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OSOE-769: Trigger validate-pull-request on pull_request_target #314
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WalkthroughWalkthroughThe modifications across various GitHub Actions workflows and actions aim to enhance automation around pull requests, particularly those originating from forks. By switching triggers from Changes
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Wouldn't these changes prevent our team members from testing their own PRs' changes to the |
Yes, for testing those you'd need to change the trigger. There's unfortunately no way around this. |
OK, I'm trying to picture in my head what the effect of this will be exactly. If all the triggers are updated, including For example, if I work on the Can this be circumvented by making changes (with malicious intent to extract a secret/token) by opening a second PR that targets my first one with the bad code? |
Those changes won't be possible to test without doing anything, but will be possible to test after changing the workflow's trigger from I guess so, yes, an external actor can open a PR targeting an issue branch that has the The point of these changes is to allow running Validate Pull Request right when opening the PR (i.e. without anybody clicking the "Approve and run" button there) even for external contributors. This wouldn't be safely possible with |
OK, thanks, this was the missing piece for me. |
Fixes #304
OSOE-769