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Create makefile.yml #1

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hikalium and others added 30 commits January 12, 2022 14:28
This adds a Virtio based video driver for video streaming device that
operates input and output data buffers to share video devices with
several guests. The current implementation consist of V4L2 based video
driver supporting video functions of decoder and encoder. The device
uses command structures to advertise and negotiate stream formats and
controls. This allows the driver to modify the processing logic of the
device on a per stream basis.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Sepp <dmitry.sepp@opensynergy.com>
Signed-off-by: Kiran Pawar <Kiran.Pawar@opensynergy.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Martyanov <Nikolay.Martyanov@opensynergy.com>
Signed-off-by: Samiullah Khawaja <samiullah.khawaja@opensynergy.com>

(am from https://patchwork.linuxtv.org/patch/61717/)

BUG=b:120456557
TEST=compile with VIRTIO_VIDEO enabled

Fixes:
* Fixed a typo in the commit message: "video_video" -> "virtio_video"
* Fixed SPDX-License-Identifier in /include/uapi/linux/virtio_video.h
* Removed vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_{cap, out}_mplane callbacks that were removed by
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=7e98b7b542a456582ea3029be857cc99a3b19bd5

Change-Id: I037b20a9faa1b31bb260cc2a0d57932e1979395e
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2066459
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge, resolved conflicts on:
            include/uapi/linux/virtio_ids.h]
Signed-off-by: Hikaru Nishida <hikalium@chromium.org>
Replace pix_mp->width with pix_mp->height.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: I75baead1b9679b54990fd1e13267f634078c2df1
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2107041
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
Add missing NULL check in init_ctrls callbacks for decoder and encoder.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: I2789ef2a4eae1c140f7d28a0228dd1c29ad36eee
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2107042
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
…ontaining frame sizes in stream

Some coded format streams like VP8 and H.264 contain metadata.
For such formats, try_fmt is called with width=0 and height=0.
This CL makes try_fmt callback support this case.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: I7a950f52c0ffdba0aba9febdc10f11e640d347ed
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2107043
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
Support V4L2_SEL_TGT_COMPOSE as a selection target in the g_selection
callback.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: Ibc156fc2c8eeda4ddb1c45d8bd65b03a0d160df8
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2107044
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
…r with EOS flag

The host can return an empty CAPTURE buffer to notify EOS or an error.
In such case, the driver must be mark the buffer as "done" with byteused=0.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: I78700fb33a8797b42a7c522f368c41b693fb81f9
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2107045
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
…deo driver

This patch makes the virtio-video driver use virtio objects as DMA buffers.
So, users will beable to import resources exported by other virtio devices
such as virtio-gpu.

Currently, we assumes that only one virtio object for each v4l2_buffer
format even if it's for a multiplanar format.

Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
(am from https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11457439/)

BUG=b:120456557
TEST=run simple decoding test

Change-Id: I6cd47add6e760fa3b3b8bf08e3a3d93cc97243a8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2060511
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]

Change-Id: Ie92e7cedca5da5553162cfd7fc27947fb7ae8fb5
…iver

0-day reports:

drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_driver.c:103:5-11: ERROR:
	allocation function on line 102 returns NULL not ERR_PTR on failure

The various basic memory allocation functions don't return ERR_PTR.

BUG=b:120456557, b:151703605
TEST=compile with VIRTIO_VIDEO enabled

Change-Id: Ia556120dd001a4f395bcfb66a29f5f3c81ee8dd0
Fixes: bbca485 ("BACKPORT: FROMLIST: virtio_video: Add the Virtio Video V4L2 driver")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2138634
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
This invalidates a uuid associated with a vb2_buffer object when the
uuid is used for another vb2_buffer.

This patch will fix a problem that happens in scenarios like this:

(1) QBUF(index=0, DMABUF uuid=1)
(2) DQBUF(index=0)
(3) QBUF(index=1, DMABUF uuid=1)
(4) DQBUF(index=1)
(5) QBUF(index=0, DMABUF uuid=1)

Note that index is associated with a vb2_buffer and a resource_id here.

In this scenario, resource_create needs to be sent to register of a new
combination of resource_id and a uuid for (1), (3) and (5).

However, in the previous implementation, resource_create wasn't sent at (5)
because the combination (index=0, uuid=1) had been registered for (1) and
not been invalidated.

With this patch, a uuid in a vbb2_buffer object will be invalidated when
the uuid is tied with another vb2_buffer.
In this scenario, the combination registered at (1) will be invalidated
at (3).

Change-Id: Ie2eb7f50980cc2258540f692331a16aa11b5c334

---

This patch fixes a bug introduced by CL:2060511, which was submitted to
LKML but not approved. So, this change should be included in the next
revision of CL:2060511.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: I441bb15d4c5da834a189f8709a2b95246cea36fb
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2120830
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
When the virtio-video driver sends RESOURCE_DESTROY_ALL command, it must
wait for the host returning a response for the command.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=compile

Change-Id: I7eeea5d3ad6beab172f9590611fe558b2e5035fb
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2060510
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
…iver

0-day reports:

drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_dec.c:156:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_dec_init_ctrls'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_dec.c:177:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_dec_init_queues'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_dec.c:335:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_dec_enum_fmt_vid_out'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_dec.c:417:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_dec_init'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_dec.c: In function 'virtio_video_dec_init':
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_dec.c:419:10: warning:
	variable 'num' set but not used

drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_enc.c:162:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_enc_init_ctrls'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_enc.c:223:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_enc_init_queues'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_enc.c:559:5: warning:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_enc_init'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_enc.c: In function 'virtio_video_enc_init':
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_enc.c:561:10: warning:
	variable 'num' set but not used

BUG=b:120456557, b:151703605
TEST=compile with VIRTIO_VIDEO enabled

Change-Id: Ic0e9f9b5efc54b627cd9024e90b3559a731ab1cc
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2214405
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
…iver

0-day reports:

drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_device.c:1188:6: error:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_device_destroy'
drivers/media/virtio/virtio_video_helpers.c:188:10: error:
	no previous prototype for 'virtio_video_get_format_from_virtio_profile'

Somewhat guessing here, virtio_video_device_destroy() is only called
locally and thus marked static.
virtio_video_get_format_from_virtio_profile() is not called at all and
presumably intended to be used as helper function. Removed this function,
as the conversion from a profile to a format doesn't make much sense.
If we need a V4L2 format, we should virtio_video_format_to_v4l2 instead.

BUG=b:120456557, b:151703605
TEST=compile with VIRTIO_VIDEO enabled

Change-Id: I02d577f8e9b1a65cbbe9877391f8f755a474fc78
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2226628
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
BUG=b:151703605
TEST=tast run ARCVM-DUT arc.VideoDecodeAccel*vm

Change-Id: I8c699abfef01c5063494546031496afa806274ea
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2253500
Reviewed-by: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
After calling V4L2_DEC_CMD_START, the stream state should be updated
from STOPPED to RUNNING.

BUG=b:168557465
BUG=b:151703605
TEST=pass android.media.cts.AdaptivePlaybackTest#testVP8_eosFlushSeek

Change-Id: I849a5d92c692bf675c54d443c7157da86877db50
Signed-off-by: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2410146
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
0-day reports:

virtio_video_device.c:(.text+0xc00): undefined reference to `virtio_dma_buf_get_uuid'

VIRTIO_VIDEO now unconditionally requires VIRTIO_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER.
Since VIRTIO_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER depends on VIRTIO_MENU, which is
independent of VIRTIO, VIRTIO_VIDEO now unconditionally depends on
VIRTIO_MENU as well.

This still leaves

WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for VIRTIO_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER
  Depends on [n]: VIRTIO_MENU [=n] && DMA_SHARED_BUFFER [=y]
  Selected by [m]:
  - DRM_VIRTIO_GPU [=m] && HAS_IOMEM [=y] && DRM [=m] && VIRTIO [=y] && MMU [=y] && PCI [=y]

which is seen if VIRTIO_MENU is disabled. This problem was introduced by
commit 7c5e019 ("BACKPORT: FROMGIT: virtio: fix build for configs
without dma-bufs"). Since that commit, DRM_VIRTIO_GPU depends on
VIRTIO_MENU as well. Add that dependency.

BUG=b:142423916
TEST=Test builds

Change-Id: Ifa87ff51b39bf39feffc28e65c3c346a324415c9
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2410825
Reviewed-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
BUG=b:151703605
TEST=manual - Run ARCVM

Signed-off-by: Lepton Wu <lepton@chromium.org>
Change-Id: Ife9d5a8c35e6496a523e15ae95c585cce4949c84
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2477075
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
When possible, avoid calling dma_buf_get. If dma_buf_get is called, make
sure dma_buf_put is also called.

BUG=b:151703605, b:170702290, b:167992701
TEST=No leaks in /sys/kernel/debug/dma_buf/bufinfo after decoding

Change-Id: I1b39f8dd2599c625cb6396bd6b5914147976f564
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2483785
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
BUG=b:151703605
TEST=manual - Run ARCVM

Signed-off-by: Lepton Wu <lepton@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I6621bd04d76efc920348eeda0393e1efd0b79c7f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2491443
Commit-Queue: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4 for initial merge]
This CL introduces the VIRTIO_VIDEO_CONTROL_FORCE_KEYFRAME control to
the virtio encoder, to support the V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDEO_FORCE_KEY_FRAME
control.

Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>

BUG=b:161498590,b:174444769,b:175270403
TEST=tast run DUT arc.VideoEncodeAccel.h264_192p_i420_vm

[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4]

Change-Id: I4b7057dcf4595c91b26bb2c70b4b3a584f9baa13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2594594
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
When stopping a stream, set its state to drain before sending the drain
command to prevent a race where the drain command callback is processed
before the state gets set to drain.

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=No flakes in AdaptivePlaybackTest#testVP9_adaptiveEosFlushSeek

[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4]
Change-Id: I680b60d59ac0a7619e7acb2066419d1a2128efd4
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2592625
Reviewed-by: Hikaru Nishida <hikalium@chromium.org>
Treat VIRTIO_VIDEO_EVENT_ERROR as an unrecoverable errors for the
respective stream.

The spec isn't explicit as to whether or not the error event is fatal.
However, since the error event is generic, the cause is opaque to the
driver, so the driver can't meaningfully do anything to recover in the
case of a non-fatal error. Therefore it doesn't make sense for the
device to send non-fatal error events in the first place.

BUG=b:151703605, b:174445948
TEST=android.security.cts.StagefrightTest#testStagefright_bug_33818508

[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4]
Change-Id: I4d9eee47ff3e42058768c0e6e70c69518e8abe20
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2594587
Reviewed-by: Hikaru Nishida <hikalium@chromium.org>
…O_BITRATE.

Upon initialization the encode device requests the bitrate from the
underlying encoder and uses that as both the default and maximum value.
This prevents us from configuring bitrates higher than the initial
value, so this CL changes the maximum value to 1GBs instead.

BUG=b:162799179,b:177213709
TEST=tast run DUT arc.VideoEncodeAccel.h264_192p_i420_vm

[5.4-arcvm: picked from 5.4]
(cherry picked from commit 675b572)

Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic32f5de210f93d2d2789be24602aee2c0a736a16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2627240
Reviewed-by: Hikaru Nishida <hikalium@chromium.org>
Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Remove streams from the id map and wait for any ongoing events to
complete before cleanup begins.

BUG=b:177697115, b:151703605
TEST=android.security.cts.StagefrightTest

Change-Id: I141b3844ffb507bfda0ea0d94c9eacb8173781a9
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2684016
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
BUG=b:177697115, b:151703605
TEST=android.security.cts.StagefrightTest

Change-Id: Ib83251555bc0af40cb015fd08c6a9335c3e3f4a5
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2683951
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
If a buffer's data offset changes, create a new object for the buffer.
In particular, this can happen when data offset is used to skip headers
at the start of input buffers.

BUG=b:174531173,b:151703605
TEST=android.media.cts.MediaDrmClearkeyTest#testClearKeyPlaybackMpeg2ts

Change-Id: I538a0bd1667a9e4b17d77f8e4707dda9700c824b
Signed-off-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2696229
Reviewed-by: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
This CL removes the unused virtio_video_mark_drain_complete function
from the virtio video device. All steps required to finish draining are
already done in the virtio_video_buf_done function.

Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>

BUG=b:151703605
TEST=emerge-$BOARD sys-kernel/arcvm-kernel-ack-5_4

Change-Id: Ibcb59624b4d5e4d016a7a3627db755c92a5a2d67
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2879433
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
When draining the V4L2 encode device or handling a drain done callback,
the stream is not properly locked. In some cases this causes the
virtio_video_buf_done (EOS done) and virtio_video_encoder_cmd
(restart encoder) functions to be executed before the original
virtio_video_encoder_cmd call to drain the encoder is even finished
executing. This leads to the stream ending up in the draining state
after it has already finished draining.

