build(deps): bump pip from 23.2.1 to 23.3 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #2
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FEATURES
This patch adds additional CPU options to the Linux kernel accessible under:
Processor type and features --->
Processor family --->
With the release of gcc 11.1 and clang 12.0, several generic 64-bit levels are
offered which are good for supported Intel or AMD CPUs:
• x86-64-v2
• x86-64-v3
• x86-64-v4
Users of glibc 2.33 and above can see which level is supported by current
hardware by running:
/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 --help | grep supported
Alternatively, compare the flags from /proc/cpuinfo to this list.[1]
CPU-specific microarchitectures include:
• AMD Improved K8-family
• AMD K10-family
• AMD Family 10h (Barcelona)
• AMD Family 14h (Bobcat)
• AMD Family 16h (Jaguar)
• AMD Family 15h (Bulldozer)
• AMD Family 15h (Piledriver)
• AMD Family 15h (Steamroller)
• AMD Family 15h (Excavator)
• AMD Family 17h (Zen)
• AMD Family 17h (Zen 2)
• AMD Family 19h (Zen 3)†
• Intel Silvermont low-power processors
• Intel Goldmont low-power processors (Apollo Lake and Denverton)
• Intel Goldmont Plus low-power processors (Gemini Lake)
• Intel 1st Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Nehalem)
• Intel 1.5 Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Westmere)
• Intel 2nd Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Sandybridge)
• Intel 3rd Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Ivybridge)
• Intel 4th Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Haswell)
• Intel 5th Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Broadwell)
• Intel 6th Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Skylake)
• Intel 6th Gen Core i7/i9 (Skylake X)
• Intel 8th Gen Core i3/i5/i7 (Cannon Lake)
• Intel 10th Gen Core i7/i9 (Ice Lake)
• Intel Xeon (Cascade Lake)
• Intel Xeon (Cooper Lake)*
• Intel 3rd Gen 10nm++ i3/i5/i7/i9-family (Tiger Lake)*
• Intel 3rd Gen 10nm++ Xeon (Sapphire Rapids)‡
• Intel 11th Gen i3/i5/i7/i9-family (Rocket Lake)‡
• Intel 12th Gen i3/i5/i7/i9-family (Alder Lake)‡
Notes: If not otherwise noted, gcc >=9.1 is required for support.
*Requires gcc >=10.1 or clang >=10.0
†Required gcc >=10.3 or clang >=12.0
‡Required gcc >=11.1 or clang >=12.0
It also offers to compile passing the 'native' option which, "selects the CPU
to generate code for at compilation time by determining the processor type of
the compiling machine. Using -march=native enables all instruction subsets
supported by the local machine and will produce code optimized for the local
machine under the constraints of the selected instruction set."[2]
Users of Intel CPUs should select the 'Intel-Native' option and users of AMD
CPUs should select the 'AMD-Native' option.
MINOR NOTES RELATING TO INTEL ATOM PROCESSORS
This patch also changes -march=atom to -march=bonnell in accordance with the
gcc v4.9 changes. Upstream is using the deprecated -match=atom flags when I
believe it should use the newer -march=bonnell flag for atom processors.[3]
It is not recommended to compile on Atom-CPUs with the 'native' option.[4] The
recommendation is to use the 'atom' option instead.
BENEFITS
Small but real speed increases are measurable using a make endpoint comparing
a generic kernel to one built with one of the respective microarchs.
See the following experimental evidence supporting this statement:
https://github.com/graysky2/kernel_gcc_patch
REQUIREMENTS
linux version >=5.15
gcc version >=9.0 or clang version >=9.0
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This patch builds on the seminal work by Jeroen.[5]
REFERENCES
1. https://gitlab.com/x86-psABIs/x86-64-ABI/-/commit/77566eb03bc6a326811cb7e9
2. https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/x86-Options.html#index-x86-Options
3. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=77461
4. https://github.com/graysky2/kernel_gcc_patch/issues/15
5. http://www.linuxforge.net/docs/linux/linux-gcc.php
Signed-off-by: graysky <graysky@archlinux.us>
Bumps [pip](https://github.com/pypa/pip) from 23.2.1 to 23.3. - [Changelog](https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/main/NEWS.rst) - [Commits](pypa/pip@23.2.1...23.3) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: pip dependency-type: direct:production ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
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Running smb2.rename test from Samba smbtorture suite against a kernel built
with lockdep triggers a "possible recursive locking detected" warning.
