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authorize_helper.go
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/
authorize_helper.go
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package fosite
import (
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/asaskevich/govalidator"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
// GetRedirectURIFromRequestValues extracts the redirect_uri from values but does not do any sort of validation.
//
// Considered specifications
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1
// The endpoint URI MAY include an
// "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" formatted (per Appendix B) query
// component ([RFC3986] Section 3.4), which MUST be retained when adding
// additional query parameters.
func GetRedirectURIFromRequestValues(values url.Values) (string, error) {
// rfc6749 3.1. Authorization Endpoint
// The endpoint URI MAY include an "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" formatted (per Appendix B) query component
redirectURI, err := url.QueryUnescape(values.Get("redirect_uri"))
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(ErrInvalidRequest, "redirect_uri parameter malformed or missing")
}
return redirectURI, nil
}
// MatchRedirectURIWithClientRedirectURIs if the given uri is a registered redirect uri. Does not perform
// uri validation.
//
// Considered specifications
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2.3
// If multiple redirection URIs have been registered, if only part of
// the redirection URI has been registered, or if no redirection URI has
// been registered, the client MUST include a redirection URI with the
// authorization request using the "redirect_uri" request parameter.
//
// When a redirection URI is included in an authorization request, the
// authorization server MUST compare and match the value received
// against at least one of the registered redirection URIs (or URI
// components) as defined in [RFC3986] Section 6, if any redirection
// URIs were registered. If the client registration included the full
// redirection URI, the authorization server MUST compare the two URIs
// using simple string comparison as defined in [RFC3986] Section 6.2.1.
//
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819#section-4.4.1.7
// * The authorization server may also enforce the usage and validation
// of pre-registered redirect URIs (see Section 5.2.3.5). This will
// allow for early recognition of authorization "code" disclosure to
// counterfeit clients.
// * The attacker will need to use another redirect URI for its
// authorization process rather than the target web site because it
// needs to intercept the flow. So, if the authorization server
// associates the authorization "code" with the redirect URI of a
// particular end-user authorization and validates this redirect URI
// with the redirect URI passed to the token's endpoint, such an
// attack is detected (see Section 5.2.4.5).
func MatchRedirectURIWithClientRedirectURIs(rawurl string, client Client) (*url.URL, error) {
if rawurl == "" && len(client.GetRedirectURIs()) == 1 {
if redirectURIFromClient, err := url.Parse(client.GetRedirectURIs()[0]); err == nil && IsValidRedirectURI(redirectURIFromClient) {
// If no redirect_uri was given and the client has exactly one valid redirect_uri registered, use that instead
return redirectURIFromClient, nil
}
} else if rawurl != "" && StringInSlice(rawurl, client.GetRedirectURIs()) {
// If a redirect_uri was given and the clients knows it (simple string comparison!)
// return it.
if parsed, err := url.Parse(rawurl); err == nil && IsValidRedirectURI(parsed) {
// If no redirect_uri was given and the client has exactly one valid redirect_uri registered, use that instead
return parsed, nil
}
}
return nil, errors.Wrap(ErrInvalidRequest, "redirect_uri parameter does not match with registered client redirect urls")
}
// IsValidRedirectURI validates a redirect_uri as specified in:
//
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
// * The redirection endpoint URI MUST be an absolute URI as defined by [RFC3986] Section 4.3.
// * The endpoint URI MUST NOT include a fragment component.
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-4.3
// absolute-URI = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ]
// * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819#section-5.1.1
func IsValidRedirectURI(redirectURI *url.URL) bool {
// We need to explicitly check for a scheme
if !govalidator.IsRequestURL(redirectURI.String()) {
return false
}
if redirectURI.Fragment != "" {
// "The endpoint URI MUST NOT include a fragment component."
return false
}
return true
}
func IsRedirectURISecure(redirectURI *url.URL) bool {
return !(redirectURI.Scheme == "http" && !isLocalhost(redirectURI))
}
func isLocalhost(redirectURI *url.URL) bool {
host := strings.Split(redirectURI.Host, ":")[0]
return strings.HasSuffix(host, "localhost") || host == "127.0.0.1"
}