V0.13.0rc

CLAUDE.md

@@ -172,4 +172,5 @@ Use `resolveModelString()` from `@automaker/model-resolver` to convert model ali
 - `DATA_DIR` - Data storage directory (default: ./data)
 - `ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY` - Restrict file operations to specific directory
 - `AUTOMAKER_MOCK_AGENT=true` - Enable mock agent mode for CI testing
+- `AUTOMAKER_AUTO_LOGIN=true` - Skip login prompt in development (disabled when NODE_ENV=production)
 - `VITE_HOSTNAME` - Hostname for frontend API URLs (default: localhost)

README.md

@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ npm run lint
 - `VITE_SKIP_ELECTRON` - Skip Electron in dev mode
 - `OPEN_DEVTOOLS` - Auto-open DevTools in Electron
 - `AUTOMAKER_SKIP_SANDBOX_WARNING` - Skip sandbox warning dialog (useful for dev/CI)
+- `AUTOMAKER_AUTO_LOGIN=true` - Skip login prompt in development (ignored when NODE_ENV=production)
 
 ### Authentication Setup
 

SECURITY_TODO.md

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+# Security Audit Findings - v0.13.0rc Branch
+
+**Date:** $(date)  
+**Audit Type:** Git diff security review against v0.13.0rc branch  
+**Status:** ⚠️ Security vulnerabilities found - requires fixes before release
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+No intentionally malicious code was detected in the changes. However, several **critical security vulnerabilities** were identified that could allow command injection attacks. These must be fixed before release.
+
+---
+
+## 🔴 Critical Security Issues
+
+### 1. Command Injection in Merge Handler
+
+**File:** `apps/server/src/routes/worktree/routes/merge.ts`  
+**Lines:** 43, 54, 65-66, 93  
+**Severity:** CRITICAL
+
+**Issue:**
+User-controlled inputs (`branchName`, `mergeTo`, `options?.message`) are directly interpolated into shell commands without validation, allowing command injection attacks.
+
+**Vulnerable Code:**
+
+```typescript
+// Line 43 - branchName not validated
+await execAsync(`git rev-parse --verify ${branchName}`, { cwd: projectPath });
+
+// Line 54 - mergeTo not validated
+await execAsync(`git rev-parse --verify ${mergeTo}`, { cwd: projectPath });
+
+// Lines 65-66 - branchName and message not validated
+const mergeCmd = options?.squash
+  ? `git merge --squash ${branchName}`
+  : `git merge ${branchName} -m "${options?.message || `Merge ${branchName} into ${mergeTo}`}"`;
+
+// Line 93 - message not sanitized
+await execAsync(`git commit -m "${options?.message || `Merge ${branchName} (squash)`}"`, {
+  cwd: projectPath,
+});
+```
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+An attacker could inject shell commands via branch names or commit messages:
+
+- Branch name: `main; rm -rf /`
+- Commit message: `"; malicious_command; "`
+
+**Fix Required:**
+
+1. Validate `branchName` and `mergeTo` using `isValidBranchName()` before use
+2. Sanitize commit messages or use `execGitCommand` with proper escaping
+3. Replace `execAsync` template literals with `execGitCommand` array-based calls
+
+**Note:** `isValidBranchName` is imported but only used AFTER deletion (line 119), not before execAsync calls.
+
+---
+
+### 2. Command Injection in Push Handler
+
+**File:** `apps/server/src/routes/worktree/routes/push.ts`  
+**Lines:** 44, 49  
+**Severity:** CRITICAL
+
+**Issue:**
+User-controlled `remote` parameter and `branchName` are directly interpolated into shell commands without validation.
+
+**Vulnerable Code:**
+
+```typescript
+// Line 38 - remote defaults to 'origin' but not validated
+const targetRemote = remote || 'origin';
+
+// Lines 44, 49 - targetRemote and branchName not validated
+await execAsync(`git push -u ${targetRemote} ${branchName} ${forceFlag}`, {
+  cwd: worktreePath,
+});
+await execAsync(`git push --set-upstream ${targetRemote} ${branchName} ${forceFlag}`, {
+  cwd: worktreePath,
+});
+```
