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rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets
It seems there are a fair few images where dangling symlinks are used as path components for mount targets, which pathrs-lite does not support (and it would be difficult to fully support this in a race-free way). This was actually meant to be blocked by commit 63c2908 ("rootfs: try to scope MkdirAll to stay inside the rootfs"), followed by commit dd827f7 ("utils: switch to securejoin.MkdirAllHandle"). However, we still used SecureJoin to construct mountpoint targets, which means that dangling symlinks were "resolved" before reaching pathrs-lite. This patch basically re-adds this hack in order to reduce the breakages we've seen so far. Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
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libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go

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@@ -531,6 +531,17 @@ func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(rootfs string) (Err error) {
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dstIsFile = !fi.IsDir()
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}
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// In previous runc versions, we would tolerate nonsense paths with
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// dangling symlinks as path components. pathrs-lite does not support
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// this, so instead we have to emulate this behaviour by doing
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// SecureJoin *purely to get a semi-reasonable path to use* and then we
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// use pathrs-lite to operate on the path safely.
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newUnsafePath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, unsafePath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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unsafePath = utils.StripRoot(rootfs, newUnsafePath)
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if dstIsFile {
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dstFile, err = pathrs.CreateInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, unix.O_CREAT|unix.O_EXCL|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o644)
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} else {

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