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<!-- NOTE: Sorry guise. We're reverse engineers. Not web devs. This is kind of a wreck and was done as a joke taken too far. Our sincere apologies. -->
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>RATastrophe: Monitoring a Malware Menagerie</title>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<link href="style.css" rel="stylesheet" />
</head>
<body>
<div id="impress">
<body class="impress-not-supported">
<div class="fallback-message">
<p>Wait, people still use browsers not supported by impress.js!?</p>
</div>
<!-- Title & Subtitle -->
<div id="title" class="step" data-x="0" data-y="0" data-scale="5">
<h1>RATastrophe</h1>
</div>
<div id="subtitle" class="step" data-x="0" data-y="1000" data-scale="5">
<h2>Monitoring a Malware Menagerie</h2>
</div>
<!-- Who are we? -->
<div id ="whoareu" class="step" data-x="0" data-y="4000">
<img src="resources/img/whoru.jpg"></img>
<div class="section-title">
<h2>Who are we?</h2>
</div>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="0" data-y="5500" data-rotate="90">
Seth Hardy
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="100" data-y="5600" data-rotate="90">
Katie Kleemola
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="200" data-y="5700" data-rotate="90">
Greg Wiseman
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="-350" data-y="5800" data-rotate="90" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/citlab.jpg"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="-100" data-y="6500">
Munk School of Global Affairs
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="-100" data-y="6600">
University of Toronto
</div>
<!-- Background section -->
<div id ="background" class="step section-title" data-x="5000" data-y="4000" data-scale="2">
<h2>Background</h2>
</div>
<div class="step lefttext" data-x="3800" data-y="3800">
<b>Comparison</b> of Targeted Threats against Human Rights Organizations Research Project
</div>
<div class="step lefttext" data-x="3800" data-y="4300">
<b>Limited visibility:</b> only participating organizations, only what they send
</div>
<div class="step righttext" data-x="5000" data-y="3800">
Looking primarily at <i>highly</i> targeted attacks and <i>already</i> compromised targets
</div>
<div class="step righttext" data-x="5000" data-y="4300">
<i>Not</i> writing AV detection - although perhaps NIDS signatures
</div>
<!-- Previous research section -->
<div id ="prev-research" class="step section-title" data-x="9600" data-y="4000" data-scale="2">
<h2>Previous Research</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="10000" data-y="3850">
From the Targeted Threats project:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="10500" data-y="3950">
IExplore/Sharky RAT (2011)
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="10500" data-y="4050">
Mac Malware (2012)
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="10000" data-y="4200">
Primarily focused on Tibetan civil society organizations
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="10000" data-y="4400">
Multiple names on Mila’s APT spreadsheet
</div>
<!-- what is apt? will fix so the red goes over it-->
<div id="aptwhat" class="step section-title" data-x="15000" data-y="4000" data-scale="4">
<h2>What is an APT?</h2>
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="14850" data-y="4000" data-scale="2">
<img src="resources/img/SlashCircle.svg"></img>
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="15250" data-y="4500">
You already know.
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="15250" data-y="4500">
You’re probably still getting owned...
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="15250" data-y="4500">
Are you really interested in <b>what</b>, as opposed to <b>who</b> and <b>why</b>?
</div>
<!-- THREAT ATTRIBUTION -->
<div id="threatattr" class="step section-title" data-x="20000" data-y="4000" data-scale="1">
<h2>THREAT ATTRIBUTION</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="20000" data-y="5000" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/AnchorPanda_0.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="20500" data-y="5000" data-scale="3">
Kind of a <div class="big">big</div> deal?
</div>
<!-- SUN TZU INTERLUDE -->
<div id="suntzu" class="step section-title" data-x="24000" data-y="4000" data-scale="3">
<h2>Obligatory Sun Tzu Quote</h2>
</div>
<div class="step quote" data-x="25000" data-y="6000" data-scale="1">
<i>"It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle."</i>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="25000" data-y="7000" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/suntzu.png"></img>
</div>
<div id="threatattr2" class="step section-title" data-x="25000" data-y="8000" data-scale="1">
<h2>THREAT</h2>
<img src="resources/img/busted.jpg"></img>
<h2>ATTRIBUTION</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="25000" data-y="9000">
Contextual information often overlooked
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="23500" data-y="9000">
How do we do this?
