 updates (#1692)
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docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-changelog.asciidoc

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@@ -6,7 +6,70 @@ significant modifications to their query or scope are listed. For detailed
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information about a rule's changes, see the rule's description page.
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[float]
9-
=== 8.0
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=== 8.1.0
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<<account-password-reset-remotely>>
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<<attempts-to-brute-force-a-microsoft-365-user-account>>
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<<azure-virtual-network-device-modified-or-deleted>>
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<<disabling-user-account-control-via-registry-modification>>
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<<gcp-kubernetes-rolebindings-created-or-patched>>
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<<installation-of-security-support-provider>>
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<<kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process>>
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<<local-scheduled-task-creation>>
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<<microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created>>
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<<microsoft-windows-defender-tampering>>
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<<modification-of-amsienable-registry-key>>
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<<modification-of-wdigest-security-provider>>
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<<net-command-via-system-account>>
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<<network-connection-via-registration-utility>>
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<<o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation>>
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<<persistence-via-hidden-run-key-detected>>
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<<port-forwarding-rule-addition>>
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<<potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer>>
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<<potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump>>
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<<potential-password-spraying-of-microsoft-365-user-accounts>>
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<<potential-port-monitor-or-print-processor-registration-abuse>>
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<<potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover>>
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<<rdp-enabled-via-registry>>
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<<registry-persistence-via-appcert-dll>>
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<<scheduled-tasks-at-command-enabled>>
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<<service-control-spawned-via-script-interpreter>>
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<<solarwinds-process-disabling-services-via-registry>>
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<<unusual-print-spooler-child-process>>
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<<volume-shadow-copy-deleted-or-resized-via-vssadmin>>
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<<windows-defender-disabled-via-registry-modification>>
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[float]
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=== 8.0.0
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<<application-added-to-google-workspace-domain>>
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docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/prebuilt-rules-reference.asciidoc

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docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-desc-index.asciidoc

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@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ include::rule-details/access-to-keychain-credentials-directories.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/adfind-command-activity.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/adding-hidden-file-attribute-via-attrib.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/adminsdholder-backdoor.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/administrator-privileges-assigned-to-an-okta-group.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/administrator-role-assigned-to-an-okta-user.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/adobe-hijack-persistence.asciidoc[]
@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@ include::rule-details/auditd-login-from-forbidden-location.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/auditd-max-failed-login-attempts.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/auditd-max-login-sessions.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/authorization-plugin-modification.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/azure-ad-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/azure-active-directory-high-risk-sign-in.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/azure-active-directory-high-risk-user-sign-in-heuristic.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/azure-active-directory-powershell-sign-in.asciidoc[]
@@ -262,7 +264,9 @@ include::rule-details/installation-of-custom-shim-databases.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/installation-of-security-support-provider.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-perl.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/interactive-terminal-spawned-via-python.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/krbtgt-delegation-backdoor.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/kerberos-cached-credentials-dumping.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/kerberos-preauthentication-disabled-for-user.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/kerberos-traffic-from-unusual-process.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/kernel-module-removal.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/keychain-password-retrieval-via-command-line.asciidoc[]
@@ -273,6 +277,7 @@ include::rule-details/launch-agent-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loadin
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include::rule-details/launchdaemon-creation-or-modification-and-immediate-loading.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/local-scheduled-task-creation.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/mfa-disabled-for-google-workspace-organization.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/ms-office-macro-security-registry-modifications.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/malware-detected-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/malware-prevented-elastic-endgame.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-anti-phish-policy-deletion.asciidoc[]
@@ -286,7 +291,8 @@ include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-attachment-rule-disabled.ascii
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-safe-link-policy-disabled.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-creation.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-exchange-transport-rule-modification.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-new-inbox-rule-created.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-global-administrator-role-assigned.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-inbox-forwarding-rule-created.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-potential-ransomware-activity.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-custom-application-interaction-allowed.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/microsoft-365-teams-external-access-enabled.asciidoc[]
@@ -333,10 +339,12 @@ include::rule-details/new-activesyncalloweddeviceid-added-via-powershell.asciido
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include::rule-details/new-or-modified-federation-domain.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/nping-process-activity.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/nullsessionpipe-registry-modification.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/o365-email-reported-by-user-as-malware-or-phish.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/o365-excessive-single-sign-on-logon-errors.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/o365-exchange-suspicious-mailbox-right-delegation.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/o365-mailbox-audit-logging-bypass.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/okta-brute-force-or-password-spraying-attack.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/onedrive-malware-file-upload.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/outbound-scheduled-task-activity-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/parent-process-pid-spoofing.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/peripheral-device-discovery.asciidoc[]
@@ -361,10 +369,12 @@ include::rule-details/port-forwarding-rule-addition.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/possible-consent-grant-attack-via-azure-registered-application.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/possible-fin7-dga-command-and-control-behavior.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/possible-okta-dos-attack.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-abuse-of-repeated-mfa-push-notifications.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-admin-group-account-addition.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-application-shimming-via-sdbinst.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-command-and-control-via-internet-explorer.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-cookies-theft-via-browser-debugging.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-dcsync.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-duplicatehandle-in-lsass.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-lsass-memory-dump.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-credential-access-via-renamed-com-services-dll.asciidoc[]
@@ -376,6 +386,7 @@ include::rule-details/potential-dns-tunneling-via-nslookup.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-disabling-of-selinux.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-evasion-via-filter-manager.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-hidden-local-user-account-creation.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-java-jndi-exploitation-attempt.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-kerberos-attack-via-bifrost.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-lsa-authentication-package-abuse.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-lsass-clone-creation-via-psscapturesnapshot.asciidoc[]
@@ -394,7 +405,9 @@ include::rule-details/potential-printnightmare-file-modification.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-localhost-secure-copy.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-privacy-control-bypass-via-tccdb-modification.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-installerfiletakeover.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-pkexec.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-privilege-escalation-via-sudoers-file-modification.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-privileged-escalation-via-samaccountname-spoofing.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-process-herpaderping-attempt.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-process-injection-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-protocol-tunneling-via-earthworm.asciidoc[]
@@ -403,12 +416,15 @@ include::rule-details/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-reverse-shell-activity-via-terminal.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-ssh-brute-force-detected.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-secure-file-deletion-via-sdelete-utility.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-sharprdp-behavior.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-shell-via-web-server.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/potential-windows-error-manager-masquerading.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-kerberos-ticket-request.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-keylogging-script.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-minidump-script.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-psreflect-script.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-script-block-logging-disabled.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-suspicious-discovery-related-windows-api-functions.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-suspicious-payload-encoded-and-compressed.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/powershell-suspicious-script-with-audio-capture-capabilities.asciidoc[]
@@ -463,9 +479,11 @@ include::rule-details/searching-for-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/security-software-discovery-using-wmic.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/security-software-discovery-via-grep.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/sensitive-files-compression.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/sensitive-privilege-seenabledelegationprivilege-assigned-to-a-user.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/service-command-lateral-movement.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/service-control-spawned-via-script-interpreter.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/setuid-setgid-bit-set-via-chmod.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/sharepoint-malware-file-upload.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/shell-execution-via-apple-scripting.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/softwareupdate-preferences-modification.asciidoc[]
@@ -631,5 +649,6 @@ include::rule-details/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/windows-network-enumeration.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/windows-script-executing-powershell.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/windows-script-interpreter-executing-process-via-wmi.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/zoom-meeting-with-no-passcode.asciidoc[]
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include::rule-details/macos-installer-spawns-network-event.asciidoc[]

docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/abnormally-large-dns-response.asciidoc

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@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in
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* Threat Detection
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* Lateral Movement
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*Version*: 5 (<<abnormally-large-dns-response-history, version history>>)
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*Version*: 6 (<<abnormally-large-dns-response-history, version history>>)
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*Added ({stack} release)*: 7.10.0
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*Last modified ({stack} release)*: 7.16.0
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*Last modified ({stack} release)*: 8.1.0
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*Rule authors*: Elastic
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@@ -63,16 +63,16 @@ also known as [SigRed](https://www.elastic.co/blog/detection-rules-for-sigred-vu
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- This specific rule is sourced from network log activity such as DNS or network level data. It's important to validate
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the source of the incoming traffic and determine if this activity has been observed previously within an environment.
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- Activity can be further investigated and validated by reviewing available corresponding Intrusion Detection Signatures (IDS) alerts associated with activity.
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- Further examination can be made by reviewing the `dns.question_type` network fieldset with a protocol analyzer, such as Zeek, Packetbeat, or Suricata, for `SIG` or `RRSIG` data.
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- Further examination can include a review of the `dns.question_type` network fieldset with a protocol analyzer, such as Zeek, Packetbeat, or Suricata, for `SIG` or `RRSIG` data.
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- Validate the patch level and OS of the targeted DNS server to validate the observed activity was not large-scale Internet vulnerability scanning.
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- Validate that the source of the network activity was not from an authorized vulnerability scan or compromise assessment.
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#### False Positive Analysis
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- Based on this rule which looks for a threshold of 60k bytes, it is possible for activity to be generated under 65k bytes
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and related to legitimate behavior. In packet capture files received by the [SANS Internet Storm Center](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/PATCH+NOW+SIGRed+CVE20201350+Microsoft+DNS+Server+Vulnerability/26356/), byte responses
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were all observed as greater than 65k bytes.
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- This activity has the ability to be triggered from compliance/vulnerability scanning or compromise assessment, it's
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important to determine the source of the activity and potential whitelist the source host
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- This activity can be triggered by compliance/vulnerability scanning or compromise assessment, it's
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important to determine the source of the activity and potentially allowlist the source host.
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### Related Rules
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ patched machines. If unable to patch immediately: Microsoft [released](https://s
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restart. This can be used as a temporary solution before the patch is applied.
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- Maintain backups of your critical systems to aid in quick recovery.
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- Perform routine vulnerability scans of your systems, monitor [CISA advisories](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity) and patch identified vulnerabilities.
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- If observed true positive activity, implement a remediation plan and monitor host-based artifacts for additional post-exploitation behavior.
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- If you observe a true positive, implement a remediation plan and monitor host-based artifacts for additional post-exploitation behavior.
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----------------------------------
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@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ and network.bytes > 60000
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[[abnormally-large-dns-response-history]]
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==== Rule version history
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Version 6 (8.1.0 release)::
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* Formatting only
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Version 5 (7.16.0 release)::
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* Formatting only
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docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/account-password-reset-remotely.asciidoc

