The policy-controller
admission controller can be used to enforce policy on a Kubernetes cluster based on verifiable supply-chain metadata from cosign
.
policy-controller
also resolves the image tags to ensure the image being ran is not different from when it was admitted.
See the installation instructions for more information.
Today, policy-controller
can automatically validate signatures and
attestations on container images.
Enforcement is configured on a per-namespace basis, and multiple keys are supported.
We're actively working on more features here.
The policy-controller
admission controller will only validate resources in namespaces
that have chosen to opt-in. This can be done by adding the label
policy.sigstore.dev/include: "true"
to the namespace resource.
kubectl label namespace my-secure-namespace policy.sigstore.dev/include=true
An image is admitted after it has been validated against all ClusterImagePolicy
that matched the digest of the image
and that there was at least one valid signature or attestation obtained from the authorities provided in each of the matched ClusterImagePolicy
.
So each ClusterImagePolicy
that matches is AND
for admission, and within each ClusterImagePolicy
authorities
are ON
.
See the Configuring Image Pattern for more information.
If no policy is matched against the image digest, the deprecated policy-controller validation behavior will occur.
An example of an allowed admission would be:
- If the image matched against
policy1
andpolicy3
- A valid signature or attestation was obtained for
policy1
with at least one of thepolicy1
authorities - A valid signature or attestation was obtained for
policy3
with at least one of thepolicy3
authorities - The image is admitted
An example of a denied admission would be:
- If the image matched against
policy1
andpolicy2
- A valid signature or attestation was obtained for
policy1
with at least one of thepolicy1
authorities - No valid signature or attestation was obtained for
policy2
with at least one of thepolicy2
authorities - The image is not admitted
An example of no policy matched:
- If the image does not match against any policy
- Fallback to deprecated policy-controller validation behavior
- Validation will be attempted against the secret defined under
cosign.secretKeyRef.name
during helm installation. - If a valid signature or attestation is obtained, image is admitted
- If no valid signature or attestation is obtained, image is denied
policy-controller
supports validation against multiple ClusterImagePolicy
kubernetes resources.
A policy is enforced when an image pattern for the policy is matched against the image being deployed.
The ClusterImagePolicy
specifies spec.images
which specifies a list of glob
matching patterns.
These matching patterns will be matched against the image digest of PodSpec resources attempting to be deployed.
Glob uses golang filepath semantics for
matching the images against. Additionally you can specify a more traditional
**
to match any number of characters. Furthermore to make it easier to specify
images, there are few defaults when an image is matched, namely:
- If there is no host in the glob pattern
index.docker.io
is used for the host. This allows users to specify commonly found images from Docker simply as myproject/nginx instead of inded.docker.io/myproject/nginx - If the image is specified without multiple path elements (so not separated by
/
), thenlibrary
is defaulted. For example specifyingbusybox
will result in library/busybox. And combined with above, will result in match being made againstindex.docker.io/library/busybox
.
A sample of a ClusterImagePolicy
which matches against all images using glob:
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
name: image-policy
spec:
images:
- glob: "**"
When a policy is selected to be evaluated against the matched image, the authorities will be used to validate signatures and attestations. If at least one authority is satisfied and a signature is validated, the policy is validated.
Authorities can be key
specifications, for example:
spec:
authorities:
- key:
data: |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
...
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
- key:
secretRef:
name: secretName
- key:
kms: KMSPATH
Each key
authority can contain these properties:
key.data
: specifies the plain text string of the public keykey.secretRef.name
: specifies the secret location name in the same namespace wherepolicy-controller
is installed.
The first key value will be used in the secret.key.kms
: specifies the location for the public key. Supported formats include:azurekms://[VAULT_NAME][VAULT_URI]/[KEY]
awskms://[ENDPOINT]/{ARN}
whereARN
can be either key ARN or alias ARN.gcpkms://projects/[PROJECT]/locations/global/keyRings/[KEYRING]/cryptoKeys/[KEY]
hashivault://[KEY]
When a policy is selected to be evaluated against the matched image, the authorities will be used to validate signatures. If at least one authority is satisfied and a signature is validated, the policy is validated.
