3061-shareable-room-keys.md

MSC3061: Sharing room keys for past messages

In Matrix, rooms can be configured via the m.room.history_visibility state event such that historical messages can be visible to all Matrix users (world_readable), all room members (shared), room members from the time that they are invited to a room (invited), or room members from the time that they join a room (joined). However, currently in encrypted rooms, rooms with the history visibility set to world_readable or shared are effectively set to invited since other members generally do not send new members the keys to decrypt messages sent before they were invited or joined a room.

We define a "shared-history" flag that identifies keys for messages that were sent when the room's visibility setting was set to world_readable or shared. This allows clients to know which keys are "safe" to share with new members so that they can decrypt historical messages. We also give examples of ways in which this flag can be used.

Proposal

A room key (such as a megolm session) is flagged as having been used for shared history when it was used to encrypt a message while the room's history visibility setting was set to world_readable or shared.

If the client does not have an m.room.history_visibility state event for the room, or its value is not understood, the client should treat it as if its value is joined for the purposes of determining whether the key is used for shared history. This is in contrast with the normal processing of m.room.history_visibility which defaults to world_readable when there is no m.room.history_visibility state event or its value is not understood. This is done so that, in the event of a bug that causes the client to fail to obtain the state event, the client will fail in a secure manner.

Internally, a client may use any mechanism it wants to keep track of this flag. When a room key is marked as having been used for shared history:

• m.room_key and m.forwarded_room_key messages used to share this key have a shared_history property set to true e.g.

  {
    "type": "m.room_key",
    "content": {
      "algorithm": "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2",
      "room_id": "!room_id",
      "session_id": "session_id",
      "session_key": "session_key",
      "shared_history": true
    }
  }

• the SessionData type in key backups (that is, the plaintext object that gets encrypted into the session_data field) of this key has a shared_history property set to true in the decrypted JSON structure e.g.

  {
    "algorithm": "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2",
    "forwarding_curve25519_key_chain": [
      "hPQNcabIABgGnx3/ACv/jmMmiQHoeFfuLB17tzWp6Hw"
    ],
    "sender_claimed_keys": {
      "ed25519": "aj40p+aw64yPIdsxoog8jhPu9i7l7NcFRecuOQblE3Y"
    },
    "sender_key": "RF3s+E7RkTQTGF2d8Deol0FkQvgII2aJDf3/Jp5mxVU",
    "session_key": "AgAAAADxKHa9uFxcXzwYoNueL5Xqi69IkD4sni8Llf...",
    "shared_history": true
  }

  and,

• the SessionData type used in key exports has a shared_history property that is set to true for this key e.g.

  {
    "algorithm": "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2",
    "forwarding_curve25519_key_chain": [
      "hPQNcabIABgGnx3/ACv/jmMmiQHoeFfuLB17tzWp6Hw"
    ],
    "sender_claimed_keys": {
      "ed25519": "aj40p+aw64yPIdsxoog8jhPu9i7l7NcFRecuOQblE3Y"
    },
    "sender_key": "RF3s+E7RkTQTGF2d8Deol0FkQvgII2aJDf3/Jp5mxVU",
    "session_key": "AgAAAADxKHa9uFxcXzwYoNueL5Xqi69IkD4sni8Llf...",
    "shared_history": true
  }

When a client obtains a key that has the shared_history property set to true, then it flags the key internally as having been used for shared history. Otherwise, the key should not be flagged as such.

When the room's history visibility setting changes to world_readable or shared from invited or joined, or changes to invited or joined from world_readable or shared, senders that support this flag must rotate their megolm sessions.

Clients may use this flag to modify their behaviour with respect to sharing keys. For example, when the user invites someone to the room, they may preemptively share keys that have this flag with the invited user. Other behaviours may be possible, but must be careful not to guard against malicious homeservers. See the "Security Considerations" section.

Potential issues

Room keys from clients that do not support this proposal will not be eligible for the modified client behaviour.

The suggested behaviour in this MSC is to only share additional keys when inviting another user. This does not allow users who join the room but were not invited (for example, if membership is restricted to another space, or if the room is publicly joinable) to receive the keys. Also, if the inviter does not have all the keys available for whatever reason, the invitee has no way of receiving the keys. This may be solved in the future when we have a mechanism for verifying room membership.

Alternatives

Rather than having the sender flagging keys, a client can paginate through the room's history to determine the room's history visibility settings when the room key was used. This would not require any changes, but has performance problems. In addition, the server could lie about the room history while the user is paginating through the history. By having the sender flag keys, this ensures that the key is treated in a manner consistent with the sender's view of the room.

Rather than using a boolean flag, we could include the history visibility setting as-is. For example, a history_visibility field could be added, which is set to the history visibility setting (e.g. world_readable). This produces an equivalent effect, but it pushes the processing of the history visibility setting to the receiver rather than the sender. For consistency, it is better for as much of the decision-making done by the sender, rather than the receiver.

Security considerations

Clients should still ensure that keys are only shared with authorized users and devices, as a malicious homeserver could inject fake room membership events. One way to ensure that keys are only shared with authorized users is to only share keys with users when the client invites them, as the client is then certain that the user is allowed to be in the room. Another way is to have a mechanism of verifying membership, such as the method proposed in MSC3917.

Unstable prefix

Until this feature lands in the spec, the property name to be used is org.matrix.msc3061.shared_history rather than shared_history.