Data analysis requirements for IR research report

[agrabeli]

As part of an upcoming research report, we will examine censorship impacting the women's rights movement in Iran.

As part of this, we will examine the following questions based on OONI data:

• How are websites defending women’s rights blocked in Iran?
  • On which networks in Iran does OONI data show the strongest signals of blocking?
  • Which censorship techniques do these ISPs adopt?

The above questions would be addressed through OONI data analysis. We will limit the analysis to 12-15 domains selected by our Iranian partners. These will include domains that (a) are already included in the Iranian & Global test lists and have therefore received measurement coverage, (b) are representative/important websites that have had an impact in defending women's rights in Iran. We will perform in-depth OONI data analysis (spanning over 2 years) for these domains.

We can supplement the narrative of the report by discussing the blocking of social media platforms (also used extensively for the defense of women’s rights) in Iran through the use of the MAT. This does not need data analysis (as we have already documented the blocking of social media in Iran quite extensively, and we can link to past reports and recent data).

Below I share the data analysis requirements in support of this research.

Data analysis requirements

The deadline for this data analysis is 15th March 2025.

Overall, this analysis involves:

• Country code: IR
• Date range of analysis: 1st February 2023 - 1st February 2025 (2 years)
• Analyzed OONI measurements: Web Connectivity -> Limited to 12-15 domains selected by partner

Please analyze OONI measurements collected from Iran between 1st February 2023 - 1st February 2025 (2 years), while limiting the analysis to 12-15 pre-selected domains of Web Connectivity measurements.

Based on this analysis, please generate 3 charts, each of which displays:

• (Around) 5 domains;
• Measurement results (ok, dns.confirmed,tls.timeout, tls.connection_reset, dns.nxdomain, etc.) for each of those domains;
• Measurement volume for each of those domains throughout the analysis period (February 2023-February 2025).

The above charts would be aggregating measurements from tested ASNs (perhaps limited to those with the largest measurement volume and strongest blocking signals).

Such charts would be similar to this: https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/images/image6.png (enabling us to gain a birds-eye-view of failure types and censorship techniques)

To show how blocks are implemented on different networks in Iran, please generate a chart (based on one of the 12-15 analyzed domains) which displays:

• Several ASNs with the largest measurement volume;
• Measurement results (ok, dns.confirmed,tls.timeout, tls.connection_reset, dns.nxdomain, etc.) from each ASN;
• Measurement volume from each of those ASNs throughout the analysis period (February 2023-February 2025).

Such charts would be similar to this: https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/images/image13.png

In comparison to other countries, internet censorship in Iran is fairly centralized, so we probably won't see much variance across networks. Yet, it's probably still interesting to show that we observe similar blocking techniques across networks (to demonstrate the centralized nature of censorship in the country).

Background context: We have previously published the following OONI reports on Iran:
https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/
https://ooni.org/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/
https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-dot/
https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/
https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-blocks-farsi-wikipedia/
https://ooni.org/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/
https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests-pt2/
https://ooni.org/post/2018-iran-protests/
https://ooni.org/post/iran-internet-censorship/