Extra mutex lock and unlock operations have been introduced here to
serialize access to the virtio_video_encoder_cmd and
virtio_video_buf_done functions to avoid the above issue.

Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>

BUG=b:186588566,b:151703605,b:187470003
TEST=android.mediav2.cts.EncoderProfileLevelTest

Change-Id: I35d36b31549a9883eaff1362d8b47653222f5613
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2859568
Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
This reverts commit 3f5e7b5cba1430eef2a7d22236de4df678afb804.

Reason for revert: It caused GTS regression: b/188009828 

Original change's description:
> CHROMIUM: virtio_video_enc: Lock stream mutex when draining.
>
> When draining the V4L2 encode device or handling a drain done callback,
> the stream is not properly locked. In some cases this causes the
> virtio_video_buf_done (EOS done) and virtio_video_encoder_cmd
> (restart encoder) functions to be executed before the original
> virtio_video_encoder_cmd call to drain the encoder is even finished
> executing. This leads to the stream ending up in the draining state
> after it has already finished draining.
>
> Extra mutex lock and unlock operations have been introduced here to
> serialize access to the virtio_video_encoder_cmd and
> virtio_video_buf_done functions to avoid the above issue.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>
>
> BUG=b:186588566,b:151703605,b:187470003
> TEST=android.mediav2.cts.EncoderProfileLevelTest
>
> Change-Id: I35d36b31549a9883eaff1362d8b47653222f5613
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2859568
> Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
> Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>

Bug: b:186588566
Bug: b:151703605
Bug: b:187470003
Bug: b:188009828
Change-Id: Id1053f1ea2f19ae44ad9d78855687c12e7fa8707
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2896200
Reviewed-by: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
Owners-Override: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
Bot-Commit: Rubber Stamper <rubber-stamper@appspot.gserviceaccount.com>
Commit-Queue: Chih-Yu Huang <akahuang@chromium.org>
This CL relands crrev.com/c/2859568 which was reverted in
crrev.com/c/2896200 because of b/188009828.

When draining the V4L2 encode device or handling a drain done callback,
the stream was not properly locked leading to b/186588566. In some
cases this caused virtio_video_buf_done() to be executed before the
V4L2_ENC_CMD_STOP command was fully executed.

Adding locks unfortunately seems to have caused another issue. This CL
reduces the scope of the lock so draining is properly synced, while at
the same time avoiding holding the lock during
virtio_video_queue_eos_event() and v4l2_m2m_buf_done() which might
cause issues.

Original change's description:
> CHROMIUM: virtio_video_enc: Lock stream mutex when draining.
>
> When draining the V4L2 encode device or handling a drain done callback,
> the stream is not properly locked. In some cases this causes the
> virtio_video_buf_done (EOS done) and virtio_video_encoder_cmd
> (restart encoder) functions to be executed before the original
> virtio_video_encoder_cmd call to drain the encoder is even finished
> executing. This leads to the stream ending up in the draining state
> after it has already finished draining.
>
> Extra mutex lock and unlock operations have been introduced here to
> serialize access to the virtio_video_encoder_cmd and
> virtio_video_buf_done functions to avoid the above issue.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>
>
> BUG=b:186588566,b:151703605,b:187470003
> TEST=android.mediav2.cts.EncoderProfileLevelTest
>
> Change-Id: I35d36b31549a9883eaff1362d8b47653222f5613
> Reviewed-on: http://crrev.com/c/2859568
> Reviewed-by: Keiichi Watanabe <keiichiw@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: David Stevens <stevensd@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
> Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>

Signed-off-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@google.com>

BUG=b:188009828,b:186588566,b:151703605,b:187470003
TEST=android.mediav2.cts.EncoderProfileLevelTest
     com.google.android.exoplayer.gts.DashTest#testH264Adaptive

Change-Id: I4b7948f24e0634b857405bf84ee08cabbdbcf3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2900138
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Tested-by: David Staessens <dstaessens@chromium.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
In i915_gem_madvise_ioctl() we immediately purge the object is not
currently used, like when the mm.pages are NULL.  With shmem the pages
might still be hanging around or are perhaps swapped out. Similarly with
ttm we might still have the pages hanging around on the ttm resource,
like with lmem or shmem, but here we need to be extra careful since
async unbinds are possible as well as in-progress kernel moves. In
i915_ttm_purge() we expect the pipeline-gutting to nuke the ttm resource
for us, however if it's busy the memory is only moved to a ghost object,
which then leads to broken behaviour when for example clearing the
i915_tt->filp, since the actual ttm_tt is still alive and populated,
even though it's been moved to the ghost object.  When we later destroy
the ghost object we hit the following, since the filp is now NULL:

[  +0.006982] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  +0.005149] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  +0.005147] PGD 11631d067 P4D 11631d067 PUD 115972067 PMD 0
[  +0.005676] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  +0.012962] Workqueue: events ttm_device_delayed_workqueue [ttm]
[  +0.006022] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_tt_unpopulate+0x3a/0x70 [i915]
[  +0.005879] Code: 89 fb 48 85 f6 74 11 8b 55 4c 48 8b 7d 30 45 31 c0 31 c9 e8 18 6a e5 e0 80 7d 60 00 74 20 48 8b 45 68
8b 55 08 4c 89 e7 5b 5d <48> 8b 40 20 83 e2 01 41 5c 89 d1 48 8b 70
 30 e9 42 b2 ff ff 4c 89
[  +0.018782] RSP: 0000:ffffc9000bf6fd70 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  +0.005244] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8883e12ae380 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  +0.007150] RDX: 000000008000000e RSI: ffffffff823559b4 RDI: ffff8883e12ae3c0
[  +0.007142] RBP: ffff888103b65d48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[  +0.007144] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88829c2c8040 R12: ffff8883e12ae3c0
[  +0.007148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff888115184140 R15: ffff888115184248
[  +0.007154] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88844db00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  +0.008108] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  +0.005763] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000013fdb4004 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[  +0.007152] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  +0.007145] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  +0.007154] Call Trace:
[  +0.002459]  <TASK>
[  +0.002126]  ttm_tt_unpopulate.part.0+0x17/0x70 [ttm]
[  +0.005068]  ttm_bo_tt_destroy+0x1c/0x50 [ttm]
[  +0.004464]  ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use+0x25/0x40 [ttm]
[  +0.005244]  ttm_bo_cleanup_refs+0x90/0x2c0 [ttm]
[  +0.004721]  ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x235/0x250 [ttm]
[  +0.004981]  ttm_device_delayed_workqueue+0x13/0x40 [ttm]
[  +0.005422]  process_one_work+0x248/0x560
[  +0.004028]  worker_thread+0x4b/0x390
[  +0.003682]  ? process_one_work+0x560/0x560
[  +0.004199]  kthread+0xeb/0x120
[  +0.003163]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[  +0.004815]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

v2:
 - Just use ttm_bo_wait() directly (Niranjana)
 - Add testcase reference

Testcase: igt@gem_madvise@dontneed-evict-race
Fixes: 213d509 ("drm/i915/ttm: Introduce a TTM i915 gem object backend")
Reported-by: Niranjana Vishwanathapura <niranjana.vishwanathapura@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: Andrzej Hajda <andrzej.hajda@intel.com>
Cc: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.15+
Reviewed-by: Niranjana Vishwanathapura <niranjana.vishwanathapura@intel.com>
Acked-by: Nirmoy Das <Nirmoy.Das@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda <andrzej.hajda@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221115104620.120432-1-matthew.auld@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 5524b5e)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
If a kernel thread is created by a user thread, it may carry FPU/SIMD
thread info flags (TIF_USEDFPU, TIF_USEDSIMD, etc.). Then it will be
considered as a fpu owner and kernel try to save its FPU/SIMD context
and cause such errors:

[   41.518931] do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
[   41.523933] CPU: 1 PID: 395 Comm: iou-wrk-394 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ torvalds#217
[   41.530757] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB/Loongson-LS3A5000-7A1000-1w-CRB, BIOS vUDK2018-LoongArch-V2.0.pre-beta8 08/18/2022
[   41.544064] $ 0   : 0000000000000000 90000000011e9468 9000000106c7c000 9000000106c7fcf0
[   41.552101] $ 4   : 9000000106305d40 9000000106689800 9000000106c7fd08 0000000003995818
[   41.560138] $ 8   : 0000000000000001 90000000009a72e4 0000000000000020 fffffffffffffffc
[   41.568174] $12   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000020 00000009aab7e130
[   41.576211] $16   : 00000000000001ff 0000000000000407 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[   41.584247] $20   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 9000000106c7fd70 90000001002f0400
[   41.592284] $24   : 0000000000000000 900000000178f740 90000000011e9834 90000001063057c0
[   41.600320] $28   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 9000000006826b40 9000000106305140
[   41.608356] era   : 9000000000228848 _save_fp+0x0/0xd8
[   41.613542] ra    : 90000000011e9468 __schedule+0x568/0x8d0
[   41.619160] CSR crmd: 000000b0
[   41.619163] CSR prmd: 00000000
[   41.622359] CSR euen: 00000000
[   41.625558] CSR ecfg: 00071c1c
[   41.628756] CSR estat: 000f0000
[   41.635239] ExcCode : f (SubCode 0)
[   41.638783] PrId  : 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit)
[   41.643191] Modules linked in: acpi_ipmi vfat fat ipmi_si ipmi_devintf cfg80211 ipmi_msghandler rfkill fuse efivarfs
[   41.653734] Process iou-wrk-394 (pid: 395, threadinfo=0000000004ebe913, task=00000000636fa1be)
[   41.662375] Stack : 00000000ffff0875 9000000006800ec0 9000000006800ec0 90000000002d57e0
[   41.670412]         0000000000000001 0000000000000000 9000000106535880 0000000000000001
[   41.678450]         9000000105291800 0000000000000000 9000000105291838 900000000178e000
[   41.686487]         9000000106c7fd90 9000000106305140 0000000000000001 90000000011e9834
[   41.694523]         00000000ffff0875 90000000011f034c 9000000105291838 9000000105291830
[   41.702561]         0000000000000000 9000000006801440 00000000ffff0875 90000000002d48c0
[   41.710597]         9000000128800001 9000000106305140 9000000105291838 9000000105291838
[   41.718634]         9000000105291830 9000000107811740 9000000105291848 90000000009bf1e0
[   41.726672]         9000000105291830 9000000107811748 2d6b72772d756f69 0000000000343933
[   41.734708]         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[   41.742745]         ...
[   41.745252] Call Trace:
[   42.197868] [<9000000000228848>] _save_fp+0x0/0xd8
[   42.205214] [<90000000011ed468>] __schedule+0x568/0x8d0
[   42.210485] [<90000000011ed834>] schedule+0x64/0xd4
[   42.215411] [<90000000011f434c>] schedule_timeout+0x88/0x188
[   42.221115] [<90000000009c36d0>] io_wqe_worker+0x184/0x350
[   42.226645] [<9000000000221cf0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0x9c

This can be easily triggered by ltp testcase syscalls/io_uring02 and it
can also be easily fixed by clearing the FPU/SIMD thread info flags for
kernel threads in copy_thread().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Qi Hu <huqi@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
xfstests generic/013 and generic/476 reported WARNING as follows:

  WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
  6.1.0-rc5+ #4 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------
  fsstress/504233 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
  2 locks held by fsstress/504233:
   #0: ffff888054c38850 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#21){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
                        lock_two_nondirectories+0xcf/0xf0
   #1: ffff8880b8fec750 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#21/4){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
                        lock_two_nondirectories+0xb7/0xf0

This will lead to deadlock and hungtask.

Fix this by releasing locks when failed to write out on a file range in
cifs_file_copychunk_range().

Fixes: 3e3761f ("smb3: use filemap_write_and_wait_range instead of filemap_write_and_wait")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
ldev->lock is used to serialize lag change operations. Since multiport
eswtich functionality was added, we now change the mode dynamically.
However, acquiring ldev->lock is not allowed as it could possibly lead
to a deadlock as reported by the lockdep mechanism.