This is because mnt_want_write() is called twice with no mnt_drop_write()
in between:
-> ksmbd_vfs_mkdir()
-> ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_create()
-> kern_path_create()
-> filename_create()
-> mnt_want_write()
-> mnt_want_write()
Fix this by removing the mnt_want_write/mnt_drop_write calls from vfs
helpers that call kern_path_create().
Full lockdep trace below:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.6.0-rc5 #775 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
kworker/1:1/32 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksmbd_vfs_mkdir+0xe1/0x410
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(sb_writers#5);
lock(sb_writers#5);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
4 locks held by kworker/1:1/32:
#0: ffff8880064e4138 ((wq_completion)ksmbd-io){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980
#1: ffff888005b0fdd0 ((work_completion)(&work->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980
#2: ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260
#3: ffff8880057ce760 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#3/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x123/0x260
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 40b268d ("ksmbd: add mnt_want_write to ksmbd vfs functions")
Signed-off-by: Marios Makassikis <mmakassikis@freebox.fr>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Originally, hugetlb_cgroup was the only hugetlb user of tail page structure fields. So, the code defined and checked against HUGETLB_CGROUP_MIN_ORDER to make sure pages weren't too small to use. However, by now, tail page #2 is used to store hugetlb hwpoison and subpool information as well. In other words, without that tail page hugetlb doesn't work. Acknowledge this fact by getting rid of HUGETLB_CGROUP_MIN_ORDER and checks against it. Instead, just check for the minimum viable page order at hstate creation time. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231004153248.3842997-1-fvdl@google.com Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fvdl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write,
nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read,
memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw,
C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency,
C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency,
C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would
trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX.
```
==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98
READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0
#0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12
#1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6
#2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9
#3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31
#4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18
#5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3
#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5
#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2
#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3
#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11
#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8
#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2
#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3
```
The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using
empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1
results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately
overflows when any member is accessed.
Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
\___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events
Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]
-e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events
=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
#1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
#2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
#3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
#4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
#5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
#6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.
Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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Lockdep complains about possible circular locking dependencies when the
i.MX SDMA driver issues console messages under its spinlock. While the
SDMA driver calls back into the UART when issuing a message, the i.MX
UART driver will never call back into the SDMA driver for this UART,
because DMA is explicitly not used for UARTs providing the console.
To avoid the lockdep warnings put the UART port lock for console devices
into a separate subclass.
This fixes possible deadlock warnings like the following which was
provoked by adding a printk to the i.MX SDMA driver at a place where the
driver holds its spinlock.
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.6.0-rc3-00045-g517852be693b-dirty #110 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock:
c1818e04 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}, at: console_flush_all+0x1c4/0x634
but task is already holding lock:
c44649e0 (&vc->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: sdma_int_handler+0xc4/0x368
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&vc->lock){-...}-{3:3}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
sdma_prep_dma_cyclic+0x1a8/0x21c
imx_uart_startup+0x44c/0x5d4
uart_startup+0x120/0x2b0
uart_port_activate+0x44/0x98
tty_port_open+0x80/0xd0
uart_open+0x18/0x20
tty_open+0x120/0x664
chrdev_open+0xc0/0x214
do_dentry_open+0x1d0/0x544
path_openat+0xbb0/0xea0
do_filp_open+0x5c/0xd4
do_sys_openat2+0xb8/0xf0
sys_openat+0x8c/0xd8
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
-> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{3:3}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