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+An attacker could inject commands via the remote name:
+
+- Remote: `origin; malicious_command; #`
+
+**Fix Required:**
+
+1. Validate `targetRemote` parameter (alphanumeric + `-`, `_` only)
+2. Validate `branchName` before use (even though it comes from git output)
+3. Use `execGitCommand` with array arguments instead of template literals
+
+---
+
+### 3. Unsafe Environment Variable Export in Shell Script
+
+**File:** `start-automaker.sh`  
+**Lines:** 5068, 5085  
+**Severity:** CRITICAL
+
+**Issue:**
+Unsafe parsing and export of `.env` file contents using `xargs` without proper handling of special characters.
+
+**Vulnerable Code:**
+
+```bash
+export $(grep -v '^#' .env | xargs)
+```
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+If `.env` file contains malicious content with spaces, special characters, or code, it could be executed:
+
+- `.env` entry: `VAR="value; malicious_command"`
+- Could lead to code execution during startup
+
+**Fix Required:**
+Replace with safer parsing method:
+
+```bash
+# Safer approach
+set -a
+source <(grep -v '^#' .env | sed 's/^/export /')
+set +a
+
+# Or even safer - validate each line
+while IFS= read -r line; do
+  [[ "$line" =~ ^[[:space:]]*# ]] && continue
+  [[ -z "$line" ]] && continue
+  if [[ "$line" =~ ^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=(.*)$ ]]; then
+    export "${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"="${BASH_REMATCH[2]}"
+  fi
+done < .env
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🟡 Moderate Security Concerns
+
+### 4. Inconsistent Use of Secure Command Execution
+
+**Issue:**
+The codebase has `execGitCommand()` function available (which uses array arguments and is safer), but it's not consistently used. Some places still use `execAsync` with template literals.
+
+**Files Affected:**
+
+- `apps/server/src/routes/worktree/routes/merge.ts`
+- `apps/server/src/routes/worktree/routes/push.ts`
+
+**Recommendation:**
+
+- Audit all `execAsync` calls with template literals
+- Replace with `execGitCommand` where possible
+- Document when `execAsync` is acceptable (only with fully validated inputs)
+
+---
+
+### 5. Missing Input Validation
+
+**Issues:**
+
+1. `targetRemote` in `push.ts` defaults to 'origin' but isn't validated
+2. Commit messages in `merge.ts` aren't sanitized before use in shell commands
+3. `worktreePath` validation relies on middleware but should be double-checked
+
+**Recommendation:**
+
+- Add validation functions for remote names
+- Sanitize commit messages (remove shell metacharacters)
+- Add defensive validation even when middleware exists
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Positive Security Findings
+
+1. **No Hardcoded Credentials:** No API keys, passwords, or tokens found in the diff
+2. **No Data Exfiltration:** No suspicious network requests or data transmission patterns
+3. **No Backdoors:** No hidden functionality or unauthorized access patterns detected
+4. **Safe Command Execution:** `execGitCommand` function properly uses array arguments in some places
+5. **Environment Variable Handling:** `init-script-service.ts` properly sanitizes environment variables (lines 194-220)
+
+---
+
+## 📋 Action Items
+
+### Immediate (Before Release)
+
+- [ ] **Fix command injection in `merge.ts`**
+  - [ ] Validate `branchName` with `isValidBranchName()` before line 43
+  - [ ] Validate `mergeTo` with `isValidBranchName()` before line 54
+  - [ ] Sanitize commit messages or use `execGitCommand` for merge commands
+  - [ ] Replace `execAsync` template literals with `execGitCommand` array calls
+
+- [ ] **Fix command injection in `push.ts`**
+  - [ ] Add validation function for remote names
+  - [ ] Validate `targetRemote` before use
+  - [ ] Validate `branchName` before use (defensive programming)
