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chore: Fix some instances of missing unsafe blocks #8232

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10 changes: 6 additions & 4 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/history/note_inclusion.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12,13 +12,15 @@ trait ProveNoteInclusion {

impl ProveNoteInclusion for Header {
fn prove_note_inclusion<Note, N, M>(self, note: Note) where Note: NoteInterface<N, M> {
// 1) Compute note_hash
let note_hash = compute_note_hash_for_nullify(note);

// 2) Get the membership witness of the note in the note hash tree
let witness = get_note_hash_membership_witness(self.global_variables.block_number as u32, note_hash);
let witness = unsafe {
get_note_hash_membership_witness(self.global_variables.block_number as u32, note_hash)
};

// 3) Prove that the commitment is in the note hash tree
// Note inclusion is fairly straightforward, since all we need to prove is that a note exists in the note tree -
// we don't even care _where_ in the tree it is stored. This is because entries in the note hash tree are
// unique.
assert_eq(
self.state.partial.note_hash_tree.root, root_from_sibling_path(note_hash, witness.index, witness.path), "Proving note inclusion failed"
);
Expand Down
22 changes: 11 additions & 11 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/history/nullifier_inclusion.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -13,21 +13,21 @@ trait ProveNullifierInclusion {
impl ProveNullifierInclusion for Header {
fn prove_nullifier_inclusion(self, nullifier: Field) {
// 1) Get the membership witness of the nullifier
let witness = get_nullifier_membership_witness(self.global_variables.block_number as u32, nullifier);
let witness = unsafe {
get_nullifier_membership_witness(self.global_variables.block_number as u32, nullifier)
};

// 2) Check that the witness we obtained matches the nullifier
assert(witness.leaf_preimage.nullifier == nullifier, "Nullifier does not match value in witness");

// 3) Compute the nullifier tree leaf
let nullifier_leaf = witness.leaf_preimage.hash();

// 4) Prove that the nullifier is in the nullifier tree
// 2) First we prove that the tree leaf in the witness is present in the nullifier tree. This is expected to be
// the leaf that contains the nullifier we're proving inclusion for.
assert(
self.state.partial.nullifier_tree.root
== root_from_sibling_path(nullifier_leaf, witness.index, witness.path), "Proving nullifier inclusion failed"
== root_from_sibling_path(witness.leaf_preimage.hash(), witness.index, witness.path), "Proving nullifier inclusion failed"
);
// --> Now we have traversed the trees all the way up to archive root and verified that the nullifier
// was included in the nullifier tree.

// 3) Then we simply check that the value in the leaf is the expected one. Note that we don't need to perform
// any checks on the rest of the values in the leaf preimage (the next index or next nullifier), since all we
// care about is showing that the tree contains an entry with the expected nullifier.
assert(witness.leaf_preimage.nullifier == nullifier, "Nullifier does not match value in witness");
}
}

Expand Down
31 changes: 16 additions & 15 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/history/nullifier_non_inclusion.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12,30 +12,31 @@ trait ProveNullifierNonInclusion {
impl ProveNullifierNonInclusion for Header {
fn prove_nullifier_non_inclusion(self, nullifier: Field) {
// 1) Get the membership witness of a low nullifier of the nullifier
let witness = get_low_nullifier_membership_witness(self.global_variables.block_number as u32, nullifier);

// 2) Prove that the nullifier is not included in the nullifier tree

// 2.a) Compute the low nullifier leaf and prove that it is in the nullifier tree
let low_nullifier_leaf = witness.leaf_preimage.hash();
let witness = unsafe {
get_low_nullifier_membership_witness(self.global_variables.block_number as u32, nullifier)
};

// 2) First we prove that the tree leaf in the witness is present in the nullifier tree. This is expected to be
// the 'low leaf', i.e. the leaf that would come immediately before the nullifier's leaf, if the nullifier were
// to be in the tree.
let low_nullifier_leaf = witness.leaf_preimage;
assert(
self.state.partial.nullifier_tree.root
== root_from_sibling_path(low_nullifier_leaf, witness.index, witness.path), "Proving nullifier non-inclusion failed: Could not prove low nullifier inclusion"
== root_from_sibling_path(low_nullifier_leaf.hash(), witness.index, witness.path), "Proving nullifier non-inclusion failed: Could not prove low nullifier inclusion"
);

// 2.b) Prove that the low nullifier is smaller than the nullifier
// 3) Prove that the low leaf is indeed smaller than the nullifier
assert(
full_field_less_than(witness.leaf_preimage.nullifier, nullifier), "Proving nullifier non-inclusion failed: low_nullifier.value < nullifier.value check failed"
full_field_less_than(low_nullifier_leaf.nullifier, nullifier), "Proving nullifier non-inclusion failed: low_nullifier.value < nullifier.value check failed"
);

