ics | title | stage | category | kind | requires | required-by | version compatibility | author | created | modified |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3 |
Connection Semantics |
draft |
IBC/TAO |
instantiation |
2, 24 |
4, 25 |
ibc-go v9.0.0 |
Christopher Goes <cwgoes@tendermint.com>, Juwoon Yun <joon@tendermint.com> |
2019-03-07 |
2024-07-23 |
This standards document describes the abstraction of an IBC connection: two stateful objects (connection ends) on two separate chains, each associated with a light client of the other chain, which together facilitate cross-chain sub-state verification and packet association (through channels). A protocol for safely establishing a connection between two chains is described.
The core IBC protocol provides authorisation and ordering semantics for packets: guarantees, respectively, that packets have been committed on the sending blockchain (and according state transitions executed, such as escrowing tokens), and that they have been committed exactly once in a particular order and can be delivered exactly once in that same order. The connection abstraction specified in this standard, in conjunction with the client abstraction specified in ICS 2, defines the authorisation semantics of IBC. Ordering semantics are described in ICS 4).
Client-related types & functions are as defined in ICS 2.
Channel and packet-related functions are as defined in ICS 4.
Commitment proof related types & functions are defined in ICS 23
Identifier
and other host state machine requirements are as defined in ICS 24. The identifier is not necessarily intended to be a human-readable name (and likely should not be, to discourage squatting or racing for identifiers).
The opening handshake protocol allows each chain to verify the identifier used to reference the connection on the other chain, enabling modules on each chain to reason about the reference on the other chain.
An actor, as referred to in this specification, is an entity capable of executing datagrams who is paying for computation / storage (via gas or a similar mechanism) but is otherwise untrusted. Possible actors include:
- End users signing with an account key
- On-chain smart contracts acting autonomously or in response to another transaction
- On-chain modules acting in response to another transaction or in a scheduled manner
- Implementing blockchains should be able to safely allow untrusted actors to open and update connections.
Prior to connection establishment:
- No further IBC sub-protocols should operate, since cross-chain sub-states cannot be verified.
- The initiating actor (who creates the connection) must be able to specify an initial consensus state for the chain to connect to and an initial consensus state for the connecting chain (implicitly, e.g. by sending the transaction).
Once a negotiation handshake has begun:
- Only the appropriate handshake datagrams can be executed in order.
- No third chain can masquerade as one of the two handshaking chains
Once a negotiation handshake has completed:
- The created connection objects on both chains contain the consensus states specified by the initiating actor.
- No other connection objects can be maliciously created on other chains by replaying datagrams.
This ICS defines the ConnectionState
and ConnectionEnd
types:
enum ConnectionState {
INIT,
TRYOPEN,
OPEN,
}
interface ConnectionEnd {
state: ConnectionState
counterpartyConnectionIdentifier: Identifier
counterpartyPrefix: CommitmentPrefix
clientIdentifier: Identifier
counterpartyClientIdentifier: Identifier
version: string | []string
delayPeriodTime: uint64
delayPeriodBlocks: uint64
}
- The
state
field describes the current state of the connection end. - The
counterpartyConnectionIdentifier
field identifies the connection end on the counterparty chain associated with this connection. - The
counterpartyPrefix
field contains the prefix used for state verification on the counterparty chain associated with this connection. Chains should expose an endpoint to allow relayers to query the connection prefix. If not specified, a defaultcounterpartyPrefix
of"ibc"
should be used. - The
clientIdentifier
field identifies the client associated with this connection. - The
counterpartyClientIdentifier
field identifies the client on the counterparty chain associated with this connection. - The
version
field is an opaque string which can be utilised to determine encodings or protocols for channels or packets utilising this connection. If not specified, a defaultversion
of""
should be used. - The
delayPeriodTime
indicates a period in time that must elapse after validation of a header before a packet, acknowledgement, proof of receipt, or timeout can be processed. - The
delayPeriodBlocks
indicates a period in blocks that must elapse after validation of a header before a packet, acknowledgement, proof of receipt, or timeout can be processed.
