In "vanilla" DHT implementations (e.g. Kademlia), peer interactions leak a lot of information about who is in the network, who stores what files and who are the producers and consumers of content. This gives potential attackers a good picture of the network very easily and hinders anonymous and private interactions over P2P DHT overlay networks. The open problem here is to improve privacy of DHT protocol.
Improve DHT protocol's privacy without affecting performance and usability.
- Anonymity for producers of content: tracking down who was the originator of content stored in the DHT should not be possible.
- Anonymity for consumers of content: nodes that request content from the DHT should not be linked to the requested content by external actors.
- Plausible deniability of the files hosted in the network nodes: when peers query for content in the DHT, they should not be able to identify which peers are storing the content.