AutoGDB focused on combining the power of ChatGPT on reverse-engineering, binary-exploitation jobs. This project includes:
/pluginthe plugin that your gdb needs to connect to your server/serverfastapi backend server, use to deal with your information and gpts, acts like a bridge between/autogdbautogdb pip package
Watch AutoGDB Introduction!!!: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYpdtcC71gg
If you are new to AutoGDB, clone our project first!
git clone https://github.com/retr0reg/AutoGDB.git && cd AutoGDB
chmod +x ./install.sh && ./install.sh
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txtinstall.sh will add plugin/gpt.py in to your ~/.gdbinit as a gdb plugin; Or you can do it by editing ~/.gdbinit manually;
echo "/YOUR/PATH/TO/autogdb/plugin/gpt.py" >> ~/.gdbinitIn you gdb or pwndbg, You can run:
pwndbg> autogdb <YOUR_SERVER_IP> <YOUR_SERVER_PORT>YOUR_SERVER_IP: Your ip for the backend serverYOUR_SERVER_PORT: Port for this server
Run chat.py, and chat with your own AutoGDB!
python3 chat.py
usage: AutoGDB [-h] [--serverless] [--clue CLUE] [--clean-history]
Enable GPT in your reversing job with GDB.
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--serverless Run AutoGDB without bulit-in server
--clue CLUE Possible provided clues or helpful description of this challenge?
--clean-history Clear previous commandline history of AutoGDB.
If you want to develop our project, check out our wonderful and written-with-heart autogdb_demo.py, it explains everything! run it by python3 autogdb_demo.py
In gdb, make sure first to run the program and Ctrl-C to stop, then enter the autogdb command
here's one wonderful example of analysis made by GPT4, OpenAI
> Entering new AgentExecutor chain...
To determine if the binary has a vulnerability, I need to start by analyzing the binary with GDB to check for any obvious signs of insecure patterns or practices such as unsafe functions, lack of bounds checking, or any other potential security weaknesses.
Action: gdb
Action Input: info functions
Observation: "All defined functions:\n\nNon-debugging symbols:\n0x0000000000000610 _init\n0x0000000000000640 printf@plt\n0x0000000000000650 read@plt\n0x0000000000000660 strcmp@plt\n0x0000000000000670 setvbuf@plt\n0x0000000000000680 __cxa_finalize@plt\n0x0000000000000690 _start\n0x00000000000006c0 deregister_tm_clones\n0x0000000000000700 register_tm_clones\n0x0000000000000750 __do_global_dtors_aux\n0x0000000000000790 frame_dummy\n0x000000000000079a main\n0x0000000000000830 __libc_csu_init\n0x00000000000008a0 __libc_csu_fini\n0x00000000000008a4 _fini\n"
Thought:The list of functions provided does not immediately suggest a vulnerability, as these are standard functions that one might expect to find in a binary. However, the presence of functions like `printf` and `read` could potentially be of interest, as they can be involved in vulnerabilities if not used correctly (e.g., format string vulnerabilities or buffer overflows). To proceed, I should examine the `main` function to understand how these functions are used within the program.