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="24000" data-y="9200">
Look for the smoking gun
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="24500" data-y="9400">
Cluster and make connections
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="25000" data-y="9600">
<b>Technical:</b> vulnerabilities, malware families, infrastructure
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="25000" data-y="9800">
<b>Contextual:</b> people (targeted and spoofed), organizations
</div>
<!-- REGIONAL OVERVIEW -->
<div id="regoverview" class="step section-title" data-x="30000" data-y="9800" data-scale="1">
<h2>REGIONAL OVERVIEW</h2>
</div>
<div id="war" class="step hide" data-x="30000" data-y="9800" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/cyberwar.png"></img>
</div>
<div id="middleeast" class="step big subsection-title" data-x="29500" data-y="8900" data-scale="1">
<h2>Middle East</h2>
</div>
<div id="syria" class="step kindabig subsection-title" data-x="30000" data-y="8650" data-scale="1">
<h2>Syria</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30600" data-y="8800" data-scale="1">
Fake Skype tools (e.g. encryption plugins)
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30600" data-y="8900" data-scale="1">
Fake hacking/DDoS tools
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30600" data-y="9000" data-scale="1">
Public RATs
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30700" data-y="9100" data-scale="1">
DarkComet
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30700" data-y="9200" data-scale="1">
XTreme RAT
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="30600" data-y="9400" data-scale="1">
<i>See EFF work by Eva Galperin & Morgan Marquis-Boire</i>
</div>
<div id="iran" class="step kindabig subsection-title" data-x="29050" data-y="4000" data-scale="1">
<h2>Iran</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="29600" data-y="4100" data-scale="1">
Fake censorship circumvention tools
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="29750" data-y="4250" data-scale="1">
njRAT posing as Psiphon, distributed by Farsi file-sharing sites
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="27500" data-y="4000" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/pisphone.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="29600" data-y="4500" data-scale="1">
Lower technical sophistication
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="29600" data-y="4650" data-scale="1">
Higher degree of “compromise and own” and social engineering
</div>
<div id="tibet" class="step subsection-title big" data-x="30000" data-y="6800" data-scale="1">
<h2>Tibet/China</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30100" data-y="7000" data-scale="1">
Mostly document malware
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="30100" data-y="7300" data-scale="1" data-rotate="20">
Same CVE's are used
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="29900" data-y="7650" data-scale="1" data-rotate="55">
over
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="29900" data-y="7650" data-scale="1" data-rotate="55">
and over
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="29900" data-y="7650" data-scale="1" data-rotate="55">
and over again
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="29900" data-y="7650" data-scale="1" data-rotate="55">
- long after they've been fixed
</div>
<div class="step long" data-x="29900" data-y="8050" data-scale="1">
CVE Timeline
<img src="resources/img/culled_cves.png">
</div>
<div id="minimizingav" class="step subsection-title" data-x="35000" data-y="6000" data-scale="1">
<h2>Minimizing AV Detection</h2>
</div>
<div class="step big" data-x="35400" data-y="6200" data-scale="2">
Protip
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="36500" data-y="4500" data-scale="1">
Modify the RTF header
<img src="resources/img/rtfhex.png"></img><p>
Word will still open them but <p>fewer AV engines will detect them
</div>
<div id="disguise20120158" class="step subsection-title" data-x="40000" data-y="6000" data-scale="1">
<h2>Disguising CVE-2012-0158</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="5000" data-scale="1">
<div class="alert">
Recall
</div>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40400" data-y="4800" data-scale="1">
CVE-2012-0158 is the still the most commonly used vulnerability used against Tibetan groups despite being fixed in April 2012
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40400" data-y="5100" data-scale="1">
CVE-2012-0158 typically uses the ListView, ListView2, TreeView or TreeView2 ActiveX controllers
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40400" data-y="5350" data-scale="1">
How to mask the use of vulnerable ActiveX controllers?