// 2.c) Prove that the low nullifier is pointing "over" the nullifier to prove that the nullifier is not
// included in the nullifier tree (or to 0 if the to-be-inserted nullifier is the largest of all)
// 4) Prove that the low leaf is pointing "over" the nullifier, which means that the nullifier is not included
// in the nullifier tree, since if it were it'd need to be between the low leaf and the next leaf. Note the
// special case in which the low leaf is the largest of all entries, in which case there's no 'next' entry.
assert(
full_field_greater_than(witness.leaf_preimage.next_nullifier, nullifier)
| (witness.leaf_preimage.next_index == 0), "Proving nullifier non-inclusion failed: low_nullifier.next_value > nullifier.value check failed"
full_field_greater_than(low_nullifier_leaf.next_nullifier, nullifier)
| (low_nullifier_leaf.next_index == 0), "Proving nullifier non-inclusion failed: low_nullifier.next_value > nullifier.value check failed"
);
// --> Now we have traversed the trees all the way up to archive root and verified that the nullifier
// was not yet included in the nullifier tree.
}
}

Expand Down
37 changes: 21 additions & 16 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/history/public_storage.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12,24 +12,36 @@ trait PublicStorageHistoricalRead {

impl PublicStorageHistoricalRead for Header {
fn public_storage_historical_read(self, storage_slot: Field, contract_address: AztecAddress) -> Field {
// 1) Compute the leaf slot by siloing the storage slot with the contract address
// 1) Compute the leaf index by siloing the storage slot with the contract address
let public_data_tree_index = poseidon2_hash_with_separator(
[contract_address.to_field(), storage_slot],
GENERATOR_INDEX__PUBLIC_LEAF_INDEX
);

// 2) Get the membership witness of the slot
let witness = get_public_data_witness(
self.global_variables.block_number as u32,
public_data_tree_index
// 2) Get the membership witness for the tree index.
let witness = unsafe {
get_public_data_witness(
self.global_variables.block_number as u32,
public_data_tree_index
)
};

// 3) The witness is made up of two parts: the preimage of the leaf and the proof that it exists in the tree.
// We first prove that the witness is indeed valid for the public data tree, i.e. that the preimage is of a
// value present in the tree. Note that `hash` returns not just the hash of the value but also the metadata
// (slot, next index and next slot).
assert(
self.state.partial.public_data_tree.root
== root_from_sibling_path(witness.leaf_preimage.hash(), witness.index, witness.path), "Proving public value inclusion failed"
);

// 3) Extract the value from the witness leaf and check that the storage slot is correct
// 4) Now that we know the preimage is valid, we determine the value that's represented by this tree entry. Here
// we have two scenarios:
// 1. The tree entry is initialized, and the value is the same as the one in the witness
// 2. The entry was never initialized, and the value is default zero (the default)
// The code below is based on the same checks in `validate_public_data_reads` in `base_rollup_inputs`.
let preimage = witness.leaf_preimage;

// Here we have two cases. Code based on same checks in `validate_public_data_reads` in `base_rollup_inputs`
// 1. The value is the same as the one in the witness
// 2. The value was never initialized and is zero
let is_less_than_slot = full_field_less_than(preimage.slot, public_data_tree_index);
let is_next_greater_than = full_field_less_than(public_data_tree_index, preimage.next_slot);
let is_max = ((preimage.next_index == 0) & (preimage.next_slot == 0));
Expand All @@ -42,13 +54,6 @@ impl PublicStorageHistoricalRead for Header {
preimage.value
};

// 4) Prove that the leaf exists in the public data tree. Note that `hash` returns not just the hash of the value
// but also the metadata (slot, next index and next slot).
assert(
self.state.partial.public_data_tree.root
== root_from_sibling_path(preimage.hash(), witness.index, witness.path), "Proving public value inclusion failed"
);

value
}
}
4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/keys/getters/mod.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -24,9 +24,7 @@ global KEY_REGISTRY_UPDATE_BLOCKS = 5;

global KEY_REGISTRY_STORAGE_SLOT = 1;

// A helper function since requesting nsk_app is very common
// TODO(#6543)
pub fn get_nsk_app(npk_m_hash: Field) -> Field {
unconstrained pub fn get_nsk_app(npk_m_hash: Field) -> Field {
get_key_validation_request(npk_m_hash, NULLIFIER_INDEX).sk_app
}

