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\documentclass[12pt]{book}
\usepackage{mtor}
\begin{document}
\MainMatter
\thispagestyle{empty}
\BookMark{0}{Title Page}
\vspace*{1ex}
\begin{center}
\parttitlefont
\booktitlefontsize THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY\\
\medskip
\large OF\\
\medskip
\booktitlefontsize RELATIVITY\\
\bigskip
\titlefont
\normalsize BY \\
\authortitlefontsize A. S. EDDINGTON, M.A., \textsc{M.Sc.}, F.R.S.\\
\medskip
\scriptsize PLUMIAN PROFESSOR OF ASTRONOMY AND EXPERIMENTAL\\
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE\\
\vspace*{\stretch{0.1}}
{\normalsize\itshape With a Foreword by Tigran Aivazian}\\
\vspace*{\stretch{0.1}}
\small THIRD EDITION\\
\vspace*{\stretch{0.4}}
\titlesepbig\\[2ex]
\Large Bibles.org.uk, 2022\\
\end{center}
\newpage\thispagestyle{empty}
\vspace*{\stretch{0.3}}
\hfill
\parbox{8.5cm}{%
\begin{center}
\textit{First Edition, Cambridge University Press}\hfill1923\\
\medskip
\textit{Second Edition, Cambridge University Press}\hfill1924\\
\medskip
\textit{Third Edition, Bibles.org.uk}\hfill2022\\
\end{center}
}
\hfill
\vspace*{\stretch{0.7}}
\begin{center}
Please send all comments to: {\makeatletter\upshape\bfseries aivazian.tigran@gmail.com\makeatother}\\[1ex]
\tux\ Typeset with \XeLaTeX\ of \TeX\ Live 2021 under Linux.\\
PDF version/date: \tunemarkup{pgnexus10}{\textcolor{red}{Colour} 10"}\tunemarkup{pgauraone}{B\&W 8"}, \textbf{\today{}}\\
Source Code: \myurl{https://github.com/tigran123/mtor}
\end{center}
\TableofContents
\Matter{Editor's Foreword}
\lettrine{\textcolor{lettrinecolour}{I}}{s} it right and proper today, in the year 2022 A.D., standing as we are on the brink of the
\emph{New Epoch} of brotherhood of all mankind,
to publish a monograph on Special and General Relativity, written by a physicist,
who flourished nearly a century ago?
It is indeed.
Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington (1882--1944) was not ``merely'' the father of modern stellar astrophysics, who started with the
scraps of uncoordinated patchwork of guesses about the internal constitution of stars, which only marginally
differed from the idle speculations of antiquity, and proceeded to build the entire body of
observationally verified knowledge, which serves as the basis of all stellar astronomy today.
Neither was he ``merely'' a lone genius physicist, who for the first time in history predicted
theoretically the value of the mass ratio of protons and electrons, as well as that of the fine
structure constant---a feat standing unrivalled to this day.
No, he was, first and foremost, the greatest \emph{God\hyp{}knowing} physicist who ever lived on this planet.
Theoretical physics of the XX century, alas, was not immune to the dangers besetting the economico\hyp{}political
structure of the world at the time.
As is usually common in the poisoned atmosphere permeated by the ``spirit of democracy'',
which, as we know, fosters the election of base and ignorant rulers and glorifies mediocrity by placing the
universal suffrage in the hands of uneducated and indolent majorities, the science was forced to pursue the false
materialistic goals of a few mediocre (relatively speaking) men like Niels Bohr and Max Born, forgetting for a season
the direction of the brilliant contributions made by the real lovers of truth---men like Arthur Eddington,
James Jeans, Louis de Broglie in theoretical physics,
Robert Millikan in experimental physics, William Sadler in medicine and psychology and others.
And so, through its neglect of unbiased approach to the truth, theoretical physics has wallowed
in the mire of purely materialistic attempts of the ``interpretation of Quantum Mechanics'',
which inevitably led to the greatest crisis since the days of Max Planck in 1900.
This crisis is indicated by the fact that since 1930s there have been no major discoveries in the field of
theoretical physics---the ``progress'' usually boasted of consisting almost entirely of technological advances.
No new substantial knowledge of the material reality was attained since the advent of General Relativity (1915)
and Quantum Mechanics (1927) and because of this we now have no choice but to go back to those glorious days
of the true discoveries and peruse the words uttered by the truth discoverers.
The chief value today of the work of men like Eddington and Jeans is revealed by the recently established
(see~\cite{Block1} and~\cite{Aivazian1}) fact, that these people happened to be the pivotal individuals
in the synthesis of all humanly accessible factual knowledge as well as the highest spiritual strivings,---
the synthesis, which culminated in the publication of the \emph{Fifth Epochal Revelation,} known also as
\emph{The Urantia Papers} \cite{Aivazian1}.
The very thoughts of those men, as well as their printed words, were used in compiling and presentation of this
great Revelation, which undoubtedly will for a long time serve universally as the common basis of
elementary education for all peoples and nations destined to survive into the \emph{New Epoch}.
It devolves upon them to build the new civilisation on the ruins made by those who arrived at an impasse,
which is an inexorable outcome of evolutionary processes, whenever beauty is substituted with ugliness,
truth with falsehood and goodness with evil and selfish deceit.
The monumental 1928--1939 trilogy on the philosophy of science (\cite{Eddington1}, \cite{Eddington2}, \cite{Eddington3}),
written by A.S~Eddington, if re\hyp{}issued today, might be bound in a single volume and furnished with
a not inappropriate title ``Becoming a Spirit''.
Having studied practically all of Eddington's published books and papers, as well as most books written about him,
I was almost tempted to write such a book myself.
However, being admonished by Ecclesiastes~12:12 (\emph{``of making many books there is no end''}) I chose to exercise the
Editor's prerogative and attempted to make a clarification and qualification of the essence of Eddington's
fundamental research in this Foreword.
A flesh and bones mortal, speaking authoritatively on the spirit state of being or how to become one, will no doubt
attract at least the following two kinds of caustic criticisms.
The first critic is an unbelieving and unfriendly type, who, on the first hearing of the word ``spirit''
can think of nothing else but the desire to touch you and see if you are made of flesh and bones.
And upon such ``empirical confirmation'' he will gleefully declare you an impostor, who violated the,
in his opinion immutable, authority of the Scriptures as expressed in Luke~24:35 (\emph{``\ldots\ for a spirit hath not flesh and bones''}).
He is quick to ridicule with disdain the very notion of a possibility for a mortal to assert anything useful on the ``matters spiritual''
and no matter how hard he tries, every possible formulation of his objections will betray how alien are the things of the spirit
to the wretched and doomed mind subservient to matter.
To such a critic I have nothing to answer, except---``come and see!''
The second type is a learned and cautious scholar, who first studies the matter diligently, albeit not without deeply ingrained
preconceptions of the scope and utility of the ``scientific method'', and then proceeds to make the following tactful enquiry:
``We know of the reality of the spirit world and, moreover, that the Universe is basically spiritual, the material aspect
thereof being merely a shadow of the more abiding spirit reality.