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="42695" data-y="5750" data-scale="1">
<div class="subheading">
Trick 1:
</div>
<div><img src="resources/img/hexencoded.png"></img></div>
Encode the ActiveX controller name
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="6000" data-scale="2">
<img src="resources/img/wizard.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45300" data-y="6000" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/decode.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45900" data-y="8000" data-scale="1">
<div class="subheading">
Trick 2:
</div>
<div><img src="resources/img/chartspace.png"></img></div>
Find a less commonly known feature to exploit the same vulnerability
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="44000" data-y="8000" data-scale="1">
<div class="subheading">
Trick 3:
</div>
<img src="resources/img/mime.png"></img>
Disguise the document
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="7100" data-scale="4">
Antivirus definitions are often updated to recognize these tricks
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="45000" data-y="7550" data-scale="2">
But there is often a lag resulting in individuals being compromised
</div>
<div class="step longest centertext" data-x="45000" data-y="8850" data-scale="1">
CVE-2012-0158 Timeline
<img src="resources/img/cve20120158.png"></src>
</div>
<div id ="methodologyintro" class="step longest" data-x="45000" data-y="9800" data-scale="1">
How do we process all the samples we receive?
</div>
<!-- SHARK -->
<div class="step longest centertext" data-x="45000" data-y="10300" data-scale="1">
System for the Holistic Analysis of RAT Kings
<div>
<img src="resources/img/lasershark2.png"></img>
</div>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="11500" data-scale="1">
Methodology
<div>
<img src="resources/img/methodologygraph.png" width="843px" height="394px"></img>
</div>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="12500" data-scale="1">
Submission Classification
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="45000" data-y="13500" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/submissionclassification.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="14500" data-scale="1">
Imported Email
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="40000" data-y="15500" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/importedemail.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="16500" data-scale="1">
Sample Metadata
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="40000" data-y="17500" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/samplemetadata.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="18500" data-scale="1">
Regex Filterable List Views
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="40000" data-y="19500" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/regex.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="20500" data-scale="1">
Interactive Visualizations
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="40000" data-y="21500" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/vis.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="22500" data-scale="1">
Export to other analysis tools
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="40000" data-y="23500" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/export.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="24500" data-scale="1">
Filters to only export desired slice of dataset
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="24650" data-scale="1">
GEXF for Gephi
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40000" data-y="24750" data-scale="1">
CSV for Maltego, Excel, etc.
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40300" data-y="26500" data-scale="2">
Future Plans
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40400" data-y="26200" data-scale="1">
More automated workflow
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40500" data-y="26300" data-scale="1">
Integration with Cuckoo Sandbox
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40500" data-y="26400" data-scale="1">
Network traffic import from pcaps
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40500" data-y="26700" data-scale="1">
Built-in interactive node-link visualizations
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40800" data-y="26900" data-scale="1">
Improved change tracking / auditing
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="40100" data-y="26800" data-scale="1">
Open source
</div>
<!-- Clustering! -->
<div id="clust" class="step subsection-title" data-x="50000" data-y="4000" data-scale="3">
<h2>Clustering</h2>
</div>
<div class="step alert" data-x="49500" data-y="4500" data-scale="1">
Definition
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="49580" data-y="4600" data-scale="1">
<div class="subheading">
RAT King:
</div>
A series of C2's intertwined by RATs
</div>
<div class="step alert" data-x="45000" data-y="4300" data-scale="1" data-rotate="90">
Example
</div>
<div id="dtl" class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="4600" data-rotate="90">
<div class="subsection-title">
<h2>"DTL Guys"</h2>
</div>
An ongoing campaign since January 2012
</div>
<div class="step alert" data-x="46300" data-y="5000" data-scale="1">
Observe
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="47000" data-y="5100" data-scale="2">
<img src="resources/img/labelledratking.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="48000" data-y="5000" data-scale="1">
Four domains resolve to same IP
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="48000" data-y="5150" data-scale="1">
C2's for six different malware families
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="48000" data-y="5300" data-scale="1">
But mostly LURK0/CCTV0 and Surtr
</div>
<div id="lurk0" class="step evilmalwarefamily" data-x="50000" data-y="6000">
<h2>LURK0 & CCTV0</h2>
</div>
<div class="step centertext" data-x="50000" data-y="7000" data-scale="1">
Gh0stRAT based
<img src="resources/img/rat.jpg"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="49600" data-y="8000" data-scale="1">
Named for five character header in communications
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="8200" data-scale="1">
Standard RAT functionality
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="49600" data-y="8400" data-scale="1">
Active development over the past two years
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="9000" data-scale="1">
At first...
