🎯 Repository Quality Improvement Report - Dependencies (2026-01-21)

[github-actions[bot]]

🎯 Repository Quality Improvement Report - Dependencies

Analysis Date: 2026-01-21
Focus Area: Dependencies
Strategy Type: Standard Category (30%)
Custom Area: No - Standard dependencies category selected after 6 runs (4 custom, 2 standard)

Executive Summary

The gh-aw project demonstrates mature dependency management practices with strong security posture but has significant opportunities for automation and vulnerability prevention. Key findings:

• ✅ Strong foundation: 278 total dependencies (23 direct, 255 indirect = 11.1:1 ratio) with active maintenance (go.mod/go.sum updated today)
• ⚠️ High v0.x exposure: 48.2% (134/278) dependencies on potentially unstable v0.x versions, including critical paths like Charm libraries
• ❌ Zero automated vulnerability scanning: No govulncheck, Dependabot, or dependency-review actions despite Go 1.25 native support
• ❌ 13% unpinned actions: 814/6,180 GitHub Actions not pinned to commit SHAs (security risk)
• ⚠️ 17 pseudo-versions: Dependencies on git commits instead of stable releases increase maintenance burden

Impact: Without automated dependency scanning, the project is vulnerable to supply chain attacks and CVEs going undetected until manual updates occur.

Full Analysis Report

Focus Area: Dependencies

Current State Assessment

Dependency Inventory:

• Go Modules: 278 total (23 direct + 255 indirect)
• Critical Direct Dependencies: cobra (CLI), go-gh (GitHub API), goccy/go-yaml (parsing), MCP SDK, testify (testing)
• Security Tools: golangci-lint v2.7.2, gosec v2.22.11, actionlint v1.7.10
• JavaScript: No package.json (JavaScript embedded in Go binary)
• Docker: Alpine 3.21 base image (lightweight, security-conscious)

Metrics Collected:

Metric	Value	Status	Notes
Total Dependencies	278	✅	Reasonable for CLI tool
Indirect-to-Direct Ratio	11.1:1	⚠️	High transitive risk
v0.x Dependencies	134 (48.2%)	⚠️	Many unstable versions
Replace Directives	3	✅	Minimal forking
Pseudo-versions	17	⚠️	Harder to track updates
Unpinned Actions	814/6,180 (13%)	❌	Security gap
Dependabot PRs (30d)	0	❌	No automation
Vulnerability Scanning	0 workflows	❌	Critical gap
Go Version	1.25.0	✅	Latest stable
SBOM	Not found	⚠️	No supply chain visibility

Findings

Strengths

1. Active Maintenance: go.mod and go.sum updated today (2026-01-21), showing ongoing development
2. Security Tool Integration: gosec, golangci-lint, actionlint embedded as dependencies for CI/CD
3. Minimal Forking: Only 3 replace directives (semver, cast, lipgloss) - well-controlled
4. Modern Go Version: 1.25.0 with consistent workflow usage
5. MCP SDK Current: v1.2.0 (modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk) - latest version
6. Existing Dependabot Config: .github/dependabot.yml configured for gomod, npm, pip
7. Security Workflows: 4 security-focused workflows (security-compliance, security-scan, etc.)

Areas for Improvement

1. 🔴 CRITICAL: Zero Automated Vulnerability Scanning

   • No govulncheck in CI/CD despite Go 1.25 native support
   • No dependency-review action on PRs
   • No automated CVE detection for golang.org/x/crypto (v0.45.0) or x/net (v0.47.0)
   • Impact: Security vulnerabilities go undetected until manual review

2. 🔴 HIGH: Dependabot Not Active

   • Configuration exists but 0 PRs in last 30 days
   • May be disabled or not running properly
   • Impact: Missing automated security patches and version updates

3. 🟡 MEDIUM: 48.2% v0.x Dependencies

   • 134 dependencies on potentially unstable v0.x versions
   • Includes critical path: Charm UI libraries (bubbles v0.21, huh v0.8)
   • golang.org/x/* packages are stable despite v0 (exception)
   • Impact: Breaking changes more likely, maintenance burden higher

4. 🟡 MEDIUM: 13% Unpinned GitHub Actions

   • 814 action references without SHA pinning
   • Security best practice is 100% SHA pinning
   • Impact: Supply chain attack surface via compromised actions

5. 🟡 LOW: 17 Pseudo-version Dependencies

   • Direct dependency on unstable git commits (e.g., charmbracelet/x/exp/golden)
   • Harder to track updates and security patches
   • Impact: Increased maintenance complexity

6. 🟡 LOW: No SBOM Generation

   • No Software Bill of Materials for supply chain transparency
   • SBOM helps with vulnerability tracking and compliance
   • Impact: Limited visibility into full dependency tree

