CloudLinux 8 shim-15.4-4.el8.cloudlinux 20210405 #152
Comments
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@julian-klode , @steve-mcintyre could you please review? |
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looking in a bit, there's others ahead of you in the queue :-) |
LGTM! |
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I concur with @aburmash - accepted. |
Make sure you have provided the following information:
Link to review: cloudlinux/shim-review@cloudlinux-shim-x86_64-20210405
What organization or people are asking to have this signed:
Cloud Linux Software, Inc.
What product or service is this for:
CloudLinux OS 8
Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file:
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains
the appropriate gnu-efi source.
Please confirm this as the origin your shim.
This starts with the shim 15.4 release tarball.
Here is the review repo: cloudlinux/shim-review@cloudlinux-shim-x86_64-20210405
It includes
README.md, both shim EFI binaries,clsecureboot001.cer, and the build logsroot.logandbuild.log.What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
We're a well known vendor with more than 4000 clients and more than 200,000
product installations
How do you manage and protect the keys used in your SHIM?
They're stored in an HSM token provided by Certification Authority.
Do you use EV certificates as embedded certificates in the SHIM?
Yes
If you use new vendor_db functionality, are any hashes allow-listed, and if yes: for what binaries ?
We don't use vendor_db in this build.
Is kernel upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 present in your kernel, if you boot chain includes a Linux kernel ?
All of the following commits are present:
And the configuration setting CONFIG_EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS is disabled.
if SHIM is loading GRUB2 bootloader, are CVEs CVE-2020-14372,
CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779,
CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308,
CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,
( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
fixed ?
Yes, these are all fixed
"Please specifically confirm that you add a vendor specific SBAT entry for SBAT header in each binary that supports SBAT metadata
( grub2, fwupd, fwupdate, shim + all child shim binaries )" to shim review doc ?
Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim
On shim, we have:
On grub2, we have:
Were your old SHIM hashes provided to Microsoft ?
We don't have old SHIM binaries
Did you change your certificate strategy, so that affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,
CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
grub2 bootloaders can not be verified ?
This is our first submission so no old grub2 binaries allowed.
What exact implementation of Secureboot in grub2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?
* Upstream grub2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
It is a "RHEL-like" implementation.
What is the origin and full version number of your bootloader (GRUB or other)?
GRUB2 version 2.02-90.el8_3.1 from RHEL with CloudLinux OS 8 cert and SBAT.
Source RPM: https://github.com/cloudlinux/shim-review/raw/master/grub2-2.02-90.el8_3.1.cloudlinux.src.rpm
If your SHIM launches any other components, please provide further details on what is launched
No
If your GRUB2 launches any other binaries that are not Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode,
please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown
No, only linux.
If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you
will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries
exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent
GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If
you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not
apply. Please describe your strategy.
This is our first submission so we're not re-using a previously used (CA)
certificate.
How do the launched components prevent execution of unauthenticated code?
Everything validates signatures using shim's protocol.
Does your SHIM load any loaders that support loading unsigned kernels (e.g. GRUB)?
No.
What kernel are you using? Which patches does it includes to enforce Secure Boot?
We're using RHEL kernel.
All signed kernels are all patched for the kernel boothole CVEs and have the CONFIG_EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS config option disabled.
What changes were made since your SHIM was last signed?
This is our first submission
What is the SHA256 hash of your final SHIM binary?
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