[  836.154963] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  836.155850] 5.19.0-rc5_net_56b7df2 #1 Not tainted
[  836.156549] ------------------------------------------------------
[  836.157418] handler1/12198 is trying to acquire lock:
[  836.158178] ffff888187d52b58 (&ldev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[  836.159575]
[  836.159575] but task is already holding lock:
[  836.160474] ffff8881d4de2930 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200
[  836.161669] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  836.162905]
[  836.162905] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  836.164008] -> #3 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[  836.164946]        down_write+0x25/0x60
[  836.165548]        tcf_block_get_ext+0x1c6/0x5d0
[  836.166253]        ingress_init+0x74/0xa0 [sch_ingress]
[  836.167028]        qdisc_create.constprop.0+0x130/0x5e0
[  836.167805]        tc_modify_qdisc+0x481/0x9f0
[  836.168490]        rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x16e/0x5a0
[  836.169189]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0
[  836.169861]        netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250
[  836.170543]        netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x4b0
[  836.171226]        sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40
[  836.171860]        ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d1/0x1f0
[  836.172535]        ___sys_sendmsg+0xab/0xf0
[  836.173183]        __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[  836.173836]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[  836.174471]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[  836.175282]

[  836.175282] -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  836.176190]        __mutex_lock+0x6b/0xf80
[  836.176830]        register_netdevice_notifier+0x21/0x120
[  836.177631]        rtnetlink_init+0x2d/0x1e9
[  836.178289]        netlink_proto_init+0x163/0x179
[  836.178994]        do_one_initcall+0x63/0x300
[  836.179672]        kernel_init_freeable+0x2cb/0x31b
[  836.180403]        kernel_init+0x17/0x140
[  836.181035]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

 [  836.181687] -> #1 (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  836.182628]        down_write+0x25/0x60
[  836.183235]        unregister_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0xb0
[  836.184029]        mlx5_ib_roce_cleanup+0x94/0x120 [mlx5_ib]
[  836.184855]        __mlx5_ib_remove+0x35/0x60 [mlx5_ib]
[  836.185637]        mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x22f/0x440 [mlx5_core]
[  836.186698]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30
[  836.187409]        device_release_driver_internal+0x1f6/0x270
[  836.188253]        bus_remove_device+0xef/0x160
[  836.188939]        device_del+0x18b/0x3f0
[  836.189562]        mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0xd6/0x2d0 [mlx5_core]
[  836.190516]        mlx5_lag_remove_devices+0x69/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[  836.191414]        mlx5_do_bond_work+0x441/0x620 [mlx5_core]
[  836.192278]        process_one_work+0x25c/0x590
[  836.192963]        worker_thread+0x4f/0x3d0
[  836.193609]        kthread+0xcb/0xf0
[  836.194189]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

[  836.194826] -> #0 (&ldev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  836.195734]        __lock_acquire+0x15b8/0x2a10
[  836.196426]        lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0
[  836.197057]        __mutex_lock+0x6b/0xf80
[  836.197708]        mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[  836.198575]        tc_act_parse_mirred+0x25b/0x800 [mlx5_core]
[  836.199467]        parse_tc_actions+0x168/0x5a0 [mlx5_core]
[  836.200340]        __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x263/0x480 [mlx5_core]
[  836.201241]        mlx5e_configure_flower+0x8a0/0x1820 [mlx5_core]
[  836.202187]        tc_setup_cb_add+0xd7/0x200
[  836.202856]        fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower]
[  836.203739]        fl_change+0xbbe/0x1730 [cls_flower]
[  836.204501]        tc_new_tfilter+0x407/0xd90
[  836.205168]        rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x406/0x5a0
[  836.205877]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0
[  836.206535]        netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250
[  836.207217]        netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x4b0
[  836.207915]        sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40
[  836.208538]        ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d1/0x1f0
[  836.209219]        ___sys_sendmsg+0xab/0xf0
[  836.209878]        __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[  836.210510]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[  836.211137]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

[  836.211954] other info that might help us debug this:
[  836.213174] Chain exists of:
[  836.213174]   &ldev->lock --> rtnl_mutex --> &block->cb_lock
   836.214650]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  836.214650]
[  836.215574]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  836.216255]        ----                    ----
[  836.216943]   lock(&block->cb_lock);
[  836.217518]                                lock(rtnl_mutex);
[  836.218348]                                lock(&block->cb_lock);
[  836.219212]   lock(&ldev->lock);
[  836.219758]
[  836.219758]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  836.219758]
 [  836.220747] 2 locks held by handler1/12198:
[  836.221390]  #0: ffff8881d4de2930 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200
[  836.222646]  #1: ffff88810c9a92c0 (&esw->mode_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_esw_hold+0x39/0x50 [mlx5_core]

[  836.224063] stack backtrace:
[  836.224799] CPU: 6 PID: 12198 Comm: handler1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5_net_56b7df2 #1
[  836.225923] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  836.227476] Call Trace:
[  836.227929]  <TASK>
[  836.228332]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[  836.228924]  check_noncircular+0x104/0x120
[  836.229562]  __lock_acquire+0x15b8/0x2a10
[  836.230201]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0
[  836.230776]  ? mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[  836.231614]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[  836.232221]  __mutex_lock+0x6b/0xf80
[  836.232799]  ? mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[  836.233636]  ? mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[  836.234451]  ? xa_load+0xc3/0x190
[  836.234995]  mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core]
[  836.235803]  tc_act_parse_mirred+0x25b/0x800 [mlx5_core]
[  836.236636]  ? tc_act_can_offload_mirred+0x135/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  836.237550]  parse_tc_actions+0x168/0x5a0 [mlx5_core]
[  836.238364]  __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x263/0x480 [mlx5_core]
[  836.239202]  mlx5e_configure_flower+0x8a0/0x1820 [mlx5_core]
[  836.240076]  ? lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0
[  836.240668]  ? tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200
[  836.241294]  tc_setup_cb_add+0xd7/0x200
[  836.241917]  fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower]
[  836.242709]  fl_change+0xbbe/0x1730 [cls_flower]
[  836.243408]  tc_new_tfilter+0x407/0xd90
[  836.244043]  ? tc_del_tfilter+0x880/0x880
[  836.244672]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x406/0x5a0
[  836.245310]  ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x7a/0x4b0
[  836.245991]  ? if_nlmsg_stats_size+0x2b0/0x2b0
[  836.246675]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0
[  836.258046]  netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250
[  836.258669]  netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x4b0
[  836.259288]  sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40
[  836.259857]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d1/0x1f0
[  836.260473]  ___sys_sendmsg+0xab/0xf0
[  836.261064]  ? lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0
[  836.261669]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[  836.262272]  ? __fget_files+0xb9/0x190
[  836.262871]  ? __fget_files+0xd3/0x190
[  836.263462]  __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[  836.264064]  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[  836.264652]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[  836.265425] RIP: 0033:0x7fdbe5e2677d

[  836.266012] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 ba ee
ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f
05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 ee ee ff ff 48
[  836.268485] RSP: 002b:00007fdbe48a75a0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[  836.269598] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fdbe5e2677d
[  836.270576] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fdbe48a7640 RDI: 000000000000003c
[  836.271565] RBP: 00007fdbe48a8368 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  836.272546] R10: 00007fdbe48a84b0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000557bd17dc860
[  836.273527] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000557bd17dc860 R15: 00007fdbe48a7640

[  836.274521]  </TASK>

To avoid using mode holding ldev->lock in the configure flow, we queue a
work to the lag workqueue and cease wait on a completion object.

In addition, we remove the lock from mlx5_lag_do_mirred() since it is
not really protecting anything.

It should be noted that an actual deadlock has not been observed.

Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
Currently, in clang version of gcov code when module is getting removed
gcov_info_add() incorrectly adds the sfn_ptr->counter to all the
dst->functions and it result in the kernel panic in below crash report. 
Fix this by properly handling it.

[    8.899094][  T599] Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffffff80461cc000
[    8.899100][  T599] Mem abort info:
[    8.899102][  T599]   ESR = 0x9600004f
[    8.899103][  T599]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    8.899105][  T599]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    8.899107][  T599]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    8.899108][  T599]   FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
[    8.899110][  T599] Data abort info:
[    8.899111][  T599]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f
[    8.899113][  T599]   CM = 0, WnR = 1
[    8.899114][  T599] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000ab8de000
[    8.899116][  T599] [ffffff80461cc000] pgd=18000009ffcde003, p4d=18000009ffcde003, pud=18000009ffcde003, pmd=18000009ffcad003, pte=00600000c61cc787
[    8.899124][  T599] Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    8.899265][  T599] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0
....
..,
[    8.899544][  T599] CPU: 7 PID: 599 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S         OE     5.15.41-android13-8-g38e9b1af6bce #1
[    8.899547][  T599] Hardware name: XXX (DT)
[    8.899549][  T599] pstate: 82400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[    8.899551][  T599] pc : gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
[    8.899557][  T599] lr : gcov_event+0x28c/0x6b8
[    8.899559][  T599] sp : ffffffc00e733b00
[    8.899560][  T599] x29: ffffffc00e733b00 x28: ffffffc00e733d30 x27: ffffffe8dc297470
[    8.899563][  T599] x26: ffffffe8dc297000 x25: ffffffe8dc297000 x24: ffffffe8dc297000
[    8.899566][  T599] x23: ffffffe8dc0a6200 x22: ffffff880f68bf20 x21: 0000000000000000
[    8.899569][  T599] x20: ffffff880f68bf00 x19: ffffff8801babc00 x18: ffffffc00d7f9058
[    8.899572][  T599] x17: 0000000000088793 x16: ffffff80461cbe00 x15: 9100052952800785
[    8.899575][  T599] x14: 0000000000000200 x13: 0000000000000041 x12: 9100052952800785
[    8.899577][  T599] x11: ffffffe8dc297000 x10: ffffffe8dc297000 x9 : ffffff80461cbc80
[    8.899580][  T599] x8 : ffffff8801babe80 x7 : ffffffe8dc2ec000 x6 : ffffffe8dc2ed000
[    8.899583][  T599] x5 : 000000008020001f x4 : fffffffe2006eae0 x3 : 000000008020001f
[    8.899586][  T599] x2 : ffffff8027c49200 x1 : ffffff8801babc20 x0 : ffffff80461cb3a0
[    8.899589][  T599] Call trace:
[    8.899590][  T599]  gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
[    8.899592][  T599]  gcov_module_notifier+0xbc/0x120
[    8.899595][  T599]  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xa0/0x11c
[    8.899598][  T599]  do_init_module+0x2a8/0x33c
[    8.899600][  T599]  load_module+0x23cc/0x261c
[    8.899602][  T599]  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x158/0x194
[    8.899604][  T599]  invoke_syscall+0x94/0x2bc
[    8.899607][  T599]  el0_svc_common+0x1d8/0x34c
[    8.899609][  T599]  do_el0_svc+0x40/0x54
[    8.899611][  T599]  el0_svc+0x94/0x2f0
[    8.899613][  T599]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
[    8.899615][  T599]  el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
[    8.899618][  T599] Code: f905f56c f86e69ec f86e6a0f 8b0c01ec (f82e6a0c)
[    8.899620][  T599] ---[ end trace ed5218e9e5b6e2e6 ]---

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1668020497-13142-1-git-send-email-quic_mojha@quicinc.com
Fixes: e178a5b ("gcov: clang support")
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
When logging an inode in full mode, or when logging xattrs or when logging
the dir index items of a directory, we are modifying the log tree while
holding a read lock on a leaf from the fs/subvolume tree. This can lead to
a deadlock in rare circumstances, but it is a real possibility, and it was
recently reported by syzbot with the following trace from lockdep:

   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.1.0-rc5-next-20221116-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   syz-executor.1/16154 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff88807e3084a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0xa1/0xf30 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff88807df33078 (btrfs-log-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x32/0x3d0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:197

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #2 (btrfs-log-00){++++}-{3:3}:
          down_read_nested+0x9e/0x450 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1634
          __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x350 fs/btrfs/locking.c:135
          btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:141 [inline]
          btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x82/0x3a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:280
          btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1678 [inline]
          btrfs_search_slot+0x3ca/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1998
          btrfs_lookup_csum+0x116/0x3f0 fs/btrfs/file-item.c:209
          btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x40e/0x1370 fs/btrfs/file-item.c:1021
          log_csums.isra.0+0x244/0x2d0 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4258
          copy_items.isra.0+0xbfb/0xed0 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4403
          copy_inode_items_to_log+0x13d6/0x1d90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5873
          btrfs_log_inode+0xb19/0x4680 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6495
          btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x890/0x2a20 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6982
          btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7083
          btrfs_sync_file+0xa41/0x13c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1921
          vfs_fsync_range+0x13e/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
          generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2856 [inline]
          iomap_dio_complete+0x73a/0x920 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:128
          btrfs_direct_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1536 [inline]
          btrfs_do_write_iter+0xba2/0x1470 fs/btrfs/file.c:1668
          call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2160 [inline]
          do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735
          do_iter_write+0x182/0x700 fs/read_write.c:861
          vfs_iter_write+0x74/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
          iter_file_splice_write+0x745/0xc90 fs/splice.c:686
          do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
          direct_splice_actor+0x114/0x180 fs/splice.c:931
          splice_direct_to_actor+0x335/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:886
          do_splice_direct+0x1ab/0x280 fs/splice.c:974
          do_sendfile+0xb19/0x1270 fs/read_write.c:1255
          __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
          __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
          __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x259/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:1309
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