But may we point out that during the long career of the ascent of a typical evolutionary mortal of animal origin, the attainment
of even the first stage of spirit is only possible after the sojourn on the mansion worlds and on the other spheres of the morontia
realm, that being the intermediate stage between matter and spirit?
Would it not, therefore, be a little premature to speak of this `becoming a spirit' now, while we are not yet even morontia beings,
let alone spiritual?''
Such honest doubts and sincere questionings are not to be despised and are not evil \Foreign{per se}.
Though they may delay the progressive journey towards perfection attainment, they can never inhibit it.
What follows may be considered an answer to such a friendly critic.
Those who see in Eddington merely a physicist---even a genius---completely miss both the potential goal of his life and the
actually and literally attained levels of spirit insight as revealed in his writings.
I admit that I myself, at first, had just such an attitude when I approached the task of studying Eddington's works more than
a decade ago.
There is a certain preordained path of studying one's environment and what makes the contribution of Eddington (and a few others)
unique is that he has walked this path to the triumphant end. And the path is this---
\emph{Analysis of the material reality can be pursued until it disappears from the sensory mechanism, yet remains real to the mind.
One can then continue this analysis by ``mind alone'' and arrive at the epistemological basis of the fundamental laws of science,
but at some point the reality placed under scruity vanishes to the (material or morontia) mind also and yet remains perceptible to the insight
of the spirit in the form of the supreme values of entirely spiritual nature.
And this is the meaning in which it can be said, that ``the Universe is basically spiritual''.}
Well, the critic says, this may all be well and good, relating strictly to the abovementioned three philosophical books,
but what does it have to do with the purely technical monograph on General Relativity that is supposed to be discussed here?
The division of knowledge into \emph{technical} and \emph{non\hyp{}technical} along the lines this is done today will become obsolete
in the \emph{New Epoch} of brotherhood.
Not because the distinction will be blurred and the two kinds of knowledge somehow merge into one, but for precisely the opposite reason:
there is a clear demarcation line between the \emph{structural} knowledge and the knowledge of the \emph{substance}.
The so\hyp{}called \emph{technical} knowledge, that is expressible in mathematical language, is nothing other than the knowledge
of \emph{structure,} i.e. of the relations between entities, and is entirely abstracted from the knowledge of the nature or essence of
the entities themselves,---their substance.
Understanding this fundamental difference neither precludes the possibility nor obviates the need for specialists, who
are skilled in one particular type of knowledge, more than in others, but it certainly does remove all illusion of
self\hyp{}sufficiency, which was giving origin to the arrogance on the part of members of one profession towards the others.
And who is better qualified to teach us about one particular kind of knowledge, than the one who has discovered that this
is not the \emph{only} kind and that there are others?
The possibility of dissecting the two types of knowledge should not be considered as something ephemeral, because it has immediate practical implications.
In fact, the very reason I moved to the United Kingdom in 1994 (from Armenia, then in a state of ruin after the destruction of Soviet Union) was due
to one such application, made by myself (then a postgraduate theoretical physicist) independently and many years \emph{prior} to learning about Eddington's research.
Namely, I have attempted and successfully performed a dissection of the formalism of Quantum Mechanics into ``information dynamics'' (or \emph{infodynamics}) and the specific features
of the microscopic world---these two being logically independent.
Having separated the purely \emph{infodynamical} aspect of Quantum Mechanics as a self\hyp{}consistent set of rules for manipulation of structural knowledge, I then proceeded
to apply it to a completely unrelated domain of human activity---economics.
Given the functions of demand $D(x,t)$ and supply $S(x,t)$, which regulate the actual price of a commodity $x(t)$ according to $\dot x = D(x,t) - S(x,t)$ I constructed
a ``price momentum'' variable $p(t)$ conjugated to $x(t)$ and the corresponding $p$-linear Hamiltonian, which upon canonical quantisantion yielded a model for prediction of the evolution
of the \emph{probability distribution} $|\psi(x,t)|^2$ of $x$ as opposed to the ``classical'' actual \emph{fixed value} of $x$ at the moment of time $t$.
Moreover, this model was free of all artificial constants (i.e. the ``Planck constant'' equivalent) due to the $p$-linearity of the Hamiltonian.
I have also pointed out that this approach is different from the well\hyp{}known ``Quantum Economics'' due to John von~Neumann.
The resulting ``New Quantum Economics'' scheme was described in a very brief paper, which I called ``On the New Method of Price Forecasting'' and showed it to the two economists from the UK,
who visited Armenia and they were sufficiently impressed to invite me to continue my studies here in the UK.
I was pleasantly surprised when I discovered that a newly typeset version of Eddington's
``The Mathematical Theory of Relativity'' has been produced recently by Andrew~D.~Hwang,
a professor of mathematics at College of the Holy Cross, who made the fruits of his labours of love
available under Public Domain as part of the \emph{Gutenberg Project} \cite{Hwang1}.
However, seeing that Dr~Hwang used the early edition (1923) of this excellent book as the basis of his work,
I have decided to update his sources to the latest edition.
During the course of editing, I decided to incorporate the material of the \emph{Supplementary Notes} into the
body of the main text.
This is similar to the way it is done in the Russian translation of this book as published in 1934.
In the previous English editions this material was delegated to the end in order to preserve the pagination
of the rest of the book.
As there is obviously no need to preserve the old pagination in a freshly retypeset modern edition,
moving the material into the main body of text seemed desirable to prevent interrupting the reading flow.
It is my hope that this edition will help those who wish to understand the new and revolutionary concepts of
time and space as contained in both the General Relativity of Albert Einstein and in its unification with the
electromagnetism by Hermann Weyl, masterfully presented by A.S.~Eddington.
\Signature{Tigran Aivazian.}{6 \emph{March} 2022.}
\begin{thebibliography}{100}
\bibitem{Block1}
Matthew~Block.
{``The Urantia Book Sources'' (online).}
{\myurl{https://urantiabooksources.com}}
\bibitem{Aivazian1}
Tigran~Aivazian.
{\em ``The British Study Edition of the Urantia Papers''.}
{Freely available at \myurl{http://www.bibles.org.uk/study-edition.html}}
\bibitem{Hwang1}
Andrew~D.~Hwang.
{\em ``The Mathematical Theory of Relativity'' by Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington.}
{Freely available at \myurl{https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59248}}
\bibitem{Eddington1}
A.S.~Eddington.
{\em ``The Nature of the Physical World''.}
{Cambridge University Press,} 1928.
\bibitem{Eddington2}
A.S.~Eddington.
{\em ``New Pathways in Science''.}
{Cambridge University Press,} 1935.
\bibitem{Eddington3}
A.S.~Eddington.
{\em ``The Philosophy of Physical Science''.}
{Cambridge University Press,} 1939.
