Table of Contents generated with DocToc
- SuperchainERC20 standard-only FMA (Failure Modes and Recovery Path Analysis)
- Introduction
- Failure Modes and Recovery Paths
- Action Items
- Audit Requirements
- Additional Notes
Author | Ng, Joxes |
---|---|
Created at | 2024-10-02 |
Needs Approval From | Mark Tyneway, Matt Solomon, and 0age |
Other Reviewers | - |
Status | Review |
This document is intended to be shared publicly for review and visibility purposes. It covers the introduction of the SuperchainERC20
standard, including its implementation and interface, the latter extending from ICrosschainERC20
.
Below are references for this project:
It does not intend to cover related contracts such as SuperchainTokenBridge
or those involving migrated liquidity.
- Description: The
onlySuperchainTokenBridge
modifier only allowscrosschainMint
andcrosschainBurn
to be callable by theSuperchainTokenBridge
. If the bridge address is badly defined or the modifier bypassed, an entity could mint and burn tokens. - Risk Assessment: Medium.
- Potential impact: High. All tokens based on this implementation could be potentially at risk.
- Likelihood: Very Low.
Predeploys.SUPERCHAIN_TOKEN_BRIDGE
are defined via protocol upgrades. The modifiers are sufficiently simple and battle-tested to give confidence in the implementation.
- Mitigation: Ensure the
SuperchainTokenBridge
is correctly set during deployment and isn’t subject to unexpected changes. - Detection: Existing off-chain scripts for token monitoring should be enough to detect any unauthorized mint or burn actions triggered by this method.
- Recovery Path(s): Equivocation on
SuperchainTokenBridge
would require a protocol upgrade or hard fork. Very unlikely to need it.
- Description: For the
SuperchainTokenBridge
to validate mints and burns correctly, theSuperchainERC20
must be deployed at the same address across all interoperable chains. If different addresses are used, the bridge will be unable to successfully finalize the cross-chain transfer. - Risk Assessment: Medium
- Potential impact: High. Inconsistent token addresses will disable interoperability functionalities for the contract.
- Likelihood: Very Low. The interoperable set of chains follows the same opcode behavior and ensures identical availability of deployer contracts, such as
create2Deployer
. Developers are encouraged not to use well-known flagged deployment methods, such asCREATE
, for these purposes.
- Mitigation: For developers, ensure to employ the appropiate deterministic deployment tools, such as the one at
create2Deployer
. - Detection: Verify contract addresses upon deployment.
- Recovery Path(s): Redeploy token contracts correctly.
Given the small scope, there is no need for relevant actions beyond resolving all comments, and continuing code implementation and testing.
No audit should be required, as it is simple and isn’t expected to have dependencies or impact on other core OP contracts.
The proposed implementation of the standard doesn’t prevent a token issuer from using other token standards, such as xERC20, with the SuperchainTokenBridge
to mint and burn tokens across an interoperable set of chains.