imx_uart_console_write+0x164/0x1a0
console_flush_all+0x220/0x634
console_unlock+0x64/0x164
vprintk_emit+0xb0/0x390
vprintk_default+0x24/0x2c
_printk+0x2c/0x5c
register_console+0x244/0x478
serial_core_register_port+0x5c4/0x618
imx_uart_probe+0x4e0/0x7d4
platform_probe+0x58/0xb0
really_probe+0xc4/0x2e0
__driver_probe_device+0x84/0x1a0
driver_probe_device+0x2c/0x108
__driver_attach+0x94/0x17c
bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xd0
bus_add_driver+0xc4/0x1cc
driver_register+0x7c/0x114
imx_uart_init+0x20/0x40
do_one_initcall+0x7c/0x3c4
kernel_init_freeable+0x17c/0x228
kernel_init+0x14/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24
-> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x14b0/0x29a0
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x264
console_flush_all+0x20c/0x634
console_unlock+0x64/0x164
vprintk_emit+0xb0/0x390
vprintk_default+0x24/0x2c
_printk+0x2c/0x5c
sdma_int_handler+0xcc/0x368
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x94/0x2d0
handle_irq_event+0x38/0xd0
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x98/0x248
handle_irq_desc+0x1c/0x2c
gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x90
generic_handle_arch_irq+0x2c/0x64
__irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
cpuidle_enter_state+0x1a0/0x4f4
cpuidle_enter+0x30/0x40
do_idle+0x210/0x2b4
cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x2c
rest_init+0xd0/0x184
arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &vc->lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&vc->lock);
lock(&port_lock_key);
lock(&vc->lock);
lock(console_owner);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by swapper/0/0:
#0: c44649e0 (&vc->lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: sdma_int_handler+0xc4/0x368
#1: c1818d50 (console_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: vprintk_default+0x24/0x2c
#2: c1818d08 (console_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: console_flush_all+0x44/0x634
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00045-g517852be693b-dirty #110
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x90
dump_stack_lvl from check_noncircular+0x184/0x1b8
check_noncircular from __lock_acquire+0x14b0/0x29a0
__lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x264
lock_acquire.part.0 from console_flush_all+0x20c/0x634
console_flush_all from console_unlock+0x64/0x164
console_unlock from vprintk_emit+0xb0/0x390
vprintk_emit from vprintk_default+0x24/0x2c
vprintk_default from _printk+0x2c/0x5c
_printk from sdma_int_handler+0xcc/0x368
sdma_int_handler from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x94/0x2d0
__handle_irq_event_percpu from handle_irq_event+0x38/0xd0
handle_irq_event from handle_fasteoi_irq+0x98/0x248
handle_fasteoi_irq from handle_irq_desc+0x1c/0x2c
handle_irq_desc from gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x90
gic_handle_irq from generic_handle_arch_irq+0x2c/0x64
generic_handle_arch_irq from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
Exception stack(0xc1801ee8 to 0xc1801f30)
1ee0: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 00030349 00000000 00000012
1f00: 00000000 d7e45f4b 00000012 00000000 d7e16d63 c1810828 00000000 c1801f38
1f20: c108125c c1081260 60010013 ffffffff
__irq_svc from cpuidle_enter_state+0x1a0/0x4f4
cpuidle_enter_state from cpuidle_enter+0x30/0x40
cpuidle_enter from do_idle+0x210/0x2b4
do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x2c
cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xd0/0x184
rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8
Reported-by: Tim van der Staaij <Tim.vanderstaaij@zigngroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230928064320.711603-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Chuyi Zhou says: ==================== Relax allowlist for open-coded css_task iter Hi, The patchset aims to relax the allowlist for open-coded css_task iter suggested by Alexei[1]. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. Patch summary: * Patch #1: Relax the allowlist and let css_task iter can be used in bpf iters and any sleepable progs. * Patch #2: Add a test in cgroup_iters.c which demonstrates how css_task iters can be combined with cgroup iter. * Patch #3: Add a test to prove css_task iter can be used in normal * sleepable progs. link[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAADnVQKafk_junRyE=-FVAik4hjTRDtThymYGEL8hGTuYoOGpA@mail.gmail.com/ --- Changes in v2: * Fix the incorrect logic in check_css_task_iter_allowlist. Use expected_attach_type to check whether we are using bpf_iters. * Link to v1:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231022154527.229117-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#m946f9cde86b44a13265d9a44c5738a711eb578fd Changes in v3: * Add a testcase to prove css_task can be used in fentry.s * Link to v2:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024024240.42790-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#m14a97041ff56c2df21bc0149449abd275b73f6a3 Changes in v4: * Add Yonghong's ack for patch #1 and patch #2. * Solve Yonghong's comments for patch #2 * Move prog 'iter_css_task_for_each_sleep' from iters_task_failure.c to iters_css_task.c. Use RUN_TESTS to prove we can load this prog. * Link to v3:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231025075914.30979-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#m3200d8ad29af4ffab97588e297361d0a45d7585d --- ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031050438.93297-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():
1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):
virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested
2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:
virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}
If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.
Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
lan9303_mdio_read
_regmap_read
regmap_read
lan9303_probe
lan9303_mdio_probe
mdio_probe
really_probe
__driver_probe_device
driver_probe_device
__device_attach_driver
bus_for_each_drv
__device_attach
device_initial_probe
bus_probe_device
deferred_probe_work_func
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire.part.0
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
regmap_lock_mutex
regmap_read
lan9303_phy_read
dsa_slave_phy_read
__mdiobus_read
mdiobus_read
get_phy_device
mdiobus_scan
__mdiobus_register
dsa_register_switch
lan9303_probe
lan9303_mdio_probe
mdio_probe
really_probe
__driver_probe_device
driver_probe_device
__device_attach_driver
bus_for_each_drv
__device_attach
device_initial_probe
bus_probe_device
deferred_probe_work_func
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
#0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
#2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
#3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
#4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace
show_stack
dump_stack_lvl
dump_stack
print_circular_bug
check_noncircular
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire.part.0
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
regmap_lock_mutex
regmap_read
lan9303_phy_read
dsa_slave_phy_read
__mdiobus_read
mdiobus_read
get_phy_device
mdiobus_scan
__mdiobus_register
dsa_register_switch
lan9303_probe
lan9303_mdio_probe
...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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…pf_iter_reg' Chuyi Zhou says: ==================== The patchset aims to let the BPF verivier consider bpf_iter__cgroup->cgroup and bpf_iter__task->task is trusted suggested by Alexei[1]. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. Link[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231022154527.229117-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#mb57725edc8ccdd50a1b165765c7619b4d65ed1b0 v2->v1: * Patch #1: Add Yonghong's ack and add description of similar case in log. * Patch #2: Add Yonghong's ack ==================== Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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We must check the return value of find_first_bit() before using the return value as an index array since it happens to overflow the array and then panic: [ 107.318430] Kernel BUG [#1] [ 107.319434] CPU: 3 PID: 1238 Comm: kill Tainted: G E 6.6.0-rc6ubuntu-defconfig #2 [ 107.319465] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 107.319551] epc : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae [ 107.319840] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x52/0x3ae [ 107.319868] epc : ffffffff80a0a77c ra : ffffffff80a0a42a sp : ffffaf83fecda350 [ 107.319884] gp : ffffffff823961a8 tp : ffffaf8083db1dc0 t0 : ffffaf83fecda480 [ 107.319899] t1 : ffffffff80cafe62 t2 : 000000000000ff00 s0 : ffffaf83fecda520 [ 107.319921] s1 : ffffaf83fecda380 a0 : 00000018fca29df0 a1 : ffffffffffffffff [ 107.319936] a2 : 0000000001073734 a3 : 0000000000000004 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 107.319951] a5 : 0000000000000040 a6 : 000000001d1c8774 a7 : 0000000000504d55 [ 107.319965] s2 : ffffffff82451f10 s3 : ffffffff82724e70 s4 : 000000000000003f [ 107.319980] s5 : 0000000000000011 s6 : ffffaf8083db27c0 s7 : 0000000000000000 [ 107.319995] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 00007fffb45d6558 s10: 00007fffb45d81a0 [ 107.320009] s11: ffffaf7ffff60000 t3 : 0000000000000004 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 107.320023] t5 : ffffaf7f80000000 t6 : ffffaf8000000000 [ 107.320037] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 107.320081] [<ffffffff80a0a77c>] pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae [ 107.320112] [<ffffffff800b42d0>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x9e/0x1a0 [ 107.320131] [<ffffffff800ad92c>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [ 107.320148] [<ffffffff8065f9f8>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e [ 107.320166] [<ffffffff80caf4a0>] handle_riscv_irq+0x54/0x86 [ 107.320189] [<ffffffff80cb0036>] do_irq+0x64/0x96 [ 107.320271] Code: 85a6 855e b097 ff7f 80e7 9220 b709 9002 4501 bbd9 (9002) 6097 [ 107.320585] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 107.320704] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 107.320775] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 107.321219] Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff80000000 [ 107.333051] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: 4905ec2 ("RISC-V: Add sscofpmf extension support") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231109082128.40777-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency.