\end{thebibliography}
\Matter{Preface}
\lettrine{\textcolor{lettrinecolour}{A}}{first} draft of this book was published in 1921 as a mathematical supplement
to the French Edition of \Title{Space, Time and Gravitation}. During
the ensuing eighteen months I have pursued my intention of developing it
into a more systematic and comprehensive treatise on the mathematical
theory of Relativity. The matter has been rewritten, the sequence of the argument
rearranged in many places, and numerous additions made throughout;
so that the work is now expanded to three times its former size. It is hoped
that, as now enlarged, it may meet the needs of those who wish to enter fully
into these problems of reconstruction of theoretical physics.
The reader is expected to have a general acquaintance with the less
technical discussion of the theory given in \Title{Space, Time and Gravitation,}
although there is not often occasion to make direct reference to it. But it is
eminently desirable to have a general grasp of the revolution of thought
associated with the theory of Relativity before approaching it along the
narrow lines of strict mathematical deduction. In the former work we explained
how the older conceptions of physics had become untenable, and traced
the gradual ascent to the ideas which must supplant them. Here our task is
to formulate mathematically this new conception of the world and to follow
out the consequences to the fullest extent.
The present widespread interest in the theory arose from the verification
of certain minute deviations from Newtonian laws. To those who are still
hesitating and reluctant to leave the old faith, these deviations will remain
the chief centre of interest; but for those who have caught the spirit of the
new ideas the observational predictions form only a minor part of the subject.
It is claimed for the theory that it leads to an understanding of the world of
physics clearer and more penetrating than that previously attained, and it
has been my aim to develop the theory in a form which throws most light
on the origin and significance of the great laws of physics.
It is hoped that difficulties which are merely analytical have been minimised
by giving rather fully the intermediate steps in all the proofs with
abundant cross\hyp{}references to the auxiliary formulae used.
For those who do not read the book consecutively attention may be called
to the following points in the notation. The summation convention (\SecRef{22})
is used. German letters always denote the product of the corresponding
English letter by~$\sqrt{-g}$ (\SecRef{49}). $\Ham$~is the symbol for ``Hamiltonian differentiation''
introduced on \SecRef{60}. An asterisk is prefixed to symbols generalised
so as to be independent of or covariant with the gauge (\SecRef{86}).
A selected list of original papers on the subject is given in the Bibliography
at the end, and many of these are sources (either directly or at
second\hyp{}hand) of the developments here set forth. To fit these into a continuous
chain of deduction has involved considerable modifications from their
original form, so that it has not generally been found practicable to indicate
the sources of the separate sections. A frequent cause of deviation in treatment
is the fact that in the view of most contemporary writers the Principle
of Stationary Action is the final governing law of the world; for reasons
explained in the text I am unwilling to accord it so exalted a position. After
the original papers of Einstein, and those of de~Sitter from which I first
acquired an interest in the theory, I am most indebted to Weyl's \Title{Raum, Zeit,
Materie}. Weyl's influence will be especially traced in \SecRefs{49}, \SecNum{58}, \SecNum{59}, \SecNum{61}, \SecNum{63}, as
well as in the sections referring to his own theory.
I am under great obligations to the officers and staff of the University
Press for their help and care in the intricate printing.
\Signature{A. S. E.}{10 \emph{August} 1922.}
\Matter{Introduction}
\index{Differentiation|seealso{Derivative}}
\index{Distance|see{Length}}
\index{Gravitation|seealso{Einstein's law}}
\index{Ponderomotive force|see{Mechanical force}}
\index{Proper-|see{Invariant mass \emph{and} Density}}
\lettrine{\textcolor{lettrinecolour}{T}}{he} subject of this mathematical treatise is not pure mathematics but
\index{Mathematics contrasted with physics}%
physics. The vocabulary of the physicist comprises a number of words such
as length, angle, velocity, force, work, potential, current, etc., which we shall
\index{Length!definition of}%
call briefly ``physical quantities.'' Some of these terms occur in pure mathematics
\index{Physical quantities}%
also; in that subject they may have a generalised meaning which does
not concern us here. The pure mathematician deals with ideal quantities
defined as having the properties which he deliberately assigns to them. But
in an experimental science we have to discover properties not to assign them;
and physical quantities are defined primarily according to the way in which
we recognise them when confronted by them in our observation of the world
around us.
Consider, for example, a length or distance between two points. It is
a numerical quantity associated with the two points; and we all know the
procedure followed in practice in assigning this numerical quantity to two
points in nature. A definition of distance will be obtained by stating the
exact procedure; that clearly must be the primary definition if we are to
make sure of using the word in the sense familiar to everybody. The pure
mathematician proceeds differently; he defines distance as an attribute of
the two points which obeys certain laws---the axioms of the geometry which
he happens to have chosen---and he is not concerned with the question how
this ``distance'' would exhibit itself in practical observation. So far as his own
investigations are concerned, he takes care to use the word self\hyp{}consistently;
but it does not necessarily denote the thing which the rest of mankind are
accustomed to recognise as the distance of the two points.
To find out any physical quantity we perform certain practical operations
followed by calculations; the operations are called experiments or observations
according as the conditions are more or less closely under our control. The
physical quantity so discovered is primarily the result of the operations and
calculations; it is, so to speak, \emph{a manufactured article}---manufactured by
\index{Manufacture of physical quantities}%
our operations. But the physicist is not generally content to believe that the
quantity he arrives at is something whose nature is inseparable from the kind
of operations which led to it; he has an idea that if he could become a god
contemplating the external world, he would see his manufactured physical
quantity forming a distinct feature of the picture. By finding that he can
lay $x$~unit measuring\hyp{}rods in a line between two points, he has manufactured
the quantity~$x$ which he calls the distance between the points; but he believes
that that distance~$x$ is something already existing in the picture of the world---a
gulf which would be apprehended by a superior intelligence as existing
in itself without reference to the notion of operations with measuring\hyp{}rods.
Yet he makes curious and apparently illogical discriminations. The parallax
of a star is found by a well-known series of operations and calculations; the
distance across the room is found by operations with a tape\hyp{}measure. Both
parallax and distance are quantities manufactured by our operations; but
for some reason we do not expect parallax to appear as a distinct element in
the true picture of nature in the same way that distance does. Or again,
instead of cutting short the astronomical calculations when we reach the
parallax, we might go on to take the cube of the result, and so obtain another
manufactured quantity, a ``cubic parallax.'' For some obscure reason we
expect to see distance appearing plainly as a gulf in the true world\hyp{}picture;
parallax does not appear directly, though it can be exhibited as an angle by
a comparatively simple construction; and cubic parallax is not in the picture
at all. The physicist would say that he \emph{finds} a length, and \emph{manufactures} a
cubic parallax; but it is only because he has inherited a preconceived theory
of the world that he makes the distinction. We shall venture to challenge
this distinction.
