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See doc/triage.md for instructions on how to triage this report.
modules:
- module: github.com/cometbft/cometbft
versions:
- {}
vulnerable_at: 0.38.0
packages:
- package: github.com/cometbft/cometbft
summary: |-
CometBFT's default for `BlockParams.MaxBytes` consensus parameter may increase
block times and affect consensus participation
description: |-
## Amulet Security Advisory for CometBFT: ASA-2023-002
**Component**: CometBFT **Criticality:** Low **Affected versions:** All
**Affected users:** Validators, Chain Builders + Maintainers
# Summary
A default configuration in CometBFT has been found to be large for common use
cases, and may affect block times and consensus participation when fully
utilized by chain participants. It is advised that chains consider their
specific needs for their use case when setting the `BlockParams.MaxBytes`
consensus parameter. Chains are encouraged to evaluate the impact of having
proposed blocks with the maximum allowed block size, especially on bandwidth
usage and block latency. Additionally, the `timeout_propose` parameter should be
computed using the maximum allowed block size as a reference. This issue does
not represent an actively exploitable vulnerability that would result in a
direct loss of funds, however it may have a slight impact on block latency
depending on a network’s topography.
When setting a large `BlockParams.MaxBytes`, there are two main implications:
* Increased bandwidth to propagate a block
* Increased latency to propagate a block
When combined, this may result in less round participation, and in some cases
additional rounds may be required to meet the consensus threshold, which could
lead to timeouts depending on the topography of a network and environmental
factors. These factors can include the number of validators on a network,
geographic distribution, network connectivity (including latency, bandwidth, and
reachability), the functionality of the modules implementing the logic for a
transaction in your chain, etc. The cost to propagate a 21MB block, the
default value for `BlockParams.MaxBytes`, will be far higher than the cost of
propagating a smaller 1MB block. CometBFT recommends tuning this parameter to a
smaller limit if full initial-round participation is an important quality for
your chain.
# Considerations CometBFT is designed to be configurable by chains, and
implements many different configuration variables and parameters to allow chain
developers, validators, node operators, and chain participants to customize it
best to their use case. A high-performing validator may find it necessary to
experiment with tuning local configuration, optimizing network and compute
resources, and implementing controls to inhibit spam.
# Next Steps for Chains and Validators
To increase awareness of the potential impacts of this default parameter, the
CometBFT team has updated the documentation
(https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/pull/1405,
[v0.34.x](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.34/spec/abci/apps#blockparamsmaxbytes),
[v0.37.x](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.37/spec/abci/abci++_app_requirements#blockparamsmaxbytes),
[v0.38.x](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/spec/abci/abci++_app_requirements#blockparamsmaxbytes))
for builders and maintainers of chain applications. Additionally, it is
recommended that:
* Chain ecosystems and their maintainers set a `BlockParams.MaxBytes`
configuration appropriate for their use case at the application level; in some
cases, fine-tuning `BlockParams` may require a network upgrade.
* Chain ecosystems and their maintainers evaluate how gas is used and required
on their chain, including gas and fee parameters, no-fee or fee-exempt message
policies, and ensure that any custom modules integrate with the gas and fee
frameworks. This is especially important for chains that may have implemented
custom modules or functionality to allow IBC messages to bypass fees.
* Chain ecosystems and their maintainers audit all of their currently-set
parameters and configurations to ensure that they are appropriate for their use
case.
* All validators develop and implement anti-spam measures on their nodes. Amulet
encourages validators to form working groups to collaborate on spam prevention
and on tooling that can be implemented by node operators across the Interchain.
* All validators consider developing and implementing tooling that would allow
them to sample incoming transactions to enable them to fine-tune the level of
service they would like to provide to be resilient in slowdown scenarios. Amulet
also encourages validators to collaborate on tooling that can be implemented by
node operators across the Interchain.
The CometBFT team has also revisited all the checks performed by the consensus
protocol regarding proposed blocks. This investigation has confirmed that
proposed blocks with size exceeding the `BlockParams.MaxBytes` limit established
by the application are not accepted by nodes. The team notwithstanding has
decided to introduce additional sanity checks for the size of proposed blocks
(https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/pull/1408), allowing for an early
identification and rejection of invalid or oversized blocks. These code changes
will be included in the _next_ release of each branch of CometBFT.
As more chains adopt the Interchain Stack for new and cutting-edge use cases,
the CometBFT team recommends that all chains regularly evaluate their parameters
and configurations to ensure they meet the needs of their ecosystem as their
networks mature.
For more information about CometBFT, see
[https://docs.cometbft.com](https://docs.cometbft.com/).
This issue was raised by Notional labs, who reported it via the vulnerability
disclosure channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io) on
Friday, September 23, 2023. If you believe you have found a bug in the
Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug,
please see [https://hackerone.com/cosmos](https://hackerone.com/cosmos).
*****
Note from Amulet on the Security Advisory Process:
In the interest of timely resolution of this issue for validators and node
operators, the Amulet team has chosen to use existing processes and resources
for distributing security advisories within the Cosmos and Interchain
Ecosystems. Stay tuned as we implement an improved, more robust security
advisory distribution system that will provide equitable access to information
about security issues in the Interchain Stack.
ghsas:
- GHSA-hq58-p9mv-338c
references:
- advisory: https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-hq58-p9mv-338c
- fix: https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/pull/1405
- web: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.34/spec/abci/apps#blockparamsmaxbytes
- web: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.37/spec/abci/abci++_app_requirements#blockparamsmaxbytes
- web: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/spec/abci/abci++_app_requirements#blockparamsmaxbytes
- advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hq58-p9mv-338c
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
In GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-hq58-p9mv-338c, there is a vulnerability in the following Go packages or modules:
Cross references:
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The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: