🔍 Static Analysis Report - February 9, 2026

[github-actions[bot]]

Analysis Summary

Daily security and quality scan of all agentic workflows using three static analysis tools: zizmor (security), poutine (supply chain), and actionlint (linting with shellcheck).

• Tools Used: zizmor, poutine, actionlint
• Total Findings: 339
• Workflows Scanned: 148
• Workflows Affected: 148 (100%)
• Scan Status: ✅ Complete

Findings by Tool

Tool	Total	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Warning	Info/Style
zizmor (security)	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
poutine (supply chain)	16	0	0	0	0	14	2
actionlint (linting)	321	0	0	0	0	0	321
Total	339	0	0	1	1	14	323

Security Posture Assessment

🟢 Overall Status: GOOD

• ✅ No critical or high severity security issues
• ⚠️ 1 medium severity security issue requiring attention
• ℹ️ 1 low severity security issue
• 🔧 321 code quality/style issues (actionlint shellcheck)

---

Top Priority Issues

1. Credential Persistence in Artifacts (Medium Severity)

• Tool: zizmor
• Issue: artipacked
• Count: 1 workflow
• Severity: Medium
• Affected: daily-copilot-token-report.lock.yml (line 115)
• Description: Workflow uploads artifacts that may contain sensitive credentials or tokens, creating potential exposure risk
• Impact: Credentials could be accessible to anyone with repository read access; artifacts persist beyond workflow execution
• Reference: (docs.zizmor.sh/redacted)

Recommendation: Review artifact upload at line 115, sanitize contents to exclude sensitive files, or use exclusion patterns to prevent credential files from being uploaded.

2. Template Injection (Low Severity)

• Tool: zizmor
• Issue: template-injection
• Count: 1 workflow
• Severity: Low
• Affected: mcp-inspector.lock.yml (line 540)
• Description: Potential code injection via template expansion
• Impact: Could allow injection of malicious code through template variables
• Reference: (docs.zizmor.sh/redacted)

Recommendation: Review template expansion at line 540, validate and sanitize any user-controlled inputs before template expansion.

3. Default Permissions on Risky Events (Poutine Warning)

• Tool: poutine
• Issue: default_permissions_on_risky_events
• Count: 14 workflows
• Severity: Warning
• Description: Workflows triggered by risky events (e.g., pull_request_target, issues) use default permissions

Affected Workflows:

• ai-moderator.lock.yml
• archie.lock.yml
• brave.lock.yml
• cloclo.lock.yml
• grumpy-reviewer.lock.yml
• mergefest.lock.yml
• pdf-summary.lock.yml
• plan.lock.yml
• pr-nitpick-reviewer.lock.yml
• q.lock.yml
• scout.lock.yml
• security-review.lock.yml
• tidy.lock.yml
• unbloat-docs.lock.yml

Note: Many of these workflows intentionally use default permissions for their operation. This may be a false positive for workflows that don't handle untrusted input.

---

Detailed Findings by Tool

Zizmor Security Findings

Issue Type	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
artipacked	Medium	1	daily-copilot-token-report.lock.yml
template-injection	Low	1	mcp-inspector.lock.yml

Total: 2 security findings (1 medium, 1 low)

Poutine Supply Chain Findings

Issue Type	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
default_permissions_on_risky_events	Warning	14	14 workflows (see list above)
unverified_script_exec	Info	4	copilot-setup-steps.yml, daily-copilot-token-report.lock.yml
github_action_from_unverified_creator_used	Info	3	Various workflows
unpinnable_action	Info	2	Composite actions in .github/actions/

Total: 16 supply chain findings

Unverified Script Execution Details:

• Pattern: curl -LsSf (astral.sh/redacted) | sh
• Pattern: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/github/gh-aw/refs/heads/main/install-gh-aw.sh | bash
• Impact: Scripts executed without verification could be compromised
• Recommendation: Consider using verified installation methods or pinning to specific commits/hashes

Actionlint Shellcheck Issues

Issue Type	Count	Description
SC2129 (style)	163	"Consider using { cmd1; cmd2; } >> file instead of individual redirects"
SC1003 (info)	158	"Want to escape a single quote? echo 'This is how it'\''s done'"

Total: 321 shellcheck issues across 148 workflows (all compiled workflows)

Impact: These are style/informational issues that don't affect functionality or security, but following shellcheck recommendations would improve code quality and maintainability.

---

Historical Trends

Comparison with Previous Scans:

Metric	Feb 9	Feb 8	Feb 7	Trend
Workflows Scanned	148	149	147	➡️ Stable
Total Findings	339	337	344	⬇️ Decreasing
Medium Severity	1	0	2	⬆️ +1
Low Severity	1	0	1	➡️ Stable
Warnings	14	14	0	➡️ Stable
Info/Style	323	323	341	⬇️ Improving

Key Observations

• New Finding: 1 medium severity issue detected today (artipacked in daily-copilot-token-report)
• Consistency: Shellcheck findings remain stable (~321-322 issues)
• Supply Chain: Poutine now providing detailed supply chain analysis (14 warnings)
• Overall Trend: Security posture remains strong with no critical/high severity issues

Notable Changes Since Feb 8

• ✅ Better tool integration (poutine now fully analyzed)
• ⚠️ New artipacked finding requires attention
• ➡️ Shellcheck issues unchanged (structural, not introduced by changes)

---

Fix Suggestion: Artipacked (Medium Severity)

Issue: Credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
Severity: Medium
Affected Workflows: 1 workflow (daily-copilot-token-report.lock.yml)

Detailed Fix Guide

Problem: The workflow uploads artifacts that may contain sensitive credentials, tokens, or API keys. These artifacts are accessible to anyone with read access to the repository and persist long after the workflow completes.