   -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
          __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5382 [inline]
          lock_release+0x371/0x810 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5688
          up_write+0x2a/0x520 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1614
          btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]
          btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x1e3/0x290 fs/btrfs/locking.c:238
          search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
          btrfs_search_slot+0x265e/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2074
          btrfs_insert_empty_items+0xbd/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4133
          btrfs_insert_delayed_item+0x826/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746
          btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]
          __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 [inline]
          __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x280/0x590 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153
          flush_space+0x147/0xe90 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:728
          btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x541/0xc10 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1086
          process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
          worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
          kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
          ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

   -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
          check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3097 [inline]
          check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3216 [inline]
          validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831 [inline]
          __lock_acquire+0x2a43/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5055
          lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
          lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
          __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
          __mutex_lock+0x12f/0x1360 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
          __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0xa1/0xf30 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
          __btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:251 [inline]
          btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
          btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x52/0x60 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1285
          btrfs_evict_inode+0x511/0xf30 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5554
          evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:664
          dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:697
          prune_icache_sb+0xeb/0x150 fs/inode.c:896
          super_cache_scan+0x391/0x590 fs/super.c:106
          do_shrink_slab+0x464/0xce0 mm/vmscan.c:843
          shrink_slab_memcg mm/vmscan.c:912 [inline]
          shrink_slab+0x388/0x660 mm/vmscan.c:991
          shrink_node_memcgs mm/vmscan.c:6088 [inline]
          shrink_node+0x93d/0x1f30 mm/vmscan.c:6117
          shrink_zones mm/vmscan.c:6355 [inline]
          do_try_to_free_pages+0x3b4/0x17a0 mm/vmscan.c:6417
          try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0x3a4/0xa70 mm/vmscan.c:6732
          reclaim_high.constprop.0+0x182/0x230 mm/memcontrol.c:2393
          mem_cgroup_handle_over_high+0x190/0x520 mm/memcontrol.c:2578
          try_charge_memcg+0xe0c/0x12f0 mm/memcontrol.c:2816
          try_charge mm/memcontrol.c:2827 [inline]
          charge_memcg+0x90/0x3b0 mm/memcontrol.c:6889
          __mem_cgroup_charge+0x2b/0x90 mm/memcontrol.c:6910
          mem_cgroup_charge include/linux/memcontrol.h:667 [inline]
          __filemap_add_folio+0x615/0xf80 mm/filemap.c:852
          filemap_add_folio+0xaf/0x1e0 mm/filemap.c:934
          __filemap_get_folio+0x389/0xd80 mm/filemap.c:1976
          pagecache_get_page+0x2e/0x280 mm/folio-compat.c:104
          find_or_create_page include/linux/pagemap.h:612 [inline]
          alloc_extent_buffer+0x2b9/0x1580 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4588
          btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4869 [inline]
          btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2e1/0x1320 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4988
          __btrfs_cow_block+0x3b2/0x1420 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:440
          btrfs_cow_block+0x2fa/0x950 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:595
          btrfs_search_slot+0x11b0/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2038
          btrfs_update_root+0xdb/0x630 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:137
          update_log_root fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:2841 [inline]
          btrfs_sync_log+0xbfb/0x2870 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3064
          btrfs_sync_file+0xdb9/0x13c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1947
          vfs_fsync_range+0x13e/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
          generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2856 [inline]
          iomap_dio_complete+0x73a/0x920 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:128
          btrfs_direct_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1536 [inline]
          btrfs_do_write_iter+0xba2/0x1470 fs/btrfs/file.c:1668
          call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2160 [inline]
          do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735
          do_iter_write+0x182/0x700 fs/read_write.c:861
          vfs_iter_write+0x74/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
          iter_file_splice_write+0x745/0xc90 fs/splice.c:686
          do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
          direct_splice_actor+0x114/0x180 fs/splice.c:931
          splice_direct_to_actor+0x335/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:886
          do_splice_direct+0x1ab/0x280 fs/splice.c:974
          do_sendfile+0xb19/0x1270 fs/read_write.c:1255
          __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
          __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
          __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x259/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:1309
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-tree-00 --> btrfs-log-00

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(btrfs-log-00);
                                  lock(btrfs-tree-00);
                                  lock(btrfs-log-00);
     lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

Holding a read lock on a leaf from a fs/subvolume tree creates a nasty
lock dependency when we are COWing extent buffers for the log tree and we
have two tasks modifying the log tree, with each one in one of the
following 2 scenarios:

1) Modifying the log tree triggers an extent buffer allocation while
   holding a write lock on a parent extent buffer from the log tree.
   Allocating the pages for an extent buffer, or the extent buffer
   struct, can trigger inode eviction and finally the inode eviction
   will trigger a release/remove of a delayed node, which requires
   taking the delayed node's mutex;

2) Allocating a metadata extent for a log tree can trigger the async
   reclaim thread and make us wait for it to release enough space and
   unblock our reservation ticket. The reclaim thread can start flushing
   delayed items, and that in turn results in the need to lock delayed
   node mutexes and in the need to write lock extent buffers of a
   subvolume tree - all this while holding a write lock on the parent
   extent buffer in the log tree.

So one task in scenario 1) running in parallel with another task in
scenario 2) could lead to a deadlock, one wanting to lock a delayed node
mutex while having a read lock on a leaf from the subvolume, while the
other is holding the delayed node's mutex and wants to write lock the same
subvolume leaf for flushing delayed items.

Fix this by cloning the leaf of the fs/subvolume tree, release/unlock the
fs/subvolume leaf and use the clone leaf instead.

Reported-by: syzbot+9b7c21f486f5e7f8d029@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000ccc93c05edc4d8cf@google.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
make_mmu_pages_available() must be called with mmu_lock held for write.
However, if the TDP MMU is used, it will be called with mmu_lock held for
read.
This function does nothing unless shadow pages are used, so there is no
race unless nested TDP is used.
Since nested TDP uses shadow pages, old shadow pages may be zapped by this
function even when the TDP MMU is enabled.
Since shadow pages are never allocated by kvm_tdp_mmu_map(), a race
condition can be avoided by not calling make_mmu_pages_available() if the
TDP MMU is currently in use.

I encountered this when repeatedly starting and stopping nested VM.
It can be artificially caused by allocating a large number of nested TDP
SPTEs.

For example, the following BUG and general protection fault are caused in
the host kernel.

pte_list_remove: 00000000cd54fc10 many->many
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:963!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:pte_list_remove.cold+0x16/0x48 [kvm]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 drop_spte+0xe0/0x180 [kvm]
 mmu_page_zap_pte+0x4f/0x140 [kvm]
 __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page+0x62/0x3e0 [kvm]
 kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages+0x7d/0xf0 [kvm]
 direct_page_fault+0x3cb/0x9b0 [kvm]
 kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0 [kvm]
 kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x207/0x930 [kvm]
 npf_interception+0x47/0xb0 [kvm_amd]
 svm_invoke_exit_handler+0x13c/0x1a0 [kvm_amd]
 svm_handle_exit+0xfc/0x2c0 [kvm_amd]
 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xa79/0x1780 [kvm]
 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x29b/0x6f0 [kvm]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page.part.0+0x4b/0xe0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages+0xae/0xf0 [kvm]
 direct_page_fault+0x3cb/0x9b0 [kvm]
 kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0 [kvm]
 kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x207/0x930 [kvm]
 npf_interception+0x47/0xb0 [kvm_amd]

CVE: CVE-2022-45869
Fixes: a2855af ("KVM: x86/mmu: Allow parallel page faults for the TDP MMU")
Signed-off-by: Kazuki Takiguchi <takiguchi.kazuki171@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
There is an interesting reference bug when -ENOMEM occurs in calling of
io_install_fixed_file(). KASan report like below:

[   14.057131] ==================================================================
[   14.059161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[   14.060975] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b09cf20 by task kworker/u8:2/45
[   14.062684]
[   14.062768] CPU: 2 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4 #1
[   14.063099] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   14.063666] Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
[   14.063936] Call Trace:
[   14.064065]  <TASK>
[   14.064175]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[   14.064360]  print_report+0x172/0x475
[   14.064547]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x83/0xe0
[   14.064758]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xef/0x170
[   14.064975]  ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[   14.065167]  kasan_report+0xad/0x130
[   14.065353]  ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[   14.065553]  unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[   14.065744]  __io_sqe_files_unregister+0x87/0x1e0
[   14.065989]  ? io_rsrc_refs_drop+0x1c/0xd0
[   14.066199]  io_ring_exit_work+0x388/0x6a5
[   14.066410]  ? io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x5bf/0x5bf
[   14.066674]  ? try_to_wake_up+0xdb/0x910
[   14.066873]  ? virt_to_head_page+0xbe/0xbe
[   14.067080]  ? __schedule+0x574/0xd20
[   14.067273]  ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
[   14.067492]  ? strscpy+0xb5/0x190
[   14.067665]  process_one_work+0x423/0x710
[   14.067879]  worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0
[   14.068073]  ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[   14.068284]  kthread+0x163/0x1a0
[   14.068454]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[   14.068697]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   14.068886]  </TASK>
[   14.069000]
[   14.069088] Allocated by task 289:
[   14.069269]  kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[   14.069463]  kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[   14.069652]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x70
[   14.069899]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xc5/0x200
[   14.070100]  __alloc_file+0x20/0x160
[   14.070283]  alloc_empty_file+0x3b/0xc0
[   14.070479]  path_openat+0xc3/0x1770
[   14.070689]  do_filp_open+0x150/0x270
[   14.070888]  do_sys_openat2+0x113/0x270
[   14.071081]  __x64_sys_openat+0xc8/0x140
[   14.071283]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[   14.071466]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   14.071791]
[   14.071874] Freed by task 0:
[   14.072027]  kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[   14.072224]  kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[   14.072415]  kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
[   14.072627]  __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
[   14.072858]  kmem_cache_free+0x98/0x340
[   14.073075]  rcu_core+0x427/0xe50
[   14.073249]  __do_softirq+0x110/0x3cd
[   14.073440]
[   14.073523] Last potentially related work creation:
[   14.073801]  kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[   14.074017]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
[   14.074264]  call_rcu+0x41/0x550
[   14.074436]  task_work_run+0xf4/0x170
[   14.074619]  exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
[   14.074858]  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
[   14.075092]  do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
[   14.075272]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   14.075529]
[   14.075612] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[   14.075900]  kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[   14.076098]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
[   14.076325]  task_work_add+0x72/0x1b0
[   14.076512]  fput+0x65/0xc0
[   14.076657]  filp_close+0x8e/0xa0
[   14.076825]  __x64_sys_close+0x15/0x50
[   14.077019]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[   14.077199]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   14.077448]
[   14.077530] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800b09cf00
[   14.077530]  which belongs to the cache filp of size 232
[   14.078105] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[   14.078105]  232-byte region [ffff88800b09cf00, ffff88800b09cfe8)
[   14.078685]
[   14.078771] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   14.079046] page:000000001bd520e7 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800b09de00 pfn:0xb09c
[   14.079575] head:000000001bd520e7 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[   14.079946] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
[   14.080244] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff88800493cc80
[   14.080629] raw: ffff88800b09de00 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   14.081016] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   14.081293]
[   14.081376] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   14.081618]  ffff88800b09ce00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   14.081974]  ffff88800b09ce80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   14.082336] >ffff88800b09cf00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   14.082690]                                ^
[   14.082909]  ffff88800b09cf80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
[   14.083266]  ffff88800b09d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[   14.083622] ==================================================================

The actual tracing of this bug is shown below:

commit 8c71fe7 ("io_uring: ensure fput() called correspondingly
when direct install fails") adds an additional fput() in
io_fixed_fd_install() when io_file_bitmap_get() returns error values. In
that case, the routine will never make it to io_install_fixed_file() due
to an early return.

static int io_fixed_fd_install(...)
{
  if (alloc_slot) {
    ...
    ret = io_file_bitmap_get(ctx);
    if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
      io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags);
      fput(file);
      return ret;
    }
    ...
  }
  ...
  ret = io_install_fixed_file(req, file, issue_flags, file_slot);
  ...
}

In the above scenario, the reference is okay as io_fixed_fd_install()
ensures the fput() is called when something bad happens, either via
bitmap or via inner io_install_fixed_file().