Action: gdb
Action Input: disassemble main
Observation: "Dump of assembler code for function main:\n 0x000000000000079a <+0>:\tpush rbp\n 0x000000000000079b <+1>:\tmov rbp,rsp\n 0x000000000000079e <+4>:\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x20087b] # 0x201020 <stdout@@GLIBC_2.2.5>\n 0x00000000000007a5 <+11>:\tmov ecx,0x0\n 0x00000000000007aa <+16>:\tmov edx,0x2\n 0x00000000000007af <+21>:\tmov esi,0x0\n 0x00000000000007b4 <+26>:\tmov rdi,rax\n 0x00000000000007b7 <+29>:\tcall 0x670 <setvbuf@plt>\n 0x00000000000007bc <+34>:\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x20086d] # 0x201030 <stdin@@GLIBC_2.2.5>\n 0x00000000000007c3 <+41>:\tmov ecx,0x0\n 0x00000000000007c8 <+46>:\tmov edx,0x2\n 0x00000000000007cd <+51>:\tmov esi,0x0\n 0x00000000000007d2 <+56>:\tmov rdi,rax\n 0x00000000000007d5 <+59>:\tcall 0x670 <setvbuf@plt>\n 0x00000000000007da <+64>:\tmov edx,0x64\n 0x00000000000007df <+69>:\tlea rsi,[rip+0x20085a] # 0x201040 <buf>\n 0x00000000000007e6 <+76>:\tmov edi,0x0\n 0x00000000000007eb <+81>:\tmov eax,0x0\n 0x00000000000007f0 <+86>:\tcall 0x650 <read@plt>\n 0x00000000000007f5 <+91>:\tlea rsi,[rip+0xb8] # 0x8b4\n 0x00000000000007fc <+98>:\tlea rdi,[rip+0x20083d] # 0x201040 <buf>\n 0x0000000000000803 <+105>:\tcall 0x660 <strcmp@plt>\n 0x0000000000000808 <+110>:\ttest eax,eax\n 0x000000000000080a <+112>:\tjne 0x813 <main+121>\n 0x000000000000080c <+114>:\tmov eax,0x0\n 0x0000000000000811 <+119>:\tjmp 0x826 <main+140>\n 0x0000000000000813 <+121>:\tlea rdi,[rip+0x200826] # 0x201040 <buf>\n 0x000000000000081a <+128>:\tmov eax,0x0\n 0x000000000000081f <+133>:\tcall 0x640 <printf@plt>\n 0x0000000000000824 <+138>:\tjmp 0x7da <main+64>\n 0x0000000000000826 <+140>:\tpop rbp\n 0x0000000000000827 <+141>:\tret \nEnd of assembler dump.\n"
Thought:The disassembled main function shows several key operations. The program is setting up buffer handling with `setvbuf` for both `stdin` and `stdout`, which is a normal operation to control buffering. It then reads up to 0x64 (100) bytes from file descriptor 0 (which is `stdin` in Unix-like systems) into a buffer located at `0x201040`. After reading the input, it compares this buffer with a string located at an offset from the current instruction pointer (the address is not shown in the disassembly but is referenced as `0x8b4`). If the `strcmp` result is zero (meaning the strings are equal), it takes one branch; otherwise, it prints the buffer using `printf` and then loops back to read more input.
The use of `read` with a fixed size is not immediately indicative of a buffer overflow, as we don't know the actual size of the buffer at `0x201040`. However, the use of `printf` with the buffer as a format string is potentially dangerous because if the buffer contains format specifiers (e.g., `%s`, `%x`), they could be used to leak memory contents or cause a crash, which indicates a format string vulnerability.
To confirm the size of the buffer and see if there is a potential for buffer overflow, I need to examine the memory layout of the program, specifically the `.bss` section where uninitialized data like buffers are typically stored.
Action: gdb
Action Input: info variables
Observation: "All defined variables:\n\nNon-debugging symbols:\n0x00000000000008b0 _IO_stdin_used\n0x00000000000008c0 __GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR\n0x0000000000000a04 __FRAME_END__\n0x0000000000200da0 __frame_dummy_init_array_entry\n0x0000000000200da0 __init_array_start\n0x0000000000200da8 __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry\n0x0000000000200da8 __init_array_end\n0x0000000000200db0 _DYNAMIC\n0x0000000000200fa0 _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_\n0x0000000000201000 __data_start\n0x0000000000201000 data_start\n0x0000000000201008 __dso_handle\n0x0000000000201010 __TMC_END__\n0x0000000000201010 __bss_start\n0x0000000000201010 _edata\n0x0000000000201020 stdout\n0x0000000000201020 stdout@@GLIBC_2.2.5\n0x0000000000201030 stdin\n0x0000000000201030 stdin@@GLIBC_2.2.5\n0x0000000000201038 completed\n0x0000000000201040 buf\n0x00000000002010a8 _end\n"
Thought:The `info variables` command in GDB lists global and static variables, including those in the `.bss` section. The buffer `buf` is located at `0x201040`, and the next variable `completed` is at `0x201038`. This suggests that the buffer `buf` is located just before `completed`. The difference in addresses between `buf` and `_end` (which marks the end of the `.bss` section) is `0x10a8 - 0x1040 = 0x68` bytes (104 bytes in decimal).
This is a critical observation: the `read` function is called with a length of `0x64` (100 bytes), and the buffer `buf` is 104 bytes long. Therefore, there is no direct buffer overflow vulnerability since the `read` call does not exceed the size of the buffer. However, there is very little space for a null terminator, and if the input does not contain a null byte, this could lead to issues with string handling, although this is not confirmed from the current information.
