kernel/sysctl.c: fix out-of-bounds access when setting file-max

commit 9002b21465fa4d829edfc94a5a441005cffaa972 upstream.

Commit 32a5ad9c2285 ("sysctl: handle overflow for file-max") hooked up
min/max values for the file-max sysctl parameter via the .extra1 and
.extra2 fields in the corresponding struct ctl_table entry.

Unfortunately, the minimum value points at the global 'zero' variable,
which is an int.  This results in a KASAN splat when accessed as a long
by proc_doulongvec_minmax on 64-bit architectures:

  | BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x5d8/0x6a0
  | Read of size 8 at addr ffff2000133d1c20 by task systemd/1
  |
  | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3-00012-g40b114779944 Roynas-Android-Playground#2
  | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  | Call trace:
  |  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x228
  |  show_stack+0x14/0x20
  |  dump_stack+0xe8/0x124
  |  print_address_description+0x60/0x258
  |  kasan_report+0x140/0x1a0
  |  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x18/0x20
  |  __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x5d8/0x6a0
  |  proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x4c/0x78
  |  proc_sys_call_handler.isra.19+0x144/0x1d8
  |  proc_sys_write+0x34/0x58
  |  __vfs_write+0x54/0xe8
  |  vfs_write+0x124/0x3c0
  |  ksys_write+0xbc/0x168
  |  __arm64_sys_write+0x68/0x98
  |  el0_svc_common+0x100/0x258
  |  el0_svc_handler+0x48/0xc0
  |  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
  |
  | The buggy address belongs to the variable:
  |  zero+0x0/0x40
  |
  | Memory state around the buggy address:
  |  ffff2000133d1b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa
  |  ffff2000133d1b80: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa
  | >ffff2000133d1c00: fa fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
  |                                ^
  |  ffff2000133d1c80: fa fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
  |  ffff2000133d1d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Fix the splat by introducing a unsigned long 'zero_ul' and using that
instead.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403153409.17307-1-will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: 32a5ad9c2285 ("sysctl: handle overflow for file-max")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

kernel/sysctl.c

@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static int zero;
 static int __maybe_unused one = 1;
 static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
 static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
+static unsigned long zero_ul;
 static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
 static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX;
 static int one_hundred = 100;
@@ -1764,7 +1765,7 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(files_stat.max_files),
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
-		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra1		= &zero_ul,
 		.extra2		= &long_max,
 	},
 	{