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ======================================================
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ #10 Not tainted
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
but task is already holding lock:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
which lock already depends on the new lock.
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
-> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
-> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
-> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
-> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
other info that might help us debug this:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of:
&fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU0 CPU1
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ---- ----
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&device->intr.lock);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&fctx->lock);
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
*** DEADLOCK ***
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel:
stack backtrace:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ #10
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace:
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: <TASK>
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau]
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc>
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280
Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: </TASK>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231107053255.2257079-1-airlied@gmail.com
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This reverts commit 4d56a4f. The DMA-fence annotations cause a lockdep warning (see below). As per https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/462170/ it sounds like the annotations don't work correctly. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.6.0-rc2+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kmstest/733 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8000819377f0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 but task is already holding lock: ffff800081a06aa0 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x20/0xc0 [tidss] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}: __dma_fence_might_wait+0x5c/0xd0 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1a4/0x32c do_one_initcall+0x84/0x2fc kernel_init_freeable+0x28c/0x4c4 kernel_init+0x24/0x1dc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x70/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 kmalloc_trace+0x38/0x78 __kthread_create_worker+0x3c/0x150 kthread_create_worker+0x64/0x8c workqueue_init+0x1e8/0x2f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x11c/0x4c4 kernel_init+0x24/0x1dc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1370/0x20d8 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x308 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x58/0xf0 kmemdup+0x34/0x60 regmap_bulk_write+0x64/0x2c0 tc358768_bridge_pre_enable+0x8c/0x12d0 [tc358768] drm_atomic_bridge_call_pre_enable+0x68/0x80 [drm] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_pre_enable+0x50/0x158 [drm] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x164/0x264 [drm_kms_helper] tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x58/0xc0 [tidss] commit_tail+0xa0/0x188 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0xa8/0xe0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9ec/0xc80 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x170 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x234/0x4b0 [drm] drm_compat_ioctl+0x110/0x12c [drm] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x128/0x150 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x48/0xb4 el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: fs_reclaim --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> dma_fence_map Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(dma_fence_map); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(dma_fence_map); lock(fs_reclaim); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kmstest/733: #0: ffff800082e5bba0 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x118/0xc80 [drm] #1: ffff000004224c88 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: modeset_lock+0xdc/0x1a0 [drm] #2: ffff800081a06aa0 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x20/0xc0 [tidss] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 733 Comm: kmstest Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 on Verdin Development Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x118 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x288/0x368 check_noncircular+0x168/0x17c __lock_acquire+0x1370/0x20d8 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x308 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x58/0xf0 kmemdup+0x34/0x60 regmap_bulk_write+0x64/0x2c0 tc358768_bridge_pre_enable+0x8c/0x12d0 [tc358768] drm_atomic_bridge_call_pre_enable+0x68/0x80 [drm] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_pre_enable+0x50/0x158 [drm] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x164/0x264 [drm_kms_helper] tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x58/0xc0 [tidss] commit_tail+0xa0/0x188 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0xa8/0xe0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9ec/0xc80 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x170 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x234/0x4b0 [drm] drm_compat_ioctl+0x110/0x12c [drm] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x128/0x150 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x48/0xb4 el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 Fixes: 4d56a4f ("drm/tidss: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <a-bhatia1@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ideasonboard.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920-dma-fence-annotation-revert-v1-1-7ebf6f7f5bf6@ideasonboard.com
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This reverts commit 250aa22. The DMA-fence annotations cause a lockdep warning (see below). As per https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/462170/ it sounds like the annotations don't work correctly. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kmstest/219 is trying to acquire lock: c4705838 (&hdmi->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 but task is already holding lock: c11e1128 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x14/0xbc which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}: __dma_fence_might_wait+0x48/0xb4 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1b8/0x2bc do_one_initcall+0x68/0x3b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x260/0x34c kernel_init+0x14/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x70/0xa8 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x3c/0x368 kmalloc_trace+0x28/0x58 _drm_do_get_edid+0x7c/0x35c hdmi5_bridge_get_edid+0xc8/0x1ac drm_bridge_connector_get_modes+0x64/0xc0 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x170/0x528 drm_client_modeset_probe+0x208/0x1334 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x30/0x548 omap_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x3c/0x6c drm_client_register+0x58/0x94 pdev_probe+0x544/0x6b0 platform_probe+0x58/0xbc really_probe+0xd8/0x3fc __driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1f4 driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xc4 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc __device_attach+0xac/0x20c bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90 device_add+0x588/0x7e0 platform_device_add+0x110/0x24c platform_device_register_full+0x108/0x15c dss_bind+0x90/0xc0 try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x1e0/0x2c8 __component_add+0xa4/0x174 hdmi5_probe+0x1c8/0x270 platform_probe+0x58/0xbc really_probe+0xd8/0x3fc __driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1f4 driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xc4 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc __device_attach+0xac/0x20c bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xd8 process_one_work+0x2ac/0x6e4 worker_thread+0x30/0x4ec kthread+0x100/0x124 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 -> #0 (&hdmi->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x145c/0x29cc lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x258 __mutex_lock+0x90/0x950 mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 drm_bridge_chain_mode_set+0x48/0x5c crtc_set_mode+0x188/0x1d0 omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x2c/0xbc commit_tail+0x9c/0x188 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x18c drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe8 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9a4/0xc38 drm_ioctl+0x210/0x4a8 sys_ioctl+0x138/0xf00 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdmi->lock --> fs_reclaim --> dma_fence_map Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(dma_fence_map); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(dma_fence_map); lock(&hdmi->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kmstest/219: #0: f1011de4 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0xf0/0xc38 #1: c47059c8 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: modeset_lock+0xf8/0x230 #2: c11e1128 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x14/0xbc stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 219 Comm: kmstest Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 dump_stack_lvl from check_noncircular+0x164/0x198 check_noncircular from __lock_acquire+0x145c/0x29cc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x258 lock_acquire.part.0 from __mutex_lock+0x90/0x950 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 hdmi5_bridge_mode_set from drm_bridge_chain_mode_set+0x48/0x5c drm_bridge_chain_mode_set from crtc_set_mode+0x188/0x1d0 crtc_set_mode from omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x2c/0xbc omap_atomic_commit_tail from commit_tail+0x9c/0x188 commit_tail from drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x18c drm_atomic_helper_commit from drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe8 drm_atomic_commit from drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9a4/0xc38 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl from drm_ioctl+0x210/0x4a8 drm_ioctl from sys_ioctl+0x138/0xf00 sys_ioctl from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf1011fa8 to 0xf1011ff0) 1fa0: 00466d58 be9ab510 00000003 c03864bc be9ab510 be9ab4e0 1fc0: 00466d58 be9ab510 c03864bc 00000036 00466ef0 00466fc0 00467020 00466f20 1fe0: b6bc7ef4 be9ab4d0 b6bbbb00 b6cb2cc0 Fixes: 250aa22 ("drm/omapdrm: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <a-bhatia1@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ideasonboard.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920-dma-fence-annotation-revert-v1-2-7ebf6f7f5bf6@ideasonboard.com
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The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration. The KASAN report shows: [16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8 [16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928 [16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2 [16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries [16386.255181] Call Trace: [16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable) [16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764 [16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8 [16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0 [16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8 [16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc [16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4 ... [16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s: [16386.256149] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256163] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80 [16386.256175] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74 [16386.256196] __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc [16386.256209] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0 [16386.256225] vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150 [16386.256245] mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4 [16386.256265] do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750 [16386.256277] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c [16386.256292] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348 [16386.256303] sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160 ... [16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s: [16386.256363] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256374] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80 [16386.256384] kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c [16386.256396] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204 [16386.256415] kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450 [16386.256428] vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8 [16386.256441] rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0 [16386.256458] rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4 [16386.256473] handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c [16386.256495] do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88 [16386.256509] do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88 [16386.256521] __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c [16386.256533] irq_exit+0x20/0x38 [16386.256544] interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c ... [16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation: [16386.256729] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256741] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c [16386.256753] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04 [16386.256766] vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c [16386.256778] remove_vma+0xf4/0x114 [16386.256797] do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870 [16386.256811] __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8 [16386.256821] sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c [16386.256830] system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0 [16386.256841] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec [16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670 which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168 [16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718) [16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81 [16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001 [16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff) [16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab) [16386.256990] raw: 043ffff800000000 c00000000501c080 0000000000000000 5deadbee00000001 [16386.257003] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000011a011a 00000001fdffffff c0000000ba430001 [16386.257018] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected This patch adds close() callback in vas_vm_ops vm_operations_struct which will be executed during munmap() before freeing VMA. The VMA address in the VAS window is set to NULL after holding the window mmap_mutex. Fixes: 37e6764 ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler") Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241214051758.997759-1-haren@linux.ibm.com