Distance, parallax and cubic parallax have the same kind of potential
existence even when the operations of measurement are not actually made---\emph{if}
you will move sideways you will be able to determine the angular shift, \emph{if}
you will lay measuring\hyp{}rods in a line to the object you will be able to count
their number. Any one of the three is an indication to us of some existent
condition or relation in the world outside us---a condition not created by our
operations. But there seems no reason to conclude that this world\hyp{}condition
\emph{resembles} distance any more closely than it resembles parallax or cubic
parallax. Indeed any notion of ``resemblance'' between physical quantities
and the world\hyp{}conditions underlying them seems to be inappropriate. If the
length~$AB$ is double the length~$CD$, the parallax of~$B$ from~$A$ is half the parallax
of~$D$ from~$C$; there is undoubtedly some world\hyp{}relation which is different
for $AB$ and~$CD$, but there is no reason to regard the world\hyp{}relation of~$AB$ as
being better represented by double than by half the world\hyp{}relation of~$CD$.
The connection of manufactured physical quantities with the existent
world\hyp{}condition can be expressed by saying that the physical quantities are
\emph{measure\hyp{}numbers} of the world\hyp{}condition. Measure\hyp{}numbers may be assigned
\index{Measure\hyp{}code}%
according to any code, the only requirement being that the same measure\hyp{}number
always indicates the same world\hyp{}condition and that different world\hyp{}conditions
receive different measure\hyp{}numbers. Two or more physical quantities
may thus be measure\hyp{}numbers of the same world\hyp{}condition, \emph{but in different
codes,} e.g.\ parallax and distance; mass and energy; stellar magnitude and luminosity.
The constant formulae connecting these pairs of physical quantities
give the relation between the respective codes. But in admitting that physical
quantities can be used as measure\hyp{}numbers of world\hyp{}conditions existing
independently of our operations, we do not alter their status as manufactured
quantities. The same series of operations will naturally manufacture the
same result when world\hyp{}conditions are the same, and different results when
they are different. (Differences of world\hyp{}conditions which do not influence
the results of experiment and observation are \Foreign{ipso facto} excluded from the
domain of physical knowledge.) The size to which a crystal grows may be a
measure\hyp{}number of the temperature of the mother\hyp{}liquor; but it is none the
less a manufactured size, and we do not conclude that the true nature of size
is caloric.
The study of physical quantities, although they are the results of our
\index{Physical quantities!definition of}%
own operations (actual or potential), gives us some kind of knowledge of the
world\hyp{}conditions, since the same operations will give different results in
different world\hyp{}conditions. It seems that this indirect knowledge is all that
we can ever attain, and that it is only through its influences on such operations
that we can represent to ourselves a ``condition of the world.'' Any
\index{Condition of the world}%
attempt to describe a condition of the world otherwise is either mathematical
symbolism or meaningless jargon. To grasp a condition of the world as
completely as it is in our power to grasp it, we must have in our minds a
symbol which comprehends at the same time its influence on the results of
all possible kinds of operations. Or, what comes to the same thing, we must
contemplate its measures according to all possible measure\hyp{}codes---of course,
without confusing the different codes. It might well seem impossible to
realise so comprehensive an outlook; but we shall find that the mathematical
calculus of tensors does represent and deal with world\hyp{}conditions precisely in
this way. A tensor expresses simultaneously the whole group of measure\hyp{}numbers
associated with any world\hyp{}condition; and machinery is provided for
keeping the various codes distinct. For this reason the somewhat difficult
tensor calculus is not to be regarded as an evil necessity in this subject, which
ought if possible to be replaced by simpler analytical devices; our knowledge
of conditions in the external world, as it comes to us through observation and
experiment, is precisely of the kind which can be expressed by a tensor and
not otherwise. And, just as in arithmetic we can deal freely with a billion
objects without trying to visualise the enormous collection; so the tensor
calculus enables us to deal with the world\hyp{}condition in the totality of its
aspects without attempting to picture it.
Having regard to this distinction between physical quantities and world\hyp{}conditions,
we shall not define a physical quantity as though it were a feature
in the world\hyp{}picture which had to be sought out. \emph{A physical quantity is
defined by the series of operations and calculations of which it is the result.}
The tendency to this kind of definition had progressed far even in pre\hyp{}relativity
physics. Force had become ``$\text{mass} \times \text{acceleration}$,'' and was no longer an invisible
agent in the world\hyp{}picture, at least so far as its definition was concerned.
Mass is defined by experiments on inertial properties, no longer as ``quantity
of matter.'' But for some terms the older kind of definition (or lack of
definition) has been obstinately adhered to; and for these the relativity
theory must find new definitions. In most cases there is no great difficulty
in framing them. We do not need to ask the physicist what conception
he attaches to ``length''; we watch him measuring length, and frame our
definition according to the operations he performs. There may sometimes be
cases in which theory outruns experiment and requires us to decide between
two definitions, either of which would be consistent with present experimental
practice; but usually we can foresee which of them corresponds to the ideal
which the experimentalist has set before himself. For example, until recently
the practical man was never confronted with problems of non\hyp{}Euclidean space,
and it might be suggested that he would be uncertain how to construct a
straight line when so confronted; but as a matter of fact he showed no
hesitation, and the eclipse observers measured without ambiguity the bending
of light from the ``straight line.'' The appropriate practical definition was so
obvious that there was never any danger of different people meaning different
loci by this term. Our guiding rule will be that a physical quantity must be
defined by prescribing operations and calculations which will lead to an
unambiguous result, and that due heed must be paid to existing practice;
the last clause should secure that everyone uses the term to denote the same
\emph{quantity,} however much disagreement there may be as to the \emph{conception}
attached to it.
When defined in this way, there can be no question as to whether the
operations give us the real physical quantity or whether some theoretical
correction (not mentioned in the definition) is needed. The physical quantity
is the measure\hyp{}number of a world\hyp{}condition in some code; we cannot assert
that a code is right or wrong, or that a measure\hyp{}number is real or unreal;
what we require is that the code should be the accepted code, and the measure\hyp{}number
the number in current use. For example, what is the real difference
of time between two events at distant places? The operation of determining
time has been entrusted to astronomers, who (perhaps for mistaken reasons)
have elaborated a regular procedure. If the times of the two events are found
in accordance with this procedure, the difference must be the real difference
of time; the phrase has no other meaning. But there is a certain generalisation
to be noticed. In cataloguing the operations of the astronomers, so as to
obtain a definition of time, we remark that one condition is adhered to in
practice evidently from necessity and not from design---the observer and his
apparatus are placed on the earth and move with the earth. This condition
is so accidental and parochial that we are reluctant to insist on it in our
definition of time; yet it so happens that the motion of the apparatus makes
an important difference in the measurement, and without this restriction the
operations lead to no definite result and cannot define anything. We adopt
what seems to be the commonsense solution of the difficulty. We decide that
time is \emph{relative to an observer}; that is to say, we admit that an observer on
another star, who carries out all the rest of the operations and calculations
as specified in our definition, is also measuring time---not our time, but a
time relative to himself. The same relativity affects the great majority of
elementary physical quantities\footnotemark;\footnotetext
{The most important exceptions are number (of discrete entities), action, and entropy.\index{Absolute change!physical quantities@physical quantities|indexfn}}
the description of the operations is insufficient
to lead to a unique answer unless we arbitrarily prescribe a particular
motion of the observer and his apparatus.