Expand Down
14 changes: 11 additions & 3 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/note/note_getter/mod.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -80,13 +80,17 @@ pub fn get_note<Note, let N: u32, let M: u32>(
context: &mut PrivateContext,
storage_slot: Field
) -> (Note, Field) where Note: NoteInterface<N, M> {
let note = get_note_internal(storage_slot);
let note = unsafe {
get_note_internal(storage_slot)
};

// Constraining that we got a valid note from the oracle is fairly straightforward: all we need to do is check that
// the metadata is correct, and that the note exists.
check_note_header(*context, storage_slot, note);

let note_hash_for_read_request = compute_note_hash_for_read_request(note);

context.push_note_hash_read_request(note_hash_for_read_request);

(note, note_hash_for_read_request)
}

Expand All @@ -95,8 +99,12 @@ pub fn get_notes<Note, let N: u32, let M: u32, PREPROCESSOR_ARGS, FILTER_ARGS>(
storage_slot: Field,
options: NoteGetterOptions<Note, N, M, PREPROCESSOR_ARGS, FILTER_ARGS>
) -> (BoundedVec<Note, MAX_NOTE_HASH_READ_REQUESTS_PER_CALL>, BoundedVec<Field, MAX_NOTE_HASH_READ_REQUESTS_PER_CALL>) where Note: NoteInterface<N, M> + Eq {
let opt_notes = get_notes_internal(storage_slot, options);
let opt_notes = unsafe {
get_notes_internal(storage_slot, options)
};

// We apply the constraints in a separate function instead of inlining them here to make it easier to test that
// these checks correctly reject bad notes.
constrain_get_notes_internal(context, storage_slot, opt_notes, options)
}

Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -19,8 +19,13 @@ unconstrained pub fn get_contract_instance_internal_avm(address: AztecAddress) -
}

pub fn get_contract_instance(address: AztecAddress) -> ContractInstance {
let instance = ContractInstance::deserialize(get_contract_instance_internal(address));
assert(instance.to_address().eq(address));
let instance = unsafe {
ContractInstance::deserialize(get_contract_instance_internal(address))
};
// The to_address function combines all values in the instance object to produce an address, so by checking that we
// get the expected address we validate the entire struct.
assert_eq(instance.to_address(), address);

instance
}

Expand Down
8 changes: 6 additions & 2 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/oracle/header.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ pub fn get_header_at(block_number: u32, context: PrivateContext) -> Header {
);

// 3) Get the header hint of a given block from an oracle
let historical = get_header_at_internal(block_number);
let historical = unsafe {
get_header_at_internal(block_number)
};

// 4) We make sure that the header hint we received from the oracle exists in the state tree and is the actual header
// at the desired block number
Expand All @@ -60,7 +62,9 @@ fn constrain_get_header_at_internal(
let block_hash = header_hint.hash();

// 2) Get the membership witness of the block in the archive tree
let witness = get_archive_membership_witness(last_archive_block_number, block_hash);
let witness = unsafe {
get_archive_membership_witness(last_archive_block_number, block_hash)
};

// 3) Check that the block is in the archive (i.e. the witness is valid)
assert(
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ unconstrained fn get_key_validation_request_internal(
KeyValidationRequest::deserialize(result)
}

pub fn get_key_validation_request(pk_m_hash: Field, key_index: Field) -> KeyValidationRequest {
unconstrained pub fn get_key_validation_request(
pk_m_hash: Field,
key_index: Field
) -> KeyValidationRequest {
get_key_validation_request_internal(pk_m_hash, key_index)
}

8 changes: 2 additions & 6 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/oracle/keys.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -4,12 +4,8 @@ use dep::protocol_types::{address::{AztecAddress, PartialAddress}, point::Point}
#[oracle(getPublicKeysAndPartialAddress)]
unconstrained fn get_public_keys_and_partial_address_oracle(_address: AztecAddress) -> [Field; 13] {}

unconstrained fn get_public_keys_and_partial_address_oracle_wrapper(address: AztecAddress) -> [Field; 13] {
get_public_keys_and_partial_address_oracle(address)
}

pub fn get_public_keys_and_partial_address(address: AztecAddress) -> (PublicKeys, PartialAddress) {
let result = get_public_keys_and_partial_address_oracle_wrapper(address);
unconstrained pub fn get_public_keys_and_partial_address(address: AztecAddress) -> (PublicKeys, PartialAddress) {
let result = get_public_keys_and_partial_address_oracle(address);

let keys = PublicKeys {
npk_m: NpkM { inner: Point { x: result[0], y: result[1], is_infinite: result[2] as bool } },
Expand Down
10 changes: 6 additions & 4 deletions noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/state_vars/private_mutable.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -70,13 +70,15 @@ impl<Note, N, M> PrivateMutable<Note, &mut PrivateContext> where Note: NoteInter
// docs:end:replace

pub fn initialize_or_replace(self, note: &mut Note) -> NoteEmission<Note> {
let is_initialized = check_nullifier_exists(self.compute_initialization_nullifier());
let is_initialized = unsafe {
check_nullifier_exists(self.compute_initialization_nullifier())
};