Connection paths are stored under a unique identifier.
function connectionPath(id: Identifier): Path {
return "connections/{id}"
}
A reverse mapping from clients to a set of connections (utilised to look up all connections using a client) is stored under a unique prefix per-client:
function clientConnectionsPath(clientIdentifier: Identifier): Path {
return "clients/{clientIdentifier}/connections"
}
addConnectionToClient
is used to add a connection identifier to the set of connections associated with a client.
function addConnectionToClient(
clientIdentifier: Identifier,
connectionIdentifier: Identifier) {
conns = privateStore.get(clientConnectionsPath(clientIdentifier))
conns.add(connectionIdentifier)
privateStore.set(clientConnectionsPath(clientIdentifier), conns)
}
Helper functions are defined by the connection to pass the CommitmentPrefix
associated with the connection to the verification function
provided by the client. In the other parts of the specifications, these functions MUST be used for introspecting other chains' state,
instead of directly calling the verification functions on the client.
function verifyClientConsensusState(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
clientIdentifier: Identifier,
consensusStateHeight: Height,
consensusState: ConsensusState
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, consensusStatePath(clientIdentifier, consensusStateHeight))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, 0, 0, proof, path, consensusState)
}
function verifyClientState(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
clientState: ClientState
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, clientStatePath(clientIdentifier)
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, 0, 0, proof, path, clientState)
}
function verifyConnectionState(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
connectionIdentifier: Identifier,
connectionEnd: ConnectionEnd
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, connectionPath(connectionIdentifier))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, 0, 0, proof, path, connectionEnd)
}
function verifyChannelState(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
portIdentifier: Identifier,
channelIdentifier: Identifier,
channelEnd: ChannelEnd
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, channelPath(portIdentifier, channelIdentifier))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, 0, 0, proof, path, channelEnd)
}
function verifyPacketCommitment(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
portIdentifier: Identifier,
channelIdentifier: Identifier,
sequence: uint64,
commitmentBytes: bytes
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, packetCommitmentPath(portIdentifier, channelIdentifier, sequence))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, connection.delayPeriodTime, connection.delayPeriodBlocks, proof, path, commitmentBytes)
}
function verifyPacketAcknowledgement(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
portIdentifier: Identifier,
channelIdentifier: Identifier,
sequence: uint64,
acknowledgement: bytes
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, packetAcknowledgementPath(portIdentifier, channelIdentifier, sequence))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, connection.delayPeriodTime, connection.delayPeriodBlocks, proof, path, acknowledgement)
}
function verifyPacketReceiptAbsence(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
portIdentifier: Identifier,
channelIdentifier: Identifier,
sequence: uint64
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, packetReceiptPath(portIdentifier, channelIdentifier, sequence))
return verifyNonMembership(clientState, height, connection.delayPeriodTime, connection.delayPeriodBlocks, proof, path)
}
// OPTIONAL: verifyPacketReceipt is only required to support new channel types beyond ORDERED and UNORDERED.
function verifyPacketReceipt(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
portIdentifier: Identifier,
channelIdentifier: Identifier,
sequence: uint64,
receipt: bytes
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, packetReceiptPath(portIdentifier, channelIdentifier, sequence))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, connection.delayPeriodTime, connection.delayPeriodBlocks, connection.counterpartyPrefix, proof, portIdentifier, channelIdentifier, sequence, receipt)
}
function verifyNextSequenceRecv(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height,
proof: CommitmentProof,
portIdentifier: Identifier,
channelIdentifier: Identifier,
sequence: uint64,
nextSequenceRecv: uint64
) {
clientState = queryClientState(connection.clientIdentifier)
path = applyPrefix(connection.counterpartyPrefix, nextSequenceRecvPath(portIdentifier, channelIdentifier, sequence))
return verifyMembership(clientState, height, connection.delayPeriodTime, connection.delayPeriodBlocks, proof, path, nextSequenceRecv)
}
function verifyMultihopMembership(
connection: ConnectionEnd, // the connection end corresponding to the receiving chain.
height: Height,
proof: MultihopProof,
connectionHops: []Identifier,
key: CommitmentPath,
value: bytes
) {
// the connectionEnd corresponding to the end of the multi-hop channel path (sending/counterparty chain).