In this example we have had a typical illustration of ``relativity,'' the
\index{Relativity of physical quantities}%
recognition of which has had far\hyp{}reaching results revolutionising the outlook
of physics. Any operation of measurement involves a comparison between
a measuring\hyp{}appliance and the thing measured. Both play an equal part in
the comparison and are theoretically, and indeed often practically, interchangeable;
for example, the result of an observation with the meridian circle
gives the right ascension of the star or the error of the clock indifferently,
and we can regard either the clock or the star as the instrument or the
object of measurement. Remembering that physical quantities are results of
comparisons of this kind, it is clear that they cannot be considered to belong
solely to one partner in the comparison. It is true that we standardise the
measuring appliance as far as possible (the method of standardisation being
explained or implied in the definition of the physical quantity) so that in
general the variability of the measurement can only indicate a variability of
the object measured. To that extent there is no great practical harm in
regarding the measurement as belonging solely to the second partner in
the relation. But even so we have often puzzled ourselves needlessly over
paradoxes, which disappear when we realise that the physical quantities are
not properties of certain external objects but are relations between these
objects and something else. Moreover, we have seen that the standardisation
of the measuring\hyp{}appliance is usually left incomplete, as regards the specification
of its motion; and rather than complete it in a way which would be
arbitrary and pernicious, we prefer to recognise explicitly that our physical
quantities belong not solely to the objects measured but have reference also
to the particular frame of motion that we choose.
The principle of relativity goes still further. Even if the measuring\hyp{}appliances
were standardised completely, the physical quantities would still
involve the properties of the constant standard. We have seen that the
world\hyp{}condition or object which is surveyed can only be apprehended in our
knowledge as the sum total of all the measurements in which it can be
concerned; any \emph{intrinsic} property of the object must appear as a uniformity
or law in these measures. When one partner in the comparison is fixed and
the other partner varied widely, whatever is common to all the measurements
may be ascribed exclusively to the first partner and regarded as an intrinsic
property of it. Let us apply this to the converse comparison; that is to say,
keep the measuring\hyp{}appliance constant or standardised, and vary as widely
as possible the objects measured---or, in simpler terms, make a particular
kind of measurement in all parts of the field. Intrinsic properties of the
measuring\hyp{}appliance should appear as uniformities or laws in these measures.
We are familiar with several such uniformities; but we have not generally
recognised them as properties of the measuring\hyp{}appliance. We have called
them \emph{laws of nature}!
The development of physics is progressive, and as the theories of the
external world become crystallised, we often tend to replace the elementary
physical quantities defined through operations of measurement by theoretical
quantities believed to have a more fundamental significance in the external
world. Thus the \Foreign{vis viva} $mv^2$, which is immediately determinable by experiment,
becomes replaced by a generalised energy, virtually defined by having
the property of conservation; and our problem becomes inverted---we have
not to discover the properties of a thing which we have recognised in nature,
but to discover how to recognise in nature a thing whose properties we have
assigned. This development seems to be inevitable; but it has grave drawbacks
especially when theories have to be reconstructed. Fuller knowledge
may show that there is nothing in nature having precisely the properties
assigned; or it may turn out that the thing having these properties has
entirely lost its importance when the new theoretical standpoint is adopted\footnotemark.\footnotetext
{We shall see in \SecRef{59} that this has happened in the case of energy. The dead\hyp{}hand of a
superseded theory continues to embarrass us, because in this case the recognised terminology
still has implicit reference to it. This, however, is only a slight drawback to set off against the
many advantages obtained from the classical generalisation of energy as a step towards the more
complete theory.}%
\tunemarkup{pgnexus10}{\linebreak}When we decide to throw the older theories into the melting\hyp{}pot and make
a clean start, it is best to relegate to the background terminology associated
with special hypotheses of physics. Physical quantities defined by operations
of measurement are independent of theory, and form the proper starting\hyp{}point
for any new theoretical development.
Now that we have explained how physical quantities are to be defined,
the reader may be surprised that we do not proceed to give the definitions of
the leading physical quantities. But to catalogue all the precautions and
provisos in the operation of determining even so simple a thing as length, is
a task which we shirk. We might take refuge in the statement that the task
though laborious is straightforward, and that the practical physicist knows
the whole procedure without our writing it down for him. But it is better to
be more cautious. I should be puzzled to say off-hand what is the series of
operations and calculations involved in measuring a length of $10^{-15}$~cm.;
nevertheless I shall refer to such a length when necessary as though it were
a quantity of which the definition is obvious. We cannot be forever examining
our foundations; we look particularly to those places where it is reported to
us that they are insecure. I may be laying myself open to the charge that
I am doing the very thing I criticise in the older physics---using terms that
have no definite observational meaning, and mingling with my physical
quantities things which are not the results of any conceivable experimental
operation. I would reply---
By all means explore this criticism if you regard it as a promising field
of inquiry. I here assume that you will probably find me a justification for
my $10^{-15}$~cm.; but you may find that there is an insurmountable ambiguity
in defining it. In the latter event you may be on the track of something
which will give a new insight into the fundamental nature of the world.
Indeed it has been suspected that the perplexities of quantum phenomena
may arise from the tacit assumption that the notions of length and duration,
acquired primarily from experiences in which the average effects of large
numbers of quanta are involved, are applicable in the study of individual
quanta. There may need to be much more excavation before we have brought
to light all that is of value in this critical consideration of experimental
knowledge. Meanwhile I want to set before you the treasure which has
already been unearthed in this field.
\Chapter{I}{Elementary Principles}
\Section{1.}{Indeterminateness of the space-time frame}
\lettrine{\textcolor{lettrinecolour}{I}}{t} has been explained in the early chapters of
\Title{Space, Time and Gravitation} that observers with different motions use different
reckonings of space and time, and that no one of these reckonings is more fundamental than another.
Our problem is to construct a method of description of the world in which
this indeterminateness of the space-time frame of reference is formally recognised.
Prior to Einstein's researches no doubt was entertained that there existed
a ``true even\hyp{}flowing time'' which was unique and universal. The moving
observer, who adopts a time\hyp{}reckoning different from the unique true time,
must have been deluded into accepting a fictitious time with a fictitious
space\hyp{}reckoning modified to correspond. The compensating behaviour of
electromagnetic forces and of matter is so perfect that, so far as present
knowledge extends, there is no test which will distinguish the true time from
the fictitious. But since there are many fictitious times and, according to
this view, only one true time, some kind of distinction is implied although its
nature is not indicated.