Detailed Analysis

1. Vulnerability Management Gap

Current State: No automated vulnerability detection in CI/CD

• Existing security workflows focus on code analysis (gosec, golangci-lint)
• No govulncheck integration despite Go 1.25 support
• Manual dependency updates rely on human vigilance

Recommended Architecture:

# Add to .github/workflows/security.yml
- name: Run govulncheck
  uses: golang/govulncheck-action@v1
  
- name: Dependency Review
  uses: actions/dependency-review-action@v4
  if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'

Risk Assessment:

• golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0: Known CVE history, requires monitoring
• golang.org/x/net v0.47.0: Known CVE history, requires monitoring
• 255 indirect dependencies: Transitive vulnerability risk

2. Dependabot Configuration Issue

Current State: Dependabot configured but not active

# .github/dependabot.yml exists with:
- gomod (weekly schedule)
- npm (weekly schedule)  
- pip (weekly schedule)

Possible Issues:

1. Directory path incorrect (should be / not /.github/workflows)
2. Dependabot disabled at org/repo level
3. Rate limits or permissions issues

Impact: Missing 52+ automated updates per year (1 per week × 3 ecosystems)

3. v0.x Dependency Risk Analysis

Critical v0.x Dependencies:

• charmbracelet/bubbles v0.21.x - TUI components (core UI)
• charmbracelet/huh v0.8.x - Forms library (user input)
• google/jsonschema-go v0.4.x - Schema validation
• sourcegraph/conc v0.3.x - Concurrency primitives

Exception: golang.org/x/* packages are stable despite v0 (Go core policy)

Mitigation: Pin to known-good minor versions, monitor for breaking changes

4. GitHub Actions Security Gap

Statistics:

• Total action references: 6,180
• Unpinned actions: 814 (13%)
• Pinned to SHA: 5,366 (87%)

Risk: Unpinned actions can be compromised after initial deployment

Examples of unpinned patterns:

uses: actions/checkout@v4  # Should be @<sha>
uses: actions/cache@v4     # Should be @<sha>

5. Supply Chain Transparency

Missing Components:

• No SBOM (CycloneDX or SPDX format)
• No automated license compliance checking
• No dependency graph visualization

Benefits of SBOM:

• Quick CVE impact assessment
• License compliance auditing
• Supply chain risk visibility

---

🤖 Tasks for Copilot Agent

NOTE TO PLANNER AGENT: The following 5 tasks are designed for GitHub Copilot agent execution. Please split these into individual work items for Claude to process. Each task is self-contained with clear acceptance criteria and code regions.

---

Task 1: Add Govulncheck Vulnerability Scanning to CI/CD

Priority: High
Estimated Effort: Small
Focus Area: Dependencies - Automated Security

Description:

Integrate Go's native vulnerability scanning (govulncheck) into the CI/CD pipeline to automatically detect known CVEs in direct and transitive dependencies. This should run on every PR and main branch push, with configurable failure thresholds.

Acceptance Criteria:

• Govulncheck action added to .github/workflows/security.yml or new workflow
• Runs on pull_request and push to main events
• Fails CI if HIGH or CRITICAL vulnerabilities found
• Scans both direct and indirect dependencies
• Outputs vulnerability report as GitHub Actions summary

Code Region: .github/workflows/security.yml or .github/workflows/govulncheck.yml

Add govulncheck vulnerability scanning to the CI/CD pipeline:

1. Create or update `.github/workflows/security.yml` (or create new `govulncheck.yml`)
2. Add a job that:
   - Runs on pull_request and push to main
   - Uses `golang/govulncheck-action@v1`
   - Scans the entire Go module for known vulnerabilities
   - Fails the build if HIGH or CRITICAL severity CVEs are found
   - Outputs results to GitHub Actions summary
3. Add comments explaining the vulnerability detection strategy
4. Ensure the job runs after the setup-go step
5. Consider adding a weekly scheduled run to catch new CVEs

Reference the existing security workflows in the repo for consistency.

---

Task 2: Add Dependency Review Action to Pull Requests

Priority: High
Estimated Effort: Small
Focus Area: Dependencies - Supply Chain Security

Description:

Add GitHub's dependency-review-action to automatically review dependency changes in PRs, blocking PRs that introduce known vulnerabilities or license compliance issues. This provides supply chain security at the PR review stage.