multihopConnectionEnd = abortTransactionUnless(getMultihopConnectionEnd(proof))
prefix = multihopConnectionEnd.GetCounterparty().GetPrefix()
client = queryClient(connection.clientIdentifier)
consensusState = queryConsensusState(connection.clientIdentifier, height)
abortTransactionUnless(client.Status() === "active")
abortTransactionUnless(client.GetLatestHeight() >= height)
// verify maximum delay period has passed
expectedTimePerBlock = queryMaxExpectedTimePerBlock()
delayPeriodTime = abortTransactionUnless(getMaximumDelayPeriod(proof, connection))
delayPeriodBlocks = getBlockDelay(delayPeriodTime, expectedTimePerBlock)
abortTransactionUnless(tendermint.VerifyDelayPeriodPassed(height, delayPeriodTime, delayPeriodBlocks))
return multihop.VerifyMultihopMembership(consensusState, connectionHops, proof, prefix, key, value) // see ics-033
}
function verifyMultihopNonMembership(
connection: ConnectionEnd, // the connection end corresponding to the receiving chain.
height: Height,
proof: MultihopProof,
connectionHops: Identifier[],
key: CommitmentPath
) {
// the connectionEnd corresponding to the end of the multi-hop channel path (sending/counterparty chain).
multihopConnectionEnd = abortTransactionUnless(getMultihopConnectionEnd(proof))
prefix = multihopConnectionEnd.GetCounterparty().GetPrefix()
client = queryClient(connection.clientIdentifier)
consensusState = queryConsensusState(connection.clientIdentifier, height)
abortTransactionUnless(client.Status() === "active")
abortTransactionUnless(client.GetLatestHeight() >= height)
// verify maximum delay period has passed
expectedTimePerBlock = queryMaxExpectedTimePerBlock()
delayPeriodTime = abortTransactionUnless(getMaximumDelayPeriod(proof, connection))
delayPeriodBlocks = getBlockDelay(delayPeriodTime, expectedTimePerBlock)
abortTransactionUnless(tendermint.VerifyDelayPeriodPassed(height, delayPeriodTime, delayPeriodBlocks))
return multihop.VerifyMultihopNonMembership(consensusState, connectionHops, proof, prefix, key) // see ics-033
}
// Return the maximum expected time per block from the paramstore.
// See 03-connection - GetMaxExpectedTimePerBlock.
function queryMaxExpectedTimePerBlock(): uint64
function getTimestampAtHeight(
connection: ConnectionEnd,
height: Height
) {
return queryConsensusState(connection.clientIdentifier, height).getTimestamp()
}
// Return the connectionEnd corresponding to the source chain.
function getMultihopConnectionEnd(proof: MultihopProof): ConnectionEnd {
return abortTransactionUnless(Unmarshal(proof.ConnectionProofs[proof.ConnectionProofs.length - 1].Value))
}
// Return the maximum delay period in seconds across all connections in the channel path.
function getMaximumDelayPeriod(proof: MultihopProof, lastConnection: ConnectionEnd): number {
delayPeriodTime = lastConnection.GetDelayPeriod()
for connData in range proofs.ConnectionProofs {
connectionEnd = abortTransactionUnless(Unmarshal(connData.Value))
if (connectionEnd.DelayPeriod > delayPeriodTime) {
delayPeriodTime = connectionEnd.DelayPeriod
}
}
return delayPeriodTime
}
This ICS defines the opening handshake subprotocol. Once opened, connections cannot be closed and identifiers cannot be reallocated (this prevents packet replay or authorisation confusion).
Header tracking and misbehaviour detection are defined in ICS 2.
Connections are stored under a unique Identifier
prefix.
The validation function validateConnectionIdentifier
MAY be provided.
type validateConnectionIdentifier = (id: Identifier) => boolean
If not provided, the default validateConnectionIdentifier
function will always return true
.
During the handshake process, two ends of a connection come to agreement on a
version associated with that connection. This Version
datatype is defined as:
interface Version {
identifier: string
features: [string]
}
The identifier
field specifies a unique version identifier. A value of "1"
specifies IBC 1.0.0.
The features
field specifies a list of features compatible with the specified
identifier. The values "ORDER_UNORDERED"
and "ORDER_ORDERED"
specify
unordered and ordered channels, respectively.
Host state machine MUST utilise the version data to negotiate encodings, priorities, or connection-specific metadata related to custom logic on top of IBC. It is assumed that the two chains running the opening handshake have at least one compatible version in common (i.e., the compatible versions of the two chains must have a non-empty intersection). If the two chains do not have any mutually acceptable versions, the handshake will fail.