However, the commit 61c1b44 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file
slot alloc") breaks the balance because it places fput() into the common
path for both io_file_bitmap_get() and io_install_fixed_file(). Since
io_install_fixed_file() handles the fput() itself, the reference
underflow come across then.

There are some extra commits make the current code into
io_fixed_fd_install() -> __io_fixed_fd_install() ->
io_install_fixed_file()

However, the fact that there is an extra fput() is called if
io_install_fixed_file() calls fput(). Traversing through the code, I
find that the existing two callers to __io_fixed_fd_install():
io_fixed_fd_install() and io_msg_send_fd() have fput() when handling
error return, this patch simply removes the fput() in
io_install_fixed_file() to fix the bug.

Fixes: 61c1b44 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file slot alloc")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/be4ba4b.5d44.184a0a406a4.Coremail.linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
There is an interesting race condition of poll_refs which could result
in a NULL pointer dereference. The crash trace is like:

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 30781 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-g493ffd6605b2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entry io_uring/poll.c:154 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entries+0x171/0x5b4 io_uring/poll.c:190
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffff88810dfefba0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc900030c4000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: ffffffff9764d3dd R09: fffffbfff3836781
R10: fffffbfff3836781 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff11003422d60
R13: ffff88801a116b04 R14: ffff88801a116ac0 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f9c07497700(0000) GS:ffff88811a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffb5c00ea98 CR3: 0000000105680005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 io_apoll_task_func+0x3f/0xa0 io_uring/poll.c:299
 handle_tw_list io_uring/io_uring.c:1037 [inline]
 tctx_task_work+0x37e/0x4f0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1090
 task_work_run+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:177
 get_signal+0x2402/0x25a0 kernel/signal.c:2635
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3b/0x660 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:166 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc2/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:201
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x58/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The root cause for this is a tiny overlooking in
io_poll_check_events() when cocurrently run with poll cancel routine
io_poll_cancel_req().

The interleaving to trigger use-after-free:

CPU0                                       |  CPU1
                                           |
io_apoll_task_func()                       |  io_poll_cancel_req()
 io_poll_check_events()                    |
  // do while first loop                   |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = poll_refs = 1                     |
  ...                                      |  io_poll_mark_cancelled()
                                           |   atomic_or()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |
  atomic_sub_return(...)                   |
  // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG       |
  // loop continue                         |
                                           |
                                           |  io_poll_execute()
                                           |   io_poll_get_ownership()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |   // gets the ownership
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // poll_refs not change                  |
                                           |
  if (v & IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG)             |
   return -ECANCELED;                      |
  // io_poll_check_events return           |
  // will go into                          |
  // io_req_complete_failed() free req     |
                                           |
                                           |  io_apoll_task_func()
                                           |  // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()

And the interleaving to trigger the kernel WARNING:

CPU0                                       |  CPU1
                                           |
io_apoll_task_func()                       |  io_poll_cancel_req()
 io_poll_check_events()                    |
  // do while first loop                   |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = poll_refs = 1                     |
  ...                                      |  io_poll_mark_cancelled()
                                           |   atomic_or()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |
  atomic_sub_return(...)                   |
  // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG       |
  // loop continue                         |
                                           |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG               |
                                           |  io_poll_execute()
                                           |   io_poll_get_ownership()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |   // gets the ownership
                                           |
  WARN_ON_ONCE(!(v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK)))   |
  // v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK = 0 WARN         |
                                           |
                                           |  io_apoll_task_func()
                                           |  // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()

By looking up the source code and communicating with Pavel, the
implementation of this atomic poll refs should continue the loop of
io_poll_check_events() just to avoid somewhere else to grab the
ownership. Therefore, this patch simply adds another AND operation to
make sure the loop will stop if it finds the poll_refs is exactly equal
to IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG. Since io_poll_cancel_req() grabs ownership and
will finally make its way to io_req_complete_failed(), the req will
be reclaimed as expected.

Fixes: aa43477 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
[axboe: tweak description and code style]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
I got a null-ptr-deref report as following when doing fault injection test:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 253 Comm: 507-spi-dm9051 Tainted: G    B            N 6.1.0-rc3+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:klist_put+0x2d/0xd0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 klist_remove+0xf1/0x1c0
 device_release_driver_internal+0x23e/0x2d0
 bus_remove_device+0x1bd/0x240
 device_del+0x357/0x770
 phy_device_remove+0x11/0x30
 mdiobus_unregister+0xa5/0x140
 release_nodes+0x6a/0xa0
 devres_release_all+0xf8/0x150
 device_unbind_cleanup+0x19/0xd0

//probe path:
phy_device_register()
  device_add()

phy_connect
  phy_attach_direct() //set device driver
    probe() //it's failed, driver is not bound
    device_bind_driver() // probe failed, it's not called

//remove path:
phy_device_remove()
  device_del()
    device_release_driver_internal()
      __device_release_driver() //dev->drv is not NULL
        klist_remove() <- knode_driver is not added yet, cause null-ptr-deref

In phy_attach_direct(), after setting the 'dev->driver', probe() fails,
device_bind_driver() is not called, so the knode_driver->n_klist is not
set, then it causes null-ptr-deref in __device_release_driver() while
deleting device. Fix this by setting dev->driver to NULL in the error
path in phy_attach_direct().

Fixes: e139345 ("[PATCH] PHY Layer fixup")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2022
Matt reported a splat at msk close time:

    BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/mptcp/protocol.c:2877
    in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 155, name: packetdrill
    preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
    RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
    4 locks held by packetdrill/155:
    #0: ffff888001536990 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#6){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release (net/socket.c:650)
    #1: ffff88800b498130 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2973)
    #2: ffff88800b49a130 (sk_lock-AF_INET/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_close_ssk (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2363)
    #3: ffff88800b49a0b0 (slock-AF_INET){+...}-{2:2}, at: __lock_sock_fast (include/net/sock.h:1820)
    Preemption disabled at:
    0x0
    CPU: 1 PID: 155 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5 torvalds#365
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
    __might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9891)
    __mptcp_destroy_sock (include/linux/kernel.h:110)
    __mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2959)
    mptcp_subflow_queue_clean (include/net/sock.h:1777)
    __mptcp_close_ssk (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2363)
    mptcp_destroy_common (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3170)
    mptcp_destroy (include/net/sock.h:1495)
    __mptcp_destroy_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2886)
    __mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2959)
    mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2974)
    inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:432)
    __sock_release (net/socket.c:651)
    sock_close (net/socket.c:1367)
    __fput (fs/file_table.c:320)
    task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:181 (discriminator 1))
    exit_to_user_mode_prepare (include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49)
    syscall_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:130)
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:87)
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)

We can't call mptcp_close under the 'fast' socket lock variant, replace
it with a sock_lock_nested() as the relevant code is already under the
listening msk socket lock protection.

Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Closes: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#316
Fixes: 30e51b9 ("mptcp: fix unreleased socket in accept queue")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
We shouldn't be calling runtime PM APIs from within the genpd
enable/disable path for a couple reasons.

First, this causes an AA lockdep splat[1] because genpd can call into
genpd code again while holding the genpd lock.

WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.19.0-rc2-lockdep+ torvalds#7 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
kworker/2:1/49 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffeea0370788 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffeea03710a8 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&genpd->mlock);
  lock(&genpd->mlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by kworker/2:1/49:
 #0: 74ffff80811a5748 ((wq_completion)pm){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x320/0x5fc
 #1: ffffffc008537cf8 ((work_completion)(&genpd->power_off_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x354/0x5fc
 #2: ffffffeea03710a8 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30

stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 49 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-lockdep+ torvalds#7
Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3 - 8) with KB Backlight (DT)
Workqueue: pm genpd_power_off_work_fn
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x1a0/0x200
 show_stack+0x24/0x30
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x44
 __lock_acquire+0xb38/0x3634
 lock_acquire+0x180/0x2d4
 __mutex_lock_common+0x118/0xe30
 mutex_lock_nested+0x70/0x7c
 genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30
 genpd_runtime_suspend+0x2f0/0x414
 __rpm_callback+0xdc/0x1b8
 rpm_callback+0x4c/0xcc
 rpm_suspend+0x21c/0x5f0
 rpm_idle+0x17c/0x1e0
 __pm_runtime_idle+0x78/0xcc
 gdsc_disable+0x24c/0x26c
 _genpd_power_off+0xd4/0x1c4
 genpd_power_off+0x2d8/0x41c
 genpd_power_off_work_fn+0x60/0x94
 process_one_work+0x398/0x5fc
 worker_thread+0x42c/0x6c4
 kthread+0x194/0x1b4
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Second, this confuses runtime PM on CoachZ for the camera devices by
causing the camera clock controller's runtime PM usage_count to go
negative after resuming from suspend. This is because runtime PM is
being used on the clock controller while runtime PM is disabled for the
device.

The reason for the negative count is because a GDSC is represented as a
genpd and each genpd that is attached to a device is resumed during the
noirq phase of system wide suspend/resume (see the noirq suspend ops
assignment in pm_genpd_init() for more details). The camera GDSCs are
attached to camera devices with the 'power-domains' property in DT.
Every device has runtime PM disabled in the late system suspend phase
via __device_suspend_late(). Runtime PM is not usable until runtime PM
is enabled in device_resume_early(). The noirq phases run after the
'late' and before the 'early' phase of suspend/resume. When the genpds
are resumed in genpd_resume_noirq(), we call down into gdsc_enable()
that calls pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and that returns -EACCES to
indicate failure to resume because runtime PM is disabled for all
devices.

Upon closer inspection, calling runtime PM APIs like this in the GDSC
driver doesn't make sense. It was intended to make sure the GDSC for the
clock controller providing other GDSCs was enabled, specifically the
MMCX GDSC for the display clk controller on SM8250 (sm8250-dispcc), so
that GDSC register accesses succeeded. That will already happen because
we make the 'dev->pm_domain' a parent domain of each GDSC we register in
gdsc_register() via pm_genpd_add_subdomain(). When any of these GDSCs
are accessed, we'll enable the parent domain (in this specific case
MMCX).

We also remove any getting of runtime PM during registration, because
when a genpd is registered it increments the count on the parent if the
genpd itself is already enabled.

Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Cc: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Cc: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com>
Cc: Satya Priya <quic_c_skakit@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAE-0n52xbZeJ66RaKwggeRB57fUAwjvxGxfFMKOKJMKVyFTe+w@mail.gmail.com [1]
Fixes: 1b77183 ("clk: qcom: gdsc: enable optional power domain support")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221103183030.3594899-1-swboyd@chromium.org
Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
If the system is restarted via kexec(), the peripherals do not start
with a known state.

If the previous system had enabled an IRQs we will receive unexected
IRQs that can lock the system.

[   28.109251] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s!
[swapper/0:0]
[   28.109263] Modules linked in:
[   28.109273] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
5.15.79-14458-g4b9edf7b1ac6 #1 9f2e76613148af94acccd64c609a552fb4b4354b
[   28.109284] Hardware name: Google Elm (DT)
[   28.109290] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS
		BTYPE=--)
[   28.109298] pc : __do_softirq+0xa0/0x388
[   28.109309] lr : __do_softirq+0x70/0x388
[   28.109316] sp : ffffffc008003ee0
[   28.109321] x29: ffffffc008003f00 x28: 000000000000000a x27:
0000000000000080
[   28.109334] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffffffefa7b350c0 x24:
ffffffefa7b47480
[   28.109346] x23: ffffffefa7b3d000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21:
ffffffefa7b0fa40
[   28.109358] x20: ffffffefa7b005b0 x19: ffffffefa7b47480 x18:
0000000000065b6b
[   28.109370] x17: ffffffefa749c8b0 x16: 000000000000018c x15:
00000000000001b8
[   28.109382] x14: 00000000000d3b6b x13: 0000000000000006 x12:
0000000000057e91
[   28.109394] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 :
ffffffefa7b47480
[   28.109406] x8 : 00000000000000e0 x7 : 000000000f424000 x6 :
0000000000000000
[   28.109418] x5 : ffffffefa7dfaca0 x4 : ffffffefa7dfadf0 x3 :
000000000000000f
[   28.109429] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000100 x0 :
0000000001ac65c5
[   28.109441] Call trace:
[   28.109447]  __do_softirq+0xa0/0x388
[   28.109454]  irq_exit+0xc0/0xe0
[   28.109464]  handle_domain_irq+0x68/0x90
[   28.109473]  gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xf0
[   28.109480]  call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x50
[   28.109488]  do_interrupt_handler+0x44/0x58
[   28.109496]  el1_interrupt+0x30/0x58
[   28.109506]  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
[   28.109512]  el1h_64_irq+0x7c/0x80
[   28.109519]  arch_local_irq_enable+0xc/0x18
[   28.109529]  default_idle_call+0x40/0x140
[   28.109539]  do_idle+0x108/0x290
[   28.109547]  cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30
[   28.109554]  rest_init+0xe8/0xf8
[   28.109562]  arch_call_rest_init+0x18/0x24
[   28.109571]  start_kernel+0x338/0x42c
[   28.109578]  __primary_switched+0xbc/0xc4
[   28.109588] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122-mtk-pinctrl-v1-1-bedf5655a3d2@chromium.org
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
test_bpf tail call tests end up as:

  test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS
  test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS
  test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS
  test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS
  test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS
  test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000
  Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac
  Modules linked in: test_bpf(+)
  CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ torvalds#195
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac
  NIP:  be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704
  REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.1.0-rc4+)
  MSR:  00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 28008242  XER: 00000000
  DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000
  GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000
  GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8
  GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000
  GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00
  NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710
  LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf]
  Call Trace:
  [f1b4dfe] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable)
  Instruction dump:
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered
with tests added by commit 38608ee ("bpf, tests: Add load store
test case for tail call")

This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different
stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller
tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based
on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously
increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes.