Those who still insist on the existence of a unique ``true time'' generally
rely on the possibility that the resources of experiment are not yet exhausted
and that some day a discriminating test may be found. But the off-chance
that a future generation may discover a significance in our utterances is
scarcely an excuse for making meaningless noises.
Thus in the phrase \emph{true time,} ``true'' is an epithet whose meaning has yet
to be discovered. It is a blank label. We do not know what is to be written
on the label, nor to which of the apparently indistinguishable time\hyp{}reckonings
it ought to be attached. There is no way of progress here. We return to
firmer ground, and note that in the mass of experimental knowledge which
has accumulated, the words \emph{time} and \emph{space} refer to one of the ``fictitious''
times and spaces---primarily that adopted by an observer travelling with the
earth, or with the sun---and our theory will deal directly with these space-time
frames of reference, which are admittedly fictitious or, in the more usual
phrase, \emph{relative to an observer with particular motion}.
The observers are studying the same external events, notwithstanding
their different space-time frames. The space-time frame is therefore something
overlaid by the observer on the external world; the partitions representing
his space and time reckonings are imaginary surfaces drawn in the
world like the lines of latitude and longitude drawn on the earth. They do
not follow the natural lines of structure of the world, any more than the
meridians follow the lines of geological structure of the earth. Such a mesh\hyp{}system
\index{Mesh\hyp{}system}%
is of great utility and convenience in describing phenomena, and we
shall continue to employ it; but we must endeavour not to lose sight of its
fictitious and arbitrary nature.
It is evident from experience that a four-fold mesh\hyp{}system must be used;
and accordingly an event is located by four coordinates, generally taken as
\index{Coordinates}%
$x$,~$y$, $z$,~$t$. To understand the significance of this location, we first consider
the simple case of two dimensions. If we describe the points of a plane figure
by their rectangular coordinates $x$,~$y$, the description of the figure is complete
and would enable anyone to construct it; but it is also more than complete,
because it specifies an arbitrary element, the orientation, which is irrelevant
to the intrinsic properties of the figure and ought to be cast aside from
a description of those properties. Alternatively we can describe the figure by
stating the distances between the various pairs of points in it; this description
is also complete, and it has the merit that it does not prescribe the
orientation or contain anything else irrelevant to the intrinsic properties of
the figure. The drawback is that it is usually too cumbersome to use in
practice for any but the simplest figures.
Similarly our four coordinates $x$,~$y$, $z$,~$t$ may be expected to contain an
arbitrary element, analogous to an orientation, which has nothing to do with
the properties of the configuration of events. A different set of values of
$x$,~$y$, $z$,~$t$ may be chosen in which this arbitrary element of the description is
altered, but the configuration of events remains unchanged. It is this
arbitrariness in coordinate specification which appears as the indeterminateness
of the space-time frame. The other method of description, by giving the
distances between every pair of events (or rather certain relations between
pairs of events which are analogous to distance), contains all that is relevant
to the configuration of events and nothing that is irrelevant. By adopting
this latter method we can strip away the arbitrary part of the description,
leaving only that which has an exact counterpart in the configuration of the
external world.
To put the contrast in another form, in our common outlook the idea of
\index{Extension and location}%
\index{Location and extension}%
position or \emph{location} seems to be fundamental. From it we derive distance or
\emph{extension} as a subsidiary notion, which covers part but not all of the conceptions
which we associate with location. Position is looked upon as the
physical fact---a coincidence with what is vaguely conceived of as an
identifiable point of space---whereas distance is looked upon as an abstraction
or a computational result calculable when the positions are known. The view
which we are going to adopt reverses this. Extension (distance, interval) is
now fundamental; and the location of an object is a computational result
summarising the physical fact that it is at certain intervals from the other
objects in the world. Any idea contained in the concept location which is not
expressible by reference to distances from other objects, must be dismissed
from our minds. Our ultimate analysis of space leads us not to a ``here'' and
a ``there,'' but to an extension such as that which relates ``here'' and ``there.''
To put the conclusion rather crudely---space is not a lot of points close
together; it is a lot of distances interlocked.
Accordingly our fundamental hypothesis is that---
\emph{Everything connected with location which enters into observational knowledge---everything
we can know about the configuration of events---is contained
\index{Configuration of events}%
in a relation of extension between pairs of events.}
This relation is called the \emph{interval,} and its measure is denoted by~$ds$.%
\index{Interval}%
If we have a system~$S$ consisting of events $A$,~$B$, $C$, $D$,~\dots, and a system~$S'$
consisting of events $A'$,~$B'$, $C'$, $D'$,~\dots, then the fundamental hypothesis implies
that the two systems will be exactly alike observationally if, and only if, all
pairs of corresponding intervals in the two systems are equal, $AB = A'B'$,
$AC = A'C'$,~\dots. In that case if $S$~and $S'$ are material systems they will appear
to us as precisely similar bodies or mechanisms; or if $S$~and $S'$ correspond to
the same material body at different times, it will appear that the body has
not undergone any change detectable by observation. But the position,
motion, or orientation of the body may be different; that is a change detectable
by observation, not of the system~$S$, but of a wider system comprising $S$
and surrounding bodies.
Again let the systems $S$ and $S'$ be abstract coordinate\hyp{}frames of reference,
the events being the corners of the meshes; if all corresponding intervals in
the two systems are equal, we shall recognise that the coordinate\hyp{}frames are
of precisely the same kind---rectangular, polar, unaccelerated, rotating, etc.
\Section{2.}{The fundamental quadratic form}
We have to keep side by side the two methods of describing the configurations
of events by coordinates and by the mutual intervals, respectively---the
first for its conciseness, and the second for its immediate absolute
significance. It is therefore necessary to connect the two modes of description
by a formula which will enable us to pass readily from one to the other. The
particular formula will depend on the coordinates chosen as well as on the
absolute properties of the region of the world considered; but it appears that
in all cases the formula is included in the following general form---
The interval $ds$ between two neighbouring events with coordinates
\index{Quadratic formula for interval}%
$(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)$ and $(x_1 + dx_1, x_2 + dx_2, x_3 + dx_3, x_4 + dx_4)$ in any coordinate\hyp{}system
is given by
\begin{multline*}
ds^2 = g_{11}\, dx_1^2 + g_{22}\, dx_2^2 + g_{33}\, dx_3^2 + g_{44}\, dx_4^2 \\
\begin{aligned}[b]
&+ 2g_{12}\, dx_1\, dx_2 + 2g_{13}\, dx_1\, dx_3 + 2g_{14}\, dx_1\, dx_4 \\
&+ 2g_{23}\, dx_2\, dx_3 + 2g_{24}\, dx_2\, dx_4 + 2g_{34}\, dx_3\, dx_4,
\end{aligned}
\Tag{(2.1)}
\end{multline*}
where the coefficients $g_{11}$, etc. are functions of $x_1$,~$x_2$, $x_3$,~$x_4$. That is to say,
$ds^2$~is some quadratic function of the differences of coordinates.