</div>
<div class="step centertext" data-x="50000" data-y="8900" data-scale="1">
Internal name: "Butterfly.dll"
<img src="resources/img/butterfly.jpg">
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="10100" data-scale="1">
Then a break...
</div>
<div class="step centertext" data-x="50200" data-y="10000" data-scale="1">
Internal name: "ETClient.dll"
<img src="resources/img/etclient.jpg"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51600" data-y="10000" data-scale="1">
Features added:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="10100" data-scale="1">
Padding with extra data
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51700" data-y="10200" data-scale="1">
Larger file size to avoid AV heuristics
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51700" data-y="10300" data-scale="1">
Different hash every time
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="10450" data-scale="1">
Upgrade zlib version used for encrypting communication
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="10600" data-scale="1">
Change persistence mechanism
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="10700" data-scale="1">
Add configuration file
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="10825" data-scale="1">
Change the five character header from 'LURK0' to 'CCTV0'
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="11700" data-scale="1">
Samples of the same family but not using this C2 cluster often haven't followed the same development branch
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="11950" data-scale="1">
and have differences in internal identifiers and functionality
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="51650" data-y="12150" data-scale="1">
but trying to track this is time consuming and tedious
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="12100" data-scale="1">
<b>Aside:</b> Researchers give malware much cooler names than their authors do
</div>
<div id="surtr" class="step evilmalwarefamily" data-x="50000" data-y="13100" data-scale="2">
<h2>Surtr</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="13100" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/surtr.jpg"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="14100" data-scale="1">
Unsurprising... standard RAT functionality
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="14300" data-scale="1">
Immediately downloads a stage 2 component allowing for easy updating
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="14500" data-scale="1">
Similar campaign codes and config files as LURK0/CCTV0
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="14650" data-scale="1">
Uses zlib to encrypt network traffic
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="14800" data-scale="1">
Pads resource section to make file larger
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="14950" data-scale="1">
Spiritual successor to LURK0/CCTV0
</div>
<div id="dtltimeline" class="step long" data-x="50000" data-y="15700" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/dtltimeline.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="15700" data-scale="2">
Clustering based on obvious shared infrastructure
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="45000" data-y="16000" data-scale="1">
But looking at the development path
of the malware families used we can
<i>try</i> to guess non-obviously related campaigns...
</div>
<!-- tseringKanyaq -->
<div id="tseringkanyaq" class="step subsection-title" data-x="50000" data-y="25000" data-rotate="90" data-scale="5">
<h2>TseringKanyaq</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="25000" data-scale="1">
Very easy cluster to spot via contextual analysis
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="25200" data-scale="1">
Reply-To: {tseringKanyaq,d.kanam}@yahoo.com
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="50000" data-y="25400" data-scale="1">
Often spoofs Tibetan Women’s Association or other real organizations
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="49600" data-y="24000" data-scale="1" data-rotate="90">
First seen May 4, 2012
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="49450" data-y="24000" data-scale="1" data-rotate="90">
Last seen July 4, 2013
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="49300" data-y="24000" data-scale="1" data-rotate="90">
(but we’ll likely see more)
</div>
<div class="step centertext" data-x="52000" data-y="25400" data-scale="1">
THREE WOLF REPLY-TO:
<img src="resources/img/3wolfmoon.jpg"></src>
</div>
<div id="infrastructureclustering" class="step subsection-title" data-x="55000" data-y="25400" data-scale="2">
<h2>Infrastructure Clustering</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="55000" data-y="25500" data-scale="1">
Uses three domains for sending email
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="55300" data-y="25600" data-scale="1">
163.com : May 4, 2012 - July 9, 2012
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="55300" data-y="25700" data-scale="1">
myopera.com : July 24, 2012 - September 5, 2012
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="55300" data-y="25800" data-scale="1">
gmx.com : October 14, 2012 - present
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="55000" data-y="25950" data-scale="1">
No overlap - moves from one to the next
</div>
<div id="vulns" class="step" data-x="58000" data-y="0" data-scale="2">
<h2>Vulnerabilities</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58200" data-y="-300" data-scale="1">
CVE-2012-0158
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58300" data-y="-150" data-scale="1">
The best thing since CVE-2010-3333!
</div>
<div class="step centertext" data-x="58400" data-y="400" data-scale="1">
And Mac users?