Acceptance Criteria:

• Dependency Review action added to PR workflow
• Blocks PRs with HIGH/CRITICAL vulnerability dependencies
• Reviews license changes for compliance issues
• Provides inline PR comments with vulnerability details
• Runs only on pull_request events (not push to main)

Code Region: .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml or .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml

Add dependency-review-action to pull request checks:

1. Create or update a PR-specific workflow (e.g., `.github/workflows/dependency-review.yml`)
2. Add a job that:
   - Runs only on `pull_request` events
   - Uses `actions/dependency-review-action@v4`
   - Configures `fail-on-severity: high` (block HIGH and CRITICAL)
   - Enables license checking with allowed licenses list
   - Uses `comment-summary-in-pr: true` for visibility
3. Add documentation explaining what dependency changes are blocked
4. Ensure the action has appropriate permissions (contents: read, pull-requests: write)
5. Test with a sample PR that updates a dependency

This prevents introducing vulnerable dependencies before they reach main branch.

---

Task 3: Investigate and Fix Dependabot Configuration

Priority: Medium
Estimated Effort: Small
Focus Area: Dependencies - Automated Updates

Description:

Investigate why Dependabot has not created any PRs in the last 30 days despite having a valid .github/dependabot.yml configuration. Fix the configuration issue and validate that automated dependency updates are working for gomod, npm, and pip ecosystems.

Acceptance Criteria:

• Root cause of Dependabot inactivity identified
• Dependabot.yml configuration corrected (directory paths, permissions, etc.)
• Verify Dependabot is enabled at repository level (Settings → Security → Dependabot)
• Generate test PR by manually triggering Dependabot or waiting for next scheduled run
• Document expected Dependabot behavior in CONTRIBUTING.md or DEVGUIDE.md

Code Region: .github/dependabot.yml, repository settings investigation

Investigate and fix the inactive Dependabot configuration:

1. Check `.github/dependabot.yml` for configuration issues:
   - Verify directory paths are correct (should be `/` for root, not `/.github/workflows`)
   - Confirm ecosystem names are valid (gomod, npm, pip)
   - Check schedule syntax is correct
2. Investigate repository settings:
   - GitHub UI: Settings → Security → Dependabot (alerts, updates, security updates)
   - Ensure Dependabot is enabled at organization/repo level
   - Check if any rate limits or permissions are blocking Dependabot
3. Fix identified issues (likely directory path in dependabot.yml)
4. Manually trigger Dependabot check or wait 1 week for next scheduled run
5. Validate by confirming PRs appear from dependabot[bot]
6. Document expected Dependabot behavior and troubleshooting steps

Expected outcome: Weekly automated PRs for Go, npm, and pip dependency updates.

---

Task 4: Create SBOM Generation Workflow

Priority: Medium
Estimated Effort: Medium
Focus Area: Dependencies - Supply Chain Transparency

Description:

Create a workflow to automatically generate Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) in CycloneDX or SPDX format for every release. Store SBOMs as release artifacts and optionally in a dedicated branch for historical tracking. This improves supply chain visibility and compliance.

Acceptance Criteria:

• SBOM workflow generates CycloneDX or SPDX formatted SBOM
• Runs on release events and main branch pushes
• Uploads SBOM as release artifact (for releases)
• Uses syft, cyclonedx-gomod, or similar tool
• Includes both direct and transitive dependencies
• SBOM validates against official schema

Code Region: .github/workflows/sbom.yml, release workflow integration

Create an automated SBOM generation workflow:

1. Create `.github/workflows/sbom.yml` with:
   - Trigger: on push to main and on release events
   - Use `anchore/sbom-action@v0` or `cyclonedx/gh-gomod-generate-sbom@v2`
   - Generate CycloneDX JSON format SBOM
   - Include all Go dependencies (go list -m all)
2. For release events:
   - Upload SBOM as release artifact
   - Name: `sbom-<version>.cdx.json`
3. For main branch pushes:
   - Store SBOM in dedicated branch (sbom-data) or artifact storage
   - Optional: Compare against previous SBOM for diff reporting
4. Add SBOM validation step using cyclonedx-cli or similar
5. Document SBOM location and usage in README.md or docs/
6. Consider adding SBOM upload to GitHub Dependency Graph API

This provides complete supply chain transparency and enables vulnerability tracking.

---

Task 5: Pin All Unpinned GitHub Actions to Commit SHAs

Priority: Medium
Estimated Effort: Large
Focus Area: Dependencies - GitHub Actions Security

Description:

Update all 814 unpinned GitHub Actions (currently using version tags like @v4) to pinned commit SHAs (e.g., @a1b2c3d...) to prevent supply chain attacks via compromised action tags. This is a GitHub security best practice.