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We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <Leo-Yang@quantatw.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107031529.3296094-1-Leo-Yang@quantatw.com [pabeni@redhat.com: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Only several SSPP blocks support such features as YUV output or scaling, thus different DRM planes have different features. Properly utilizing all planes requires the attention of the compositor, who should prefer simpler planes to YUV-supporting ones. Otherwise it is very easy to end up in a situation when all featureful planes are already allocated for simple windows, leaving no spare plane for YUV playback. To solve this problem make all planes virtual. Each plane is registered as if it supports all possible features, but then at the runtime during the atomic_check phase the driver selects backing SSPP block for each plane. As the planes are attached to the CRTC and not the encoder, the SSPP blocks are also allocated per CRTC ID (all other resources are currently allocated per encoder ID). This also matches the hardware requirement, where both rectangles of a single SSPP can only be used with the LM pair. Note, this does not provide support for using two different SSPP blocks for a single plane or using two rectangles of an SSPP to drive two planes. Each plane still gets its own SSPP and can utilize either a solo rectangle or both multirect rectangles depending on the resolution. Note #2: By default support for virtual planes is turned off and the driver still uses old code path with preallocated SSPP block for each plane. To enable virtual planes, pass 'msm.dpu_use_virtual_planes=1' kernel parameter. Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/629022/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241215-dpu-virtual-wide-v8-1-65221f213ce1@linaro.org
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This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.
- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
`amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
`amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
held, it can create a circular dependency.
By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:
[ 606.297333] ======================================================
[ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE
[ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.297413]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.297725]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 606.297738]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 606.297749]
-> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.298929]
-> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.299236]
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.300416]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 606.300428] Chain exists of:
(work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex
[ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1
[ 606.300476] ---- ----
[ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[ 606.300536]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[ 606.301083]
stack backtrace:
[ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19
[ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[ 606.301140] Call Trace:
[ 606.301146] <TASK>
[ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.303512] </TASK>
v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)
- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
`amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
`enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.
Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
FireBurn
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 15, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.
- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
`amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
`amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
held, it can create a circular dependency.
By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:
[ 606.297333] ======================================================
[ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE
[ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.297413]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.297725]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 606.297738]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 606.297749]
-> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.298929]
-> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.299236]
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.300416]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 606.300428] Chain exists of:
(work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex
[ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1
[ 606.300476] ---- ----
[ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[ 606.300536]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[ 606.301083]
stack backtrace:
[ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19
[ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[ 606.301140] Call Trace:
[ 606.301146] <TASK>
[ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120
[ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 606.303512] </TASK>
v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)
- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
`amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
`enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.
Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
FireBurn
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 17, 2025
Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test.
The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead
to a deadlock.
However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its
parent lock are distinct ones.
The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object
class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev).
To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both
locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired.