Authorities can be keyless
specifications. For example:
spec:
authorities:
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.example.com
ca-cert:
data: Certificate Data
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.example.com
ca-cert:
secretRef:
name: secretName
- keyless:
identities:
- issuer: https://accounts.google.com
subject: .*@example.com
- issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
subject: https://github.com/mycompany/*/.github/workflows/*@*
Each keyless
authority can contain these properties:
keyless.url
: specifies the Fulcio urlkeyless.ca-cert
: specifiesca-cert
information for thekeyless
authoritysecretRef.name
: specifies the secret location name in the same namespace wherepolicy-controller
is installed.
The first key value will be used in the secret for theca-cert
.data
: specifies the inline certificate data
keyless.identities
: Identity may contain an array ofissuer
and/or thesubject
found in the transparency log. Either field supports a regex.issuer
: specifies the issuer found in the transparency log. Regex patterns are supported.subject
: specifies the subject found in the transparency log. Regex patterns are supported.
If signatures are located in a different repository, it can be specified along with the key
or keyless
definition.
When no source
is specified for the key, the expectation is that the signature is colocated with the image.
Note: By default, credentials used for the remote source repository are the ones provided in the PodSpec providing resource under imagePullSecrets
.
To define a source
, under the corresponding authorities
node, source
can be specified.
A sample of source specification for key
and keyless
:
spec:
authorities:
- key:
data: |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
...
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
source:
- oci: registry.example.com/project/signature-location
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.example.com
source:
- oci: registry.example.com/project/signature-location
If the signatures / attestations are in a different repo or they use different
PullSecrets, you can configure source
to point to a secret
which must live
in the same namespace as policy-controller
webhook (by default cosign-system
).
spec:
authorities:
- key:
data: |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
...
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
source:
- oci: registry.example.com/project/signature-location
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.example.com
source:
- oci: registry.example.com/project/signature-location
signaturePullSecrets:
- name: mysecret
Note: The secret has to be in the format type: dockerconfigjson
.
TLog specifies the URL to a transparency log that holds signature and public key information.
When tlog
key is not specified, the public rekor instance will be used.
spec:
authorities:
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.example.com
tlog:
url: https://rekor.example.com
Just like with cosign
CLI you can verify attestations (using verify-attestation
),
you can configure policies to validate that a particular attestation was signed by
a trusted authority. You do this by using attestations
array within an authorities
section. For example, to configure that a custom
predicate has to exist and is
attested by the specified issuer
and subject
, and the actual Data
section
of the predicate matches the string foobar e2e test
:
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
name: image-policy-keyless-with-attestations
spec:
images:
- glob: registry.local:5000/policy-controller/demo*
authorities:
- name: verify custom attestation
keyless:
url: http://fulcio.fulcio-system.svc
identities:
- issuer: .*kubernetes.default.*
subject: .*kubernetes.io/namespaces/default/serviceaccounts/default
ctlog:
url: http://rekor.rekor-system.svc
attestations:
- name: custom-match-predicate
predicateType: custom
policy:
type: cue
data: |
predicateType: "cosign.sigstore.dev/attestation/v1"
predicate: Data: "foobar e2e test"
policy
is optional and if left out, only the existence of the attestation is
verified.