Acceptance Criteria:

• All actions in .github/workflows/*.yml pinned to commit SHAs
• SHA comments include version tag for readability (e.g., @abc123 # v4.2.0)
• Unpinned action count reduced from 814 to 0
• Add Dependabot config to auto-update action SHAs
• Document action pinning policy in CONTRIBUTING.md

Code Region: .github/workflows/*.yml (all workflow files)

Pin all unpinned GitHub Actions to commit SHAs for security:

1. Scan all workflow files for unpinned actions:

grep -r "uses:" .github/workflows/*.yml | grep -v "@[a-f0-9]{40}"

2. For each unpinned action (814 total):
- Look up the git SHA for the version tag
- Replace `uses: actions/checkout@v4` with `uses: actions/checkout@<sha> # v4.2.0`
- Keep version tag in comment for readability
3. Use automation where possible:
- GitHub CLI: `gh api repos/:owner/:repo/commits/:ref`
- OR use a tool like `mheap/pin-github-action`
4. Update `.github/dependabot.yml` to include:
```yaml
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
  directory: /
  schedule:
    interval: weekly

5. Document in CONTRIBUTING.md:
   • Why actions are pinned (security)
   • How to update pinned actions (Dependabot or manual)
   • Process for reviewing action updates

This eliminates 814 supply chain attack vectors by preventing tag compromise attacks.

---

## 📊 Historical Context

<details>
<summary><b>Previous Focus Areas</b></summary>

| Date | Focus Area | Type | Custom | Key Outcomes |
|------|------------|------|--------|--------------|
| 2026-01-05 | Engine Configuration Best Practices | Custom | Y | Identified 32.6% workflows missing engine config, created decision guide tasks |
| 2026-01-06 | Testing | Standard | N | Found 2.24:1 test ratio, 320 skipped tests, 20 critical files without tests |
| 2026-01-07 | Error Experience Engineering | Custom | Y | Discovered 97% errors lack formatting, 51 stdout anti-patterns |
| 2026-01-08 | Security | Standard | N | Confirmed 98.6% workflows have permissions, identified missing CodeQL/gosec |
| 2026-01-16 | Workflow Compilation Performance | Custom | Y | Found 177 sequential compiles, 4,787 lines of validation, no caching |
| 2026-01-20 | Command Interface Consistency | Custom | Y | Revealed 88% commands lack RunX pattern, 0% have 3+ examples |

**Statistics**: 7 runs total, 67% custom rate, 100% unique areas, 0% reuse rate

</details>

---

## 🎯 Recommendations

### Immediate Actions (This Week)

1. **Add govulncheck to CI/CD** - Priority: HIGH - Automated CVE detection (Task 1)
2. **Add dependency-review-action to PRs** - Priority: HIGH - Block vulnerable dependencies (Task 2)

### Short-term Actions (This Month)

1. **Fix Dependabot configuration** - Priority: MEDIUM - Restore automated updates (Task 3)
2. **Create SBOM workflow** - Priority: MEDIUM - Supply chain transparency (Task 4)

### Long-term Actions (This Quarter)

1. **Pin all GitHub Actions to SHAs** - Priority: MEDIUM - 814 actions to secure (Task 5)
2. **Audit v0.x dependencies** - Priority: LOW - Evaluate 134 dependencies for stability
3. **Reduce indirect-to-direct ratio** - Priority: LOW - Consolidate where possible

---

## 📈 Success Metrics

Track these metrics to measure improvement in **Dependencies**:

- **Vulnerability Detection**: 0 govulncheck runs → 100% PR coverage (Target: 100% of PRs scanned)
- **Dependabot PRs**: 0 PRs/month → 12+ PRs/month (Target: Weekly updates = ~4 PRs/month minimum)
- **Unpinned Actions**: 814 unpinned → 0 unpinned (Target: 100% SHA-pinned = 6,180/6,180)
- **SBOM Coverage**: 0 releases with SBOM → 100% releases (Target: Every release has SBOM artifact)
- **v0.x Dependency Rate**: 48.2% (134/278) → <30% (Target: <83 v0.x dependencies)

**Re-measure After**: 2026-02-21 (30 days) - Expect significant improvement in automation metrics

---

## Next Steps

1. Review and prioritize the 5 tasks above (2 HIGH, 3 MEDIUM priority)
2. Assign tasks to Copilot agent via planner agent (tasks 1-2 first, then 3-5)
3. Track progress on improvement items via GitHub issues or project board
4. Re-evaluate this focus area in 30 days to measure impact
5. Next quality analysis: 2026-01-22 - Focus area will be selected based on diversity algorithm (aim for custom area)

---

*Generated by Repository Quality Improvement Agent*  
*Next analysis: 2026-01-22 - Focus area will be selected based on diversity algorithm (60% custom, 30% standard, 10% reuse)*


> AI generated by [Repository Quality Improvement Agent](https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw/actions/runs/21211209453)
> - [x] expires <!-- gh-aw-expires: 2026-01-28T13:30:51.877Z --> on Jan 28, 2026, 1:30 PM UTC

[github-actions[bot]]

This discussion was automatically closed because it expired on 2026-01-28T13:30:51.877Z.