<div>
<img src="resources/img/dalailamamac.jpg"></img>
</div>
CVE-2009-0563, CVE-2012-0507
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58500" data-y="1100" data-scale="1">
None of these stand out for Tibetan attacks
</div>
<div id="malfam" class="step subsection-title" data-x="58500" data-y="2000" data-scale="2">
<h2>Malware Families</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="59000" data-y="1900" data-scale="1">
Windows:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="59050" data-y="2000" data-scale="1">
Shadownet & Duojeen
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58550" data-y="2150" data-scale="1">
Remember Lucky Cat?
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="59050" data-y="2150" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/lucky_cat.gif"></img>
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="58550" data-y="2300" data-scale="1">
See the Trend Micro reports.
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58050" data-y="2150" data-scale="1">
Mac:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58150" data-y="2250" data-scale="1">
PubSab
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="58150" data-y="2400" data-scale="1">
See last year's talk.
</div>
<div id="shadownet" class="step evilmalwarefamily" data-x="58150" data-y="3500" data-scale="2">
<h2>Shadownet</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58150" data-y="3600" data-scale="1">
Persistence via WMI - fairly unusual
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58150" data-y="3750" data-scale="1">
Very inconsistent technical sophistication
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58550" data-y="3825" data-scale="1">
Some attacks use UAC elevation
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58550" data-y="3950" data-scale="1">
Some attacks are just completely broken
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58150" data-y="4100" data-scale="1">
No clear sign of active development on any malware family
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58550" data-y="4250" data-scale="1">
Repurposing, as opposed to development?
</div>
<div id="c2infrastructure2" class="step subsection-title" data-x="58550" data-y="5500" data-scale="2">
<h2>C2 Infrastructure</h2>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58650" data-y="5200" data-scale="1">
Disposable infrastructure:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58800" data-y="5350" data-scale="1">
free hosting providers
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="59000" data-y="5500" data-scale="1">
mostly .com and .info, but also .in and .gg
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58800" data-y="5650" data-scale="1">
some Tibetan-themed names
</div>
<div id="c2infrastructure" class="step centertext subsection-title" data-x="58800" data-y="6200">
<h2>C2 Infrastructure</h2>
<img src="resources/img/appleboy1111.png">
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58800" data-y="7000" data-scale="1">
Threat clustering and attribution most clear from contextual analysis
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="59000" data-y="7200" data-scale="1">
Vulnerabilities and exploits very similar to many others
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="58800" data-y="7500" data-scale="1">
Knowing how targeted organizations and (real, impersonated) people are related assists with analysis
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="59000" data-y="7700" data-scale="1">
In this case it was easy to know where to look with Reply-To: headers
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="59000" data-y="7950" data-scale="1">
Many times this information is really obvious in retrospect, but hard to find when processing large amounts of data
</div>
<div class="step subsection-title" data-x="61000" data-y="0" data-scale="2">
Targeted Threat Index
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61300" data-y="-300" data-scale="1">
A metric for assigning an overall threat ranking score to email messages that deliver malware
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61600" data-y="-100">
Measures both contextual and technical targeting complexity
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61700" data-y="100">
Measuring the sophistication of targeted attacks is complicated, due to contextual familiarity needed
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61500" data-y="350">
Intended for use in prioritizing analysis and understanding severity and danger of targeted threats
</div>
<div id = "tti" class="step" data-x="61500" data-y="1000">
TTI METRIC
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61500" data-y="1500">
The TTI score is calculated in two parts:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61700" data-y="1650">
<em>(Targeting Sophistication Base Value) * (Technical Sophistication Multiplier) = TTI Score</em>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61700" data-y="2400">
Base value is 0 - 5
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61750" data-y="2500">
Technical multiplier is 1 - 2
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61800" data-y="2600">
Overall score is 0 - 10
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61800" data-y="2750">
0 is reserved for non-targeted threats, e.g. spam
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="61800" data-y="3500">
TARGETING SOPHISTICATION
</div>
<div class="step tiny" data-x="61800" data-y="4300">
<table>
<tr>
<td class="short"><strong>Value</strong></td>
<td class="long"><strong>Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not targeted (spam, financially motivated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Targeted but not customized (looks fake)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Targeted and poorly customized (may look questionable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Targeted and customized (may use a real person, organization, content)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Targeted and well-customized (likely directly addresses recipient or send from a compromised account, can be externally verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Targeted and highly customized using sensitive data (likely from a separate compromise)</td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63500" data-y="4300">