This is, of course, not the most general case conceivable; for example, we
might have a world in which the interval depended on a general quartic
function of the~$dx$'s. But, as we shall presently see, the quadratic form~\Eq{(2.1)} is
definitely indicated by observation as applying to the actual world. Moreover
near the end of our task (\SecRef{97}) we shall find in the general theory of relation\hyp{}structure
a precise reason why a quadratic function of the coordinate\hyp{}differences
should have this paramount importance.
Whilst the form of the right-hand side of~\Eq{(2.1)} is that required by
observation, the insertion of~$ds^2$ on the left, rather than some other function
of~$ds$, is merely a convention. The quantity~$ds$ is a measure of the interval.
\index{Length!measurement of}%
\index{Measure of interval}%
It is necessary to consider carefully how measure\hyp{}numbers are to be affixed
to the different intervals occurring in nature. We have seen in the last
section that equality of intervals can be tested observationally; but so far
as we have yet gone, intervals are merely either equal or unequal, and their
differences have not been further particularised. Just as wind-strength may
be measured by velocity, or by pressure, or by a number on the Beaufort
scale, so the relation of extension between two events could be expressed
numerically according to many different plans. To conform to~\Eq{(2.1)} a
particular code of measure\hyp{}numbers must be adopted; the nature and
advantages of this code will be explained in the next section.
The pure geometry associated with the general formula~\Eq{(2.1)} was studied
by Riemann, and is generally called Riemannian geometry. It includes
\index{Geometry, Riemannian}%
\index{Riemannian geometry}%
Euclidean geometry as a special case.
\Section{3.}{Measurement of intervals}
Consider the operation of proving by measurement that a distance~$AB$ is
equal to a distance~$CD$. We take a configuration of events $LMNOP$\dots, viz.\ a
measuring\hyp{}scale, and lay it over~$AB$, and observe that $A$~and $B$ coincide with
two particular events $P$,~$Q$ (scale\hyp{}divisions) of the configuration. We find
that the same configuration\footnote
{The logical point may be noticed that the measuring\hyp{}scale in two positions (necessarily at
different times) represents the same \emph{configuration} of events, not the same events.}
can also be arranged so that $C$~and $D$ coincide
with $P$~and $Q$~respectively. Further we apply all possible tests to the
measuring\hyp{}scale to see if it has ``changed'' between the two measurements;
and we are only satisfied that the measures are correct if no observable
difference can be detected. According to our fundamental axiom, the absence
of any observable difference between the two configurations (the structure of
the measuring\hyp{}scale in its two positions) signifies that the intervals are unchanged;
in particular the interval between $P$ and~$Q$ is unchanged. It follows
that the interval $A$ to~$B$ is equal to the interval $C$ to~$D$. We consider that the
experiment proves equality of distance; but it is primarily a test of equality
of interval.
In this experiment time is not involved; and we conclude that in space
considered apart from time the test of equality of distance is equality of
interval. There is thus a one-to-one correspondence of distances and intervals.
We may therefore adopt the same measure\hyp{}number for the interval as is in
general use for the distance, thus settling our plan of affixing measure\hyp{}numbers
to intervals. It follows that, when time is not involved, the interval
reduces to the distance.
It is for this reason that the quadratic form~\Eq{(2.1)} is needed in order to
agree with observation, for it is well known that in three dimensions the
square of the distance between two neighbouring points is a quadratic
function of their infinitesimal coordinate\hyp{}differences---a result depending
ultimately on the experimental law expressed by Euclid \Vol{I},~47.
When time is involved other appliances are used for measuring intervals.
If we have a mechanism capable of cyclic motion, its cycles will measure
equal intervals provided the mechanism, its laws of behaviour, and all relevant
surrounding circumstances, remain precisely similar. For the phrase ``precisely
similar'' means that no observable differences can be detected in the mechanism
or its behaviour; and that, as we have seen, requires that all corresponding
intervals should be equal. In particular the interval between the events
marking the beginning and end of the cycle is unaltered. Thus a clock
primarily measures equal intervals; it is only under more restricted conditions
that it also measures the time\hyp{}coordinate~$t$.
In general any repetition of an operation under similar conditions, but for
a different time, place, orientation and velocity (attendant circumstances
which have a relative but not an absolute significance\footnotemark),\footnotetext
{They express relations to events which are not concerned in the test, e.g.\ to the sun and
stars.}
tests, equality of
interval.
It is obvious from common experience that intervals which can be
measured with a clock cannot be measured with a scale, and \Foreign{vice versa}. We
have thus two varieties of intervals, which are provided for in the formula~\Eq{(2.1)},
since $ds^2$~may be positive or negative and the measure of the interval
will accordingly be expressed by a real or an imaginary number. The
\index{Imaginary intervals}%
abbreviated phrase ``imaginary interval'' must not be allowed to mislead;
there is nothing imaginary in the corresponding relation; it is merely that in
our arbitrary code an imaginary number is assigned as its measure\hyp{}number.
We might have adopted a different code, and have taken, for example, the
antilogarithm of~$ds^2$ as the measure of the interval; in that case space\hyp{}intervals
would have received code\hyp{}numbers from~$1$ to~$\infty$, and time\hyp{}intervals
numbers from~$0$ to~$1$. When we encounter~$\sqrt{-1}$ in our investigations, we
must remember that it has been introduced by our choice of measure\hyp{}code,
and must not think of it as occurring with some mystical significance in the
external world.
\Section{4.}{Rectangular coordinates and time}
\index{Rectangular coordinates and time}%
\index{Coordinate\hyp{}systems!rectangular}%
Suppose that we have a small region of the world throughout which the
$g$'s can be treated as constants\footnotemark.\footnotetext
{It will be shown in \SecRef{36} that it is always possible to transform the coordinates so that the
first derivatives of the~$g$'s vanish at a selected point. We shall suppose that this preliminary
transformation has already been made, in order that the constancy of the~$g$'s may be a valid
approximation through as large a region as possible round the selected point.}
In that case the right\hyp{}hand side of~\Eq{(2.1)} can
be broken up into the sum of four squares, admitting imaginary coefficients
if necessary. Thus writing
\begin{align*}
y_1 &= a_1 x_1 + a_2 x_2 + a_3 x_3 + a_4 x_4, \\
y_2 &= b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + b_3 x_3 + b_4 x_4,\quad\text{etc.,} \\
\intertext{so that}
dy_1 &= a_1\, dx_1 + a_2\, dx_2 + a_3\, dx_3 + a_4\, dx_4,\quad\text{etc.,}
\end{align*}
we can choose the constants $a_1$, $b_1$,~\dots\ so that \Eq{(2.1)}~becomes
\[
ds^2 = dy_1^2 + dy_2^2 + dy_3^2 + dy_4^2.
