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shim-15.4 for Isoo (2021-08-09) #192
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My previously accepted SHIM: |
Can the submission be reviewed |
update SBAT for grub2 |
Can the submission be reviewed |
Hi! Back from vacation and back to reviewing now... I assume that now you've updated your branch to include the tag isoo-shim-20210809 (today!), you are aiming to get that latest version reviewed and signed? |
Either way, both versions reproduce here |
thanks |
If you are asking for the later submission, please also update the date in the review title to be 100% clear! |
ok |
May I know if my submission can be accepted today? |
Looking at the patches you#re applying, I think I need to add review comments on them directly. But I don't see anything here that obviously breaks security. So that's OK. SBAT entries look good. Marking accepted. |
thanks |
complete |
Make sure you have provided the following information:
https://github.com/haobinnan/shim-review/tree/isoo-shim-20210809
What organization or people are asking to have this signed:
What product or service is this for:
Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file:
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains
the appropriate gnu-efi source.
Please confirm this as the origin your shim.
What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
How do you manage and protect the keys used in your SHIM?
Do you use EV certificates as embedded certificates in the SHIM?
If you use new vendor_db functionality, are any hashes allow-listed, and if yes: for what binaries ?
Is kernel upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 present in your kernel, if you boot chain includes a Linux kernel ?
if SHIM is loading GRUB2 bootloader, are CVEs CVE-2020-14372,
CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779,
CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308,
CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,
( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
fixed ?
"Please specifically confirm that you add a vendor specific SBAT entry for SBAT header in each binary that supports SBAT metadata
( grub2, fwupd, fwupdate, shim + all child shim binaries )" to shim review doc ?
Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim
Were your old SHIM hashes provided to Microsoft ?
Did you change your certificate strategy, so that affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,
CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,
CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )
grub2 bootloaders can not be verified ?
What exact implementation of Secureboot in grub2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?
* Upstream grub2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
What is the origin and full version number of your bootloader (GRUB or other)?
If your SHIM launches any other components, please provide further details on what is launched
If your GRUB2 launches any other binaries that are not Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode,
please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown
If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you
will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries
exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent
GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If
you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not
apply. Please describe your strategy.
How do the launched components prevent execution of unauthenticated code?
Does your SHIM load any loaders that support loading unsigned kernels (e.g. GRUB)?
What kernel are you using? Which patches does it includes to enforce Secure Boot?
What changes were made since your SHIM was last signed?
What is the SHA256 hash of your final SHIM binary?
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