The potential format string vulnerability identified earlier is still a concern because the `printf` function is called with the buffer as the format string. If an attacker can control the contents of the buffer and include format specifiers, they could exploit this vulnerability.
To confirm the format string vulnerability, I should check the arguments passed to `printf`. If the buffer is directly used as the format string without any additional arguments, this would confirm the vulnerability.
Action: gdb
Action Input: disassemble main
Observation: "Dump of assembler code for function main:\n 0x000000000000079a <+0>:\tpush rbp\n 0x000000000000079b <+1>:\tmov rbp,rsp\n 0x000000000000079e <+4>:\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x20087b] # 0x201020 <stdout@@GLIBC_2.2.5>\n 0x00000000000007a5 <+11>:\tmov ecx,0x0\n 0x00000000000007aa <+16>:\tmov edx,0x2\n 0x00000000000007af <+21>:\tmov esi,0x0\n 0x00000000000007b4 <+26>:\tmov rdi,rax\n 0x00000000000007b7 <+29>:\tcall 0x670 <setvbuf@plt>\n 0x00000000000007bc <+34>:\tmov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x20086d] # 0x201030 <stdin@@GLIBC_2.2.5>\n 0x00000000000007c3 <+41>:\tmov ecx,0x0\n 0x00000000000007c8 <+46>:\tmov edx,0x2\n 0x00000000000007cd <+51>:\tmov esi,0x0\n 0x00000000000007d2 <+56>:\tmov rdi,rax\n 0x00000000000007d5 <+59>:\tcall 0x670 <setvbuf@plt>\n 0x00000000000007da <+64>:\tmov edx,0x64\n 0x00000000000007df <+69>:\tlea rsi,[rip+0x20085a] # 0x201040 <buf>\n 0x00000000000007e6 <+76>:\tmov edi,0x0\n 0x00000000000007eb <+81>:\tmov eax,0x0\n 0x00000000000007f0 <+86>:\tcall 0x650 <read@plt>\n 0x00000000000007f5 <+91>:\tlea rsi,[rip+0xb8] # 0x8b4\n 0x00000000000007fc <+98>:\tlea rdi,[rip+0x20083d] # 0x201040 <buf>\n 0x0000000000000803 <+105>:\tcall 0x660 <strcmp@plt>\n 0x0000000000000808 <+110>:\ttest eax,eax\n 0x000000000000080a <+112>:\tjne 0x813 <main+121>\n 0x000000000000080c <+114>:\tmov eax,0x0\n 0x0000000000000811 <+119>:\tjmp 0x826 <main+140>\n 0x0000000000000813 <+121>:\tlea rdi,[rip+0x200826] # 0x201040 <buf>\n 0x000000000000081a <+128>:\tmov eax,0x0\n 0x000000000000081f <+133>:\tcall 0x640 <printf@plt>\n 0x0000000000000824 <+138>:\tjmp 0x7da <main+64>\n 0x0000000000000826 <+140>:\tpop rbp\n 0x0000000000000827 <+141>:\tret \nEnd of assembler dump.\n"
Thought:The re-examination of the `main` function's disassembly confirms that the `printf` call at address `0x081f` uses the buffer at `0x201040` directly as the format string (`rdi` register holds the first argument to functions in the x86_64 calling convention, which is the format string for `printf`). There are no additional arguments being pushed onto the stack or loaded into registers for this `printf` call, which means that any format specifiers in the buffer will be interpreted by `printf` and could potentially be exploited.
Given this information, it is clear that the binary has a format string vulnerability because it uses uncontrolled input as the format string for `printf`. This could allow an attacker to read from or write to memory locations, depending on the contents of the format string they provide.
Thought: I now know the final answer.
Final Answer: The binary has a format string vulnerability due to the use of an uncontrolled buffer as the format string argument for `printf`.
> Finished chain.After the AutoGDB1.2 Version, Serverside-settings will be done within the chat.py, if you have problems with AutoGDB server, you may run python3 chat.py --serverless in serverless mode, with ip and ports in .server_cache_autogdb.json
The Server-side of AutoGDB can be pull and used by using docker;
docker pull retr0regd/autogdb-server:latest
docker run -p 5000:5000 retr0regd/autogdb-server:latestAfter this, the server will be running on 5000 port in 127.0.0.1
Or you may simply use python3 to install:
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt && chmod +x ./run.shafter installing requirements, you can run the server by ./run.sh