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tsa.go
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tsa.go
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// Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package verify
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
tsaverification "github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/pkg/verification"
"github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/root"
)
// VerifyTimestampAuthority verifies that the given entity has been timestamped
// by a trusted timestamp authority and that the timestamp is valid.
func VerifyTimestampAuthority(entity SignedEntity, trustedMaterial root.TrustedMaterial) ([]time.Time, error) { //nolint:revive
signedTimestamps, err := entity.Timestamps()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// disallow duplicate timestamps, as a malicious actor could use duplicates to bypass the threshold
for i := 0; i < len(signedTimestamps); i++ {
for j := i + 1; j < len(signedTimestamps); j++ {
if bytes.Equal(signedTimestamps[i], signedTimestamps[j]) {
return nil, errors.New("duplicate timestamps found")
}
}
}
sigContent, err := entity.SignatureContent()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signatureBytes := sigContent.Signature()
verificationContent, err := entity.VerificationContent()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
verifiedTimestamps := []time.Time{}
for _, timestamp := range signedTimestamps {
verifiedSignedTimestamp, err := verifySignedTimestamp(timestamp, signatureBytes, trustedMaterial, verificationContent)
// Timestamps from unknown source are okay, but don't count as verified
if err != nil {
continue
}
verifiedTimestamps = append(verifiedTimestamps, verifiedSignedTimestamp)
}
return verifiedTimestamps, nil
}
// VerifyTimestampAuthority verifies that the given entity has been timestamped
// by a trusted timestamp authority and that the timestamp is valid.
//
// The threshold parameter is the number of unique timestamps that must be
// verified.
func VerifyTimestampAuthorityWithThreshold(entity SignedEntity, trustedMaterial root.TrustedMaterial, threshold int) ([]time.Time, error) { //nolint:revive
verifiedTimestamps, err := VerifyTimestampAuthority(entity, trustedMaterial)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(verifiedTimestamps) < threshold {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("threshold not met for verified signed timestamps: %d < %d", len(verifiedTimestamps), threshold)
}
return verifiedTimestamps, nil
}
func verifySignedTimestamp(signedTimestamp []byte, dsseSignatureBytes []byte, trustedMaterial root.TrustedMaterial, verificationContent VerificationContent) (time.Time, error) {
certAuthorities := trustedMaterial.TimestampingAuthorities()
// Iterate through TSA certificate authorities to find one that verifies
for _, ca := range certAuthorities {
trustedRootVerificationOptions := tsaverification.VerifyOpts{
Roots: []*x509.Certificate{ca.Root},
Intermediates: ca.Intermediates,
TSACertificate: ca.Leaf,
}
// Ensure timestamp responses are from trusted sources
timestamp, err := tsaverification.VerifyTimestampResponse(signedTimestamp, bytes.NewReader(dsseSignatureBytes), trustedRootVerificationOptions)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if !ca.ValidityPeriodStart.IsZero() && timestamp.Time.Before(ca.ValidityPeriodStart) {
continue
}
if !ca.ValidityPeriodEnd.IsZero() && timestamp.Time.After(ca.ValidityPeriodEnd) {
continue
}
// Check tlog entry time against bundle certificates
// TODO: technically no longer needed since we check the cert validity period in the main Verify loop
if !verificationContent.ValidAtTime(timestamp.Time, trustedMaterial) {
continue
}
// All above verification successful, so return nil
return timestamp.Time, nil
}
return time.Time{}, errors.New("unable to verify signed timestamps")
}