+  - [ ] Replace `execAsync` template literals with `execGitCommand`
+
+- [ ] **Fix shell script security issue**
+  - [ ] Replace unsafe `export $(grep ... | xargs)` with safer parsing
+  - [ ] Add validation for `.env` file contents
+  - [ ] Test with edge cases (spaces, special chars, quotes)
+
+### Short-term (Next Sprint)
+
+- [ ] **Audit all `execAsync` calls**
+  - [ ] Create inventory of all `execAsync` calls with template literals
+  - [ ] Replace with `execGitCommand` where possible
+  - [ ] Document exceptions and why they're safe
+
+- [ ] **Add input validation utilities**
+  - [ ] Create `isValidRemoteName()` function
+  - [ ] Create `sanitizeCommitMessage()` function
+  - [ ] Add validation for all user-controlled inputs
+
+- [ ] **Security testing**
+  - [ ] Add unit tests for command injection prevention
+  - [ ] Add integration tests with malicious inputs
+  - [ ] Test shell script with malicious `.env` files
+
+### Long-term (Security Hardening)
+
+- [ ] **Code review process**
+  - [ ] Add security checklist for PR reviews
+  - [ ] Require security review for shell command execution changes
+  - [ ] Add automated security scanning
+
+- [ ] **Documentation**
+  - [ ] Document secure coding practices for shell commands
+  - [ ] Create security guidelines for contributors
+  - [ ] Add security section to CONTRIBUTING.md
+
+---
+
+## 🔍 Testing Recommendations
+
+### Command Injection Tests
+
+```typescript
+// Test cases for merge.ts
+describe('merge handler security', () => {
+  it('should reject branch names with shell metacharacters', () => {
+    // Test: branchName = "main; rm -rf /"
+    // Expected: Validation error, command not executed
+  });
+
+  it('should sanitize commit messages', () => {
+    // Test: message = '"; malicious_command; "'
+    // Expected: Sanitized or rejected
+  });
+});
+
+// Test cases for push.ts
+describe('push handler security', () => {
+  it('should reject remote names with shell metacharacters', () => {
+    // Test: remote = "origin; malicious_command; #"
+    // Expected: Validation error, command not executed
+  });
+});
+```
+
+### Shell Script Tests
+
+```bash
+# Test with malicious .env content
+echo 'VAR="value; echo PWNED"' > test.env
+# Expected: Should not execute the command
+
+# Test with spaces in values
+echo 'VAR="value with spaces"' > test.env
+# Expected: Should handle correctly
+
+# Test with special characters
+echo 'VAR="value\$with\$dollars"' > test.env
+# Expected: Should handle correctly
+```
+
+---
+
+## 📚 References
+
+- [OWASP Command Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
+- [Node.js Child Process Security](https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_process_security_concerns)
+- [Shell Script Security Best Practices](https://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashGuide/Practices)
+
+---
+
+## Notes
+
+- All findings are based on code diff analysis
+- No runtime testing was performed
+- Assumes attacker has access to API endpoints (authenticated or unauthenticated)
+- Fixes should be tested thoroughly before deployment
+
+---
+
+**Last Updated:** $(date)  
+**Next Review:** After fixes are implemented

TODO.md

@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@
 
 - Setting the default model does not seem like it works.
 
+# Performance (completed)
+
+- [x] Graph performance mode for large graphs (compact nodes/edges + visible-only rendering)
+- [x] Render containment on heavy scroll regions (kanban columns, chat history)
+- [x] Reduce blur/shadow effects when lists get large
+- [x] React Query tuning for heavy datasets (less refetch on focus/reconnect)
+- [x] DnD/list rendering optimizations (virtualized kanban + memoized card sections)
+
 # UX
 
 - Consolidate all models to a single place in the settings instead of having AI profiles and all this other stuff