// check_nullifier_exists() is an unconstrained function - we can constrain a true value by providing an
// inclusion proof of the nullifier, but cannot constrain a false value since a non-inclusion proof would only
// check_nullifier_exists() is an unconstrained function - we can constrain a true value by providing an
// inclusion proof of the nullifier, but cannot constrain a false value since a non-inclusion proof would only
// be valid if done in public.
// Ultimately, this is not an issue ginen that we'll either:
// - initialize the state variable, which would fail if it was already initialized due to the duplicate
// - initialize the state variable, which would fail if it was already initialized due to the duplicate
// nullifier, or
// - replace the current value, which would fail if it was not initialized since we wouldn't be able to produce
// an inclusion proof for the current note
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -97,27 +97,28 @@ impl<T, let INITIAL_DELAY: u32, Context> SharedMutable<T, INITIAL_DELAY, Context
// Instead, we get an oracle to provide us the correct values for both the value and delay changes, and instead
// prove inclusion of their hash, which is both a much smaller proof (a single slot), and also independent of
// the size of T.
let (value_change_hint, delay_change_hint) = get_public_storage_hints(address, self.storage_slot, historical_block_number);
let (value_change_hint, delay_change_hint) = unsafe {
get_public_storage_hints(address, self.storage_slot, historical_block_number)
};

// Ideally the following would be simply public_storage::read_historical, but we can't implement that yet.
let hash = header.public_storage_historical_read(self.get_hash_storage_slot(), address);

// @todo This is written strangely to bypass a formatting issue with the if that is breaking ci.
let (a, b, c) = if hash != 0 {
let a = SharedMutable::hash_scheduled_data(value_change_hint, delay_change_hint);
(a, value_change_hint, delay_change_hint)
if hash != 0 {
assert_eq(
hash, SharedMutable::hash_scheduled_data(value_change_hint, delay_change_hint), "Hint values do not match hash"
);
} else {
// The hash slot can only hold a zero if it is uninitialized, meaning no value or delay change was ever
// scheduled. Therefore, the hints must then correspond to uninitialized scheduled changes.
let b = ScheduledValueChange::deserialize(zeroed());
let c = ScheduledDelayChange::deserialize(zeroed());
(hash, b, c)
assert_eq(
value_change_hint, ScheduledValueChange::deserialize(zeroed()), "Non-zero value change for zero hash"
);
assert_eq(
delay_change_hint, ScheduledDelayChange::deserialize(zeroed()), "Non-zero delay change for zero hash"
);
};

assert_eq(hash, a, "Hint values do not match hash");
assert_eq(value_change_hint, b, "Non-zero value change for zero hash");
assert_eq(delay_change_hint, c, "Non-zero delay change for zero hash");

(value_change_hint, delay_change_hint, historical_block_number)
}
}
Expand Down
7 changes: 6 additions & 1 deletion noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/utils/collapse_array.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6,14 +6,19 @@ use dep::protocol_types::traits::Eq;
// this returns
// collapsed: [3, 1]
pub fn collapse_array<T, let N: u32>(input: [Option<T>; N]) -> BoundedVec<T, N> where T: Eq {
// Computing the collpased BoundedVec would result in a very large number of constraints, since we'd need to loop
// over the input array and conditionally write to a dynamic vec index, which is a very unfriendly pattern to the
// proving backend.
// Instead, we use an unconstrained function to produce the final collapsed array, along with some hints, and then
// verify that the input and collapsed arrays are equivalent.
let (collapsed, collapsed_to_input_index_mapping) = unsafe {
get_collapse_hints(input)
};
verify_collapse_hints(input, collapsed, collapsed_to_input_index_mapping);
collapsed
}

pub fn verify_collapse_hints<T, let N: u32>(
fn verify_collapse_hints<T, let N: u32>(
input: [Option<T>; N],
collapsed: BoundedVec<T, N>,
collapsed_to_input_index_mapping: BoundedVec<u32, N>
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/utils/mod.nr
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ mod comparison;
mod point;
mod test;

use crate::utils::collapse_array::{collapse_array, verify_collapse_hints};
use crate::utils::collapse_array::collapse_array;
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