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CBC mode refactor/improvements #124
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b1b3bdf
modes: CBC implementation based on CipherInterface #80
staslyakhov 9951470
modes: add instantiation + test for AES128_CBC #80
staslyakhov af37f80
modes: remove old AES128 CBC implementation/test #80
staslyakhov 38ae90b
modes: update CBC module comment #80
staslyakhov dad7d78
modes: add AES192 CBC instantiation and test vectors #80
staslyakhov 2f56503
modes: add AES256 CBC instantiation and test vectors #80
staslyakhov 9b9d5a0
modes: elaborate on IV generation warnings for CBC #80
staslyakhov b00f200
modes: match cbc variable names closer to spec #80
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10 changes: 10 additions & 0 deletions
10
Primitive/Symmetric/Cipher/Block/Instantiations/AES128_CBC.cry
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/* | ||
* Instantiate CBC mode for AES 128. | ||
* | ||
* @copyright Galois, Inc. | ||
* @author Stanislav Lyakhov <stan@galois.com> | ||
*/ | ||
module Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Instantiations::AES128_CBC = | ||
Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Modes::CBC { | ||
Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::AES128 | ||
} |
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Primitive/Symmetric/Cipher/Block/Instantiations/AES192_CBC.cry
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/* | ||
* Instantiate CBC mode for AES 192. | ||
* | ||
* @copyright Galois, Inc. | ||
* @author Stanislav Lyakhov <stan@galois.com> | ||
*/ | ||
module Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Instantiations::AES192_CBC = | ||
Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Modes::CBC { | ||
Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::AES192 | ||
} |
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Primitive/Symmetric/Cipher/Block/Instantiations/AES256_CBC.cry
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/* | ||
* Instantiate CBC mode for AES 256. | ||
* | ||
* @copyright Galois, Inc. | ||
* @author Stanislav Lyakhov <stan@galois.com> | ||
*/ | ||
module Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Instantiations::AES256_CBC = | ||
Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Modes::CBC { | ||
Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::AES256 | ||
} |
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// Cryptol CBC Implementation | ||
// Copyright (c) 2010-2018, Galois Inc. | ||
// www.cryptol.net | ||
// Author: Ajay Kumar Eeralla | ||
/* | ||
* Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation, as defined in [NIST-SP-800-38A], Section 6.2. | ||
* | ||
* ⚠️ Warning ⚠️: CBC mode requires that the initialization vector (IV) is generated "unpredictably". | ||
* See Appendix C of [NIST-SP-800-38A] for discussion. | ||
* | ||
* @copyright Galois, Inc. | ||
* @author Ajay Kumar Eeralla | ||
* @author Marcella Hastings <marcella@galois.com> | ||
* @author Stanislav Lyakhov <stan@galois.com> | ||
* www.cryptol.net | ||
* | ||
* References: | ||
* [NIST-SP-800-38A]: Morris Dworkin. Recommendation for Block Cipher | ||
* Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques. NIST Special Publication | ||
* 800-38A. December 2001. | ||
* | ||
*/ | ||
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module Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Modes::CBC where | ||
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// set the sizes | ||
type iv = [128] | ||
type block = [128] | ||
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module Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Modes::CBC where | ||
import interface Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::CipherInterface as C | ||
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cbcEnc : {n, k} (fin n, fin k) => ([k]->block -> block) -> [k] -> iv -> [n]block -> [n]block | ||
cbcEnc enc k iv ps = cs | ||
where cs = [ enc k (p ^ c') | p <- ps | c' <- [iv] # cs ] | ||
/** | ||
* CBC encryption: [NIST-SP-800-38A] Section 6.2. | ||
* | ||
* Parameters: key, initialization vector, plaintext | ||
* | ||
* ⚠️ Warning ⚠️: CBC mode requires that the initialization vector (IV) is generated "unpredictably". | ||
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* See Appendix C of [NIST-SP-800-38A] for discussion. | ||
*/ | ||
encrypt : {n} (fin n) => [C::KeySize] -> [C::BlockSize] -> [n][C::BlockSize] -> [n][C::BlockSize] | ||
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encrypt k iv ps = cs | ||
where | ||
ciph_k = C::encrypt k | ||
cs = [ ciph_k (p_j ^ c') | p_j <- ps | c' <- [iv] # cs] | ||
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cbcDec : {n, k} (fin n, fin k) => ([k]->block -> block) -> [k] -> iv -> [n]block -> [n]block | ||
cbcDec dec k iv cs = [ (dec k c) ^ c' | c <- cs | c' <- [iv] # cs ] | ||
/** | ||
* CBC decryption: [NIST-SP-800-38A] Section 6.2. | ||
* | ||
* Parameters: key, initialization vector, ciphertext | ||
* | ||
* ⚠️ Warning ⚠️: CBC mode requires that the initialization vector (IV) is generated "unpredictably". | ||
* See Appendix C of [NIST-SP-800-38A] for discussion. | ||
*/ | ||
decrypt : {n} (fin n) => [C::KeySize] -> [C::BlockSize] -> [n][C::BlockSize] -> [n][C::BlockSize] | ||
decrypt k iv cs = ps | ||
where | ||
ciph_inv_k = C::decrypt k | ||
ps = [ (ciph_inv_k c) ^ c' | c <- cs | c' <- [iv] # cs] | ||
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// This will need to be parameterized with a specific encryption function before it can be proved | ||
property cbcEncCorrect encrypt k c ps = (cbcDec encrypt k c (cbcEnc encrypt k c ps)) == ps | ||
/** | ||
* Decryption must be the inverse of encryption. | ||
* With high probability, this will be incredibly slow to prove. | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :check encryptCorrect`{n=5} | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
encryptCorrect : {n} (fin n) => [C::KeySize] -> [C::BlockSize] -> [n][C::BlockSize] -> Bool | ||
property encryptCorrect k iv ps = (decrypt k iv (encrypt k iv ps)) == ps |
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/* | ||
* Test vectors for AES-CBC mode. | ||
* These are taken from [NIST-SP-800-38A] Appendix F.2 | ||
* | ||
* @copyright Galois, Inc. | ||
* @author Ajay Kumar Eeralla | ||
* @author Marcella Hastings <marcella@galois.com> | ||
* @author Stanislav Lyakhov <stan@galois.com> | ||
* www.cryptol.net | ||
* | ||
* References: | ||
* [NIST-SP-800-38A]: Morris Dworkin. Recommendation for Block Cipher | ||
* Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques. NIST Special Publication | ||
* 800-38A. December 2001. | ||
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* | ||
*/ | ||
import Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Instantiations::AES128_CBC as AES128_CBC | ||
import Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Instantiations::AES192_CBC as AES192_CBC | ||
import Primitive::Symmetric::Cipher::Block::Instantiations::AES256_CBC as AES256_CBC | ||
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/** | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :prove aes128_cbc_encrypt_vector | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
property aes128_cbc_encrypt_vector = (AES128_CBC::encrypt k iv plaintext) == ciphertext | ||
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where | ||
k = 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c | ||
iv = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f | ||
plaintext = [ | ||
0x6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a, | ||
0xae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51, | ||
0x30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef, | ||
0xf69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710] | ||
ciphertext = [ | ||
0x7649abac8119b246cee98e9b12e9197d, | ||
0x5086cb9b507219ee95db113a917678b2, | ||
0x73bed6b8e3c1743b7116e69e22229516, | ||
0x3ff1caa1681fac09120eca307586e1a7] | ||
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/** | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :prove aes128_cbc_decrypt_vector | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
property aes128_cbc_decrypt_vector = (AES128_CBC::decrypt k iv ciphertext) == plaintext | ||
where | ||
k = 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c | ||
iv = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f | ||
ciphertext = [ | ||
0x7649abac8119b246cee98e9b12e9197d, | ||
0x5086cb9b507219ee95db113a917678b2, | ||
0x73bed6b8e3c1743b7116e69e22229516, | ||
0x3ff1caa1681fac09120eca307586e1a7] | ||
plaintext = [ | ||
0x6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a, | ||
0xae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51, | ||
0x30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef, | ||
0xf69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710] | ||
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/** | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :prove aes192_cbc_encrypt_vector | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
property aes192_cbc_encrypt_vector = (AES192_CBC::encrypt k iv plaintext) == ciphertext | ||
where | ||
k = 0x8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b | ||
iv = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f | ||
plaintext = [ | ||
0x6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a, | ||
0xae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51, | ||
0x30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef, | ||
0xf69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710] | ||
ciphertext = [ | ||
0x4f021db243bc633d7178183a9fa071e8, | ||
0xb4d9ada9ad7dedf4e5e738763f69145a, | ||
0x571b242012fb7ae07fa9baac3df102e0, | ||
0x08b0e27988598881d920a9e64f5615cd] | ||
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/** | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :prove aes192_cbc_decrypt_vector | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
property aes192_cbc_decrypt_vector = (AES192_CBC::decrypt k iv ciphertext) == plaintext | ||
where | ||
k = 0x8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b | ||
iv = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f | ||
ciphertext = [ | ||
0x4f021db243bc633d7178183a9fa071e8, | ||
0xb4d9ada9ad7dedf4e5e738763f69145a, | ||
0x571b242012fb7ae07fa9baac3df102e0, | ||
0x08b0e27988598881d920a9e64f5615cd] | ||
plaintext = [ | ||
0x6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a, | ||
0xae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51, | ||
0x30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef, | ||
0xf69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710] | ||
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/** | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :prove aes256_cbc_encrypt_vector | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
property aes256_cbc_encrypt_vector = (AES256_CBC::encrypt k iv plaintext) == ciphertext | ||
where | ||
k = 0x603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4 | ||
iv = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f | ||
plaintext = [ | ||
0x6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a, | ||
0xae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51, | ||
0x30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef, | ||
0xf69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710] | ||
ciphertext = [ | ||
0xf58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6, | ||
0x9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d, | ||
0x39f23369a9d9bacfa530e26304231461, | ||
0xb2eb05e2c39be9fcda6c19078c6a9d1b] | ||
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/** | ||
* ```repl | ||
* :prove aes256_cbc_decrypt_vector | ||
* ``` | ||
*/ | ||
property aes256_cbc_decrypt_vector = (AES256_CBC::decrypt k iv ciphertext) == plaintext | ||
where | ||
k = 0x603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4 | ||
iv = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f | ||
ciphertext = [ | ||
0xf58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6, | ||
0x9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d, | ||
0x39f23369a9d9bacfa530e26304231461, | ||
0xb2eb05e2c39be9fcda6c19078c6a9d1b] | ||
plaintext = [ | ||
0x6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a, | ||
0xae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51, | ||
0x30c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52ef, | ||
0xf69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710] |
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CTR has a warning about not duplicating counters, so I figured I'd leave a warning about having unpredictable IVs here. Is that a good place to document such requirements?
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Yeah, right now I'm in "throw warnings everywhere" mode, since there's no canonical approach. At the top of the file I like to list any differences we have with the spec (e.g. things it requires and we don't do, assumptions it makes that we can't satisfy, methods we've skipped for some reason etc.) with a flag for any that are security-critical, like this. I also like having them on the functions itself, like you did below.