An implementation MUST define a function getCompatibleVersions
which returns the list of versions it supports, ranked by descending preference order.
type getCompatibleVersions = () => [Version]
An implementation MUST define a function pickVersion
to choose a version from a list of versions.
type pickVersion = ([Version]) => Version
The opening handshake sub-protocol serves to initialise consensus states for two chains on each other.
The opening handshake defines four datagrams: ConnOpenInit, ConnOpenTry, ConnOpenAck, and ConnOpenConfirm.
A correct protocol execution flows as follows (note that all calls are made through modules per ICS 25):
Initiator | Datagram | Chain acted upon | Prior state (A, B) | Posterior state (A, B) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Actor | ConnOpenInit |
A | (none, none) | (INIT, none) |
Relayer | ConnOpenTry |
B | (INIT, none) | (INIT, TRYOPEN) |
Relayer | ConnOpenAck |
A | (INIT, TRYOPEN) | (OPEN, TRYOPEN) |
Relayer | ConnOpenConfirm |
B | (OPEN, TRYOPEN) | (OPEN, OPEN) |
At the end of an opening handshake between two chains implementing the sub-protocol, the following properties hold:
- Each chain has each other's correct consensus state as originally specified by the initiating actor.
- Each chain has knowledge of and has agreed to its identifier on the other chain.
This sub-protocol need not be permissioned, modulo anti-spam measures.
Chains MUST implement a function generateIdentifier
which chooses an identifier, e.g. by incrementing a counter:
type generateIdentifier = () -> Identifier
A specific version can optionally be passed as version
to ensure that the handshake will either complete with that version or fail.
ConnOpenInit initialises a connection attempt on chain A.
function connOpenInit(
counterpartyPrefix: CommitmentPrefix,
clientIdentifier: Identifier,
counterpartyClientIdentifier: Identifier,
version: string,
delayPeriodTime: uint64,
delayPeriodBlocks: uint64) {
// generate a new identifier
identifier = generateIdentifier()
abortTransactionUnless(queryClientState(clientIdentifier) !== null)
abortTransactionUnless(provableStore.get(connectionPath(identifier)) == null)
state = INIT
if version != "" {
// manually selected version must be one we can support
abortTransactionUnless(getCompatibleVersions().indexOf(version) > -1)
versions = [version]
} else {
versions = getCompatibleVersions()
}
connection = ConnectionEnd{state, "", counterpartyPrefix,
clientIdentifier, counterpartyClientIdentifier, versions, delayPeriodTime, delayPeriodBlocks}
provableStore.set(connectionPath(identifier), connection)
addConnectionToClient(clientIdentifier, identifier)
}
ConnOpenTry relays notice of a connection attempt on chain A to chain B (this code is executed on chain B).
function connOpenTry(
counterpartyConnectionIdentifier: Identifier,
counterpartyPrefix: CommitmentPrefix,
counterpartyClientIdentifier: Identifier,
clientIdentifier: Identifier,
clientState: ClientState, // DEPRECATED
counterpartyVersions: string[],
delayPeriodTime: uint64,
delayPeriodBlocks: uint64,
proofInit: CommitmentProof,
proofClient: CommitmentProof, // DEPRECATED
proofConsensus: CommitmentProof, // DEPRECATED
proofHeight: Height,
consensusHeight: Height,
hostConsensusStateProof?: bytes, // DEPRECATED
) {
// generate a new identifier
identifier = generateIdentifier()
abortTransactionUnless(queryClientState(clientIdentifier) !== null)
expectedConnectionEnd = ConnectionEnd{INIT, "", getCommitmentPrefix(), counterpartyClientIdentifier,
clientIdentifier, counterpartyVersions, delayPeriodTime, delayPeriodBlocks}
versionsIntersection = intersection(counterpartyVersions, getCompatibleVersions())
version = pickVersion(versionsIntersection) // aborts transaction if there is no intersection
connection = ConnectionEnd{TRYOPEN, counterpartyConnectionIdentifier, counterpartyPrefix,
clientIdentifier, counterpartyClientIdentifier, [version], delayPeriodTime, delayPeriodBlocks}
abortTransactionUnless(connection.verifyConnectionState(proofHeight, proofInit, counterpartyConnectionIdentifier, expectedConnectionEnd))
provableStore.set(connectionPath(identifier), connection)
addConnectionToClient(clientIdentifier, identifier)
}
ConnOpenAck relays acceptance of a connection open attempt from chain B back to chain A (this code is executed on chain A).
