fixup! more precise wording

Co-authored-by: Tim Ruffing <crypto@timruffing.de>

doc/musig-spec.mediawiki

@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ Instead of incurring this complexity, we make two modifications (compared to the
 * In ''Sign'', implicitly disallow the input ''aggnonce'' to contain infinity (since the serialization format doesn't support it).
 
 The entire ''NonceAgg'' function (both the original and modified version) only depends on publicly available data (the set of public pre-nonces from every signer).
-In the security proof, we consider ''NonceAgg'' to be performed by an untrusted party; thus modifications to ''NonceAgg'' do not affect the security of the scheme.
+In the unforgeability proof, ''NonceAgg'' is considered to be performed by an untrusted party; thus modifications to ''NonceAgg'' do not affect the unforgeability of the scheme.
 
 The (implicit) modification to ''Sign'' is equivalent to adding a clause, "abort if the input ''aggnonce'' contained infinity".
 This modification only depends on the publicly available ''aggnonce''.
-Given an adversary against the security game (EUF-CMA) for the modified scheme, a reduction can win the security game for the original scheme by simulating the modification (i.e. checking whether to abort) when interacting with the adversary.
+Given a successful adversary against the security game (EUF-CMA) for the modified scheme, a reduction can win the security game for the original scheme by simulating the modification (i.e. checking whether to abort) towards the adversary.
 
 We conclude that these two modifications preserve the security of the MuSig2* scheme.