Higher scores rely on detailed knowledge of the recipient
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63600" data-y="4450">
Identity, interests, and trust networks
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63600" data-y="4600">
Very frequently use knowledge from a separate compromise
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63600" data-y="4750">
Content and presentation strongly matter
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63500" data-y="4950">
Sender identity (email address and name) also very important
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63600" data-y="5125">
Need contextual knowledge to assess this
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="63600" data-y="6200">
TECHNICAL SOPHISTICATION
</div>
<div class="step tiny" data-x="63600" data-y="8000">
<table>
<tr>
<td class="short"><strong>Value</strong></td>
<td class"long"><strong>Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No code protection (packing, obfuscation, anti-reversing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>Simple code protection (one method from above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Multiple simple code protection techniques, or memory-only decryption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>Simple code protection with at least one advanced protection method (rootkit, virtualized packer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Multiple advanced protection techniques, appears designed by a professional software engineering team</td>
</tr>
</table>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="65000" data-y="0">
Almost all samples we've analyzed score 1.5 or less
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="65100" data-y="150">
Notable exceptions: FinFisher, DaVinci RCS
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="65100" data-y="300">
1.25 seems to be the sweet spot of least resistance
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="65000" data-y="450">
No need to go overboard...
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="65500" data-y="650" data-scale="2">
thanks, AV industry!!!
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="64100" data-y="250" data-rotate="90">
1.5 becoming more common as attack tools are developed
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="64000" data-y="400" data-rotate="90">
PlugX, Surtr
</div>
<div id="recommendations" class="step" data-x="68150" data-y="0" data-scale="2">
RECOMMENDATIONS
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="68950" data-y="0" data-scale="1">
<img src="resources/img/MrGarrison.png"></img>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="68150" data-y="200">
Contextual and technical analysis for cluster identification
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="68150" data-y="350">
Threat data collection system
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="68300" data-y="500">
Need something beyond MD5s, domain names, and IPs
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="69200" data-y="500">
TTI metric for ranking and prioritizing threats
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="69400" data-y="300">
Monitoring threats under active development
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="69400" data-y="100">
Knowing how to catch it now will help with catching it later
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="69400" data-y="-100">
And it means the attackers are invested!
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="71400" data-y="0">
...AND SOME DONT'S
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="71400" data-y="1000">
Cluster identification is <b>not</b> the same as actor attribution
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="71650" data-y="1150">
State-sponsored, state-supported, state-suggested, state-overlooked?
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="71650" data-y="2000">
"Offensive defense" and "strike back policy"
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="71800" data-y="2500">
Are you <em>absolutely</em> sure you know who you're dealing with?
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="71900" data-y="2600">
...and even if you do, what then?
</div>
<div class="step long centertext" data-x="73000" data-y="0">
<img src="resources/img/seven-ending-box.jpg"></img>
ALSO, STOP OPENING ATTACHMENTS
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="73000" data-y="1150">
we all know what happens when you open the box
</div>
<div class="step hide" data-x="73000" data-y="1300">
(it is not good)
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="0">
TARGETED THREATS REPORT
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="1000">
Citizen Lab will soon be releasing all of our findings, including those described here, in a full report: <em>Comparison of Targeted Threats Against Human Rights Organizations</em>
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="2000">
This will include technical details as well as contextual
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76200" data-y="2150">
MD5s, C2 IPs, domain names, malware families
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76200" data-y="2350">
Descriptions of spoofed individuals, organizations, and their trust relationships
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="3050">
Check out citizenlab.org
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="3150">
or follow @citizenlab
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="4050">
Or you can follow us individually:
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="4150">
@thirdson
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="4250">
@katharineaudrey
</div>
<div class="step" data-x="76000" data-y="4350">
@wisemang
</div>
<div class="step longest centertext" data-x="76000" data-y="5350">
If you want to read about rabbit psychology, flamethrowers and parenthood.
</div>
<div class="step longest" data-x="76000" data-y="6350">
<img src="resources/img/attilasbender.jpg"></img>
</div>
<div class="step centertext" data-x="77500" data-y="2350">
QUESTIONS?
<img src="resources/img/lasershark.png">
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