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@@ -34,10 +34,12 @@ Identifies an attempt to reset an account password remotely. Adversaries may man
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* Threat Detection
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* Persistence
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*Version*: 1
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*Version*: 2 (<<account-password-reset-remotely-history, version history>>)
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*Added ({stack} release)*: 8.0.0
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*Last modified ({stack} release)*: 8.1.0
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*Rule authors*: Elastic
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*Rule license*: Elastic License v2
@@ -54,9 +56,9 @@ Legitimate remote account administration.
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sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where
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event.action == "logged-in" and /* event 4624 need to be logged */
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winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and
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source.ip != null and not source.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")] by
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winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId /* event 4724 need to be logged */
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[iam where event.action == "reset-password"] by
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source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip !=
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"::1"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId /* event 4724 need to be
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logged */ [iam where event.action == "reset-password"] by
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winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
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----------------------------------
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@@ -72,3 +74,21 @@ winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
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** Name: Account Manipulation
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** ID: T1098
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** Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
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[[account-password-reset-remotely-history]]
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==== Rule version history
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Version 2 (8.1.0 release)::
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* Updated query, changed from:
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+
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[source, js]
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----------------------------------
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sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where
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event.action == "logged-in" and /* event 4624 need to be logged */
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winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and
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source.ip != null and not source.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")] by
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winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId /* event 4724 need to be logged */
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[iam where event.action == "reset-password"] by
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winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
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----------------------------------
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docs/detections/prebuilt-rules/rule-details/adfind-command-activity.asciidoc

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@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legiti
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* Threat Detection
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* Discovery
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*Version*: 5 (<<adfind-command-activity-history, version history>>)
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*Version*: 6 (<<adfind-command-activity-history, version history>>)
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*Added ({stack} release)*: 7.11.0
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*Last modified ({stack} release)*: 7.16.0
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*Last modified ({stack} release)*: 8.1.0
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*Rule authors*: Elastic
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@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ This rule detects the Active Directory query tool, AdFind.exe. AdFind has legiti
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### Investigating AdFind Command Activity
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[AdFind](http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/) is a freely available command-line tool used to retrieve information from
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Activity Directory (AD). Network discovery and enumeration tools like `AdFind` are useful to adversaries in the same ways
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Active Directory (AD). Network discovery and enumeration tools like `AdFind` are useful to adversaries in the same ways
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they are effective for network administrators. This tool provides quick ability to scope AD person/computer objects and
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understand subnets and domain information. There are many [examples](https://thedfirreport.com/category/adfind/)
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observed where this tool has been adopted by ransomware and criminal groups and used in compromises.
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ the source of the activity. This could involve identifying the account using `A
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what information was retrieved, then further determining if these actions are in scope of that user's traditional responsibilities.
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- In multiple public references, `AdFind` is leveraged after initial access is achieved, review previous activity on impacted
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machine looking for suspicious indicators such as previous anti-virus/EDR alerts, phishing emails received, or network traffic
72-
to suspicious infrastructure
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to suspicious infrastructure.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- This rule has the high chance to produce false positives as it is a legitimate tool used by network administrators. One
76-
option could be whitelisting specific users or groups who use the tool as part of their daily responsibilities. This can
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option could be allowlisting specific users or groups who use the tool as part of their daily responsibilities. This can
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be done by leveraging the exception workflow in the Kibana Security App or Elasticsearch API to tune this rule to your environment
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- Malicious behavior with `AdFind` should be investigated as part of a step within an attack chain. It doesn't happen in
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isolation, so reviewing previous logs/activity from impacted machines could be very telling.
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ isolation, so reviewing previous logs/activity from impacted machines could be v
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- Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE
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### Response and Remediation
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- Immediate response should be taken to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further
87+
- take immediate action to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further
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post-compromise behavior
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- It's important to understand that `AdFind` is an Active Directory enumeration tool and can be used for malicious or legitimate
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purposes, so understanding the intent behind the activity will help determine the appropropriate response.
@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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[[adfind-command-activity-history]]
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==== Rule version history
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Version 6 (8.1.0 release)::
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* Formatting only
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Version 5 (7.16.0 release)::
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* Formatting only
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