This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller
to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in
the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail
call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be
different.

Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count
during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if
required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more
correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with
normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input
parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later.

Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between
tail calls and a normal function exit.

With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull:

  test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS
  test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS
  test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS
  test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS
  test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS
  test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS
  test_bpf: torvalds#9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS
  test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]

Suggested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes: 51c66ad ("powerpc/bpf: Implement extended BPF on PPC32")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/757acccb7fbfc78efa42dcf3c974b46678198905.1669278887.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
Walking the nvme_ns_head siblings list is protected by the head's srcu
in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() but not nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths().
Removing namespaces from the list also fails to synchronize the srcu.
Concurrent scan work can therefore cause use-after-frees.

Hold the head's srcu lock in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths() and
synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove().

Observed the following panic when making NVMe/RDMA connections
with native multipath on the Rocky Linux 8.6 kernel
(it seems the upstream kernel has the same race condition).
Disassembly shows the faulting instruction is cmp 0x50(%rdx),%rcx;
computing capacity != get_capacity(ns->disk).
Address 0x50 is dereferenced because ns->disk is NULL.
The NULL disk appears to be the result of concurrent scan work
freeing the namespace (note the log line in the middle of the panic).

[37314.206036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
[37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity change from 0 to 11811160064
[37314.299753] PGD 0 P4D 0
[37314.299756] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[37314.299759] CPU: 29 PID: 322046 Comm: kworker/u98:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W      X --------- -  - 4.18.0-372.32.1.el8test86.x86_64 #1
[37314.299762] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0JP31P, BIOS 2.7.0 05/23/2018
[37314.299763] Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core]
[37314.299783] RIP: 0010:nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x26/0xb0 [nvme_core]
[37314.299790] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42 d0 48 8b 50 20 <48> 3b 4a 50 74 05 f0 80 60 70 ef 48 8b 50 30 48 8d 42 d0 48 39 d3
[37315.058803] RSP: 0018:ffffabe28f913d10 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37315.121316] RAX: ffff927a077da800 RBX: ffff92991dd70000 RCX: 0000000001600000
[37315.206704] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff92991b719800
[37315.292106] RBP: ffff929a6b70c000 R08: 000000010234cd4a R09: c0000000ffff7fff
[37315.377501] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffabe28f913a30 R12: 0000000000000000
[37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000
[37315.548286] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b87fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37315.645111] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[37315.713871] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000002208810006 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[37315.799267] Call Trace:
[37315.828515]  nvme_update_ns_info+0x1ac/0x250 [nvme_core]
[37315.892075]  nvme_validate_or_alloc_ns+0x2ff/0xa00 [nvme_core]
[37315.961871]  ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x6b/0x90
[37316.015021]  nvme_scan_work+0x151/0x240 [nvme_core]
[37316.073371]  process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[37316.121318]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37316.168227]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[37316.212024]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37316.258939]  kthread+0x10a/0x120
[37316.297557]  ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[37316.347590]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[37316.390360] Modules linked in: nvme_rdma nvme_tcp(X) nvme_fabrics nvme_core netconsole iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp dm_queue_length dm_service_time nf_conntrack_netlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay nft_chain_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_addrtype xt_CT nft_counter xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath tg3 rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore ib_core ipmi_si joydev mei_me pcspkr ipmi_devintf mei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg mgag200 mlx5_core drm_kms_helper syscopyarea
[37316.390419]  sysfillrect ahci sysimgblt fb_sys_fops libahci drm crc32c_intel libata mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf tls i2c_algo_bit psample dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [last unloaded: nvme_core]
[37317.645908] CR2: 0000000000000050

Fixes: e7d6580 ("nvme-multipath: revalidate paths during rescan")
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander <csander@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
Syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref bug:

 NILFS (loop0): segctord starting. Construction interval = 5 seconds, CP
 frequency < 30 seconds
 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
 CPU: 1 PID: 3603 Comm: segctord Not tainted
 6.1.0-rc2-syzkaller-00105-gb229b6ca5abb #0
 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google
 10/11/2022
 RIP: 0010:nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry+0xe5/0x6b0
 fs/nilfs2/alloc.c:608
 Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 cd 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00
 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 73 08 49 8d 7e 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02
 00 0f 85 26 05 00 00 49 8b 46 10 be a6 00 00 00 48 c7 c7
 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003dff830 EFLAGS: 00010212
 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88802594e218 RCX: 000000000000000d
 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000002000 RDI: 0000000000000010
 RBP: ffff888071880222 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000003f
 R10: 000000000000000d R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888071880158
 R13: ffff88802594e220 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000)
 knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007fb1c08316a8 CR3: 0000000018560000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  nilfs_dat_commit_free fs/nilfs2/dat.c:114 [inline]
  nilfs_dat_commit_end+0x464/0x5f0 fs/nilfs2/dat.c:193
  nilfs_dat_commit_update+0x26/0x40 fs/nilfs2/dat.c:236
  nilfs_btree_commit_update_v+0x87/0x4a0 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1940
  nilfs_btree_commit_propagate_v fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2016 [inline]
  nilfs_btree_propagate_v fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2046 [inline]
  nilfs_btree_propagate+0xa00/0xd60 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2088
  nilfs_bmap_propagate+0x73/0x170 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:337
  nilfs_collect_file_data+0x45/0xd0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:568
  nilfs_segctor_apply_buffers+0x14a/0x470 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1018
  nilfs_segctor_scan_file+0x3f4/0x6f0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1067
  nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1197 [inline]
  nilfs_segctor_collect fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1503 [inline]
  nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x12fc/0x6af0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2045
  nilfs_segctor_construct+0x8e3/0xb30 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2379
  nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2487 [inline]
  nilfs_segctor_thread+0x3c3/0xf30 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2570
  kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
  </TASK>
 ...

If DAT metadata file is corrupted on disk, there is a case where
req->pr_desc_bh is NULL and blocknr is 0 at nilfs_dat_commit_end() during
a b-tree operation that cascadingly updates ancestor nodes of the b-tree,
because nilfs_dat_commit_alloc() for a lower level block can initialize
the blocknr on the same DAT entry between nilfs_dat_prepare_end() and
nilfs_dat_commit_end().

If this happens, nilfs_dat_commit_end() calls nilfs_dat_commit_free()
without valid buffer heads in req->pr_desc_bh and req->pr_bitmap_bh, and
causes the NULL pointer dereference above in
nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry() function, which leads to a crash.

Fix this by adding a NULL check on req->pr_desc_bh and req->pr_bitmap_bh
before nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry() in nilfs_dat_commit_free().

This also calls nilfs_error() in that case to notify that there is a fatal
flaw in the filesystem metadata and prevent further operations.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000097c20205ebaea3d6@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114040441.1649940-1-zhangpeng362@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221119120542.17204-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+ebe05ee8e98f755f61d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
When running as a Xen PV guests commit eed9a32 ("mm: x86: add
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG") can cause a protection violation in
pmdp_test_and_clear_young():

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8880083374d0
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
 PGD 3026067 P4D 3026067 PUD 3027067 PMD 7fee5067 PTE 8010000008337065
 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 7 PID: 158 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-20221118-doflr+ #1
 RIP: e030:pmdp_test_and_clear_young+0x25/0x40

This happens because the Xen hypervisor can't emulate direct writes to
page table entries other than PTEs.

This can easily be fixed by introducing arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_young()
similar to arch_has_hw_pte_young() and test that instead of
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221123064510.16225-1-jgross@suse.com
Fixes: eed9a32 ("mm: x86: add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>	[core changes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
Wei Chen reported a NULL deref in sk_user_ns() [0][1], and Paolo diagnosed
the root cause: in unix_diag_get_exact(), the newly allocated skb does not
have sk. [2]

We must get the user_ns from the NETLINK_CB(in_skb).sk and pass it to
sk_diag_fill().

[0]:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000270
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 12bbce067 P4D 12bbce067 PUD 12bc40067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 27942 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-next-20221118 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_user_ns include/net/sock.h:920 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sk_diag_dump_uid net/unix/diag.c:119 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sk_diag_fill+0x77d/0x890 net/unix/diag.c:170
Code: 89 ef e8 66 d4 2d fd c7 44 24 40 00 00 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 18 e8
54 d7 2d fd 49 8b 5c 24 18 48 8d bb 70 02 00 00 e8 43 d7 2d fd <48> 8b
9b 70 02 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 e8 33 d7 2d fd 48 8b 5b 10 48 8d
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d67968 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff88812badaa48 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff840d481d
RDX: 0000000000000465 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000270
RBP: ffffc90000d679a8 R08: 0000000000000277 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0001ffffffffffff R11: 0001c90000d679a8 R12: ffff88812ac03800
R13: ffff88812c87c400 R14: ffff88812ae42210 R15: ffff888103026940
FS:  00007f08b4e6f700(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000270 CR3: 000000012c58b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unix_diag_get_exact net/unix/diag.c:285 [inline]
 unix_diag_handler_dump+0x3f9/0x500 net/unix/diag.c:317
 __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:235 [inline]
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x237/0x250 net/core/sock_diag.c:266
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x13e/0x250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
 sock_diag_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:277
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x5e9/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1356
 netlink_sendmsg+0x739/0x860 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1932
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x4697f9
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f08b4e6ec48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000077bf80 RCX: 00000000004697f9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000004d29e9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000077bf80
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000077bf80 R15: 00007ffdb36bc6c0
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000270

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAO4mrfdvyjFpokhNsiwZiP-wpdSD0AStcJwfKcKQdAALQ9_2Qw@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e04315e7c90d9a75613f3993c2baf2d344eef7eb.camel@redhat.com/

Fixes: cae9910 ("net: Add UNIX_DIAG_UID to Netlink UNIX socket diagnostics.")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
The test prog dumps a single AF_UNIX socket's UID with and without
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and checks if it matches the result of getuid().

Without the preceding patch, the test prog is killed by a NULL deref
in sk_diag_dump_uid().

  # ./diag_uid
  TAP version 13
  1..2
  # Starting 2 tests from 3 test cases.
  #  RUN           diag_uid.uid.1 ...
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000270
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 105212067 P4D 105212067 PUD 1051fe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.amzn2022.0.1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:sk_diag_fill (./include/net/sock.h:920 net/unix/diag.c:119 net/unix/diag.c:170)
  ...
  # 1: Test terminated unexpectedly by signal 9
  #          FAIL  diag_uid.uid.1
  not ok 1 diag_uid.uid.1
  #  RUN           diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 ...
  # 1: Test terminated by timeout
  #          FAIL  diag_uid.uid_unshare.1
  not ok 2 diag_uid.uid_unshare.1
  # FAILED: 0 / 2 tests passed.
  # Totals: pass:0 fail:2 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0

With the patch, the test succeeds.

  # ./diag_uid
  TAP version 13
  1..2
  # Starting 2 tests from 3 test cases.
  #  RUN           diag_uid.uid.1 ...
  #            OK  diag_uid.uid.1
  ok 1 diag_uid.uid.1
  #  RUN           diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 ...
  #            OK  diag_uid.uid_unshare.1
  ok 2 diag_uid.uid_unshare.1
  # PASSED: 2 / 2 tests passed.
  # Totals: pass:2 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
If coretemp_add_core() gets an error then pdata->core_data[indx]
is already NULL and has been kfreed. Don't pass that to
sysfs_remove_group() as that will crash in sysfs_remove_group().