\Tag{(4.1)}
\]
For, substituting for the $dy$'s and comparing coefficients with~\Eq{(2.1)}, we have
only $10$~equations to be satisfied by the $16$~constants. There are thus many
ways of making the reduction. Note, however, that the reduction to the sum
of four squares of complete differentials is not in general possible for a \emph{large}
region, where the $g$'s have to be treated as functions, not constants.
Consider all the events for which $y_4$~has some specified value. These will
form a three\hyp{}dimensional world. Since $dy_4$~is zero for every pair of these
events, their mutual intervals are given by
\[
ds^2 = dy_1^2 + dy_2^2 + dy_3^2.
\Tag{(4.2)}
\]
But this is exactly like familiar space in which the interval (which we have
shown to be the same as the distance for space without time) is given by
\[
ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2,
\Tag{(4.3)}
\]
where $x$, $y$, $z$ are rectangular coordinates.
Hence a section of the world by $y_4 = \text{const.}$ will appear to us as space, and
$y_1$,~$y_2$,~$y_3$ will appear to us as rectangular coordinates. The coordinate\hyp{}frames
$y_1$,~$y_2$,~$y_3$, and $x$,~$y$,~$z$, are examples of the systems $S$ and~$S'$ of \SecRef{1}, for which
the intervals between corresponding pairs of mesh\hyp{}corners are equal. The
two systems are therefore exactly alike observationally; and if one appears
to us to be a rectangular frame in space, so also must the other. One proviso
must be noted; the coordinates $y_1$,~$y_2$,~$y_3$ for real events must be real, as in
familiar space, otherwise the resemblance would be only formal.
Granting this proviso, we have reduced the general expression to
\[
ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 + dy_4^2,
\Tag{(4.4)}
\]
where $x$, $y$, $z$ will be recognised by us as rectangular coordinates in space.
Clearly $y_4$~must involve the time, otherwise our location of events by the four
coordinates would be incomplete; but we must not too hastily identify it
with the time~$t$.
I suppose that the following would be generally accepted as a satisfactory
(pre\hyp{}relativity) definition of equal time\hyp{}intervals:---if we have a mechanism
\index{Time!definition of}%
capable of cyclic motion, its cycles will measure equal durations of time
\emph{anywhere} and \emph{anywhen,} provided the mechanism, its laws of behaviour, and
all outside influences remain precisely similar. To this the relativist would
add the condition that the mechanism (as a whole) must be at rest in the
space-time frame considered, because it is now known that a clock in motion
goes slow in comparison with a fixed clock. The non\hyp{}relativist does not disagree
in fact, though he takes a slightly different view; he regards the proviso
that the mechanism must be at rest as already included in his enunciation,
because for him motion involves progress through the aether, which (he
considers) directly affects the behaviour of the clock, and is one of those
``outside influences'' which have to be kept ``precisely similar.''
Since then it is agreed that the mechanism as a whole is to be at rest,
and the moving parts return to the same positions after a complete cycle, we
shall have for the two events marking the beginning and end of the cycle
\[
dx,\ dy,\ dz = 0.
\]
Accordingly \Eq{(4.4)} gives for this case
\[
ds^2 = dy_4^2.
\]
We have seen in \SecRef{3} that the cycles of the mechanism in all cases correspond
to equal intervals~$ds$; hence they correspond to equal values of~$dy_4$. But by
the above definition of time they also correspond to equal lapses of time~$dt$;
hence we must have $dy_4$~proportional to~$dt$, and we express this proportionality
by writing
\[
dy_4 = ic\, dt,
\Tag{(4.5)}
\]
where $i = \sqrt{-1}$, and $c$~is a constant. It is, of course, possible that $c$~may be
an imaginary number, but provisionally we shall suppose it real. Then \Eq{(4.4)}
becomes
\[
ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - c^2 dt^2.
\Tag{(4.6)}
\]
A further discussion is necessary before it is permissible to conclude that
\Eq{(4.6)}~is the most general possible form for~$ds^2$ in terms of ordinary space and
time coordinates. If we had reduced~\Eq{(2.1)} to the rather more general form
\[
ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - c^2 dt^2 - 2c\alpha\, dx\, dt - 2c\beta\, dy\, dt - 2c\gamma\, dz\, dt,
\Tag{(4.7)}
\]
this would have agreed with~\Eq{(4.6)} in the only two cases yet discussed, viz.\
(1)~when $dt = 0$, and (2)~when $dx$,~$dy$, $dz = 0$. To show that this more general
form is inadmissible we must examine pairs of events which differ both in
time and place.
In the preceding pre\hyp{}relativity definition of~$t$ our clocks had to remain
stationary and were therefore of no use for comparing time at different places.
What did the pre\hyp{}relativity physicist mean by the difference of time~$dt$
between two events at different places? I do not think that we can attach
any meaning to his hazy conception of what $dt$~signified; but we know one
or two ways in which he was accustomed to determine it. One method which
he used was that of transport of chronometers. Let us examine then what
happens when we move a clock from $(x_1, 0, 0)$ at the time~$t_1$ to another place
\index{Clocks, transport of}%
\index{Time!convention in reckoning}%
$(x_2, 0, 0)$ at the time~$t_2$.
We have seen that the clock, whether at rest or in motion, provided it
remains a precisely similar mechanism, records equal \emph{intervals}; hence the
difference of the clock\hyp{}readings at the beginning and end of the journey will
be proportional to the integrated interval
\[
\int_{1}^{2} ds.
\Tag{(4.81)}
\]
If the transport is made in the direct line ($dy = 0$, $dz = 0$), we shall have
according to~\Eq{(4.7)}
\[
-ds^2 = c^2\, dt^2 + 2c\alpha\, dx\, dt - dx^2 = c^2\, dt^2\left\{1 + \frac{2\alpha}{c}\, \frac{dx}{dt} - \frac{1}{c^2} \left(\frac{dx}{dt}\right)^{2}\right\}.
\]
Hence the difference of the clock\hyp{}readings \Eq{(4.81)} is proportional to
\[
\int\limits_{t_1}^{t_2} dt \sqrt{1 + \frac{2\alpha u}{c} - \frac{u^2}{c^2}},
\Tag{(4.82)}
\]
where $u = dx/dt$, i.e. the velocity of the clock. The integral will not in general
reduce to $t_{2} - t_{1}$; so that the difference of time at the two places is not given
correctly by the reading of the clock. Even when $\alpha = 0$, the moving clock
does not record correct time.
Now introduce the condition that the velocity~$u$ is very small, remembering
that $t_{2} - t_{1}$ will then become very large. Neglecting $u^2/c^2$, \Eq{(4.82)}~becomes approximately
\[
\int\limits_{t_1}^{t_2} dt \left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{c}\, \frac{dx}{dt}\right) = (t_2 - t_1) + \frac{\alpha}{c} (x_2 - x_1).
\]
The clock, if moved sufficiently slowly, will record the correct time\hyp{}difference