Solution Approaches:

Option 1: Sanitize Before Upload (Recommended)

- name: Sanitize artifacts before upload
  run: |
    # Create sanitized copy
    mkdir -p ./safe-output
    cp -r ./output/* ./safe-output/
    
    # Remove sensitive files
    find ./safe-output -name "*.env" -delete
    find ./safe-output -name "*token*" -delete
    find ./safe-output -name "*secret*" -delete
    find ./safe-output -name "*credentials*" -delete
    find ./safe-output -name ".git" -type d -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null || true

- name: Upload sanitized artifacts
  uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    name: results
    path: ./safe-output/

Option 2: Use Exclusion Patterns

- name: Upload artifacts with exclusions
  uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    name: results
    path: |
      ./output/**
      !./output/**/*.env
      !./output/**/*token*
      !./output/**/*secret*
      !./output/**/*credentials*
      !./output/.git/**

Option 3: Remove Artifact Upload (If not needed)

If the artifact is only for debugging and not required:

# Remove or comment out the entire upload-artifact step

Verification Steps:

1. Apply the fix to the workflow markdown file
2. Recompile: gh-aw compile daily-copilot-token-report.md --zizmor
3. Verify no artipacked warning appears
4. Run the workflow and download the artifact
5. Manually inspect to ensure no sensitive data is present

Full fix template saved to: /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/fix-templates/zizmor-artipacked.md

---

All Findings Details

View Complete Workflow-by-Workflow Analysis

High Priority Workflows (Security Findings)

daily-copilot-token-report.lock.yml

• Line 115: [Medium] artipacked - credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
• Line 131: [Info] unverified_script_exec - Unverified Script Execution (install-gh-aw.sh)
• Line 143: [Info] unverified_script_exec - Unverified Script Execution (uv/install.sh)
• Multiple shellcheck issues (SC2129, SC1003)

mcp-inspector.lock.yml

• Line 540: [Low] template-injection - code injection via template expansion
• Multiple shellcheck issues

Workflows with Poutine Warnings

All 14 workflows flagged for default_permissions_on_risky_events:

• Most are triggered by workflow_dispatch or schedule events
• Some are triggered by issues, pull_request_target events
• Review recommended but likely false positives for most

Workflows with Shellcheck Issues

All 148 compiled workflows have shellcheck issues:

• SC2129: 163 occurrences across workflows
• SC1003: 158 occurrences across workflows

Most Common Pattern (SC2129):

echo "line1" >> file
echo "line2" >> file
echo "line3" >> file

Recommended Pattern:

{
  echo "line1"
  echo "line2"
  echo "line3"
} >> file

Most Common Pattern (SC1003):

# String contains backslash-escaped single quotes
jq '. | select(.field == '\''value'\'')'

Impact: Style issues only, no functional or security impact

---

Recommendations

Immediate Actions (This Week)

1. Fix Medium Severity Issue

   • Review daily-copilot-token-report workflow artifact upload at line 115
   • Apply sanitization or exclusion patterns to prevent credential exposure
   • Re-scan to verify fix

2. Review Low Severity Issue

   • Examine mcp-inspector workflow template expansion at line 540
   • Validate/sanitize any user-controlled template variables

Short-term Actions (This Month)

3. Address Poutine Warnings

   • Review 14 workflows with default_permissions_on_risky_events
   • Add explicit permissions where appropriate
   • Document intentional use of default permissions

4. Evaluate Unverified Script Execution

   • Consider pinning installation scripts to specific commits
   • Add checksum verification for curl | sh patterns
   • Or use verified GitHub Action alternatives

Long-term Actions (This Quarter)

5. Improve Code Quality

   • Create workflow templates that follow shellcheck best practices
   • Consider bulk fix for SC2129 (redirect grouping)
   • Update documentation to avoid SC1003 patterns

6. Enhance CI/CD Pipeline

   • Add pre-commit hooks for static analysis
   • Run zizmor + poutine + actionlint in PR checks
   • Set up automated fix suggestions for common issues

7. Security Posture

   • Establish artifact upload guidelines
   • Create allowlist/blocklist for sensitive file patterns
   • Regular audit of uploaded artifacts

---

Context

• Workflow Run: §21841395299
• Repository: github/gh-aw
• Date: 2026-02-09
• Triggered By: pelikhan (scheduled scan)
• Analysis Tool Version: gh-aw with zizmor, poutine, actionlint
• Compilation: All 148 workflows compiled successfully with strict mode

Scan Data Stored: /tmp/gh-aw/cache-memory/security-scans/2026-02-09.json

---

Next Scan

The next static analysis scan will run tomorrow at the scheduled time. Focus areas for next scan:

• Verify artipacked fix has been applied
• Monitor for new security findings
• Track shellcheck issue trends
• Continue building historical security baseline

AI generated by Static Analysis Report

• expires on Feb 16, 2026, 9:35 PM UTC

[github-actions[bot]]

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Agent signature: Copilot Engine - Run 21845575538

AI generated by Smoke Copilot

[github-actions[bot]]

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All systems are GO ✅ Testing complete at 2026-02-10 00:49:16 UTC 🕐

Until next time! 👋

AI generated by Smoke Copilot

[github-actions[bot]]

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AI generated by Smoke Claude

[github-actions[bot]]

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AI generated by Smoke Copilot

[github-actions[bot]]

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AI generated by Smoke Copilot