[Shortened for readability]
[91854.020159] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/coretemp.0/hwmon/hwmon2/temp20_label'
<cpu offline>
[91855.126115] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000188
[91855.165103] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[91855.194506] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[91855.224445] PGD 0 P4D 0
[91855.238508] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
...
[91855.342716] RIP: 0010:sysfs_remove_group+0xc/0x80
...
[91855.796571] Call Trace:
[91855.810524]  coretemp_cpu_offline+0x12b/0x1dd [coretemp]
[91855.841738]  ? coretemp_cpu_online+0x180/0x180 [coretemp]
[91855.871107]  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x105/0x4b0
[91855.893432]  cpuhp_thread_fun+0x8e/0x150
...

Fix this by checking for NULL first.

Signed-off-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-hwmon@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117162313.3164803-1-pauld@redhat.com
Fixes: 199e0de ("hwmon: (coretemp) Merge pkgtemp with coretemp")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
QAT devices on Intel Sapphire Rapids and Emerald Rapids have a defect in
address translation service (ATS). These devices may inadvertently issue
ATS invalidation completion before posted writes initiated with
translated address that utilized translations matching the invalidation
address range, violating the invalidation completion ordering.

This patch adds an extra device TLB invalidation for the affected devices,
it is needed to ensure no more posted writes with translated address
following the invalidation completion. Therefore, the ordering is
preserved and data-corruption is prevented.

Device TLBs are invalidated under the following six conditions:
1. Device driver does DMA API unmap IOVA
2. Device driver unbind a PASID from a process, sva_unbind_device()
3. PASID is torn down, after PASID cache is flushed. e.g. process
exit_mmap() due to crash
4. Under SVA usage, called by mmu_notifier.invalidate_range() where
VM has to free pages that were unmapped
5. userspace driver unmaps a DMA buffer
6. Cache invalidation in vSVA usage (upcoming)

For #1 and #2, device drivers are responsible for stopping DMA traffic
before unmap/unbind. For #3, iommu driver gets mmu_notifier to
invalidate TLB the same way as normal user unmap which will do an extra
invalidation. The dTLB invalidation after PASID cache flush does not
need an extra invalidation.

Therefore, we only need to deal with #4 and #5 in this patch. #1 is also
covered by this patch due to common code path with #5.

Tested-by: Yuzhang Luo <yuzhang.luo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130062449.1360063-1-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
A NAPI is setup for each network sring to poll data to kernel
The sring with source host is destroyed before live migration and
new sring with target host is setup after live migration.
The NAPI for the old sring is not deleted until setup new sring
with target host after migration. With busy_poll/busy_read enabled,
the NAPI can be polled before got deleted when resume VM.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000008
IP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Call Trace:
 finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230
 timerqueue_del+0x1d/0x40
 hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0xb5/0x110
 xennet_alloc_rx_buffers+0x2a0/0x2a0
 napi_busy_loop+0xdb/0x270
 sock_poll+0x87/0x90
 do_sys_poll+0x26f/0x580
 tracing_map_insert+0x1d4/0x2f0
 event_hist_trigger+0x14a/0x260

 finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230
 __schedule+0x256/0x890
 recalc_sigpending+0x1b/0x50
 xen_sched_clock+0x15/0x20
 __rb_reserve_next+0x12d/0x140
 ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x3d0
 event_triggers_call+0x87/0xb0
 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1c4/0x210
 xen_clocksource_get_cycles+0x15/0x20
 ktime_get_ts64+0x51/0xf0
 SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0
 SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x41/0xa6
...
RIP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 RSP: ffffb4f041933900
CR2: 0000000000000008
---[ end trace f8601785b354351c ]---

xen frontend should remove the NAPIs for the old srings before live
migration as the bond srings are destroyed

There is a tiny window between the srings are set to NULL and
the NAPIs are disabled, It is safe as the NAPI threads are still
frozen at that time

Signed-off-by: Lin Liu <lin.liu@citrix.com>
Fixes: 4ec2411 ([NET]: Do not check netif_running() and carrier state in ->poll())
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
When booting a arm 32-bit kernel with config CONFIG_AHCI_DWC enabled on
a am57xx-evm board. This happens when the clock references are unnamed
in DT, the strcmp() produces a NULL pointer dereference, see the
following oops, NULL pointer dereference:

[    4.673950] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
[    4.682098] [00000000] *pgd=00000000
[    4.685699] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM
[    4.690338] Modules linked in:
[    4.693420] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #1
[    4.699615] Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree)
[    4.705749] PC is at strcmp+0x0/0x34
[    4.709350] LR is at ahci_platform_find_clk+0x3c/0x5c
[    4.714416] pc : [<c130c494>]    lr : [<c0c230e0>]    psr: 20000013
[    4.720703] sp : f000dda8  ip : 00000001  fp : c29b1840
[    4.725952] r10: 00000020  r9 : c1b23380  r8 : c1b23368
[    4.731201] r7 : c1ab4cc4  r6 : 00000001  r5 : c3c66040  r4 : 00000000
[    4.737762] r3 : 00000080  r2 : 00000080  r1 : c1ab4cc4  r0 : 00000000
[...]
[    4.998870]  strcmp from ahci_platform_find_clk+0x3c/0x5c
[    5.004302]  ahci_platform_find_clk from ahci_dwc_probe+0x1f0/0x54c
[    5.010589]  ahci_dwc_probe from platform_probe+0x64/0xc0
[    5.016021]  platform_probe from really_probe+0xe8/0x41c
[    5.021362]  really_probe from __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x204
[    5.027313]  __driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x38/0xc8
[    5.033782]  driver_probe_device from __driver_attach+0xb4/0x1ec
[    5.039825]  __driver_attach from bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xb8
[    5.045532]  bus_for_each_dev from bus_add_driver+0x17c/0x220
[    5.051300]  bus_add_driver from driver_register+0x90/0x124
[    5.056915]  driver_register from do_one_initcall+0x48/0x1e8
[    5.062591]  do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x1cc/0x234
[    5.068817]  kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x20/0x13c
[    5.074584]  kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c
[    5.079681] Exception stack(0xf000dfb0 to 0xf000dff8)
[    5.084747] dfa0:                                     00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[    5.092956] dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[    5.101165] dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
[    5.107818] Code: e5e32001 e3520000 1afffffb e12fff1e (e4d03001)
[    5.114013] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Add an extra check in the if-statement if hpriv-clks[i].id.

Fixes: 6ce73f3 ("ata: libahci_platform: Add function returning a clock-handle by id")
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
The LTP test pty03 is causing a crash in slcan:
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 348 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.0.8-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 9d20364b934f5aab0a9bdf84e8f45cfdfae39dab
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  Workqueue:  0x0 (events)
  RIP: 0010:process_one_work (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:706 /home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2185)
  Code: 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 06 48 8b 6f 48 49 89 c4 45 30 e4 a8 04 b8 00 00 00 00 4c 0f 44 e0 <49> 8b 44 24 08 44 8b a8 00 01 00 00 41 83 e5 20 f6 45 10 04 75 0e
  RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b40f47e98 EFLAGS: 00010046
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RCX: ffff9d649e439968
  RDX: 00000000ffff8455 RSI: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RDI: ffff9d64764aa6c0
  RBP: ffff9d649e4335c0 R08: 0000000000000c00 R09: ffff9d64764aa734
  R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff9d649e4335e8 R14: ffff9d64490da780 R15: ffff9d64764aa6c0
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d649e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000036424000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
  worker_thread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2436)
  kthread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/kthread.c:376)
  ret_from_fork (/home/rich/kernel/linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:312)

Apparently, the slcan's tx_work is freed while being scheduled. While
slcan_netdev_close() (netdev side) calls flush_work(&sl->tx_work),
slcan_close() (tty side) does not. So when the netdev is never set UP,
but the tty is stuffed with bytes and forced to wakeup write, the work
is scheduled, but never flushed.

So add an additional flush_work() to slcan_close() to be sure the work
is flushed under all circumstances.

The Fixes commit below moved flush_work() from slcan_close() to
slcan_netdev_close(). What was the rationale behind it? Maybe we can
drop the one in slcan_netdev_close()?

I see the same pattern in can327. So it perhaps needs the very same fix.

Fixes: cfcb446 ("can: slcan: remove legacy infrastructure")
Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1205597
Reported-by: Richard Palethorpe <richard.palethorpe@suse.com>
Tested-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@suse.com>
Cc: Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com>
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Max Staudt <max@enpas.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Max Staudt <max@enpas.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221201073426.17328-1-jirislaby@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
When sending packets between nodes in netns, it calls tipc_lxc_xmit() for
peer node to receive the packets where tipc_sk_mcast_rcv()/tipc_sk_rcv()
might be called, and it's pretty much like in tipc_rcv().

Currently the local 'node rw lock' is held during calling tipc_lxc_xmit()
to protect the peer_net not being freed by another thread. However, when
receiving these packets, tipc_node_add_conn() might be called where the
peer 'node rw lock' is acquired. Then a dead lock warning is triggered by
lockdep detector, although it is not a real dead lock:

    WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
    --------------------------------------------
    conn_server/1086 is trying to acquire lock:
    ffff8880065cb020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
                     at: tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc]

    but task is already holding lock:
    ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
                     at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc]

    other info that might help us debug this:
     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0
           ----
      lock(&n->lock#2);
      lock(&n->lock#2);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

     May be due to missing lock nesting notation

    4 locks held by conn_server/1086:
     #0: ffff8880036d1e40 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC){+.+.}-{0:0}, \
                          at: tipc_accept+0x9c0/0x10b0 [tipc]
     #1: ffff8880036d5f80 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, \
                          at: tipc_accept+0x363/0x10b0 [tipc]
     #2: ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
                          at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc]
     #3: ffff888012e13370 (slock-AF_TIPC){+...}-{2:2}, \
                          at: tipc_sk_rcv+0x2da/0x1b40 [tipc]

    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5b
     __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x1f2/0x3d7
     lock_acquire+0x1d2/0x610
     _raw_write_lock_bh+0x38/0x80
     tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc]
     tipc_sk_finish_conn+0x21e/0x640 [tipc]
     tipc_sk_filter_rcv+0x147b/0x3030 [tipc]
     tipc_sk_rcv+0xbb4/0x1b40 [tipc]
     tipc_lxc_xmit+0x225/0x26b [tipc]
     tipc_node_xmit.cold.82+0x4a/0x102 [tipc]
     __tipc_sendstream+0x879/0xff0 [tipc]
     tipc_accept+0x966/0x10b0 [tipc]
     do_accept+0x37d/0x590

This patch avoids this warning by not holding the 'node rw lock' before
calling tipc_lxc_xmit(). As to protect the 'peer_net', rcu_read_lock()
should be enough, as in cleanup_net() when freeing the netns, it calls
synchronize_rcu() before the free is continued.

Also since tipc_lxc_xmit() is like the RX path in tipc_rcv(), it makes
sense to call it under rcu_read_lock(). Note that the right lock order
must be:

   rcu_read_lock();
   tipc_node_read_lock(n);
   tipc_node_read_unlock(n);
   tipc_lxc_xmit();
   rcu_read_unlock();

instead of:

   tipc_node_read_lock(n);
   rcu_read_lock();
   tipc_node_read_unlock(n);
   tipc_lxc_xmit();
   rcu_read_unlock();

and we have to call tipc_node_read_lock/unlock() twice in
tipc_node_xmit().

Fixes: f73b128 ("tipc: improve throughput between nodes in netns")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bdd1f8fee9db695cfff4528a48c9b9d0523fb00.1670110641.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
If a cookie expires from the LRU and the LRU_DISCARD flag is set, but
the state machine has not run yet, it's possible another thread can call
fscache_use_cookie and begin to use it.

When the cookie_worker finally runs, it will see the LRU_DISCARD flag
set, transition the cookie->state to LRU_DISCARDING, which will then
withdraw the cookie.  Once the cookie is withdrawn the object is removed
the below oops will occur because the object associated with the cookie
is now NULL.

