vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability

This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability.

This change does one of two things. This change either

1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
OR
2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.

For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.

Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.4
Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)

Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <Jonathan.Leitschuh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <Jonathan.Leitschuh@gmail.com>

Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16


Co-authored-by: Moderne <team@moderne.io>

bootable-jar/boot/src/main/java/org/wildfly/core/jar/boot/Main.java

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 import java.io.BufferedReader;
 import java.io.File;
+import java.io.IOException;
 import java.io.InputStream;
 import java.io.InputStreamReader;
 import java.lang.reflect.Method;
@@ -210,6 +211,9 @@ private static void unzip(InputStream wf, Path dir) throws Exception {
             while (ze != null) {
                 String fileName = ze.getName();
                 Path newFile = dir.resolve(fileName);
+             if (!newFile.normalize().startsWith(dir.normalize())) {
+              throw new IOException("Bad zip entry");
+             }
                 if (ze.isDirectory()) {
                     Files.createDirectories(newFile);
                 } else {

cli/src/main/java/org/jboss/as/cli/handlers/ArchiveHandler.java

@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ private File extractArchive(File archive) throws IOException {
             for (Enumeration<JarEntry> entries = jarFile.entries(); entries.hasMoreElements();) {
                 JarEntry entry = entries.nextElement();
                 File file = new File(tempDir, entry.getName());
+             if (!file.toPath().normalize().startsWith(tempDir.toPath().normalize())) {
+              throw new IOException("Bad zip entry");
+             }
                 if (entry.isDirectory()) {
                     file.mkdir();
                     continue;

patching/src/main/java/org/jboss/as/patching/ZipUtils.java

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ private static void unzip(final ZipFile zip, final File patchDir) throws IOExcep
             final String name = entry.getName();
             final File current = new File(patchDir, name);
             final String canonicalDestinationPath = current.getCanonicalPath();
-            if (! canonicalDestinationPath.startsWith(patchDir.getCanonicalPath())) {
+            if (! current.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(patchDir.getCanonicalFile().toPath())) {
                 throw PatchLogger.ROOT_LOGGER.entryOutsideOfPatchDirectory(canonicalDestinationPath);
             }
             if (entry.isDirectory()) {