function connOpenAck(
identifier: Identifier,
clientState: ClientState, // DEPRECATED
version: string,
counterpartyIdentifier: Identifier,
proofTry: CommitmentProof,
proofClient: CommitmentProof, // DEPRECATED
proofConsensus: CommitmentProof, // DEPRECATED
proofHeight: Height,
consensusHeight: Height,
hostConsensusStateProof?: bytes, // DEPRECATED
) {
connection = provableStore.get(connectionPath(identifier))
abortTransactionUnless(connection !== null)
abortTransactionUnless(connection.state === INIT && connection.versions.indexOf(version) !== -1)
expectedConnectionEnd = ConnectionEnd{
TRYOPEN,
identifier,
getCommitmentPrefix(),
connection.counterpartyClientIdentifier,
connection.clientIdentifier,
[version],
connection.delayPeriodTime,
connection.delayPeriodBlocks
}
abortTransactionUnless(connection.verifyConnectionState(proofHeight, proofTry, counterpartyIdentifier, expectedConnectionEnd))
connection.state = OPEN
connection.versions = [version]
connection.counterpartyConnectionIdentifier = counterpartyIdentifier
provableStore.set(connectionPath(identifier), connection)
}
ConnOpenConfirm confirms opening of a connection on chain A to chain B, after which the connection is open on both chains (this code is executed on chain B).
function connOpenConfirm(
identifier: Identifier,
proofAck: CommitmentProof,
proofHeight: Height) {
connection = provableStore.get(connectionPath(identifier))
abortTransactionUnless(connection !== null)
abortTransactionUnless(connection.state === TRYOPEN)
expected = ConnectionEnd{OPEN, identifier, getCommitmentPrefix(), connection.counterpartyClientIdentifier,
connection.clientIdentifier, connection.versions, connection.delayPeriodTime, connection.delayPeriodBlocks}
abortTransactionUnless(connection.verifyConnectionState(proofHeight, proofAck, connection.counterpartyConnectionIdentifier, expected))
connection.state = OPEN
provableStore.set(connectionPath(identifier), connection)
}
Connections can be queried by identifier with queryConnection
.
function queryConnection(id: Identifier): ConnectionEnd | void {
return provableStore.get(connectionPath(id))
}
Connections associated with a particular client can be queried by client identifier with queryClientConnections
.
function queryClientConnections(id: Identifier): Set<Identifier> {
return privateStore.get(clientConnectionsPath(id))
}
- Connection identifiers are first-come-first-serve: once a connection has been negotiated, a unique identifier pair exists between two chains.
- The connection handshake cannot be man-in-the-middled by another blockchain's IBC handler.
In the latest specification of the connection handshake, connOpenTry
and connOpenAck
will no longer validate that the counterparty's clien state and consensus state is a valid client of the executing chain's consensus protocol. Thus, clientState
, proofClient
, proofConsensus
and consensusHeight
fields in the ConnOpenTry
and ConnOpenACk
datagrams are deprecated and will eventually be removed.
A future version of this ICS will include version negotiation in the opening handshake. Once a connection has been established and a version negotiated, future version updates can be negotiated per ICS 6.
The consensus state can only be updated as allowed by the updateConsensusState
function defined by the consensus protocol chosen when the connection is established.
- Implementation of ICS 03 in Go can be found in ibc-go repository.
- Implementation of ICS 03 in Rust can be found in ibc-rs repository.
Parts of this document were inspired by the previous IBC specification.
Mar 29, 2019 - Initial draft version submitted
May 17, 2019 - Draft finalised
Jul 29, 2019 - Revisions to track connection set associated with client
Jul 27, 2022 - Addition of ClientState
validation in connOpenTry
and connOpenAck
Jul 23, 2024 - Removal of ClientState
and ConsensusState
validation in connOpenTry
and connOpenAck
. For information on the consequences of these changes see the attached diagram and consequences document
All content herein is licensed under Apache 2.0.