Fix the oops by clearing the LRU_DISCARD bit if another thread uses the
cookie before the cookie_worker runs.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
  ...
  CPU: 31 PID: 44773 Comm: kworker/u130:1 Tainted: G     E    6.0.0-5.dneg.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/26/2022
  Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work [netfs]
  RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x28/0x90 [cachefiles]
  ...
  Call Trace:
    netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x11c/0x320 [netfs]
    process_one_work+0x217/0x3e0
    worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0
    kthread+0xd6/0x100

Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning")
Reported-by: Daire Byrne <daire.byrne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <daire@dneg.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117115023.1350181-1-dwysocha@redhat.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117142915.1366990-1-dwysocha@redhat.com/ # v2
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
KASAN found that addr was dereferenced after br2dev_event_work was freed.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in qeth_l2_br2dev_worker+0x5ba/0x6b0
Read of size 1 at addr 00000000fdcea440 by task kworker/u760:4/540
CPU: 17 PID: 540 Comm: kworker/u760:4 Tainted: G            E      6.1.0-20221128.rc7.git1.5aa3bed4ce83.300.fc36.s390x+kasan #1
Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR)
Workqueue: 0.0.8000_event qeth_l2_br2dev_worker
Call Trace:
 [<000000016944d4ce>] dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0xf8
 [<000000016942cd9c>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x34/0x2a0
 [<000000016942d118>] print_report+0x110/0x1f8
 [<0000000167a7bd04>] kasan_report+0xfc/0x128
 [<000000016938d79a>] qeth_l2_br2dev_worker+0x5ba/0x6b0
 [<00000001673edd1e>] process_one_work+0x76e/0x1128
 [<00000001673ee85c>] worker_thread+0x184/0x1098
 [<000000016740718a>] kthread+0x26a/0x310
 [<00000001672c606a>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8
 [<00000001694711da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
Allocated by task 108338:
 kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
 kasan_set_track+0x36/0x48
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xc0
 qeth_l2_switchdev_event+0x25a/0x738
 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xf8
 br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xf4/0x110
 fdb_notify+0x122/0x180
 fdb_add_entry.constprop.0.isra.0+0x312/0x558
 br_fdb_add+0x59e/0x858
 rtnl_fdb_add+0x58a/0x928
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5f8/0x8d8
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f2/0x408
 netlink_unicast+0x570/0x790
 netlink_sendmsg+0x752/0xbe0
 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x510/0x6a8
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x12a/0x180
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe6/0x168
 __do_sys_socketcall+0x3c8/0x468
 do_syscall+0x22c/0x328
 __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0
 system_call+0x82/0xb0
Freed by task 540:
 kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
 kasan_set_track+0x36/0x48
 kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x68
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x14e/0x1a8
 __kasan_slab_free+0x24/0x30
 __kmem_cache_free+0x168/0x338
 qeth_l2_br2dev_worker+0x154/0x6b0
 process_one_work+0x76e/0x1128
 worker_thread+0x184/0x1098
 kthread+0x26a/0x310
 __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8
 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0
 insert_work+0x56/0x2e8
 __queue_work+0x4ce/0xd10
 queue_work_on+0xf4/0x100
 qeth_l2_switchdev_event+0x520/0x738
 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xf8
 br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xf4/0x110
 fdb_notify+0x122/0x180
 fdb_add_entry.constprop.0.isra.0+0x312/0x558
 br_fdb_add+0x59e/0x858
 rtnl_fdb_add+0x58a/0x928
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5f8/0x8d8
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f2/0x408
 netlink_unicast+0x570/0x790
 netlink_sendmsg+0x752/0xbe0
 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x510/0x6a8
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x12a/0x180
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe6/0x168
 __do_sys_socketcall+0x3c8/0x468
 do_syscall+0x22c/0x328
 __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0
 system_call+0x82/0xb0
Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0
 kvfree_call_rcu+0xb2/0x760
 kernfs_unlink_open_file+0x348/0x430
 kernfs_fop_release+0xc2/0x320
 __fput+0x1ae/0x768
 task_work_run+0x1bc/0x298
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a0/0x1a8
 __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0
 system_call+0x82/0xb0
The buggy address belongs to the object at 00000000fdcea400
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of
 96-byte region [00000000fdcea400, 00000000fdcea460)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:000000005a9c26e8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xfdcea
flags: 0x3ffff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
raw: 3ffff00000000200 0000000000000000 0000000100000122 000000008008cc00
raw: 0000000000000000 0020004100000000 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
 00000000fdcea300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
 00000000fdcea380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
>00000000fdcea400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
                                           ^
 00000000fdcea480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
 00000000fdcea500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Fixes: f7936b7 ("s390/qeth: Update MACs of LEARNING_SYNC device")
Reported-by: Thorsten Winkler <twinkler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thorsten Winkler <twinkler@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207105304.20494-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
The following program will trigger the BUG_ON that this patch removes,
because the user can munmap() mm->brk:

  #include <sys/syscall.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>
  #include <assert.h>
  #include <unistd.h>

  static void *brk_now(void)
  {
    return (void *)syscall(SYS_brk, 0);
  }

  static void brk_set(void *b)
  {
    assert(syscall(SYS_brk, b) != -1);
  }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
    void *b = brk_now();
    brk_set(b + 4096);
    assert(munmap(b - 4096, 4096 * 2) == 0);
    brk_set(b);
    return 0;
  }

Compile that with musl, since glibc actually uses brk(), and then
execute it, and it'll hit this splat:

  kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:229!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  CPU: 12 PID: 1379 Comm: a.out Tainted: G S   U             6.1.0-rc7+ torvalds#419
  RIP: 0010:__do_sys_brk+0x2fc/0x340
  Code: 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 04 d3 fe ff eb 9a be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 35 e0 fe ff e9 6e ff ff ff 4d 89 a7 20>
  RSP: 0018:ffff888140bc7eb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000007e7000 RCX: ffff8881020fe000
  RDX: ffff8881020fe001 RSI: ffff8881955c9b00 RDI: ffff8881955c9b08
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8881955c9b00 R09: 00007ffc77844000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000007e8000
  R13: 00000000007e8000 R14: 00000000007e7000 R15: ffff8881020fe000
  FS:  0000000000604298(0000) GS:ffff88901f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000603fe0 CR3: 000000015ba9a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
  RIP: 0033:0x400678
  Code: 10 4c 8d 41 08 4c 89 44 24 10 4c 8b 01 8b 4c 24 08 83 f9 2f 77 0a 4c 8d 4c 24 20 4c 01 c9 eb 05 48 8b>
  RSP: 002b:00007ffc77863890 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000c
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000040031b RCX: 0000000000400678
  RDX: 00000000004006a1 RSI: 00000000007e6000 RDI: 00000000007e7000
  RBP: 00007ffc77863900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000007e6000
  R10: 00007ffc77863930 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00007ffc77863978
  R13: 00007ffc77863988 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
   </TASK>

Instead, just return the old brk value if the original mapping has been
removed.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix changelog, per Liam]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221202162724.2009-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Fixes: 2e7ce7d ("mm/mmap: change do_brk_flags() to expand existing VMA and add do_brk_munmap()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
We use "unsigned long" to store a PFN in the kernel and phys_addr_t to
store a physical address.

On a 64bit system, both are 64bit wide.  However, on a 32bit system, the
latter might be 64bit wide.  This is, for example, the case on x86 with
PAE: phys_addr_t and PTEs are 64bit wide, while "unsigned long" only spans
32bit.

The current definition of SWP_PFN_BITS without MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS misses
that case, and assumes that the maximum PFN is limited by an 32bit
phys_addr_t.  This implies, that SWP_PFN_BITS will currently only be able
to cover 4 GiB - 1 on any 32bit system with 4k page size, which is wrong.

Let's rely on the number of bits in phys_addr_t instead, but make sure to
not exceed the maximum swap offset, to not make the BUILD_BUG_ON() in
is_pfn_swap_entry() unhappy.  Note that swp_entry_t is effectively an
unsigned long and the maximum swap offset shares that value with the swap
type.

For example, on an 8 GiB x86 PAE system with a kernel config based on
Debian 11.5 (-> CONFIG_FLATMEM=y, CONFIG_X86_PAE=y), we will currently
fail removing migration entries (remove_migration_ptes()), because
mm/page_vma_mapped.c:check_pte() will fail to identify a PFN match as
swp_offset_pfn() wrongly masks off PFN bits.  For example,
split_huge_page_to_list()->...->remap_page() will leave migration entries
in place and continue to unlock the page.

Later, when we stumble over these migration entries (e.g., via
/proc/self/pagemap), pfn_swap_entry_to_page() will BUG_ON() because these
migration entries shouldn't exist anymore and the page was unlocked.

[   33.067591] kernel BUG at include/linux/swapops.h:497!
[   33.067597] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[   33.067602] CPU: 3 PID: 742 Comm: cow Tainted: G            E      6.1.0-rc8+ torvalds#16
[   33.067605] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
[   33.067606] EIP: pagemap_pmd_range+0x644/0x650
[   33.067612] Code: 00 00 00 00 66 90 89 ce b9 00 f0 ff ff e9 ff fb ff ff 89 d8 31 db e8 48 c6 52 00 e9 23 fb ff ff e8 61 83 56 00 e9 b6 fe ff ff <0f> 0b bf 00 f0 ff ff e9 38 fa ff ff 3e 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 57 31
[   33.067615] EAX: ee394000 EBX: 00000002 ECX: ee394000 EDX: 00000000
[   33.067617] ESI: c1b0ded4 EDI: 00024a00 EBP: c1b0ddb4 ESP: c1b0dd68
[   33.067619] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   33.067624] CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7a00000 CR3: 01bbbd20 CR4: 00350ef0
[   33.067625] Call Trace:
[   33.067628]  ? madvise_free_pte_range+0x720/0x720
[   33.067632]  ? smaps_pte_range+0x4b0/0x4b0
[   33.067634]  walk_pgd_range+0x325/0x720
[   33.067637]  ? mt_find+0x1d6/0x3a0
[   33.067641]  ? mt_find+0x1d6/0x3a0
[   33.067643]  __walk_page_range+0x164/0x170
[   33.067646]  walk_page_range+0xf9/0x170
[   33.067648]  ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x2a8/0x340
[   33.067653]  pagemap_read+0x124/0x280
[   33.067658]  ? default_llseek+0x101/0x160
[   33.067662]  ? smaps_account+0x1d0/0x1d0
[   33.067664]  vfs_read+0x90/0x290
[   33.067667]  ? do_madvise.part.0+0x24b/0x390
[   33.067669]  ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x20
[   33.067673]  ksys_pread64+0x58/0x90
[   33.067675]  __ia32_sys_ia32_pread64+0x1b/0x20
[   33.067680]  __do_fast_syscall_32+0x4c/0xc0
[   33.067683]  do_fast_syscall_32+0x29/0x60
[   33.067686]  do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20
[   33.067689]  entry_SYSENTER_32+0x98/0xf1

Decrease the indentation level of SWP_PFN_BITS and SWP_PFN_MASK to keep it
readable and consistent.

[david@redhat.com: rely on sizeof(phys_addr_t) and min_t() instead]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221206105737.69478-1-david@redhat.com
[david@redhat.com: use "int" for comparison, as we're only comparing numbers < 64]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1f157500-2676-7cef-a84e-9224ed64e540@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221205150857.167583-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 0d206b5 ("mm/swap: add swp_offset_pfn() to fetch PFN from swap entry")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Gnurou pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 16, 2022
For dax pud, pud_huge() returns true on x86. So the function works as long
as hugetlb is configured. However, dax doesn't depend on hugetlb.
Commit 414fd08 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") fixed
devmap-backed huge PMDs, but missed devmap-backed huge PUDs. Fix this as
well.

This fixes the below kernel panic:

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x69e7c000cc478: 0000 [#1] SMP
	< snip >
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_user_pages_fast+0x1f/0x40
iov_iter_get_pages+0xc6/0x3b0
? mempool_alloc+0x5d/0x170
bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4e0
? bvec_alloc+0x91/0xc0
? bio_alloc_bioset+0x19a/0x2a0
blkdev_direct_IO+0x282/0x480
? __io_complete_rw_common+0xc0/0xc0
? filemap_range_has_page+0x82/0xc0
generic_file_direct_write+0x9d/0x1a0
? inode_update_time+0x24/0x30
__generic_file_write_iter+0xbd/0x1e0
blkdev_write_iter+0xb4/0x150
? io_import_iovec+0x8d/0x340
io_write+0xf9/0x300
io_issue_sqe+0x3c3/0x1d30
? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x6c/0x80
__io_queue_sqe+0x33/0x240
? fget+0x76/0xa0
io_submit_sqes+0xe6a/0x18d0
? __fget_light+0xd1/0x100
__x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x199/0x880
? __context_tracking_enter+0x1f/0x70
? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x30
? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
? __context_tracking_exit+0xe/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fc97c11a7be
	< snip >
</TASK>
---[ end trace 48b2e0e67debcaeb ]---
RIP: 0010:internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x340/0x990
	< snip >
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1670392853-28252-1-git-send-email-ssengar@linux.microsoft.com
Fixes: 414fd08 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax")
Signed-off-by: John Starks <jostarks@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Saurabh Sengar <ssengar@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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6 participants