[1]
raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.620270]
[ 213.620270] but task is already holding lock:
[ 213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.622045]
[ 213.622045] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 213.622778] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 213.622778]
[ 213.623465] CPU0
[ 213.623815] ----
[ 213.624148] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[ 213.624615] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[ 213.625071]
[ 213.625071] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 213.625071]
[ 213.625805] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 213.625805]
[ 213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118:
[ 213.627019] #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0},
at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.628088] #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3},
at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.629094] #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.630106] #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.631185]
[ 213.631185] stack backtrace:
[ 213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted
6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1
[ 213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 213.633785] Call Trace:
[ 213.634099]
[ 213.634393] dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
[ 213.634806] print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0
[ 213.635265] __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40
[ 213.635712] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[ 213.636120] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.636722] ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.637277] __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0
[ 213.637697] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.638305] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.638902] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 213.639400] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.640016] mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.640615] set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.641144] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40
[ 213.641586] mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.642145] ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.642679] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0
[ib_uverbs]
[ 213.643426] ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80
[ 213.643878] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.644426] ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130
[ib_uverbs]
[ 213.645213] ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40
[ 213.645675] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[ 213.646101] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.646625] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0
[ 213.647102] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770
[ 213.647586] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.648102] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.648632] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0
[ 213.649060] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770
[ 213.649528] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[ 213.649947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b
[ 213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c
89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d
7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
[ 213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX:
00007fa179b0737b
[ 213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
[ 213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09:
0000000000000002
[ 213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffd2e6d487c
[ 213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
00007ffd2e6d4f70
Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Clear the port select structure on error so no stale values left after
definers are destroyed. That's because the mlx5_lag_destroy_definers()
always try to destroy all lag definers in the tt_map, so in the flow
below lag definers get double-destroyed and cause kernel crash:
mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
mlx5_lag_create_definers()
mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 1
mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets destroyed
mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
mlx5_lag_create_definers()
mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 0
mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets double-destroyed
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000112ce2e00
[0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: iptable_raw bonding ip_gre ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ipip tunnel4 ip_tunnel rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlxfw(OE) memtrack(OE) mlx_compat(OE) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount psample xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype iptable_filter iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc netconsole overlay efi_pstore sch_fq_codel zram ip_tables crct10dif_ce qemu_fw_cfg fuse ipv6 crc_ccitt [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u53:2 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0+ #2
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Workqueue: mlx5_lag mlx5_do_bond_work [mlx5_core]
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
lr : mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
sp : ffff800085fafb00
x29: ffff800085fafb00 x28: ffff0000da0c8000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff0000da0c8000 x25: ffff0000da0c8000 x24: ffff0000da0c8000
x23: ffff0000c31f81a0 x22: 0400000000000000 x21: ffff0000da0c8000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8b0c9350
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081390d18 x12: ffff800081dc3cc0
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000b10 x9 : ffff80007ab7304c
x8 : ffff0000d00711f0 x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : 0000000000000190
x5 : ffff00027edb3010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0000d39b8000 x1 : ffff0000d39b8000 x0 : 0400000000000000
Call trace:
mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_destroy_definers+0xa0/0x108 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_port_sel_create+0x2d4/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_activate_lag+0x60c/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_do_bond_work+0x284/0x5c8 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x170/0x3e0
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3e0
kthread+0x11c/0x128
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: a9025bf5 aa0003f6 a90363f7 f90023f9 (f9400400)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: dc48516 ("net/mlx5: Lag, add support to create definers for LAG")
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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syz reports an out of bounds read: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline] ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078 ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981 ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003 ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline] path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984 do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014 do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000 </TASK> ================================================================== And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert: ================================================================== loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768 JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280 Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00 e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088 do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0 __do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline] __se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline] __x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000103 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2dafda3a99 RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09: 000055555a6784c0 R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe336a6680 R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007f2dafdec03b </TASK> ================================================================== The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode. For ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero. Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry(). It fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(). Also set a up limit for dir with OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL. The i_size can't be great than blocksize. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250106140640.92260-1-glass.su@suse.com Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/17a04f01.1ae74.19436d003fc.Coremail.stitch@zju.edu.cn/T/#u Reported-by: syzbot+5a64828fcc4c2ad9b04f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000005894f3062018caf1@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we
must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking.
This fixes the following lockdep splat:
[ 5.349336] =============================
[ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 Tainted: G W
[ 5.363031] -----------------------------
[ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock:
[ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 5.385138] context-{5:5}
[ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44:
[ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204)
[ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205)
[ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006)
[ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596)
[ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614)
[ 5.436472] stack backtrace:
[ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ #69
[ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 5.461699] Call trace:
[ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C
[ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)
[ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176)
[ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814)
[ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162)
[ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8))
[ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345)
[ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250)
[ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270)
[ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807)
[ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208)
Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110163354.2012654-1-sean.anderson@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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e3dc91dBump for release3e85558Update AUTHORS.txt8d02787Reclassify news fragmentf6ecf40Merge pull request #12350 from sbidoul/readact-collecting-url3060865Merge pull request #12335 from edmorley/patch-18f0ed32Redact URLs in Collecting... logsd1659b8Correct issue number for NEWS entry added by #121972333ef3Upgrade urllib3 to 1.26.17 (#12343)496b268Update "Running Tests" documentation (#12334)d1f0981Merge pull request #12331 from sbidoul/update-egg-deprecation-messageDependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting
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