Add new verify_server_hostname to mitigate possibility of MITM
#927
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This LGTM! |
armon
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May 12, 2015
Add new `verify_server_hostname` to mitigate possibility of MITM
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Fixes #792. Previously, a compromised client could be restarted as a server and perform a MITM attack against the cluster. With this PR, TLS certs can be generated matching the pattern of "server..", which is optionally verified using this flag. This prevents a MITM by a compromised client, as the TLS handshake will always fail.
This should be the default, but it would break all currently TLS secured clusters unless they used this specific SAN already, which is unlikely. In the future, we will deprecate support for this being false, and
verify_outgoingwill just imply this behavior.