As discussed earlier, by specifying multiple ClusterImagePolicy
creates an AND
clause so that each ClusterImagePolicy
must be satisfied for an admission, and
having multiple authorities
creates an OR
clause so that any matching authority
is considered a success, sometimes you may want more flexibility, for example, if you
wanted to specify that at least 2 out of N signatures match, and for those you
can create a single ClusterImagePolicy
but craft a policy
that then gets applied
after a ClusterImagePolicy
has been validated. Here's a bit more complex example
that ties all the bits from above together. It requires there to be two
attestations custom
and vuln
and also two signatures, one signed with a key
and one keyless
signature
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
name: image-policy-requires-two-signatures-two-attestations
spec:
images:
- glob: registry.local:5000/policy-controller/demo*
authorities:
- name: keylessatt
keyless:
url: http://fulcio.fulcio-system.svc
ctlog:
url: http://rekor.rekor-system.svc
attestations:
- predicateType: custom
name: customkeyless
policy:
type: cue
data: |
import "time"
before: time.Parse(time.RFC3339, "2049-10-09T17:10:27Z")
predicateType: "cosign.sigstore.dev/attestation/v1"
predicate: {
Data: "foobar e2e test"
Timestamp: <before
}
- predicateType: vuln
name: vulnkeyless
policy:
type: cue
data: |
import "time"
before: time.Parse(time.RFC3339, "2022-04-15T17:10:27Z")
after: time.Parse(time.RFC3339, "2022-03-09T17:10:27Z")
predicateType: "cosign.sigstore.dev/attestation/vuln/v1"
predicate: {
invocation: {
uri: "invocation.example.com/cosign-testing"
}
scanner: {
uri: "fakescanner.example.com/cosign-testing"
}
metadata: {
scanStartedOn: <before
scanStartedOn: >after
scanFinishedOn: <before
scanFinishedOn: >after
}
}
- name: keyatt
key:
data: |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEOz9FcbJM/oOkC26Wfo9paG2tYGBL
usDLHze93DzgLaAPDsyJrygpVnL9M6SOyfyXEsjpBTUu6uFZqHua8hwAlA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
ctlog:
url: http://rekor.rekor-system.svc
attestations:
- name: custom-match-predicate
predicateType: custom
policy:
type: cue
data: |
predicateType: "cosign.sigstore.dev/attestation/v1"
predicate: Data: "foobar key e2e test"
- name: keylesssignature
keyless:
url: http://fulcio.fulcio-system.svc
ctlog:
url: http://rekor.rekor-system.svc
- name: keysignature
key:
data: |
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEOz9FcbJM/oOkC26Wfo9paG2tYGBL
usDLHze93DzgLaAPDsyJrygpVnL9M6SOyfyXEsjpBTUu6uFZqHua8hwAlA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
ctlog:
url: http://rekor.rekor-system.svc
policy:
type: cue
data: |
package sigstore
import "struct"
import "list"
authorityMatches: {
keyatt: {
attestations: struct.MaxFields(1) & struct.MinFields(1)
},
keysignature: {
signatures: list.MaxItems(1) & list.MinItems(1)
},
if (len(authorityMatches.keylessatt.attestations) < 2) {
keylessattMinAttestations: 2
keylessattMinAttestations: "Error"
},
keylesssignature: {
signatures: list.MaxItems(1) & list.MinItems(1)
}
}
Note: This behavior is being deprecated in favor of using ClusterImagePolicy
resources.
During the admission validation, if no ClusterImagePolicy
is matched, the deprecated behavior will occur.
Image digests will be validated against the public key secret defined by cosign.secretKeyRef.name
during installation.
If the public key secret is not configured, the admission validation verifies against the fulcio root.
When installing policy-controller
through helm, cosign.secretKeyRef.name
can be specified.
helm install policy-controller -n cosign-system sigstore/policy-controller --devel --set cosign.secretKeyRef.name=mysecret
The secret specified should contain the key cosign.pub
and the public key data content.
Where cosign.pub
is a file containing the public key, the kubernetes secret can be created with:
kubectl create secret generic mysecret -n cosign-system --from-file=cosign.pub=./cosign.pub
If the public key is able to validate a signature for the image digest, the admission controller will admit the image. If the public key is not able to validate a signature for the image digest, the admission controller will deny the image.
This repo includes a policy-tester
tool which enables checking a policy against
various images.
In the root of this repo, run the following to build:
make policy-tester
Then run it pointing to a YAML file containing a ClusterImagePolicy, and an image to evaluate the policy against:
(set -o pipefail && \
./policy-tester \
--policy=test/testdata/policy-controller/tester/cip-public-keyless.yaml \
--image=ghcr.io/sigstore/cosign/cosign:v1.9.0 | jq)
Should you discover any security issues, please refer to sigstores security process